J.F.R.O. v. ODDO et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
J.F.R.O.,
Petitioner,
v.
ODDO, et al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 3:26-cv-1499
Judge Marilyn J. Horan
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Juan Francisco Renderos Ortiz’s (“Petitioner”)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 8), Respondents’
Response (ECF No. 19), and Petitioner’s Reply in Support (ECF No. 20). The petition is now fully
briefed; and thus, ripe for disposition. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the Court will
GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner is a detainee at Moshannon Valley Processing Center (“MVPC”) in Philipsburg,
Pennsylvania. See ECF 8, p. 2. He entered the United States in 2007. Id. at 7. On September 25,
2025, ICE officials arrested Petitioner on his way to work and served him with a Notice to Appear.
Id. at 8-9. He has been detained since that date. Id.
On February 12, 2026, an immigration judge denied all forms of relief and ordered
Petitioner removed. Id. at 11. Petitioner then timely appealed this decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, where it appears to still be pending. Id.
In his habeas petition, Petitioner argues that Respondents’ “continuous denial of adequate
medical care renders [his] conditions of confinement unconstitutional” and that MVPC’s deliberate
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 7

2
indifference to his medical needs violates the Rehabilitation Act, the Administrative Procedure
Act, and internal ICE policies. Id. at 22-37, 60-64 (capitalization adjusted). In part, he alleges that
his medical conditions are worsening due to the lack of medical care and accessible facilities at
MVPC. Id. at 11-22. Petitioner also argues that “Respondents violated due process and the
Immigration and Nationality Act by erroneously subjecting [Petitioner] to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)” and asserts that he is instead properly detained under § 1226(a) and is owed an
individualized custody determination. Id. at 37-49, 64-65 (capitalization adjusted). Citing to the
four-factor test found in German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.
2020), Petitioner asserts that his detention has become unconstitutionally prolonged as well. Id. at
54-61.
As relief, Petitioner requests immediate release or “a constitutionally adequate bond
hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof to justify continued detention by clear
and convincing evidence.” Id. at 5, 49-53.
In turn, recognizing the binding precedent established in Buele Morocho v. Warden
Philadelphia FDC, No. 26-1150, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), Respondents agree
that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) and is owed an individualized custody determination.
ECF No. 19, p. 2. However, Respondents dispute the applicability of German Santos to § 1226(a)
detainees, but suggest, if the Court were to consider the German Santos factors, that the factors
would weigh in favor of Respondents, rather than Petitioner. Id. at 3-6. Respondents decline to
otherwise address Petitioner’s medical care claims. Id. at 5.
First, for the reasons stated in the Court’s prior decision Deh v. Warden Moshannon Valley
Processing Center, et al., No. 3:26-CV-00738-MJH, 2026 WL 1255947 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2026)
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 7

3
and recently by the Third Circuit in Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, No. 26-1150,
2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), the Court finds that Petitioner is properly detained
under § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b), and is thus owed a bond hearing. See Buele Morocho, 2026
WL 2546223, at *5 (“The INA’s broader statutory scheme also supports the conclusion that §
1225(b) governs noncitizens arriving to the United States whereas § 1226 governs those already
within our borders.”). Yet the Court’s analysis will not stop there.
Utilizing the German Santos framework, this Court and other courts in this District have
previously concluded that Third Circuit precedent does not categorically foreclose a burden-shifted
bond hearing for § 1226(a) detainees experiencing prolonged detention. See, e.g., Bah v. Oddo,
No. 3:26-CV-01393, 2026 WL 2561261 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2026); Fadel v. Warden of
Moshannon Valley ICE Processing Ctr., No. 3:26-cv-00625, 2026 WL 1649901, at *2–3 (W.D.
Pa. June 8, 2026). As such, the Court will evaluate the following four German Santos factors to
determine which party bears the burden of proof in this initial bond hearing under § 1226: (i) the
duration of detention; (ii) whether the detention is likely to continue; (iii) reasons for the delay;
and (iv) whether the detainee’s conditions of confinement are “meaningfully different from
criminal punishment.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 210–11.
First, when considering whether detention has become unreasonable, “[t]he most important
factor is the duration of detention.” See id. at 211. While there is no bright-line threshold of time
that permits a court to presume that detention has crossed the line from reasonable to unreasonable,
detention does become “‘more and more suspect’” the longer it continues. See id. (quoting Diop
v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011)). In particular, “[c]ourts within this circuit
have previously found detention for over one year weighs in favor of the petitioner.” See Nyamekye
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 7

4
v. Oddo, No. CV 22-240J, 2023 WL 9271844, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2023), R&R adopted, No.
CR 3:22-CV-240, 2023 WL 9271879 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 2023).
Here, Petitioner has been detained for over a year. See ECF 8, p. 56-57. This duration is
longer than the detention period which triggered a burden-shifted bond hearing for another §
1226(a) petitioner before this Court. See Bah, 2026 WL 2561261 (eleven months). Thus, this first
factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
Next, when evaluating the second factor, a habeas court must consider “whether the
detention is likely to continue.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. Here, Petitioner asserts that there
“is no end in sight to his detention while he litigates his fear-based claims” on appeal. See ECF 8,
p. 57. If the BIA affirms the denial, Petitioner also “intends to submit a Petition for Review to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals[.]” Id. at 11. As such, this factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See
German Santos, 965 F.3d at 212 (concluding that this factor weighed in the petitioner’s favor
where the petitioner was awaiting BIA decision and potential Third Circuit review).
Third, in assessing the impact of the reasons for delay upon the reasonableness of detention,
a petitioner’s “appeals and applications for discretionary relief [are not held] against him[.]” Id.
However, neither are delays or alleged errors held against the government “[a]bsent carelessness
or bad faith[;]” for “[n]o system of justice can be error-free, and those errors require time to fix.”
Id. (citing Diop, 656 F.3d at 234). Here, the parties do not allege any delays, other than routine
court docketing, scheduling, and minor filing continuances. See ECF 8, p. 58; ECF 19, p. 4-5; see
also Leslie v. AG of the United States, 678 F.3d 265, 270–271 (discounting a minor filing
continuance relative to a longer detention). Thus, this factor is neutral as to both parties.
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 7

5
Finally, when assessing the reasonableness of a petitioner’s detention, “we cannot ignore
the conditions of confinement.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 212–13 (citing Chavez-Alvarez, 783
F.3d at 478). In particular, a district court must examine the factual circumstances particular to the
petitioner in order to assess whether “his detention is indistinguishable from criminal
punishment[,]” “[d]espite its civil label[.]” See id. at 210.
Here, Petitioner contends that his conditions of confinement at MVPC are “consistent with
its carceral nature.” He alleges that he “sleeps in a cell[,]” is “forced to eat meals in his cell due to
the facility’s inaccessibility[,]” and “has been denied access to outdoor recreation because he
cannot pass through the metal detectors in his wheelchair.” See ECF 8, p. 60. In particular, he
asserts that “the impact of his serious medical needs makes his civil detention increasingly
indistinguishable from penal confinement.” Id. (quoting J.M. v. Oddo, No. 3:24-cv-255-KAP,
2025 WL 3706433, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025)). In turn, Respondents contend that
“Petitioner’s conditions of confinement are no different from hundreds of other detainees.” See
ECF No. 19, p. 5.
Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Petitioner’s experience is significantly
different from the experiences of other MVPC detainees because he lacks meaningful access to
the facilities enjoyed by other detainees and instead spends the majority of his time in his cell.
Further, Respondents do not offer any evidence to suggest that these facilities are made available
and accessible to Petitioner. See ECF No. 19, p. 5; c.f. Nunez v. Oddo, 2025 WL 2443437 (W.D.
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 7

6
Pa. Aug. 25, 2025) (referencing Respondents’ ability to provide affidavits, declarations, or other
evidence regarding conditions of confinement). As such, this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.1
In conclusion, because three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor, while one remains neutral,
the Court finds, based upon the specific facts of the detention before it and underneath the standard
set within German Santos, that Petitioner’s detention under § 1226(a) has become unreasonable.2
Thus, the burden of proof at the initial bond hearing will be placed upon the Government. “To
justify [Petitioner’s] continued detention,” “the Government must put forth clear and convincing
evidence” to “support a finding that continued detention is needed to prevent him from fleeing or
harming the community[;]” “[i]f it cannot, it must release him.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213-
14 (citing Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 477-78).
Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will GRANT Petitioner’s Habeas
Petition (ECF No. 8), in so much as it requests that this Court direct that he be afforded a
constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge with the Government bearing
the burden of proof and will DENY the Petition in all other respects.
1 As for Petitioner’s remaining conditions of confinement claims, these claims are not cognizable in a habeas
petition. See Silva v. Soto, No. CV 25-16577, 2025 WL 3485658, at 6 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2025) (“Consistent with
Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535-536 (3d Cir. 2012), claims seeking relief from general conditions of
confinement, as opposed to the fact or duration of custody, are not cognizable under § 2241.”); Javokhir v. AG of the
U.S., No. 26-1314, 2026 WL 2434667, at 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2026) (“A habeas petition can be used only to
challenge the legality or the duration of detention; the proper means for seeking relief for a claim challenging the
conditions of confinement is a civil rights action under § 1983, after any available administrative remedies have
been exhausted.”); Kayian v. Thompson, No. CV 23-21623 (KMW), 2024 WL 64777, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2024)
(“Claims asserting inadequate medical care are thus generally not cognizable in a habeas proceeding…and courts
must decline to exercise habeas jurisdiction over cases asserting such claims.”).
2 Like other District courts in this Circuit, the Court finds that Petitioner may only appropriately be afforded a
constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, rather than being granted immediate release.
See, e.g., Davis v. Warden Pike Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 4:22-cv-20, 2022 WL 4391686, at * 4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18,
2022) (“The only remedy for an alien challenging [his] mandatory detention is a bond hearing.”); German Santos,
965 F.3d at 210, 214 (“[W]hen detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a bond hearing.”)
(quoting Diop, 656 F.3d at 233); A.L., 761 F. Supp. 3d at 826–27.
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 7

7
Accordingly, this 16th day of October 2026, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition is GRANTED IN PART in so much as it requests that this
Court order that he be afforded a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge.
2. Respondents shall provide Petitioner a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before a
neutral Immigration Judge within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order. This timeline
may be extended by Petitioner upon a motion to the Immigration Judge.
3. At this bond hearing, the Government must put forth clear and convincing evidence to
support a finding that continued detention is needed to prevent Petitioner from fleeing or
harming the community.
4. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition (ECF No. 8) is DENIED in all other respects.
5. With no further action required by the Court at this time, the Clerk of Court shall mark this
matter closed.
DATED: October 16, 2026
Case 3:26-cv-01499-MJH Document 21 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 7