Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:26-cv-02902-RDM Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page1of6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EMANUEL DE JESUS RODRIGUEZ

Petitioner, 3:26-cv-2902

(JUDGE MARIANI)
V.
JESSICA SAGE, WARDEN OF oo FILED

FCI LEWISBURG . SCRANTON

OCT 15 2026

Respondent.

PER Cire,

MEMORANDUM OPINION DEPUTY CLERK

Before the Court is Petitioner Emanuel de Jesus Rodriguez's (“Petitioner”) pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against Respondent Jessica
Sage, Warden of FCI Lewisburg. (Doc. 1). For the reasons that follow, Petitioner's motion
will be granted, and the Court will order Petitioner's immediate release.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras residing in the United States since at least 2019,
(Doc. 7-2 at 2), filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 30, 2026.
(Doc. 1). Petitioner alleges he has been unlawfully detained by Respondent for more than
six (6) months without a bond hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Petitioner was first detained on
March 15, 2026, (see Doc. 7-2 at 1-2), when he was transferred to the custody of ICE after

he was arrested and charged with two misdemeanor counts of larceny and assault. (Doc.

Case 3:26-cv-02902-RDM Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page 2of6

7-2 at 3). At the time of his arrest, ICE noted that Petitioner “has been identified as an
individual with substantiated Laken Riley Act crimes” (id.)—i.e., a noncitizen subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1,
139 Stat 3 (2025) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to require mandatory detention of a
noncitizen who “is charged with ... larceny”). |

Contrary to Petitioner's allegations and ICE's initial documentation, Respondent now
alleges that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1226(c). (See Doc. 7 at
4-7 (“Thus, immigration officials oroperly detain Mr. Moreira-Rodriguez pursuant to
subsection 1226(a).”)). Although Petitioner has been charged with two misdemeanor
counts (larceny and assault) that are pending disposition, (Doc. 7-2 at 3), Respondent
argues throughout her response that she is authorized to detain Petitioner discretionarily
under § 1226(a), and she makes no mention of § 1226(c) except to distinguish Petitioner's
case from those cases involving mandatory detention. (See Doc. 7 at 4, 6). Towards this
end, on September 4, 2026, Respondent made an initial custody determination in
accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c), which necessarily indicates that Petitioner is detained
under § 1226(a), not the mandatory detention provisions of § 1226(c). See 8 C.F.R. §
236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer's
discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the [Immigration and

Nationality] Act, under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act” (emphasis

Case 3:26-cv-02902-RDM Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page 3of6

added)).1 Respondent further acknowledges that Petitioner has not been provided with a
bond hearing but purports the present petition should be denied for failure to exhaust |
administrative remedies because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing “through the
proper channels.” (Doc. 7 at 7).

ll. |§ STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent suspension, the Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas
corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art 1, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a
federal district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner's immigration detention
is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.” ILN.S. v. Si. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration
detainees seeking relief from their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas
corpus.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). It is well established that a federal
habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a
discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations

omitted).

1 Sections 236(c)(1) and 236(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act are codified as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1) and § 1226(a)(2) respectively. .

3

Case 3:26-cv-02902-RDM Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page 4 of 6

Given that Petitioner has filed his habeas petition pro se, the Court will carefully
consider Petitioner's arguments and “liberally construel]” the petition. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.

2011) (explaining the Court's “[special] obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s
pleadings is well-established”). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when
the complaint has failed to name it." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d
Cir. 2013).

ll. ANALYSIS

Before the Court is a peculiar situation in which the Government appears to have
changed the statutory basis for a noncitizen’s detention, without expressly telling either the
Court or the detainee himself. This latent sleight-of-hand is troubling because it is
ostensibly calculated to subvert the binding case law of this Circuit. It is well established
that a noncitizen who has been mandatorily detained for more than 6 months pursuant to
§ 1226(c) becomes entitled to critical due process protections—namely, a bond hearing at
which the Government bears the burden of proof to detain the noncitizen. See German
Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We now hold
that once detention under § 1226(c) has become unreasonable, the Government must put
forth clear and convincing evidence that continued detention s necessary.” (emphasis
added)). Thus, the record before the Court reflects the unusual situation in which, just on

the cusp of 6-months of mandatory detention without a bond hearing (and days before

Case 3:26-cv-02902-RDM Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page5of6

Petitioner would become entitled to a bond hearing under German Santos), the Government
suddenly reached the indispensable realization that Petitioner is not, in fact, subject to
mandatory detention at all.2 Nonetheless, the Court accepts the Government's
representation that Petitioner is properly detained pursuant § 1226(a) and proceeds to
evaluate the merits of the present habeas petition on that basis.

Respondent's admission that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a),
(see Doc. 7 at 6-7), is all but dispositive in this case. If Petitioner was not subject to
mandatory detention, he was entitled to an initial custody determination on or around March
15, 2026, when he was detained. Instead, he languished for six months and was denied the
initial custody determination that would enable him to seek a bond hearing before an
immigration judge in the first place. Respondent's position that Petitioner should now go
through the formal administrative process of requesting a bond hearing before an
immigration judge is unavailing. The Government’s sudden realization that Petitioner is not
subject to mandatory detention does not alter Petitioner’s entitlement to a bond hearing from
the outset. See Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959) (“To decide
this case we need look no further than the deep-rooted principle of law that no man may
take advantage of his own wrong.”). Thus, the record compels the Court to find that

Petitioner's detention for more than six months without any bond hearing violates the INA

2 Absent some change in circumstances, such as a detainee’s criminal charges being dropped, the
statutory basis for his detention does not change. This is because § 1226(c) mandates the detention of a
noncitizen who falls within the statutory text, while § 1226(a) does not. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a-c).

5

Case 3:26-cv-02902-RDM Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page 6of6

and due process. See Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 278 (3d
Cir. 2018) (noting that “a prompt bond hearing [is] required by § 1226(a) and its |
implementing regulations”). Accordingly, the Court will grant Petitioner's immediate release.
See Zheng v. Rokosky, 826 F. Supp. 3d 545, 560 (D.N.J. 2026) (finding that “the only just
remedy in these circumstances is immediate release”); see generally Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (detailing history of the writ of habeas corpus and explaining that
discharge from unlawful custody is the traditional remedy).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted. A separate

Order follows.

Robert D. Variant ~
United States District Judge —