Maccarone v. Siemens Industry, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

)
ANN MARIE MACCARONE, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 20-259-JJM-LDA
)
SIEMENS INDUSTRY, INC., )
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief Judge, United States District Court.

Ann Marie Maccarone formerly worked at Siemens Industry, Inc. (“Siemens”)
as a union electrician. She brings a claim against her former employer for unpaid
wages and sex discrimination under several state and federal causes of action. The
Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Siemens’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. ECF No. 21.

Siemens employed Ms. Maccarone as a journeyman wireman electrician
beginning in May 2016. Her job duties primarily involved maintaining and repairing
streetlights, i.e., converting them to light emitting diode streetlights. During her two-
years of employment, Ms. Maccarone alleges that she was not paid for work
performed or for overtime because Siemens’ system for recording the time,
mCompanion, did not work properly for her. She also alleges that she was mistreated
due her gender. Ms. Maccarone resigned from her job in May 2018.

Ms. Maccarone sued in state court, which Siemens then removed to this Court

based on federal question jurisdiction. Her Complaint contains five counts:

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Count I: Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“FLSA”);

Count II: Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-12-1
(““RIMWA”) and the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Act, R.I.
Gen. Laws § 28-14-1 (“RIPWA”);

Count III: Rhode Island Prevailing Wages Law, R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-13-17
(“RIPWL”);

Count IV: Rhode Island Civil Rights’ Act for gender discrimination, R.I.
Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 (“RICRA”); and

Count V: Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-
50-1 “RIWPA”).

Siemens moved for summary judgment on all counts, which the Court will
address here in the order they appear in the complaint.
I, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls in deciding whether a
party is entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jd. More
particularly,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When deciding whether the Court
should grant summary judgment, the Court must “view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 68 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted). As alluded to, there must first be no genuine issues of material fact. “[MJere

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

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otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of materia/fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, the issue must be genuine and
material. See id. “In this context, ‘genuine’ means that the evidence about the fact
is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party
‘(M]aterial’ means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Morris v. Govt Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
II. DISCUSSION
A. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Count I)
1. Statute of Limitations
Siemens seeks to limit the span of Ms. Maccarone’s claims period because of
the two-year statute of limitations for FLSA claims. That would mean that, because
she filed suit on April 10, 2020, her claim period would run for six weeks from
April 10, 2018 and end on May 27, 2018, the day she quit. Ms. Maccarone advocates
that a three-year statute of limitations applies to FLSA claims where an employer
“knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the FLSA.” McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 130 (1988)
(quoting Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 82 (1986)). By her calculation, she

alleges she is owed back wages for a little more than a year—from April 10, 2017 until

May 27, 2018.

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Ms. Maccarone argues that there is sufficient evidence in the record that a jury
could reasonably decide that Siemens acted willfully in failing to pay her the proper
wage. Essentially, she asserts that she consistently complained that her time was
not being recorded correctly in mCompanion and she could not get mCompanion to
work for her, but Siemens did nothing in response. Siemens knew her time was not
being recorded and that she was not being fully paid and, in choosing to ignore it,
recklessly disregarded that violation. Siemens responds by claiming that the
evidence does not show that it acted willfully, but that her pay irregularities stemmed
from user error because Ms. Maccarone did not enter her time correctly into
mCompanion.

Based on the record as it stands, there are disputed issues of fact as to Siemens’
intent or state of mind during the time in question. “Where questions of fact are
presented, statute of limitations defenses are ordinarily submitted to the jury.”
Meléndez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., 273 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2001). It
is unclear which version is factually correct so the Court will defer this factual dispute
to the jury’s determination.

2. Wage Claims

Next, Siemens argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Ms. Maccarone’s wage claims because there is no evidence in the record that Siemens
owes her any additional compensation. Siemens urges the Court to discount and
discard Ms. Maccarone’s evidence and testimony about hours she worked for which

Siemens did not pay her as inadmissible and self-serving, but they do raise disputes

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about the material facts that she needs to prove her wage claims. These disputes are
better decided by a jury who will listen to her testimony, along with whatever
admissible evidence she may seek to introduce or use to refresh her recollection, to
determine whether her testimony and supporting evidence is credible. Likewise, a
jury could consider all the facts that Siemens claims discredits her records and find
that Ms. Maccarone has not met her burden. Considering these disputes, the Court
DENIES entering summary judgment on Ms. Maccarone’s FLSA wage claims in
Count I.
B. STATE LAW WAGE CLAIMS (Counts II & IIT)

Ms. Maccarone brings two claims under three state laws alleging that Siemens
did not properly pay her under the CBA. Siemens moves for summary judgment on
these claims, arguing that they are preempted under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) because they require interpretation of the CBA
to be resolved. Section 801 specifically allows “[sluits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ....” 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a). “In creating § 301 of the LMRA, Congress intended ‘that a comprehensive,
unified, body of federal law should govern actions concerning the interpretation and
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.” Fant v. New England Power Serv.
Co., 239 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting The Developing Labor Law, at 1698-99
(Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) (1971)). Thus, § 301 preempts a state law
claim when “the asserted state law claim plausibly can be said to depend upon the

meaning of one or more provisions within the collective bargaining agreement.”

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Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc., 648 F.3d 50, 54—55 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Flibotte v. Pa. Truck Lines, Inc., 131 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1997)).

A state law claim can “depend on the meaning” of a CBA if either (1) “it alleges
conduct that arguably constitutes a breach of duty that arises pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement,” or (2) “its resolution arguably hinges upon an interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement.” Jd. “In deference to the agreed-to remedies,
courts ordinarily dismiss claims falling within such provisions—namely, those
intertwined with interpretation and application of the CBA—so long as relief can be
provided within the CBA process.” Cavallaro v. UMass Mem Healthcare, Inc., 678
F.3d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 2012) (describing this process as preemption, deference, or
exhaustion). However, if a “state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the
agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption
purposes.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988).

Ms. Maccarone’s claims are rooted in her allegations that Siemens failed to pay
her correct pay rate, failed to pay for all the hours she worked performing non-
electrical work, and failed to pay her overtime for hours worked more than eight
hours per day. Article 3 of the CBA specifically addresses all her wage claims.
Sections 3.01 (a) & (b) of the CBA defines and discusses the parameters of overtime
pay, employee shifts, and workday and work week schedules that would dictate
Ms. Maccarone’s pay. See ECF No. 22-7 at 9. And Section 3.12 (b) outlines an
alternate “prevailing practice” governing overtime pay as contemplated by the

RIPWL § 37-13-10. /d at 18. The resolution of her state statutory claims based on

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allegations that Siemens failed to pay her correct pay rate, failed to pay for all the
hours she worked performing non-electrical work, and failed to pay her overtime for
hours worked in excess of eight hours per day are dependent on an interpretation of
the CBAs’ terms and on the contractual labor relationship between Ms. Maccarone
and Siemens. Cavallaro, 678 F.3d at8 (whether wages are owed implicated
“peculiarities of industry-specific wage and benefit structures” found in the CBA so
required interpretation); Rose v. RTN Fed. Credit Union, 1 F.4th 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2021)
(overtime); Adames v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 258 F.3d 7, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (overtime);
Hamilton v. Partners Healthcare Sys., 209 F. Supp. 3d 397, 410 (D. Mass. 2016)
(underpayment of wages and overtime). Therefore, because the Court would have to
interpret the terms of the CBA to resolve her RIPWL, RIPWA, RIMWA claims, it
finds that Ms. Maccarone’s state law claims against Siemens are preempted under
§ 301 and dismisses Counts IJ and III.

C. RICRA CLAIM FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (Count IV)

“The Rhode Island Civil Rights Act provides broad protection against all forms
of discrimination in all phases of employment.” Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police
Dep’, 639 A.2d 1379, 1381 (R.I. 1994). In a gender-based disparate treatment claim
based on the three-step McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1978)
burden:shifting framework, Ms. Maccarone must first set forth a prima facie case.
She must prove that she is a member of a protected class, she was satisfactorily
performing her job, she suffered an adverse employment action and her employer
tried to replace her with a comparable individual. Smith v. Stratus Comput., Inc., 40

F.3d 11, 15 (ist Cir. 1994); DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I.

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2005). Presuming she meets the low bar of proving a prima facie case, the burden
then shifts to Siemens to put forth a nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. Soto—
Feliciano v. Villa Cotresi Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19, 23 (ist Cir. 2015) (citing St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)). Siemens has done that so then
Ms. Maccarone must show that the stated reason is pretext for gender discrimination.
She may try to show “that others similarly situated to hler] in all relevant respects
were treated differently by the employer.” Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 381 F.3d 207,
214 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st
Cir. 1999)).

“Reasonableness is the touchstone’ when considering comparators in a
disparate treatment case; that is, ‘while the plaintiff's case and the comparison cases
that [s]he advances need not be perfect replicas, they must closely resemble one
another in respect to relevant facts and circumstances.” Fay v. Ropes & Gray LLP,
799 F.3d 99, 114 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Conward, 171 F.3d at 20). The Court asks
whether “a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them
roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated.” Dartmouth Review v.
Dartmouth Coll, 889 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by

Educadores Puertorriquetios en Accién v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2004).

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To support her claim of gender discrimination, Ms. Maccarone submits these

facts:

33. Plaintiff knows of one man who entered the time into his time sheet
portion of mCompanion and was paid where she wasn’t.

KKEEKK

36. Plaintiff testified that she was the only person with a pay problem
that was not addressed and the only one give[n] more work than

anybody else.

37. To Plaintiffs knowledge, men either did conversion or outage work,
not both, but she had to do both.

38. Plaintiff was told that she was the only person doing outage work by
Defendant’s employee Alexis on numerous occasions.

39. When men made complaints about not getting correct state taxes
taken out of their check, it was fixed.

EKEKE

41. Plaintiff worked by herself. Plaintiff did the inventory of the
warehouse, the unloading of the trucks, and pick-ups of items at FedEx
and men didn't.

42. Plaintiff did the work for Siemen’s [sic] in the entire state of Rhode
Island and did not get help.

ECF No. 27 at 4-5. Each of these facts is supported solely by Ms. Maccarone’s own
deposition testimony. ECF No. 27-1. There is no evidence in the record on which a
jury could reasonably conclude that the unidentified men Ms. Maccarone speaks of in

her deposition are appropriate comparators in any respect. There is no evidence

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before the Court upon which a jury could reasonably determine that any of those
incidents cited by Ms. Maccarone are roughly equivalent.

Ms. Maccarone also alleged that the Siemens’ work environment was hostile
such that she felt discriminated against due to her gender. “[Dliscriminatory conduct
[that is] so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to
employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VIT’s
broad rule of workplace equality.” O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728
(1st Cir. 2001) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)). To succeed
in a hostile work environment claim, Ms. Maccarone must prove: “(1) that she (or he)
is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiffs
employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable
conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person
would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6)
that some basis for employer liability has been established.” O'Rourke, 235 F.3d
at 728.

Upon reviewing the entire summary judgment record, the Court does not find
any evidence sufficient to establish a claim of hostile work environment. There is no
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Maccarone faced
unwelcome sexual harassment or that the harassment was severe or pervasive

enough to alter the conditions of her employment and created an abusive work

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environment. Ms. Maccarone’s claim under RICRA for discrimination based on
gender fails for lack of proof; the Court DISMISSES Count IV.
D. RIWPA CLAIM (Count V)

Finally, Siemens moves for summary judgment on Ms. Maccarone’s RIWPA
claim. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1. Ms. Maccarone asserts that she repeatedly
complained to Siemens employees about its failure to pay her correctly. To make out
a prima facie case under the RIWPA, Ms. Maccarone must demonstrate that (1) she
engaged in protected whistleblowing conduct as defined by that statute; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action at the time or later; and (3) the adverse action
was causally related to the protected conduct. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq.

Ms. Maccarone has not produced evidence of either an adverse employment
action or for causation as the statute requires. She voluntarily resigned and despite
blaming her resignation on Siemens’ failure to pay her, a voluntary resignation has
not been found to be tantamount to an adverse employment action and thus cannot
support a RIWPA claim. See Cohen v. FGX Int Inc., No. 18-380 WES, 2019 WL
2526728, at *7 (D.R.I. June 17, 2019). Alternatively, Ms. Maccarone states that the
adverse employment action was Siemens not paying her what she was legally owed.
But that is not an adverse employment action under the RIWPA either-—it is the action
giving rise to this complaint. And even if that were considered an adverse
employment action, nothing in the record suggests that Siemens took any adverse
employment action (like refusing to pay her wages she was owed) because she

complained to Siemens employees about wages that she was legally owed. The Court

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finds that Siemens is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Maccarone’s RIWPA
claim. Count V is DISMISSED.
III. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Siemens’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. ECF No. 21. Counts II, III, IV, and V are dismissed; Count I

remains.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge

December 15, 2023

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