USA v. APONTE, ET AL.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
EDWIN APONTE
CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 25-227-1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Edwin Aponte (“Aponte”) has been charged for his alleged involvement in the
June 3, 2024 carjacking and kidnapping of D.P. and R.G. with one count of federal carjacking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and 2; two counts of federal kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1201(a) and 2; and one count of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. Some of the evidence against Aponte was obtained
through a search of his cell phone, and he now moves to suppress this evidence, arguing that the
warrant application authorizing that search was defective because it: (1) contained a serious
misstatement of fact; and, (2) was fatally overbroad. For the reasons that follow Aponte’s
Motion will be denied.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2024, D.P. and R.G. were lured to Philadelphia, robbed at gunpoint, abducted,
and ultimately abandoned in a cemetery with their hands zip-tied and their heads covered.
In an interview after-the-fact, D.P. explained the context for the events of that day as
follows: it started with a number of skill machines1 he had listed for sale on Facebook
1 A “skill machine” is an electronic gaming device resembling a traditional slot machine but incorporating a
component in which a player’s skill affects the outcome of the game. See 4 Pa. C.S. § 1103 (defining a “skill slot
machine” as one in which “the skill of the player, rather than the element of chance,” predominates in determining
the outcome); In re Three Pa. Skill Amusement Devices, 358 A.3d 385, 394-95 (Pa. 2026) (describing the devices as
resembling slot machines while incorporating a skill component).
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Marketplace. After being contacted by a prospective buyer and receiving a deposit on June 2,
2024, the next day, D.P. and his father-in-law, R.G., drove to Philadelphia in a U-Haul with the
machines to complete the sale. When they arrived, they met with two men in a red Chevrolet
SUV who identified themselves as the buyers. The men directed D.P. and R.G. to follow them to
another location, purportedly to deliver the machines and collect the remaining purchase price.
But after parking the U-Haul, a black Jeep Cherokee pulled up and two men in ski masks, armed
with handguns, got out. They bound D.P.’s hands behind his back with zip ties, put a bag over
his head, took his cellphone, wallet, and necklace, and forced him into the Jeep. And then they
did the same to R.G. The men drove them a short distance and then ordered D.P. and R.G. out of
the vehicle and told them to walk away. Once he heard the Jeep drive off, D.P. removed the bag
from his head to discover they had been left in a cemetery.
Working from a description of the red Chevrolet and its occupants, the Philadelphia
Police were able to identify the vehicle and its driver, Jose Polanco-Lopez (“Polanco-Lopez”).
Polanco-Lopez told police that a friend had recruited him to help recover a stolen skill machine.
He further explained that he had connected that friend with a man known as “Cano” or “Rojo”—
later identified as Aponte through an Instagram photo—and that “Cano” was the owner of the
black Jeep involved in the incident.
Investigators were also able to obtain surveillance footage, allowing them to track the
paths of the U-Haul, Chevrolet, and Jeep, and the routes that took them from the initial meet up
location, to the cemetery, and then back to Kensington Avenue. The footage then showed a
person who the government identifies as Aponte parking and exiting the driver’s seat of the Jeep
with the keys, locking it, then talking on his cell phone before meeting up with some of the other
individuals allegedly involved in the kidnapping and robbery.
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Police arrested Aponte on an unrelated matter and questioned him about the June 3
robbery and abduction. Aponte told detectives that a person he knew as “JR”—whom he
subsequently identified as Polanco-Lopez—had asked for his help retrieving one of the
machines. According to Aponte, he merely put JR in contact with others who could assist but
was otherwise uninvolved. During that interview, however, Aponte identified himself in
surveillance images taken on the day of the robbery, including an image showing him in
possession of the Jeep’s keys. Based on that information, Aponte’s cell phone was seized, and
officers sought, and obtained, a warrant to search its contents.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides
that “no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Aponte’s Motion implicates two requirements of the Warrant Clause: that a
warrant be supported by oath or affirmation and that it particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
To satisfy the oath requirement, a search warrant must be supported by an oath or
affirmation by a law enforcement agent, generally in the form of a sworn affidavit. United States
v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 662 (3d Cir. 2011). Although such affidavits are entitled to a
presumption of validity, a criminal defendant may challenge the veracity of the statements
contained therein. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 171 (1978). To bring this
challenge, the defendant must satisfy a two-part test. Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399
(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). First, he must make a “substantial
preliminary showing” that (1) “the affidavit contained a false statement, which was made
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knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth;” and, (2) the statement was “material to the
finding of probable cause.” United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399). If that showing is made, the defendant is entitled to a Franks
hearing. And if, and only if, at that hearing he then proves both elements by a preponderance of
the evidence, “the fruits of the search [are] excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was
lacking on the face of the affidavit.” United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).
The particularity requirement—the “touchstone of a warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d
232, 239 (3d Cir. 2004)—guards against unbridled government discretion in the execution of a
search by barring overbroad and general warrants, United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four
Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.).
A general warrant “vest[s] the executing officers with unbridled discretion to conduct an
exploratory rummaging” for evidence of crime. Id. (quoting United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d
749, 753 (3d Cir. 1982). “An overly broad warrant ‘describe[s] in both specific and inclusive
generic terms what is to be seized,’” yet still authorize the seizure of items for which probable
cause is lacking. Id. (quoting. Christine, 687 F.2d at 755-54). While a true general warrant
requires total suppression of the fruits of the search, Christine, 687 F.2d at 758, an overly broad
warrant may be remedied by only the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to those portions
of the warrant unsupported by probable cause. Ninety-Two Thousand, 307 F.3d at 149.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Oath Requirement
Aponte’s first challenge, brought pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 155-56, is
to a supposed misstatement in the probable cause affidavit. He argues that, because the license
plate of the black Jeep was not visible in all of the surveillance footage to trace the vehicle’s
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route, the use of the definite article “the” incorrectly “led the magistrate to believe that the black
Jeep that was seen entering the cemetery was the same one seen earlier in close proximity to the
u-Haul truck.”2
Even assuming for present purposes that the statement was false,3 Aponte has failed to
make the requisite “substantial preliminary showing” that the affiant made that statement to
deliberately deceive the magistrate or with a reckless disregard for the truth.4 See Franks, 438
U.S. at 164-65 (explaining that “truthful” does not mean “that every fact recited in the warrant
affidavit is necessarily correct” but that “the information put forth is believed or appropriately
accepted by the affiant as true”); United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1993)
(inaccuracies in the affidavit did not support an inference that officer was recklessly or
deliberately untruthful); see also United States v. Stanford, 75 F.4th 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2023)
(“even substantiated assertions of mere negligent misrepresentation don't suffice”). Aponte may
not “rest on mere conclusory allegations or a ‘mere desire to cross-examine.’” United States v.
Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383 n.8). For his challenge to
2 The warrant affidavit states, in relevant part:
Several cameras capture the involved vehicles, along with the complainant’s U-Haul, including the route
the offenders take to the initial meeting location from Kensington, arrival to the cemetery and return to
Kensington Ave. Cameras capture the tag of the Jeep as PA MGP -7721. The black Jeep is captured
entering the cemetery where the complainants were dropped off and then exiting the cemetery. The black
Jeep is then observed returning to Kensington Ave and parking on the 500 block of Hart Lane. Aponte is
seen on camera exiting from the driver seat, with the keys and locking the vehicle.
3 The record does not necessarily establish actual falsity. If detectives reviewed multiple cameras depicting a black
Jeep traveling along the relevant route, entering and leaving locations at times consistent with a continuous journey,
and ultimately arriving where the defendant was observed exiting the driver’s seat, describing the vehicle throughout
the narrative as “the black Jeep” may simply reflect the investigators’ inference from the sequence of footage that it
was the same vehicle. The fact that a particular camera angle did not show the license plate does not conclusively
establish otherwise.
4 “[A]ssertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer has obvious reasons to doubt the truth
of what he or she is asserting.” See United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Wilson v.
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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proceed, he “must present an offer of proof contradicting the affidavit, including materials such
as sworn affidavits or otherwise reliable statements from witnesses.” Id. Aponte offers no such
proof from which it could be inferred that Rosenbaum deliberately misled the issuing judge or
recklessly disregarded the truth, and thus his Franks challenge does not get off the ground.
Nor does Aponte establish that this supposed misstatement is material to the finding of
probable cause. Under Franks, if, after the challenged material is set aside, “there remains
sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is
required.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances suggests that “there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). It is a “fluid concept” that turns on “the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts.” United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232). The inquiry, therefore, looks to the “whole picture,”
recognizing that “the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts
are viewed in isolation.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 60-61 (2018); see also
Cummings v. City of Philadelphia, 137 F. App’x 504, 506 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In assessing whether
probable cause exists, the inculpatory evidence should be weighed against the exculpatory
evidence to determine whether a reasonable person would believe an offense has been committed
by the suspect.”).
So, excising the offending “the” and replacing it with Aponte’s proposed formulation—
that a black Jeep was seen entering the cemetery—the affidavit would still contain sufficient
inculpatory information linking him to the carjacking to support a finding of probable cause. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (probable cause requires “only the probability, and not a prima facie
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showing, of criminal activity.”). A coconspirator linked the Jeep involved in the offense and
Aponte, and implicated him in arranging the retrieval of the skill machines. Surveillance footage
showed Aponte speaking with other participants in the aftermath of the offense. And Aponte
himself admitted that he had been asked to assist in retrieving the machines and identified
himself in a surveillance still taken after he had parked a black Jeep. Thus, even if the cemetery
footage did not conclusively establish that the particular Jeep associated with Aponte entered the
cemetery, the affidavit still placed him in possession and control of a matching vehicle
immediately after the robbery, connected him to the other participants, and included his own
admission that he helped facilitate the effort to recover the property at the center of the scheme.
B. Particularity Requirement
If probable cause establishes the basis for a search, particularity defines its permissible
scope. Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 392-93; see also Groody, 361 F.3d at 239 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining
that a warrant must be “sufficiently definite and clear so that the magistrate, police, and search
subjects can objectively ascertain its scope”). “Whether a warrant is sufficiently particularized
turns on the nexus between the evidence to be sought or seized and the alleged offenses.” United
States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 394). The degree of
specificity required for that analysis depends upon “the particular factual context of each case
and also the information available to the investigating agent that could limit the search at the
time the warrant application is given to the magistrate.” Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 395.
Aponte argues that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement because it was overly broad in that it “gave no specific details as to how [his] cell
phone was connected to this crime” and “failed to cabin the scope of the search to the evidence
for which probable cause was actually established.” In his view, because the affidavit did not
“establish that the phone itself was an instrumentality of the alleged offense, any search of the
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device’s contents exceeds the permissible scope.” (emphasis added). Although Aponte frames
his challenge in terms of overbreadth, his argument implicates two related but distinct questions:
whether there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the offenses would be found on his
cellphone at all, and, if so, whether the warrant sufficiently limited the scope of the authorized
search.
With respect to whether his phone should have been searched at all, Aponte’s argument
that the warrant affidavit fails to link his cell phone to the offenses does not withstand scrutiny. 5
To the contrary, the affidavit described how D.P. and R.G. were lured to Philadelphia through an
online transaction, how D.P. communicated with one of the defendants through Facebook, and
how a payment was made through a digital payment platform. It further explained that a
coconspirator put the person seeking to retrieve the skill machines “in contact” with Aponte and
that Aponte himself acknowledged that he had been asked to help and had connected that person
with others who could assist. The affidavit also detailed the coordinated conduct of the
occupants of two vehicles—one of which was allegedly driven by Aponte—during the robbery
and kidnapping. A coconspirator stated that he had received text message instructions during the
act, and most directly, the affidavit stated that surveillance footage captured Aponte speaking on
a cellphone in the direct aftermath of the crime before meeting up with the other participants.
The affidavit also explained why evidence of a jointly committed crime could appear in different
locations on a smartphone, including communications, location information, photographs, social-
media applications, and other stored data. Taken together with the case-specific facts, this linked
5 The Government argues that an officer’s training and experience may, standing alone, establish the requisite nexus,
relying on United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000). We need not consider this question in isolation
because the warrant at issue contains more than just the affiant’s assertion that—as Aponte puts it—“cell phones are
useful when investigating a crime.” The conclusions of the affiant are part of the totality of the circumstances and
are considered alongside the other facts set forth in the affidavit.
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the charged conduct to likely cell phone use, and therefore supplied a substantial basis to
conclude that there was a “fair probability” that evidence of the kidnapping and robbery would
be found on Aponte’s phone. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; cf. United States v. LaCosta-Franco,
828 F. Supp.3d 543, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2026) (Weilheimer, J.) (suppressing evidence obtained from a
cellphone warrant where the affidavit lacked offense-specific evidence linking the phones to the
charged crimes and explaining that “something in the way of objective information related to
Defendant’s phones is needed to buttress the officer’s training and experience”); United States v.
Williams, 813 F.Supp. 3d 503, 524-25 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (Weilheimer, J.) (finding no probable
cause where nothing beyond the officer’s “training and experience” suggested that the cellphone
contained evidence of the drug offense).
Regarding the scope of the cell phone search, Aponte also argues that the warrant
authorized an “unlimited ‘rummaging’ through the device’s contents.” But this argument also
fails.
In the context of electronic searches, the practical realities of digital storage may require
“a broad, expansive search” to locate evidence within the scope of the warrant because electronic
files can be hidden, mislabeled, or manipulated. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237 (3d
Cir. 2011). Thus, “when a search requires review of a large collection of items,” some innocuous
material will necessarily be examined, at least cursorily, to determine whether it falls within the
warrant’s authorization. Id. at 234 (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11
(1976)); see also United States v. Karrer, 460 F. App’x 157, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2012)
(nonprecedential) (holding that a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of electronic devices
was not overbroad “simply because the devices and files it authorized to be searched and seized
were likely to include materials unrelated” to the offense); United States v. Vetri, 811 F. App’x
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79, 82 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (explaining that law enforcement may conduct “a cursory
review of all electronic files”).
Consistent with those principles, warrants may describe the objects of a search in
“specific and inclusive generic terms,” Christine, 687 F.2d at 753, including categories of
electronic information, so long as the warrant sufficiently limits the search to evidence of
identified criminal conduct. See Bansal, 663 F.3d at 662 (rejecting a challenge to a warrant
authorizing search of email where it “particularly described several categories of records:
information on accounts, billing, payment, and ‘stored electronic information or files’ associated
with [defendant]’s email accounts”). Courts in this Circuit have rejected particularity challenges
to cell-phone warrants where the warrant identified the device to be searched, specified the
categories of electronic information subject to search, and limited the search to evidence of
identified criminal conduct. See United States v. Murphy, 2024 WL 3440149, at *12-14 (D.N.J.
July 17, 2024); United States v. Reese, 2021 WL 4429429, at *4-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021);
United States v. Dewald, 361 F. Supp. 3d 413, 418-19, 421-22 (M.D. Pa. 2019).
The warrant here did precisely that. It identified the “place” to be searched as a “[b]lack
[c]ellphone in a black and green case,” and although it identified numerous categories of
potentially searchable electronic data—including messages, emails, photographs, videos, call
logs, location information, internet history, and application data—it expressly limited the items
to be searched for and seized as “the evidence or fruits or motive or planning or modus operandi
related to the June 3, 2024 Kidnapping and Armed Robbery of complainants ‘D.P’ and ‘R.G.’”
See United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1208 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he phrases in a search warrant
must be read in context and not in isolation.”). It then further identified the kinds of evidence
sought: evidence concerning the planning or commission of only these offenses, communications
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concerning them, the identity of the device’s relevant users, the geographic and chronological
context of the device’s use, the user’s state of mind, the identities of persons communicating with
the device concerning the offenses, motive, and the identities of coconspirators or aiders and
abettors. That is enough to cabin the search and the discretion of the executing officers. See
Stabile, 633 F.3d at 234, 237; Christine, 687 F.2d at 753.6
***
Because Aponte has not made a “substantial preliminary showing” that the supporting
affidavit contained a material falsehood, and the warrant particularly described the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, his motion shall be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:
S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE
_______________________________
WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J.
6 The Government argues that even if the search warrant was overbroad, the evidence it yielded is nonetheless
admissible under the good faith exception. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Because the warrant
was not overbroad, the Court declines to consider whether the good faith exception applies here.
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