Briggs v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
SIMEON J. BRIGGS, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	C.A. No. 22-31WES
:
RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF 	:
CORRECTIONS, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Simeon J. Briggs has filed an Amended Complaint in this Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 ECF No. 3. He alleges that he is a severely and persistently mentally ill
(“SPMI”) inmate who was harassed, assaulted and transferred to a prison in Virginia by the
Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”), its Director (Patricia Coyne-Fague) and its
Administrator of Classification Service (Linda Amado). His Amended Complaint is
accompanied by an Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit, which has
been referred to me. ECF Nos. 4-5 (“IFP Application”). Plaintiff’s Motion for the Appointment
of Counsel (ECF No. 7) was also referred to me. Because of the IFP Application, the Court is
required to screen the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that he was involuntarily transferred by RIDOC
from custody in Rhode Island to custody in a facility in Virginia with the approval of Defendant
Amado and with the knowledge after the fact of Defendant Coyne-Fague. ECF No. 3 at 8-9.
Plaintiff claims that the transfer was implemented without his having first been provided with
1 Plaintiff is suing as a pro se prisoner. Therefore, the Court has reviewed his filings with the leniency required for
all pro se litigants. Instituto de Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
Case 1:22-cv-00031-WES-PAS Document 9 Filed 03/16/22 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
notice, an administrative hearing and a written statement of the reasons for the transfer. Id.
Plaintiff contends that pre-transfer notice and hearing and a written statement of reasons are
required by RIDOC Policy 15.03-2 (“Out-of-State Transfer”) and that the failure to comply with
this Policy violated his Constitutional right to due process of law. Id. at 8. In Virginia, Plaintiff
alleges that he is away from family and unable to access the programing, schooling and work
opportunities that he was getting while in RIDOC’s custody in Rhode Island. Id. at 9. Plaintiff
also complains that the inmate locator for him has been turned off and he “is being spoken about
as a (PC) Protective Custody which is putting his safety in harms way.” Id.
II. 	Standard of Review
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §
1915(e)(2) and § 1915A is identical to the standard used when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Chase v. Chafee, No. CA 11-586ML, 2011 WL 6826504, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2011). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. However, the court is not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The tenet that the court
is required to accept all of the (well-pled) allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Id.
Case 1:22-cv-00031-WES-PAS Document 9 Filed 03/16/22 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
III. 	Law and Analysis
It is well settled that the transfer of a prisoner from a state prison in one state to one in a
different state does not implicate a liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 240, 248 (1983). The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees procedural due process only to protect a substantive interest
to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement, id. at 250, and it is well settled that
prison officials may transfer a prisoner “for whatever reason or for no reason at all.” Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976). There can be no Due Process Clause violation when there is
no constitutional liberty interest for process to protect.2 Olim, 461 U.S. at 249. While a state
may choose to require procedures for reasons other than protection against deprivation of
substantive rights, as Plaintiff claims Rhode Island has done for out-of-state transfers, in making
that choice the state does not create an independent substantive right. See id. at 250-51 (citing
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983)). Put differently, the fact that Rhode Island has
created a procedural prerequisite to out-of-state transfers does not create a liberty interest that is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at
471. Because an inmate “has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any
particular State,” the Due Process Clause does not, “in and of itself, give rise to any protected
liberty interest in remaining in-state to serve a prison sentence.” Gibbs v. Zenk, Civil No. 17-
CV-299-PB, 2018 WL 3946517, at *3 (D.N.H. June 28, 2018) (quoting Olim, 461 U.S. at 245,
2 This principle is not unfamiliar to Plaintiff. In 2009, he sued Rhode Island prison officials, inter alia, for violating
his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him in the High Security Center
without a classification board hearing. Briggs v. Wall, C.A. No. 09-456 S, 2009 WL 4884529, at *4 (D.R.I. Dec.
16, 2009). In reliance on Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225, this Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim because due process protections apply only to protect a liberty or
property interest and, as to the location of confinement, “neither the constitution nor Rhode Island state law create a
liberty interest in a prison-inmate classification housing procedure.” Briggs, 2009 WL 4884529, at *4.
Case 1:22-cv-00031-WES-PAS Document 9 Filed 03/16/22 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
248), adopted sub nom., Gibbs v. NH State Prison, Warden, 2018 WL 3945869 (D.N.H. Aug. 16,
2018).
Based on these well-settled principles, Plaintiff’s allegation that he did not get
appropriate notice, a hearing and a written statement of reasons before the transfer to Virginia
fails to state a § 1983 claim based on a due process violation. Similarly, transfer to a location
further removed from family is not actionable because an inmate does not have a liberty interest
in unfettered visitation that is protected by the Constitution. Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Gibbs, 2018 WL 3946517, at *3.
The balance of Plaintiff’s claims (harassment, assault, turning off the inmate locator and
references to him as being in protective custody) are vaguely stated and utterly lacking in
supportive facts. The Court cannot ascertain whether these are actions of officials in Virginia or
why the named Defendants in this case could be liable for them. To assert a claim for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must assert facts that allow the Court to find that it is plausible
that the Rhode Island Defendants named in this case are responsible for the conduct alleged, that
the risk of harm created by the conduct was foreseeable, and “that there was some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Cty. of L.A., Calif. v. Mendez,
137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548-49 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The concerns
Plaintiff has highlighted – harassment and assault, Plaintiff’s appearance on an inmate locator
and references to him as being in protective custody – are not alleged in a manner that states a
claim that they were a foreseeable consequence of the transfer or of other conduct for which the
named Defendants are alleged to be responsible. See Gibbs, 2018 WL 3946517, at *5.
IV. 	Conclusion
Case 1:22-cv-00031-WES-PAS Document 9 Filed 03/16/22 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim cognizable in this Court. Because it is conceivable
that he may be able to articulate facts sufficient to state a viable claim, I recommend that the
Court order that he has thirty days from the adoption of this report and recommendation to file a
Second Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff timely files a viable Second Amended Complaint, the
IFP motion should be granted, and the case may proceed, including the motion for counsel,
which will be addressed. If he fails to do so or if he files a Second Amended Complaint that still
fails to state a viable claim, I recommend that the case be DISMISSED and that the IFP
Application (ECF Nos. 4-5) and Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 7) be
DENIED as moot.
Any objection to this report and recommendation must be specific and must be served
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of its receipt. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2); DRI LR Cv 72(d). Failure to file specific objections in a timely manner constitutes
waiver of the right to review by the district judge and the right to appeal the Court’s decision.
See United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2008); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980).
/s/ Patricia A. Sullivan
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
March 16, 2022
Case 1:22-cv-00031-WES-PAS Document 9 Filed 03/16/22 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>