Richard Paiva v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
RICHARD LEE PAIVA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
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_________________________ )
C.A. No. 17-mc-14-JJivi-LDA
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief United States District Judge.
This Court entered a permanent injunction in 197 4 incorporating the "Morris
Rules"-a set of rules for due process involving inmate classifications and discipline
within the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions ("ACI"). When entered, both
the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit (the "First Circuit") held that the Morris Rules, as a judicial decree, could not
be altered or suspended without an order of the Court. 	Yet, in the mid 1990's, the
Rhode Island Department of Corrections ("RIDOC") unilaterally and substantively
changed the Morris Rules without seeking an amendment or relief from the Court.
Richard Lee Paiva, an inmate subjected to discipline by the RIDOC in violation of the
Morris Rules, moves to hold the RIDOC in contempt for violating the Morris Rules
and for further relief as deemed necessary and proper.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
PTocedul'al Background of this Motion
Mr. Paiva petitioned this Court to enforce the Morris Rules that the Court
established in 1970 in .Monis v. Travisono (U.S.D.C. D.R.I., Civ. A. No. 4192). 	ECF
No. 4. 1 He alleges that, in violation of this Court's injunction enshrining the Morris
Rules, the RIDOC subjected him to segregation of more than thirty clays, had his
appeal of discipline heard by a single official, rather than the required three-member
panel, and had his outgoing mail opened and read by the RIDOC. 	See ECF No. 4 at
2, n1·4; ECF No. 25·6.
Consistent with the opinions of the judicial officers of this District Court since
1996 on the enforceability by contempt of individual violations of the Manis Rules in
federal court, the Court denied Mr. Paiva relief and dismissed his petition. 	ECF No.
1; Text Order dated April 20, 2017. 	Mr. Paiva appealed. 	ECF No. 10. 	The First
Circuit reversed the dismissal and entered a judgment stating:
Even assuming JYionisis a closed case, that event in and of itself would
not necessarily bar a 	motion to 	address 	a 	claimed violation of an
injunction if the injunction has not expired or been terminated. 	Here,
[lVIr. Paiva's] motion alleges just such a violation. 	Given the absence of
any indication in the present record that the injunction is no longer in
effect, we believe it makes better sense for the district court to get
RIDOC's response before considering whether dismissal is appropriate.
ECF No. 22 (emphasis added).
1 This Court docketed Mr. Paiva's ".!Vlotion for Further Relief and Order to
Show Causa" as a miscellaneous case, because the Jlfonis case had been closed for
decades. 	Mr. 	Paiva 	recently 	moved 	to 	be 	designated 	as 	the 	successor 	class
representative in 	the llfonis case. 	ECF No. 	60. 	That motion was 	granted as
unopposed. 	Text Order elated December 18, 2019.
2
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After the remand, lVIr. Paiva filed an "Amended Motion for Further Relief:
Motion for Contempt." ECF No. 25. He supplemented the motion several times. See
ECF Nos. 26, 31, 41, 54, and 55. 2 The Court ordered the RIDOC to show cause "why
it should not be held in contempt, or otherwise sanctioned, for unilaterally changing
tho rules set forth without an order from this Court-in particular, limits on the length
of punitive segregation and the composition of the Disciplinary Board." 	ECF No. 29
at 1. 	The RIDOC responded to the Court's show cause order and objected to Mr.
Paiva's motions. 	ECF Nos. 27, 32, 35, and 53.
Mr. Paiva originally requested that the Court: "either adjudge the RIDOC in
contempt and issue sanctions, or to issue a supplemental order ordering the RIDOC
to re·promulgate the Morris Rules back into RIDOC policies, in their entirety and
without modification and ·without undue delay." 	ECF No. 2 at 26. 	In his Amended
Motion 	for 	Further 	Relief; 	Motion 	for 	Contempt, 	Mr. 	Paiva 	requests: 	(A) 	"a
declaration 	declaring 	that 	the 	[RIDOC] 	violated 	the 	consent 	decree;" 	(B) 	" a
declaration 	declaring 	that 	the 	[RIDOC] 	violated 	the 	'Manis 	Rules' 	when 	the
Petitioner 	was 	g1ven 	more 	than 	thirty 	clays 	ln 	disciplinary 	segregation;" 	(C)
"commanding the [RIDOC] to revise their disciplinary policy;" (D) "issue coercive
sanctions;" (E) "award Petitioner his costs;" and (F) "award further relief as this Court
deems fair and just" under 28 U.S.C. § 2202.3 	ECF No. 25·1 at 7·9. 	Mr. Paiva
2 	Mr. Paiva also filed an "Oral Motion for Costs." 	ECF No. 56. 	That motion
was denied in open court on May 15, 2019. See Text Order dated December 18, 2019.
3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, a court issuing a declaratory judgment or decree has
the authority to grant "[f]urther necessary or proper relief' under the judgment. 	See
3
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subsequently 	specified 	that 	the 	"further 	relief' 	he 	seeks 	is 	the 	vacation 	and
expungement from his institutional record of twenty-one disciplinary convictions.
ECF No. 31 at 2; ECF No. 41 at 2.4
After being designated as the successor class representative, Mr. Paiva moved
for leave from the Court to conduct limited post-judgment discovery in support of his
motion for contempt and further relief. 	ECF No. 66.
Histoq of tile MoTl'is Rules as Binding on tile RIDOC
In March 1970, after extensive litigation and court-directed mediation, the
Court issued a Consent Order that set forth "Regulations Governing Disciplinary and
Classification Procedures at the Adult Correctional Institutions, State of Rhode
Island." 	Jllfonis v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D.R.I 1970) (".M01ns r). 	The
Court stated: "... these Regulations establish rules oflaw which must be followed."
Id. at 861. 	The Regulations 5 (now commonly called the "IVIorris Rules") were "to
become an interim decree of this court" and then a "final decree." 	I d. at 862.
also Union de Empleados de 111uelles de Puerto Rico, hJC. 	v. Int'J Longshoremen s
Ass'n, 884 F.3d 48, 59 (1st Cir. 2018).
4 Mr. Paiva also asked this Court to "enter a declaration declaring that the
[RIDOC's] 	current disciplinary policy is unconstitutional." 	ECF No. 	25·1 at 8.
Because IVIr. Paiva did not bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a federal
constitutional violation and instead filed motions for contempt and further relief, the
Court need not, nor will it, address the constitutionality of the RIDOC's current
disciplinary policy. 	See Aldminola 	v. 	Wall, 	No. 	CV 	16·370-lVI-LDA, 	2016 	WL
6462203, at *2 (D.R.I. Oct. 31, 2016) (citing Doctor v. Wc1ll, 143 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205
(D .R.I. 200 1)).
;; The First Circuit described the Morris Rules as "a set of rules for clue process
within prison that was carefully shaped by prisoners and correctional administrators
working together under the aegis of the District Court." 	Palmigiano v. Baxte1; 487
F.2d 1280, 1286 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and rev'd on other gmunds, 425 U.S. 308
(HJ76).
4
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The IVIorris Rules set forth a classification process and categories (A through
D) 	(ll1onis 	I 	at 	8G5-71); 	disciplinary 	procedures 	including 	a 	hearing before 	a
disciplinary board of three members-tho deputy warden and two members from the
custody and treatment departments (Jc/_ at 872); limits on placement in punitive
segregation of thirty clays (/d. at 87 4); and minimum standards of confinement while
in punitive segregation. 	ECF No. 25-2 at 27.
On 	April 20, 	1972, 	the 	Court entered its 	final 	decree 	and a 	declaratory
judgment. 6 See ll1onis v. Travisono, 373 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D.R.I. 1974) ("ll1onis II').
The 	Court 	found 	this 	judgment 	"the 	authoritative 	final 	decree 	judicially
determinative of the rights and obligations of the parties." 	Id at 182.
Because 	an 	"extensive riot" occurred 	at the 	ACI 	in April 	1973, 	the 	ACI
suspended· the. lVIorris Rules, "without filing any Motion to modify or vacate [the]
Court's judgment of April 20, 1972." 	ll1onis II at 179. 	After the rioting ended, the
Morris Rules were not reinstated, prompting the prisoners to request reinstatement
from the Court. 	See id. 	In reviewing this request, the Court found that its order
"precluded the Defendants from summarily suspending the Rules." 	Id at 182. 	In
response to the RIDOC's suspension of the Morris Rules, the 	Court invoked its
"residual 	power 	to 	now 	issue 	a 	permanent 	injunction." 	Id 	The 	"permanent
G "ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECLARED, AND DECRED. 	The Plaintiffs and
members of their class are entitled to those minimum procedural safeguards with
respect 	to 	classification and 	discipline 	as 	are 	set 	out 	in 	the 	classification and
disciplinary rules of the 'Regulations Goveming Disciplinary, Classifications, and
Mail and Procedures for all inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions . 	"'
11101n's II at 179, n.l.
5
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injunction [was] against suspension of the l:Vlorris Rules." 	lifon·is v. Travisono, 509
F.2d 1358, 1360 (1st Cir. 1975) ("Manis IfF).
In reviewing the 	District Court's permanent injunction incorporating the
Morris Rules, the First Circuit chastised the RIDOC because it "simply determined,
on [its] own initiative to scrap the [Morris] Rules and, in effect, to disregard the
obligations imposed by the consent decree." 	lifonis III at 1360.
[W]o find inexplicable [D]efendants' failure to approach tho Court in an
effort to explain their difficulties and to secure an adjudication of their
continuing obligations. 	* * * Where the state officials erred was in
failing to accord proper deference to the judicial decree. 	Distaste for the
Rules did not allow defendants simply to disregard the court's judgment
of April 20, 1972, and the Fourteenth Amendment rights declared under
that judgment. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 	To the extent the Rules seemed
unduly burdensome, the state had to seek their modification by legal
means. 	* * * [T]he contention that the Morris Rules themselves may be
eliminated under state law is without merit. 	* * * Tho :Morris Rules,
including tho emergency provisions, embodied a binding declaration of
constitutional rights and were part of a judgment; 	* * * Defendants
cannot unilaterally order the elimination of rights in fedora! courts
simply because the consent decree was to be enforced through state
machinery.
Id. at 1361.
The next time the Morris Rules required court attention was five years Ia ter
in 1980. An ACI inmate asked the Court to adjudge the RIDOC in civil contempt for
failing to follow the Morris Rules. Jlfonis v. Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149 (D.R.I. 1980)
("lifOJns IV'). 	The Court found the RIDOC had "violated several provisions of the
Morris Rules." 	!d. at 157. The Court ordered compliance and warned that "[f]ailure
to comply shall result in a finding of contempt." !d. at 159.
6
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A decade passes before the courts were confronted with a Morris Rule issue
again. 	In 1991, the First Circuit, in finding that the J\llorris Rules "endowed inmates
at tho ACI ... with a liberty interest in remaining in the general population,"7 stated
again the axiom that the Morris Rules "cannot be modified without application to a
federal judge." Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 27·28 (1st Cir. 1991). In the opinion,
the First Circuit noted that:
The history of the Morris Rules reflects just such a process: the inmates
agreed to drop their class action against prison officials and abandon
their damage claims in exchange for the State's agreement to institute,
and thereafter abide by, the Morris Rules. 	. . . 	Having willingly, if
unenthusiastically, 	negotiated 	an 	end 	to 	aclversarial 	litigation 	and
them by fathered the Morris Rules, the State cannot now disinherit the
obligations which those rules impose by the simple expedient of claiming
that 	the 	court 	created 	the 	Morris 	Rules 	by 	a 	sort 	of immaculate
conception.
Id at 28·29.
How the courts dealt with the I'I'Iorris Rules changed in 1992. In dismissing an
inmate's motion to adjudge the RIDOC in contempt for violating provisions of tho
Morris Rules, the District Court ruled that "state prisoner actions alleging violations
of the Morris Rules or seeking enforcement of those rules properly belong in state
court because the rules were promulgated under state law and were meant to be dealt
7 This finding was questioned after the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). See Heon v. Vase, No. 95·2137 (1st Cir. August 12,
1996). 	In Sandin, the Supreme Court abandoned the analysis previously used to
determine the existence of state·createcl due process liberty interests, on which the
findings in Rodiwere based, and instead found that principles of clue process would
only be implicated if the restrictions placed on an inmate by prison officials imposed
an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life." 	Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
7
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with by state machinery." 	Cugh1i v. Ventetualo, 781 F. Supp. 107, 113 (D.R.I. 1992). 8
The RIDOC appealed the case to the First Circuit, which affirmed but not because
the Morris Rules were unenforceable in federal court. 	Cugini v. Ventetuala, 966 F.2d
1440 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 	Instead, the First Circuit found, with respect to
the plaintiffs claim of a constitutional deprivation, that the complaint did not satisfy
the 	t·equisite 	showing 	that 	'"with 	convincing 	particularity"' 	there 	was 	'"some
likelihood ... that the defendants disregarded Morris procedures ..."' 	Id. (citing
Palmigiana v. Jl1ullen, 491 F.2d978, 980 (1st Cir. 1974)). The First Circuit also noted
that, even if the plaintiffs complaint was treated as a motion for contempt, it would
still fail because the "prison officials did not disregard the Morris Rules ...." ld. 9
Meanwhile, in Rhode Island state court, because of the federal court's ruling
m 	Cugini, inmates filed cases seeking to enforce the Morris Rules and to receive
damages for their violation. 	Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
8 	Noteworthy 	is 	that 	the 	District 	Court 	cited 	no 	authority 	for 	that
proclamation.
n 	In the summer of 1996, in a series ofthree separate per curiam unpublished
opinions, the First Circuit found no state created liberty interest in the Morris Rules
and therefore no right to enforce them in a damages action under federal law. 	See
Lather v. Vase, 89 F.3d 823 (1st Cir. 1996) (" ... since both the lVIorris rules and the
Rhode Island Administrative Procedure Acts are state laws, the alleged violation of
either, in and of itself, is not a sufficient predicate to sustain a damages action under
federal law. 	Complaints of such violations therefore should be directed to state
court."); Weems v. Vase, 89 F.3d 824 (1st Cir. 1996) ("First, since the Morris [R]ules
are state law, an alleged violation of them, without more, is not a sufficient predicate
to sustain a damag·es action under federal law. 	Complaints of such violations should
be directed to state court."); Hean v. 	Vase, No. 95·2137 (1st Cir. August 12, 1996)
(Plaintiff has no claim for a "state·created liberty interest enabling him to due process
protection under the classification provision of state prison regulations (the Morris
Rules)" 	because 	the 	U.S. 	Supreme 	Court 	adopted 	an 	"atypical 	and 	significant
hardship" standard in Sandin).
8
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"the lVIorris Rules which constitute a federal construct, enforced eventually by a
permanent 	injunction 	in 	A10Jn's IV, 	are 	binding 	upon 	the 	/RI]DOC and 	arc
enforceable for violation ofsuch rules by contempt proceedings in the Federal Distn'ct
Court." 	L'Heureux v. State Dep't of Con, 708 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I. 1998) (emphasis
added). 	The court went on to conclude that the state courts had no role in enforcing
the Manis Rules. 	Jd.
So by the late 1990's, pnsoners with the RIDOC were told by the federal
district court to seek redress for violations of the Morris Rules in state court ( Cugim),
and by tho Rhode Island Supreme Court to go to federal court (L'Heureux).
Beginning in 1995, the RIDOC unilaterally changed tho Morris Rules without
notice to the parties or the Court. 	ECF No. 44 at 7·8. 	It eliminated the need for a
three·member 	disciplinary 	board 	and 	tho 	thirty·day 	limitation 	on 	punitive
segregation. Jd.I 0 The RIDOC did not ask the Court to amend or alter the court order
establishing the Ivlorris Rules. 11 	And the RIDOC did not file the new regulations
under the state's Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 	Id. at 7.
II. 	ANALYSIS
The MoJTis Rules as a Court Order
Mr. Paiva contends that the :Morris Rules, initially contained in a consent
decree, subsequently became an order of this Court when it issued an injunction
10 The current RIDOC rules on discipline that appear to have supplanted the
Morris Rules can bo found at ECF No. 25·4.
II To this date, despite "suggestions" from the Court on at least two occasions,
tho State has not filed a Motion to Amend or Alter the Court's injunction in the Af01n's
case. 	See, e.g, ECF No. 44 at 9·12.
9
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,
incorporating them. ECF No. 25·1 at 2. He also asserts that this Court and the First
Circuit have been clear that the RIDOC needs court approval before substantively
changing the Morris Rules. See id at 2, 5-7. He asserts that the RIDOC intentionally
ignored and violated this Court's order when it unilaterally changed the Morris Rules
and subjected him to discipline in violation of the Morris Rules as ordered by this
Court. Id. at 3-4. Finally, he contends that RIDOC's claim that the Iviorris Rules are
state law to be enforced in state court is disingenuous, when it knows that the Rhode
Island Supremo Court ruled it had no jurisdiction over the Iviorris Rules and that
claimants needed to seek relief in federal court because the Morris Rules were part
of a federal court order. 	ECF No. 55 at 7·8.
The RIDOC contends that the Morris Rules are state regulations, not subject
to federal review and that they need not seek cot1rt approval for changes in the Morris
Rules that do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 	ECF No. 27 at 2. 	It
asserts that in effect the Morris Rules are moot, considering subsequent United State
Supreme Court precedence, specifically, the opinion in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995). 	Id. at 3.
After 	extensive 	briefing from 	both parties 	(with 	Mr. 	Paiva 	representing
himself)t2 and two hearings, the Court is now able to rule on Mr. Paiva's motion.
The underlying initial question posed by Mr. Paiva's motion and framed by the
First Circuit's judgment and remand here, is whether the RIDOC could change the
12 After this motion was fully briefed and argued, two attorneys entered their
appearances on behalf of Mr. Paiva. 	ECF Nos. 59, 61.
10
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procedures 	mandated by the 	court's 	injunction incorporating the 	Morris Rules,
without seeking permission from the Court. 	See ECF No. 22. 	The United State
Supreme Court offers guidance when it states that there is" ... impressive authority
for the proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and
proper proceedings. 	This is true without regard even for the constitutionality of the
Act under which tho order is issued." 	United States v. United Nfine Workers ofAm.,
330 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1847) (citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 188-80 (1822)).
In Howat, the Supremo Court said:
An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with
equity powers, upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served
upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be
obeyed by them, however erroneous the action of the court may be, even
if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming, but void
law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance to
determine tho question of the validity of the law, and until its decision
is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher
court, 	its 	orders 	based 	on 	its 	decision 	are 	to 	be 	respected, 	and
disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.
258 U.S. at 188-80.
As tho First Circuit guides, "[i]f the court has jurisdiction over the person and
tho subject matter, the interests of orderly government demand that the court's
orders be respected and obeyed." 	Fenws-Lopez v. US. Dist. Court foT Dist. ofPueTto
Rico, 588 F.2d 1087, 1081 (1st Cir. 1878). 	It is axiomatic that to follow tho rule of
law, the RIDOC cannot ignore or disobey an injunction of this Court.
Despite erroneous district court rulings starting with Cugini, the statement by
the First Circuit forty-five years ago in Nfonis III remains true today. 	Without a
11
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court "adjudication of their continuing obligations," the RIDOC cannot unilaterally,
without court notice or permission, substantively changed the Morris Rules. 	ll1on1·s
III at 1361. 	In doing so, the RIDOC has failed "to accord proper deference to the
judicial decree." 	Id
In support of its objection to !VIr. Paiva's motions, the RIDOC makes several
claims. 	H first makes a series of arguments refuting the substance of the injunction,
claiming that "it is inappropriate to restrict prison officials to make a wide range of
decisions that do not reach a constitutional dimension" and that "running of state
detention facilities and the imposition of discipline are state functions only subject to
federal 	authority when paramount federal or constitutional or statutory 	rights
supervene." 	ECF No. 27 at 2. The RIDOC also asserts that because there is no state
created liberty interest under the Morris Rules, the Supreme Court's precedent from
Sandin requires that a prisoner show that prison officials imposed an atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, in order to
show a protected liberty interest. Id at 3. Consequently, the RIDOC argues whether
the 19741Vlorris injunction remains in effect is essentially moot. 	Jd.
The RIDOC's substantive arguments may well have merit, but they cannot be
asserted by violating an existing court order. If the law has changed, if circumstances
have changed, if new arguments need to be made, the rule of law does not allow tho
government-or any party-unilaterally to 	disregard 	a 	Court order. 	The proper
remedy is to seek a modification or vacation of the order. 	After the orderly filing of
motions, objections, and arguments the Court can determine whether to modify its
12
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order, not one of the parties changing the order sua sponte.
The RIDOC next argues that not all changes in the Morris Rt1les should require
the Court's involvement. 	See ECF No. 27 at 2-3 (citing JYionis II at 185 and A1onis
III at 1362). 	The flaw with the RIDOC argument is that these were not minor
changes of insignificant effect. 	The changes at issue go to the heart of the consent
decree, which was fiercely negotiated. As discussed further below, the RIDOC should
have first requested judicial guidance to determine whether such changes were
permissible.
Lastly, the RIDOC argues that the lVIorris Rules are state rules-state law-and
therefore, the Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 35
at 3·4. 	'While the Morris Rules were to be adopted by the state through its APA
process, the lVIorris Rules became an order of this Court-an injunction~when the
RIDOC suspended them without Court notice. 	JYionis II at 182. 	With that order in
place, jurisdiction is vested squarely in this Cot1rt, where Mr. Paiva now seeks to hold
the RIDOC in contempt.
Civil Contempt
The Court may impose civil contempt "to compel compliance with a court order
or to compensate a party harmed by non-compliance." 	United States v. Saccoccia,
433 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing JYicComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S.
187 (1949)). 	But "(r]ecognizing the contempt power's virility and damage potential,
courts 	have 	created 	a 	number 	prudential 	principles 	designed 	to 	oversee 	its
deployment" and require a movant to show, with clear and convincing evidence, that
13
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(1) 	the alleged contemnor had notice of the order, 	(2) "the order was clear and
unambiguous," (3) the alleged contemnor "had the ability to comply with the order,"
and (4) tho alleged contemnor violated the order. 	I d. (citing Project B.A.S.l C. 	v.
Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1991)).
In considering each prong, the Court first notes that the RIDOC had notice of
the 	order 	as 	it 	was 	the 	party 	who 	agreed 	to 	the 	!'dorris 	Rules 	"willingly, 	if
unenthusiastically" to facilitate "an end to adversariallitigation." 	Rocb; 941 F.2d at
27. The RIDOC was also involved in each ensuing court proceeding that involved the
Morris Rules, including when the Court made tho injunction permanent in 1974.
Aside from the violations in the previously discussed cases, the RIDOC lived with the
Niorris Rules for twenty years-from the time the injunction was made permanent
until the substantive changes were made in 1995-showing it had the ability to
comply. 	And as discussed above, in unilaterally, without court notice or permission,
changing the substance of the Morris Rules, the RIDOC violated the existing court
order.
The final prong, which gives the Court pause, questions whether "the order
was clear and unambiguous." 	See Saccocda, 433 F.3cl at 27. 	As for this prong, the
First Circuit has stated that "[t]he test is whether the putative contemnor is 'able to
ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden."' 	Goya
Foods, Inc. v. 	Wallack ll1gmt. Co., 290 F.3cl 63, 76 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting G1Jday v.
Dubojs, 124 F.3cl 277, 282 (1st Cir.1997)). 	Because of the damaging consequences of
a contempt finding, "courts must 'read court decrees to mean rather precisely what
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they say,"' to "narrowly cabinO the circumstances in which contempt may be found."
Saccoccia, 433 F.3d at 27 (citing Project B.A.Sl C., 947 F.2d at 17). 	In noting that
"[t)he judicial contempt power is a potent weapon," the Supreme Court has warned
that. "[w)hen it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be deadly
.... " Int'J Longshoremen's Ass11 v. PhJla.l11an·ne 7'radeAss11, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967).
So any ambiguities or omissions in a court order must be read to tho benefit of the
person charged with contempt. 	NBA Properties, Inc. 	v. Gold, 895 F.2d 30, 32 (1st
Cir.Hl90).
The RIDOC asserts that the order enjoining it from suspending the Morris
Rules was not "clear and unambiguous." 	ECF No. 53 at 12·14. 	Because of the
inconsistencies in the caselaw, the Court finds this argument compelling, particularly
with respect to when the RIDOC could change the Morris Rules without permission
from the Court.
When the permanent injunction was affirmed by the First Circuit in 1975, the
First Circuit emphasized the inappropriateness of restricting the ability of prison
officials to make a wide range of decisions not of constitutional dimension and
expressed agreement with the district court's intention to promulgate "a procedural
guideline by which prison officials may chango the Morris Rules without first seeking
the sanction of the district court" because "not all changes in the lVIorris Rules should
require [the Court's) approval." 111onis III at 1362. Such procedural guideline never
appears to have been memorialized. 	ECF No. 53 at 11.
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Ambiguity later arose after the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Sandin, when
the First Circuit recognized that the lVIorris Rules no longer entitled prisoners to a
"state-created liberty interest." 	See Heon v. Vase, No. 95·2137 (1st Cir. August 12,
199G) (denial of petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S.
at 1172). As such, changes to the lVIorris Rules would no longer impact a constitutional
t·ight unless such changes imposed an "atypical and significant hardship ... in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 	Jd. 	If the intended procedural
guideline 	had been 	memorialized to 	allow prison officials 	unilaterally 	to make
changes to the Morris Rules not of a constitutional dimension, then it would follow
that the RIDOC could make such changes so long as they did not violate the limitation
set forth in Sandin.
Armed with the Sandin ruling, the language from the First Circuit in 111onis
III, and the District Court's mistaken suggestion in Cugini that the Morris Rules
were not contained in, or part of, a court decree, the RIDOC believed it was free
unilaterally to make "revisions to its internal classification and disciplinary policies
in executing its state function of operating a prison" so long as such revisions did not
result in a constitutional harm. 	ECF No. 27 at 2·3. 	The problem with that belief,
however, was that the RIDOC was the one determining which revisions could result
in a constitutional harm, without first seeking guidance from the Court. 	~With the
permanent injunction in place, the RIDOC did not have that ft·eedom, and, as the
First Circuit noted in Jl1mn's III, "access to the district court has been, and remains,
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available 	to 	a 	party 	seeking 	to 	establish 	what 	in 	the 	:Morris 	Rules 	1s 	now
constitutionally necessary and what is not." Nfonis III at 1362.
While the Court finds that the RIDOC should have first requested judicial
guidance 	before 	making substantive changes to 	the 	iVIorris 	Rules 	to 	determine
whether such changes wore of constitutional dimension, it recognizes the ambiguity
because of the caselaw over time. Thus, despite finding that the RIDOC violated the
consent decree and judicial order, the Court declines to make a finding of contempt
because the order was not "clear and unambiguous" as to when the RIDOC could
change tho :Morris Rules without permission from the Court.l 3
III. 	CONCLUSION
After reviewing the extensive history of the Morris Rules, and responding to
tho First Circuit's directive, the Court makes the following findings and declarations.
1. 	The First Circuit directed this Court to determine if the injunction against
suspension of the Morris Rules is still in effect. 	ECF No. 22. 	The Court finds that
the final decree, judgment, and injunction entered by this Court on March 8, 1974 in
J11onis II remains unaltered and in full force and effect and that the injunction has
"not. expired or been tenninated."
2. 	The 	RIDOC 	violated 	the 	injunction 	and 	order 	of this 	Court 	when 	it
unilaterally and without Court permission disregarded the Court's injunction by
J:l In making this finding, the Court also notes that the information that Mr.
Paiva hopes to obtain in his request for limited post·juclgment discovery would not
aiel in the judgment of the motions currently before the Court. 	ECF No. 66. 	That
request is thus denied as moot.
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substantively changing the Morris Rules.
3. 	It. is unclisputecl that the RIDOC violated the Morris Rules when Mr. Paiva
was given more than thirty clays in disciplinary segregation and when a single officer
heard his appeal of the discipline instead of a three-member panel.
4. 	The 	Court 	orders 	the 	RIDOC 	to 	reinstate 	the 	Morris 	Rules 	as 	its
disciplinary policy in their entirety and without modification within thirty clays of
this Order.
5. 	Despite finding that the RIDOC violated the consent decree and judicial
order, the Court declines to make a finding of contempt because the order was not
"clear and unambiguous" as to when the RIDOC could change the Morris Rules
without permission from the Court. 	Mr. Paiva's Amended :Motion for Further Relief;
Motion for Contempt, as supplemented, is thus DENIED. 	ECF Nos. 4, 25, and 26.
6. 	The Court DENIES Mr. Paiva's request for any further relief at this time,
including 	the 	vacation 	and 	expungement 	from 	his 	institutional 	record 	of the
disciplinary convictions decided in violation of the l'l'lorris Rules. 	Mr. Paiva is free to
file a motion seeking any further relief he deems warranted, which the Court will
consider in a manner consistent with this Order.
7. 	Finally, the Court DENIES as moot Mr. Paiva's motion for leave to conduct
limited post·judgment discovery. 	ECF No. 66.
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~~-~---~~_2~~d------=-t~
,John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
January 28, 2020
r
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