USA v. Soto

THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.
WALNEL MORDAN SOTO
3:26-CR-171
(JUDGE MARIANI)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant Walnel Mordan Soto 's Motion to Revoke Detention
Order and fo r Pretrial Release (Doc. 16) , which follows the Court 's August 25, 2026 Order of
Detention (Doc. 14). For the reasons that follow , the Court will DENY Defendant's Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Walnel Mordan Soto ("Defendant " or "Soto ") is a citizen of the Dominican
Repub lic, allegedly without lawful presence in the United States. 	(Doc. 20 at 1). 	Soto was
indicted by a grand jury on August 5, 2026 with one count of illegal reentry pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a). 	(See Doc. 1). 	Soto was previously removed from the United States in
2016, and the Government alleges he re-entered without authorization at an unknown point
thereafter under the alias "Lewis Jose Mordan Soto ." (Doc . 20 at 1- 2) . Soto appeared before
the Honorable Leo A. Latella on August 25 , 2026 , and pleaded not guilty to the charge aga inst
him. 	(Doc. 12) . Magistrate Judge Latella then held a detention hearing and ordered Soto
detained pending trial. 	(Doc. 14). 1 Although Defendant is presently in pre-trial detention as
1 Mag istrate Judge Latella found Defendant should be deta ined pending trial because : (1 ) the we ight
of evidence against the Defendant is strong ; (2) Defendant lacks sign ificant family or other ties to the
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a result of his pending criminal charges, he is also subject to an active ICE detainer and a
reinstated final order of removal. 	(Doc. 17 at 2). 	Defendant does not dispute that he will be
immediately and properly re-detained by ICE if he is ordered released. 	(Id. at 1).
Defendant 	contends 	that 	his 	Detention 	Order 	must 	be 	revoked 	because 	the
Government failed to make a threshold showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
there was "a serious risk that [Defendant] will flee," pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(D. (Doc. 17
at 1-2) . 	If the Government did not make such a threshold showing upon moving for
Defendant's detention , no hearing should have been held in the first instance, according to
Defendant. 	(Id.). 	Defendant argues that because he will be immediately and properly
detained by ICE upon his release from pre-trial detention, there is no serious risk of his flight.
(Id. at 5). The Government responds that it demonstrated Defendant was a serious flight risk
and further argues that the Court "must assess the defendant's risk of nonappearance under
§ 3142 without assuming what immigration authorities will do under a separate statutory and
regulatory regime." (Doc. 20 at 9).
community; (3) Defendant has significant family or other ties outside the United States ; (4) Defendant lacks
legal status in the United States ; (5) Defendant is subject to removal or deportation after serving any period
of incarceration ; (6) Defendant has previously used alias(es) or false documents; (7) Defendant has prior
criminal history ; (8) Defendant has prior violations of probation , parole , or supervised release; (9) Defendant
has participated in criminal activity while on probation, parole , or supervision . (Doc. 14) .
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A criminal defendant generally should not be detained pending trial except upon a
specific showing of the need to detain him or as required by statute. 	The Bail Reform Act
("BRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq., was enacted to advance this longstanding principle that
"liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception."
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also United States v. Soriano Nunez,
928 F.3d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting BRA "was enacted to ensure 'all persons, regardless
of their financial status , shall not needlessly be detained ... when detention serves neither the
ends of justice nor the public interest. "' (citing United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 87
n.13 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bail Reform Act of 19662, Pub. L. No. 89-465 § 2, 80 Stat. 214,
214 (1966)))).
Although the BRA begins with a presumption of release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), the
Act allows for pretrial detention in appropriate cases-namely, in cases involving certain
serious offenses (which are not applicable here), see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(D(1), and in cases
involving flight risk or danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(D(2). The BRA outlines
a two-step process to determine whether pre-trial detention is appropriate if the Government
contends a defendant poses a flight risk under § 3142(D(2). 	First, an attorney for the
Government or the Court, sua sponte, may move for a pre-trial detention hearing (see 18
2 The Bail Reform Act of 1966 has been partially repealed and replaced, and a presumption in favor
of release on bail for convicted defendants pending appeal is no longer applicable; however , the presumption
in favor of pre-trial release remains. 	See United States v. Diaz-Colon, 729 F. Supp . 3d 232, 236 (D.P .R.
2024), aff'd, 2024 WL 5074591 (1st Cir. July 8, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1110, 220 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2025).
3
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U.S.C. § 3142(D(2)); second, upon a showing that a pre-trial detention hearing is appropriate,
the Court must conduct the hearing.
At step one, the Court must find that the case involves:
(A) a serious risk that [the criminal defendant] will flee; or
(B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or
threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective
witness or juror .
18 U.S.C. § 3142(D(2). A finding that the defendant presents a serious risk of flight (allowing
a hearing) must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 	United States v. Him/er,
797 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court must make an "individualized" determination of
the criminal defendant's flight risk "at step one of the inquiry." See United States v. Gonzalez,
780 F. Supp. 3d 574, 582 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (citations omitted); see also United States v.
Sanchez, 2025 WL 2101964 , at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2025) (noting that "the Bail Reform Act
demands ... [an individualized assessment]"). 	The threshold inquiry of whether a pre-trial
detention hearing is appropriate "serves an important gate-keeping function, by preventing
even the opportunity to seek detention in all but a certain, narrow subset of cases." Sanchez,
2025 WL 2101964, at *3 (citation omitted).
If a preponderance of the evidence shows a defendant poses a serious flight risk, then
the Court conducts a pre-trial detention hearing and considers certain statutorily-provided
factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also Gonzalez, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (noting "at step
two, 	[the Government must] demonstrate that there is 'no condition 	or combination of
conditions [that] will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community' pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 	In making
4
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that determination, courts are instructed to consider the ... [factors] enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g) ." (citation omitted)). 	Although this is a two-step process, courts routinely conduct
both steps at a single hearing. 	See United States v. Cook, 87 F.4th 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2023)
(noting "the two inquiries, while not identical , substantially overlap" and affirming that "the
magistrate judge permissibly conducted the two inquiries in a single detention hearing").
The parties agree that the Court reviews a Defendant's detention order entered by a
magistrate judge de nova and makes "an independent determination" whether a detention
hearing was permitted. 	United States v. Delker , 757 F.2d 1390, 1394 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that BRA contemplated de nova determination by district court upon a party's motion to revoke
a release or detention order); see also 18 U.S.C . § 3145(b) ("If a person is ordered detained
by a magistrate judge ... the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over
the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order."). 	Nonetheless, the Court
need 	not 	conduct 	"an 	additional 	evidentiary 	hearing;" 	it 	"may 	make 	its 	independent
determination based solely upon the evidence introduced at the prior hearing " and any
evidentiary supplementation by the parties. 	Sanchez, 2025 WL 2101964, at *3 (quoting
United States v. Burgess, 2009 WL 2038148, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2009)). 	Because the
parties have not requested a new detention hearing, (see generally Docs. 16, 17, 20, and 21),
the Court will decide Defendant's Motion to Revoke Detention upon the existing evidentiary
record.
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Ill. ANALYSIS
The only issue before the Court is whether the Government carried its burden of
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant's case presented a "serious
risk " of flight.
Defendant strenuously argues that his active ICE detainer and imminent deportation
negate the otherwise copious evidence that he poses a serious flight risk. 	This issue has
been thoughtfully analyzed by dozens of courts , and the Court will not engage in a lengthy
recita l of those analyses.3 The common thread throughout these cases , though, is that the
mere existence of an active ICE detainer cannot unilaterally dictate the outcome of the
threshold flight -risk inquiry. 	See Sanchez, 2025 WL 2101964, at *5 ("If a defendant subject
to an ICE detainer is required to remain detained pending trial or sentencing , solely because
of that detainer , Congress's meticulously crafted detention framework under 18 U.S.C. § 3142
would , in effect , be overridden." (emphasis original)); United States v. Diaz-Garcia, 2025 WL
814359, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2025) ("Similarly, the facts that an individual is subject to an
ICE detainer and may not be released if he is transferred to ICE custody are insufficient
reasons to grant him pretrial release under the BRA. Rather, the Court is tasked with weighing
the evidence and conducting an individualized assessment[.]"); see also United States v.
Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming detention order because "the
totality of the evidence supports the district court 's ruling," despite defendant's active ICE
3 See United States v. Ai/on-Ai/on , 875 F.3d 1334 , 1337 (10th Cir . 2017) (col lecting distr ict court
cases) ; United States v. Gilbert-Perez, 2026 WL 1216756 , at *3 (M.D . Pa . May 4, 2026) (collect ing cases) ;
United States v. Diaz -Hernandez , 943 F.3d 1196 , 1199 (9th Cir . 2019) (affirming detention order) .
6
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detainer). Thus, the Court should conduct the threshold flight risk inquiry exactly as it normally
would, weighing the "the totality of the personal circumstances, family ties, associations, etc.,
and ... criminal history," without permitting the singular fact of an active ICE detainer to pre-
ordain any outcome or dispose of necessary evidentiary balancing. 	Sanchez, 2025 WL
2101964, at *6.
Although it is true that several courts have found an active ICE detainer mitigates a
criminal defendant's flight risk, 4 the Court concludes that an individualized analysis of Soto's
flight risk required the Magistrate Judge to conduct a detention hearing. 	In the present case,
the Government presented evidence that, in nearly any other case, would create a nearly
insurmountable showing of flight risk:
Soto has previously been convicted of narcotics offenses in Pennsylvania. He is
currently charged with driving under the influence in state court. He presented an alias
to authorities when he sustained that arrest and another arrest for theft and receiving
stolen 	property. 	He 	has 	significant 	ties 	to 	the 	Dominican 	Republic; 	that
notwithstanding, he has repeatedly disregard[ed] laws precluding him from entering
the United States without permission . The weight of the evidence [on his charges] is
strong.
(Doc. 20 at 11 ). 	Thus, on one side of the scale , the Court is confronted with Defendant's
undisputed5 history of disobeying court orders and statutes, using an alias to avoid detection,
4 See Ai/on-Ai/on , 875 F.3d at 1337 (stating that "a risk of involuntary removal does not establish a
'serious risk that [the defendant] will flee ' upon which pre-trial detention may be based "); United States v.
Gonzalez , 780 F. Supp. 3d 574, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (noting that "the plain meaning of 'flight' contemplates
volitional conduct " such that existence of ICE detainer cuts against serious risk of flight); see a/so Gilbert-
Perez , 2026 WL 1216756 at *4 ; United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088 , 1091 (9th Cir . 2015). Notably ,
with the exception of Gilbert-Perez , many of these cases faced an inverted posture: the Government argued
that a defendant shou ld be detained because an active ICE detainer created a serious flight risk. 	Here , of
course , the Defendant argues the inverse-that an active ICE detainer negates serious flight risk .
5 Although Defendant disputes the conclusion that no conditions of release could assure his
7
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and an absence of local ties . See Un ited States v. Hernandez-Us , 2025 WL 918695 , at *9
(W.D . Pa . Mar . 26 , 2025) ("Defendant's prior interactions with immigration authorities , most
notably his prior removal and subsequent re -entry to the United States without permission ,
calls into question his reliability and trustworthiness. " (citing Figueroa-Alvarez, 681 F. Supp .
3d 1131, 1144 (D. Idaho 2023), for the proposition that a non-citizen "defendant's illegal
reentry into the United States after removal is indicative of his or her general disregard for the
law and court order.")). 	At the initial deten tion 	hearing , the Magistrate Judge further
articulated that one of Soto's drug trafficking co nvictions related to a crime that occurred while
he was released on bond, demonstrating Soto's particular non -compliance with release
conditions. 	(Recording of August 25, 2026 Detention Hearing , United States v. Soto , Case
No. 3:26-cv-171 (on file with Court; transcript available upon request)). Soto has further "lived
without detection in the United States" for many years , and he faces a criminal charge carrying
up to 20 years in prison. (Id.). The record is thus replete with evidence that Defendant poses
a serious risk of flight, all of which the Court must consider given that § 3142 calls for a
balancing of the "totality" of the evidence . Sanchez , 2025 WL 2101964, at *6.
On the other side of the scale, there is no credible evidence to mitigate Defendant's
flight risk. 	Defendant has not presented evidence that he has local family ties, a job to
maintain, or property ownership, for example . 	See id . (noting noncitizen defendant "is the
primary caregiver for his son 	in 	the United 	States, 	maintains close 	relationships 	with
appearance in court , (see Doc . 21 at 2) , he does not appea r to dispute the verac ity of the evidence of flight
risk that the Government has advanced.
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[extended 	family], 	and 	has 	an 	extensive 	history of residence 	and 	employment in 	the
community, with both family members and employers attesting to his reliability and strong
character"). Defendant presents only the happenstance that ICE will, presumably, detain him
upon his release from pre-trial detention. 	That sole happenstance cannot single-handedly
negate a mountain of evidence that the Magistrate Judge rightly considered. 	See United
States v. Perez-Vasquez, 779 F. Supp. 3d 248 (N.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding Court may not
consider existence of active ICE detainer dispositive and finding detention hearing was
warranted by serious risk of flight).
Defendant encourages the Court to follow Gilbert-Perez, in which a criminal defendant
was found not to pose a serious flight risk because "the Government conceded that if released
from custody, ICE will almost certainly immediately take Gilbert-Perez into custody and initiate
removal proceedings." 	Gilbert-Perez , 2026 WL 1216756, at *3. 	No such concession is
present here. 	Given the fact-intensive nature of the flight-risk inquiry, the Court cannot find
that a defendant's active ICE detainer restricts the Court from conducting a detention hearing
at all. 	The holding in Gilbert-Perez, like the Court's holding here, should be limited to the
individualized facts of the criminal defendant before the court. 	Although an active ICE
detainer may provide one piece of evidence cutting against a finding of serious flight risk ,6 it
does not unilaterally negate a plethora of contrary evidence. 	This holding accords with
several courts that have conducted the same fact-intensive analysis and found that, despite
a defendant's active ICE detainer and imminent deportation , the totality of the evidence
6 See supra n. 4.
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showed he posed a serious risk of flight. 	See United States v. Phan, 2026 WL 601874, at
*16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2026) ("[A]fter carefully weighing all of the facts of record, the Court
concludes that the Government has sufficiently established by a preponderance of the
evidence that ... Defendant ... will flee[.]"); Hernandez-Us, 2025 WL 918695, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 26, 2025) (reversing Magistrate Judge's release order and finding non-citizen criminal
defendant posed flight risk despite active ICE detainer); accord Diaz-Garcia, 2025 WL
814359, at *11-12; Perez-Vasquez, 779 F. Supp. 3d 248; see a/so Sanchez, 2025 WL
2101964, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2025) (granting in part motion to revoke detention order
and ordering a new detention hearing).
This Court adopts the reasoning of the court in Sanchez. 	See supra p. 6. 	The
possibility or even the likelihood of a criminal defendant being detained by ICE does not
relieve or deprive this Court of its obligation to follow the carefully drafted requirements of the
BRA, in particular the its requirement that the Court determine whether a criminal defendant
is a flight risk under§ 3142(D.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that, notwithstanding Defendant's high likelihood of entering ICE
custody if he were released, the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that Defendant posed a serious risk of flight. 	Thus, a detention hearing was appropriately
conducted by the Magistrate Judge. 	Defendant's Motion to Revoke Detention Order is
DENIED. An appropriate Order follows.
United States District Judge
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