Talebinejad v. ODDO et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:25-cv-00329-SLH-PLD Document 19
Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAHYAR TALEBINEJAD,
V. Petitioner, )
)
)
Case No. 3:25-cv-329
)
Judge Stephanie L. Haines
LEONARD OTTO Warden, Moshannon ) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
Valley ICE Processing Center, et al.,
Respondents.
) ) ) )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Shahyar Talebinejad's ("Petitioner") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 at ECF No. 1 ("Habeas Petition") and Petitioner's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction ("P.I.") at ECF No. 2 ("Motion for P.I."). Petitioner, who is detained at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center ("MVPC"), raises two claims in his underlying Habeas Petition. First, at Count I, Petitioner alleges that the length of his post-removal detention has exceeded the presumptively reasonable period set forth in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and, that his continued detention is unlawful because there is no significant likelihood that his removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. ECF No. 1, pp. 7-8. Second, at Count II, Petitioner contends that Respondents violated due process by "denying him an individualized custody review to which he is entitled under ICE policy." ECF No. 1, p. 9, 131. In his Motion for a P.I., ECF No. 2, and his accompanying Brief in Support. ECF No. 3, Petitioner reiterates Count I and requests that this Court Order that Respondents immediately release him. See ECF No. 2, p. 2.
This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge ("Magistrate Judge Dodge") for proceedings in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S. C. § 636, and Local Civil Rule 72.D. On December 3, 2025, Magistrate Judge Dodge filed a Report and
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AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

Case 3:25-cv-00329-SLH-PLD Document 19 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 4
Recommendation, ECF No. 16, recommending that:
[The] Court deny Petitioner's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, deny Count II of the Petition (a due process claim related to the alleged failure to conduct the 90-day custody review), and direct that Petitioner file a supplement to Count I of the Petition once his detention has surpassed the six-month period presumed reasonable in Zadvydas or when factual developments warrant it.
ECF No. 16, p. 1. Petitioner was advised that he could file objections to the Report and Recommendation by December 17, 2025. See 28 U.S.C.§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and (C) and Local Civil Rule 72.D.2. Petitioner has not filed any objections, and the time to do so has expired.
Upon review of the record and the Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 16, under the applicable "reasoned consideration" standard, see EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (standard of review when no timely and specific objections are filed), and pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.D.2, the Court will, as supplemented herein, accept in full the findings and well-reasoned recommendations of Magistrate Judge Dodge.1
1 The Court takes this opportunity to explain its decision more fully as six months have now passed since Petitioner was re-detained on June 24, 2025. ECF No. 16, p. 3.
Relative to Count I, Magistrate Judge Dodge succinctly explained the following:
The Zadvydas Court held that post-removal detention for six months is "presumptively reasonable."[Zadvydas, 533 U.S.] at 701. Beyond six months, if removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized under § 1231(a)(6). Thus, at that point, the Supreme Court explained, a noncitizen could bring a claim in a federal habeas petition asserting that ICE no longer has the statutory authority for continued detention. Id. at 700-01.
ECF No. 16, p. 9.
Indeed, the language of the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas and the continued discussion of that decision by the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit clarify that an alien's due process challenge to the length of his post-removal detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) may only be brought after his post-removal detention has exceeded the six-month, presumptively reasonable period. See e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 ("After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.") (emphasis added); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) ("The [Zadvydas] Court further held that the presumptive period during which the detention of an alien is reasonably necessary to effectuate his removal is six months; after that, the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can demonstrate[ .... ]") (emphasis added) (called into question on other grounds by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)); Alexander v. Attorney General U.S., 495 F.App'x. 274, 276 (3d Cir. 2012) ("While the language of section 1231(a)(6) does not impose clear statutory limits, temporal or otherwise, on the Government's ability to detain aliens prior to their removal, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas held that after a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention, the alien may 'provide[ ] good reason to believe that there is no significant
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An appropriate Order follows:
ORDER
f
I
AND NOW, this __ day of January 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Magistrate Judge Dodge's Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 16, is adopted as the Opinion
of the Court as supplemented in the foregoing Memorandum Order; and,
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future...."') (emphasis added) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701); Leslie v. Attorney General of US., 363 F.App'x. 955, 958 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); Rodney v. Mukasey, 340
F.App'x. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009) ("After six months, the alien is eligible for conditional release if[ ....]") (emphasis
added); Barenboy v. Attorney General of US., 160 F. App'x 258, 261 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Once the six-month period
has passed, the burden is on the alien to 'provide[ ] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future...."') (emphasis added) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701); see also
Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) ("This six-month period thus must have expired at the
time Akinwale's § 2241 petition was filed in order to state a claim under Zadvydas."). As such, this Court declines to
adopt the approach taken by other District Courts that would permit Zadvydas claims to be raised prior to the
expiration of six months of post-removal detention as that position seemingly nullifies the six-month presumption
adopted by the Supreme Court. See ECF No. 16, pp. 10-11 (discussing this theory as set forth in Munoz-Saucedo v.
Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395-98 (D.N.J. 2025)).
Therefore, in this case, because this Court has rejected the aggregation approach when determining whether a
petitioner who was re-detained after an extensive period of time released on an Order of Supervision ("OSUP") is
currently detained in violation of§ 123 l(a)(6), see e.g., Roe v. Oddo, 3 :25-cv-128, 2025 WL 3030692, at *7 n.8 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 30, 2025) Pan v. Oddo, No. 3:25-cv-265, (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2025) (ECF No. 9 at 2 n.l), Petitioner could
not, and indeed did not, sufficiently allege a prima facie Zadvydas claim, demonstrating a likelihood ofsuccess on the
merits, at the time he filed his Motion for a P.I. on October 3, 2025. Indeed, Petitioner was re-detained by ICE on June
24, 2025, ECF No. 1, ,r 18; ECF No. 3, p. 2; ECF No. 1-4-six months from that date is approximately December 24,
2025. For this reason, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge Dodge's well-reasoned recommendation that "the Court
should deny Petitioner's motion for preliminary injunctive reliefon Count I" because "Petitioner has not established
a reasonable probability of eventual success on that claim as currently pied[.)" ECF No. 16, p. 12. See
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, 108 F.4th 144, 150 (3d Cir.
2024) (explaining that failure to make a showing ofeither threshold factor is fatal to a request for injunctive relief).
Further, because Petitioner's detention has now crossed the threshold ofthe presumptively reasonable period ofpost
removal detention-six months-the Court will likewise adopt Magistrate Judge Dodge's Report and
Recommendation and permit Petitioner to Supplement Count I ofhis underlying Habeas Petition. As such, Petitioner's
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, ECF No. 18, will be GRANTED.
Finally, relative to Count II, Magistrate Judge Dodge correctly recommends that this Court deny that count on the
merits as "Petitioner has conceded that Respondents provided him with the 90-day custody review" and "cited no
legal authority to show that this Court can review the discretionary decisions made during his review[.]"ECF No. 16,
p. 12 (citing ECF 11, pp. 10-11).
For the above reasons, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge Dodge's Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 16, in
full, as supplemented above.
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Case 3:25-cv-00329-SLH-PLD Document 19 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 4
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count II of Petitioner Shahyar Talebinejad's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 at ECF No. 1 is DISMISSED; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 2, is DENIED; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all remaining matters are returned to the assigned Magistrate Judge for consideration in the first instance.
BY THE COURT:
Stephanie L. Haines United States District Judge
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