DE LA ROSA MACAS et al v. MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE:
ANA CAROLINA DE LA ROSA MACAS
RAFAEL TORRES LAUREANO
CASE NO. 07-05185 BKT
CHAPTER 13
Debtor(s)
ANA CAROLINA DE LA ROSA MACAS
RAFAEL TORRES LAUREANO
ADVERSARY NO. 12-00053
Plaintiff
MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELORS AT LAW
FILED & ENTERED ON 05/11/2012
Defendant(s)
ORDER
This proceeding is before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to shorten terms of discovery
(Dkt No. 10), and Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt No. 16) of the Order allowing the
limited discovery proposed by Defendants (Dkt No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
I. 	Procedural background
On April 10, 2012, Defendants sought leave of Court to shorten the response period on a
limited discovery comprising two (2) interrogatories and two (2) requests for production of
documents, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. (Dkt No. 10). Defendants argued that said discovery
request was needed to properly answer the complaint. On April 19, 2012, this Court entered an
order granting Defendants’ unopposed motion and reducing the period for Plaintiffs to answer the
interrogatories to fifteen (15) days. (Dkt No. 12). Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on
April 27, 2012 (Dkt No. 16), stating that Defendants’ request to shorten the period to answer to
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discovery should have been denied as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ arguments are threefold. First, that
Defendants’ cannot use discovery means to answer a complaint, because they are to admit or deny
statements in the complaint without using extrinsic evidence. Second, that discovery procedures
cannot begin until the parties have conferred, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), or otherwise ordered
by the court. Finally, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or rule upon this discovery matter
until the parties have addressed the controversy without the Court’s intervention, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26& 37, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026 & 7037.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Expedited discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed R.
Bankr. P. 7026, parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense.” The limitation with respect to the scope of discovery under Rule
26(b)(1) is that the matter sought to be discovered is not privileged, “[o]ther than that, discovery
may be obtained with respect to any matter relevant to the claims or defenses of any party.” 10
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9020.01(16th ed.).
Although a party ordinarily may not commence discovery until the parties hold the discovery
conference required by Rule 26(f), the parties may engage in discovery earlier, however, if the court
has issued an order authorizing the discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Consequently, a party must
obtain leave of court if the party seeks to commence discovery before the time specified in Rule
26(d), given the parties have not agreed otherwise.
The majority of Courts, including within the First Circuit, have applieda “good cause” or
“reasonableness” standardwhen considering request for expedited discovery. See Momenta Pharms.,
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Inc. v. Teva Pharms. Indus. Ltd., 765 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 (D.Mass.2011); see also 6 Moore's Federal
Practice § 26.121 (2011).In a “good cause” analysis, a court must examine the discovery request on
the entirety of the record and the “reasonableness” of the request in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 385, 386 (E.D. Wis. 2009);St.
Louis Group, Inc. v. Metals and Additives Corp., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Good
cause for expedited discovery may be found when the need for the expedited discovery outweighs
the prejudice to the responding party.Edgenet, Inc.,259 F.R.D. at 386; Moore's Federal Practice §
26.121.The party seeking expedited discovery has the burden of establishing the need for early
discovery and the burden of showing good cause.St. Louis Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240, citing
Qwest Commc'n Int'l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003);
Moore's Federal Practice § 26.121. Finally, in allowing expedited discovery, the courts seek that the
subject matter related to requests for expedited discovery are narrowly tailored in scope. St. Louis
Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240; Monsanto Co. v. Woods, 250 F.R.D. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
In the present case, Defendants have in fact, narrowly tailored the discovery purportedly
needed to answer Plaintiffs’ claims and bring forth their defenses. Once the need for expedited
discovery was established by Defendants, and upon Plaintiffs’ failure to raise a timely opposition
that outweighed Defendants’ request, the Court found good cause to grant Defendants’ reasonable
request for the limited expedited discovery.
With regards to Plaintiffs’ allegations that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
discovery matter because the parties failed to confer, or attempted to confer, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26& 37, this Court finds that nothing in the cited statues precludes this Court from entertaining
Defendants’ motion for expedited discovery. Rule 26(c)(1) & Rule 37(a)(1), require that, prior to
requesting that the court issue a protective order or an order to compel discovery, the movant must
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attempt to secure the discovery by making a good faith effort to confer with the recalcitrant party.
That is not the controversy before this Court.
B. 	Relief from a Judgment or Order
Plaintiffs’cite no legal authority for their request for reconsideration. However, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6o, made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 9024, affords six categories
of reasons or grounds on which to base a motion seeking relief from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeks to balance the interest in the stability of judgments with the
interest in seeing that judgments not become instruments of oppression and fraud. 10 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶9024.03 (15 th ed. rev.). “[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment,
order, or proceedings for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1); Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief "for any other reason that justifies relief." Fed R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6).
Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and motions invoking that rule should be
granted sparingly. 	Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002). 	Such relief is
available in our jurisdiction only when exceptional circumstances exist to justify this extraordinary
relief. In re Rodriguez Camacho, 361 B.R. 294 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (citing Simon v. Navon, 116
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1997)). A party who seeks relief under Rule 60(b) must persuade the Court, at a
bare minimum, that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the
judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and
that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted. Rodriguez
Camacho, supra (citing Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002)).
Except for the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ motion for relief, none of the above factors have been
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demonstrated.Plaintiffs’ have failed to allege details showing excusable neglect under a Rule
60(b)(1), or “any other reason justifying relief” under a Rule 60(b)(6). The Court concludes that
Plaintiffs’request for reconsideration is meritless.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Debtors’ motion for reconsideration shall be, and it
hereby is, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11 day of May, 2012.
Brian K. Tester
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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