Talebinejad v. ODDO et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAHYAR TALEBINEJAD, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	) 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-329
)
v. 	) 	Judge Stephanie L. Haines
) 	Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
LEONARD ODDO, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the counseled Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 1) filed by
Shahryar Talebinejad (“Petitioner”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which he raises two grounds for
relief. Also before the Court is Petitioner’s accompanying motion (ECF 2) seeking preliminary
injunctive relief on Count I of the Petition (a Zadvydas claim).
It is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s motion for preliminary
injunctive relief, deny Count II of the Petition (a due process claim related to the alleged failure to
conduct the 90-day custody review), and direct that Petitioner file a supplement to Count I of the
Petition once his detention has surpassed the six-month period presumed reasonable in Zadvydas
or when factual developments warrant it.
II. 	REPORT
A. Relevant Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iran. He entered the United States in 2005 and obtained
legal permanent resident status. (ECF 8-1, Resp’s Ex. 1, ¶¶ 2-3.)
In around August 2008, Petitioner was arrested in Maryland and charged with robbery and
other crimes. (Id. ¶ 5.) In September 2009, he was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to three
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years of confinement, with a portion of the sentence suspended. (Id. ¶ 7.) Shortly thereafter,
Petitioner was placed into the custody of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)
On January 5, 2010, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United
States to Iran. (ECF 1-2, Pet’s Ex. 1.) Petitioner was in ICE custody at the time, but ICE eventually
released him on June 1, 2010, on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) because it was unable to
secure a travel document for his removal. (ECF 8-1, Resp’s Ex. 1, ¶ 11.)
In around June 2015, Petitioner was once again arrested in Maryland and charged with
third-degree burglary, fourth-degree burglary, second-degree assault, and malicious destruction of
property valued over $1,000. (Id. ¶ 13.) This prompted ICE, on June 30, 2015, to detain Petitioner
for violating his OSUP. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On July 6, 2015, ICE released Petitioner to another OSUP because it was unable to secure
a travel document. (Id. ¶ 15; see also ECF 1-3, Pet’s Ex. 2.) Less than a year later, in May 2016,
Petitioner was arrested following an 11-defendant federal Indictment filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. A Superseding Information charged him with
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17; see also docket sheet for United States v.
Talebi-Nejad, 8:16-cr-260 (D. Md.), available on PACER).
Petitioner pleaded guilty to both counts. In October 2017, the district court sentenced him
to a total term of imprisonment of 30 months to be followed by four years of supervised release.
(Id. ¶¶ 16-17; see also docket sheet for United States v. Talebi-Nejad, 8:16-cr-260 (D. Md.),
available on PACER).
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About a year later, in October 2018, Petitioner was found guilty in Maryland state court of
third-degree burglary. The court in that case sentenced him to a term of ten years of imprisonment,
with six years suspended, followed by a term of probation. (Id. ¶ 18.)
On November 19, 2019, Petitioner re-entered ICE custody due to violations of his OSUP.
(Id. ¶ 19.) ICE released him on January 9, 2020, on an OSUP due to an inability to obtain a travel
document. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Petitioner remained free from detention for more than five years, until June 24, 2025. He
has been in ICE custody since that date, when ICE revoked his OSUP and served him with a Notice
of Revocation of Release, which states:
This letter is to inform you that your order of supervision has been revoked and you
will be detained in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) at this time. This decision has been made based on a review of your official
alien file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your case.
ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the United States
pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. On January 5, 2010, you
were ordered removed from the United States to Iran by an immigration judge. You
are subject to an administratively final order of removal. Your case is under current
review by the Government of Iran for re-issuance of a travel document.
Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 / § 241.13, you are to remain
in ICE custody at this time. You will promptly be afforded an informal interview
at which you will be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the
revocation. You may submit any evidence or information you wish to be reviewed
in support of your release. If you are not released after the informal interview, you
will receive notification of a new review, which will occur within approximately
three months of the date of this notice.
You are advised that you must demonstrate that you are making reasonable efforts
to comply with the order of removal and that you are cooperating with ICE’s efforts
to remove you by taking whatever actions ICE requests to affect your removal. You
are also advised that any willful failure or refusal on your part to make timely
application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary for your departure,
or any conspiracy or actions to prevent your removal or obstruct the issuance of a
travel document, may subject you to criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. Section
1253(a).
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(ECF 1-4, Pet’s Ex. 3.)
On July 28, 2025, ICE forwarded a Travel Document Request to the Consul General at the
Interest Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran to facilitate Petitioner’s removal. (ECF 8-2, Resp’s
Ex. 2.) This request stated that Iran is a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
As such, Iran is required to provide travel documents to facilitate the return of one of its nationals
within 30 days after the request is made. (Id.) According to the sworn declaration of Zachary
Phillips, who is a Deportation Officer for the United States Department of Homeland Security,
ICE, 	Enforcement 	and 	Removal 	Operations 	(“ERO”), 	“[o]n 	September 	9, 	2025 	and
October 9, 2025, ICE followed up on that request. To date, Iran has not declined to issue a travel
document.” (ECF 8-1, Resp’s Ex. 1, ¶ 26.)
ICE is detaining Petitioner at Moshannon Valley Processing Center (“Moshannon”), which
is located within the territorial boundaries of this Court.
On October 2, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, commenced this habeas case by filing a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF 1.) He names as Respondents Leonard Oddo, the Warden
of Moshannon; Brian McShane, the Acting Direct of ICE’s Philadelphia Field Office; Kristi Noem,
the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; and Pam Bondi, the Attorney
General of the United States.
Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in the Petition. At Count I, he contends that he is
being detained in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. As
relief, he seeks an order from this Court directing that he be immediately released to an OSUP.
(ECF 1, ¶¶ 27-29.)
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At Count II, Petitioner claims that ICE has violated his “due process rights by denying him
an individualized custody review to which he is entitled under ICE policy.” As relief, Petitioner
requests that the Court conduct its own review of his custody and then order his release to an
OSUP. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.)
Petitioner also has filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF 2) and accompanying
brief (ECF 3). He asserts that he is entitled to injunctive relief on Count I (the Zadvydas claim).
He seeks an order that directs that he be immediately released from custody and enjoins
Respondents from resuming custody of him without a showing of imminent removal to Iran.
(ECF 2 at 2.)
The Court ordered expediated service of Petitioner’s filings upon Respondents, who then
filed their Responses opposing the Petition and motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (ECF 8,
9.) Respondents contend that the Court should deny Count I (the Zadvydas claim) and Petitioner’s
request for preliminary injunctive relief on it.
As for Count II, Respondents have established that its premise, which is that ICE failed to
provide Petitioner with the required custody review, is factually incorrect because Petitioner
received his 90-day custody review on or around September 17, 2025. (ECF 8-1, Resp’s Ex. 1,
¶ 28.) Following that review, Petitioner was advised:
[Y]our custody status has been reviewed and it has been determined that you will
not be released from the custody of [ICE] at this time. This decision has been made
based on a review of your file and upon review of the factors for consideration set
forth at 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e), (f), and (g).
As explained below, after such review, ICE has determined to maintain your
custody because you have not demonstrated that, if released, you will not pose a
flight risk or be a danger to the public. ICE is pending the necessary travel
documents to effectuate your removal, and removal is practicable, likely to occur
in the reasonably foreseeable future, and in the public interest.
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Based on the above, you are to remain in ICE custody pending schedule for a
removal flight, as ICE is unable to conclude that the facts set forth at 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(e) have been satisfied. You must demonstrate that you are making
reasonable efforts to comply with the order of removal and that you are cooperating
with ICE’s efforts to remove you by taking whatever actions ICE requests to affect
your removal. You are also advised that any willful failure or refusal on your part
to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary
for your departure, or any conspiracy or actions to prevent your removal or obstruct
the issuance of a travel document, may subject you to criminal prosecution under
8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
If you have not been released or removed from the United States at the expiration
of the three-month period after this 90-day review, jurisdiction of the custody
decision in your case will be transferred to the ICE Headquarters (ERO Removal
Division), Potomac Center North, 500 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20536. The
ERO Removal Division will thereafter conduct a custody review and will make a
determination regarding whether you will continue to be detained pending removal
or may be released.
(ECF 8-3, Resp’s Ex. 3.) Petitioner was further advised that to assist in his ERO Removal Division
custody review, he will be given a personal interview and that he and his representative will be
notified of the date and time of that interview approximately 30 days before the scheduled
interview date. (Id.)
Petitioner has filed his Replies (ECF 10, 11) to Respondents’ submissions. As to Count I,
he maintains that his current period of detention exceeds Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable six-
month period (ECF 11 at 2-5), and that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future (id. at 6-10). As for Count II, Petitioner concedes that, contrary to
what he alleged in the Petition, Respondents have provided him with the 90-day custody review.
He now takes issue with the findings made following that review. (Id. at 10-11.)
B. Discussion
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which an
individual is being held in custody. See, e.g., Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir.
2013). The general habeas statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear
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both statutory and constitutional challenges to the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention by ICE. See,
e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88. Section 2241 provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not
extend to a detainee unless “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
As noted above, Petitioner has moved for preliminary injunctive relief on Count I of the
Petition. Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy” and “should be granted only
in limited circumstances.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). In
evaluating a movant’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, courts employ the familiar four-
factor balancing test. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176-79 (3d Cir. 2017). This test
requires that the movant establish (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation,
and (2) that it is more likely than not that he will suffer irreparable injury without immediate
injunctive relief. Id. The remaining two factors are (3) the possibility of harm to other interested
persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest. Id. If the movant
meets his burden on the first two factors, which are the “most critical[,]” “a court then considers
the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together,
balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Id. at 179.
1. 	The Court should deny Petitioner’s request for preliminary injunctive relief on
Count I and direct him to supplement that claim after certain events have
occurred and if he is not removed and ICE continues to detain him
ICE is detaining Petitioner under the post-removal detention provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). This statute provides that
“when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United
States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The noncitizen must be detained
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during this 90-day timeframe, id. § 1231(a)(2), which is “referred to as the ‘removal period.’” Id.,
§ 1231(a)(1)(A).1
If the noncitizen “does not leave or is not removed within the removal period,” then he or
she is normally subject to supervised release. Id. § 1231(a)(3). But § 1231(a)(6) provides that
certain categories of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including inadmissible and
criminal noncitizens or noncitizens whom the Attorney General has determined are a risk to the
community or are unlikely to comply with the order of removal, “may be detained beyond the
removal period[.]” (Emphasis added.) The parties agree that Petitioner is currently being detained
under § 1231(a)(6).
The text of § 1231(a)(6) does not contain an express limit on the duration a noncitizen can
be detained under its authority. In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001). In it, the Supreme Court outlined the due process concerns that would be implicated
by a statute permitting indefinite detention. Id. at 690-96. Invoking the canon of constitutional
avoidance so that it did not have to decide whether § 1231(a)(6) violated the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to contain an implicit temporal
limit. It held that the statute, “read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-
removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s removal from
the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” Id. at 689.
1 In relevant part, “[t]he removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The date the order
of removal becomes administratively final…. (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under
an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(B). 	The 	parties 	calculate 	the 	removal 	period 	under 	the 	first 	provision 	(§
1231(a)(1)(B)(i)) but disagree on whether the aggregation theory advanced by Petitioner relative
to calculating the post-removal period applies. Respondents also argue in the alternative that the
Court could calculate the removal period under § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii) (ECF 8 at 10), but Petitioner
convincingly argues that this alternative argument lacks merit (ECF 11 at 3-5.)
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The Zadvydas Court held that post-removal detention for six months is “presumptively
reasonable.” Id. at 701. Beyond six months, if removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized under § 1231(a)(6). Thus, at that point, the Supreme
Court explained, a noncitizen could bring a claim in a federal habeas petition asserting that ICE
no longer has the statutory authority for continued detention. Id. at 700-01. In such a proceeding,
the Supreme Court instructed, the noncitizen must show there is “good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future[.]” Id. at 701. If the
noncitizen does so, the burden would then shift to the government to produce “evidence sufficient
to rebut that showing.” Id.
The Department of Homeland Security promulgated regulations around the time of, and
after, the Zadvydas decision that established a series of processes to address the concerns discussed
in that decision and to determine whether a noncitizen should be released from custody after the
expiration of the 90-day removal period. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. These regulations provide
for administrative custody reviews at 90 days, 180 days, and one year. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k).
At Count I, Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief under Zadvydas. As
explained above, Petitioner has been in ICE custody since June 24, 2025. Six months from that
date is on or around December 24, 2025. Thus, Respondents contend, Petitioner’s current period
of detention does not exceed Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable six-month detention period.
Petitioner counters in support of Count I (and his accompanying motion for preliminary
injunctive relief), that his detention has surpassed Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable six-month
period. This argument hinges on Petitioner’s contention that the fragmented periods of time he
spent in ICE detention after the issuance of the final order of removal on January 5, 2010 but
before his currently custody commenced on June 24, 2025 should be aggregated with the time he
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has spent in his current custody. Only by doing so can he contend that his detention has extended
beyond the six-month detention period the Supreme Court presumed reasonable in Zadvydas.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit Court has ruled on this issue. However,
this Court noted in another case before it that it was skeptical that a petitioner could state a prima
facie Zadvydas claim premised on an aggregation theory. Roe v. Oddo, No. 3:25-cv-128, 2025 WL
1892445, *6 n.6 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (Haines, J.). More recently, in that same case, this Court
rejected the aggregation theory advanced by the petitioner when it discussed the burdens the parties
bore at that stage of the case. Roe v. Oddo, No. 3:25-cv-128, 2025 WL 3030692, *7 n.8 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 30, 2025) (Haines, J.) For the reasons that the Court discussed in that case, this Court should
conclude that at this point Petitioner’s detention has not moved beyond Zadvydas’ presumptively
reasonable six-month period.
Some courts have held that the conclusion that Zadvydas’ six-month presumptively
reasonable period has not yet expired does not categorically preclude a detainee from challenging
the lawfulness of his detention in habeas proceeding at that time. See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v.
Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395-98 (D.N.J. 2025). Assuming these courts are correct, the
conclusion in this case that Petitioner’s detention is still within the presumptively reasonable
period at the very least warrants the denial of his request for preliminary injunction relief. That is
because his request for such relief is based on his contention that his detention had exceeded
Zadvydas’ six-month presumptively reasonable period. (ECF 3 at 4, “[Petitioner’s] detention
beyond the six-month period obligates the government to demonstrate that [his] deportation is
reasonably foreseeable. It is not.”)
The conclusion that Zadvydas’ six-month presumptively reasonable period has not yet
expired also affects the parties’ current burdens. As another district court within the Third Circuit
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recently explained, Zadvydas’ six-month “presumption of reasonableness is the default, but if a
person can prove that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that
presumption. In practical terms, before the six-month period elapses, the government bears no
burden to justify detention, and the petitioner must claim and prove, that his removal is not
reasonably foreseeable.” Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 397 (internal citations and quotations
omitted) (emphasis added).
Assuming 	once 	again 	that 	Petitioner 	could 	challenge 	his 	current 	detention 	under
§ 1231(a)(6) before the expiration of Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable six-month period,
Petitioner has not submitted evidence that would satisfy the heavy burden placed on him at this
time. Id. In contrast, Respondents have produced evidence that ICE has forwarded a Travel
Document Request to Iranian officials and that Iran has not declined to issue a travel document (at
least as of October 27, 2025, which is the date Officer Phillips signed his declaration). (ECF 8-1,
Resp’s. Ex. 1, ¶¶ 26-29.) That said, as this Court has explained in another case before it, if
Petitioner remains detained in ICE custody and as time goes on, his burden will lessen as
Respondents’ burden to justify his continued detention will increase. Roe, 3:25-cv-128, 2025 WL
3030692, at *7 (“In the context of the [Zadvydas’] burden shifting framework, there is an inverse
relationship between the time the alien has been detained post-removal and the showing the
Government must make in rebuttal…. For this reason, the same evidence that may be sufficient
for the Government to rebut an alien’s proffer of good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal when that alien has been in post-removal confinement for six months and
one day may not likewise be sufficient when that same alien has been in post-removal confinement
for twelve months and one day.”)
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Based on the above, the Court should deny Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on Count I. Petitioner has not established a reasonable probability of eventual success on
that claim as currently pled and, therefore, fails to satisfy the first factor of the test for preliminary
injunctive relief.
The Court also could deny Count I without prejudice to Petitioner raising a Zadvydas claim
in another habeas petition if his detention in ICE custody continues. But Petitioner is due to have
his custody reviewed by the ERO Removal Division around mid-December. And if his detention
continues after that review, it will surpass Zadvydas’ six-month presumptively reasonable period
on or around December 24, 2025. Under these circumstances, the better course is for the Court to
direct Petitioner to supplement Count I after these events or as warranted by other factual
developments.
2. 	The Court should deny Count II on the merits
As for Count II, Petitioner claims that ICE violated his “due process rights by denying him
an individualized custody review to which he is entitled under ICE policy.” (ECF 1, ¶ 31.) But as
already noted, Respondents have established that ICE conducted Petitioner’s 90-day custody
review on or around September 17, 2025. (ECF 8-1, Resp’s Ex. 1, ¶ 28; ECF 8-3, Resp’s Ex. 3.)
Petitioner has conceded that Respondents provided him with the 90-day custody review,
but now takes issue with the decision to continue to detain him. (ECF 11 at 10-11.) He has cited
no legal authority to show that this Court can review the discretionary decisions made during his
review, let alone establish how his constitutional rights or federal law has been violated under the
current facts.
Accordingly, the Court should deny Count II on the merits.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court:
(1) deny the Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF 2);
(2) deny Count II on the merits; and
(3) direct Petitioner, if he is not removed and his ICE custody continues, to supplement the
Petition as to Count I after his ERO Removal Division custody review and his current continuous
detention exceeds Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable period on or around December 24, 2025,
or as warranted by other factual developments. If no supplement is filed, Petitioner’s counsel shall
file a status report no later than by January 8, 2026.
Under the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of
the Local Civil Rules, the parties are allowed 14 days from the date of this Report and
Recommendation to file objections. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v.
Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dated: December 3, 2025 	/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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