Noel v. United Better Homes, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
ARNOLD A. NOEL
v. Civil No. 1:23-cv-00028-SJM-TLSM
BRIAN COUTCHER, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS
On December 9, 2025, this court issued an Order to Show Cause (Doc. No. 99) directing
self-represented Plaintiff, Arnold A. Noel, to show cause, by December 23, 2025, as to why this
case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Noel failed to respond to the Show Cause
Order. Instead, on December 24, 2025, he filed a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 100),
without an accompanying motion to amend, in which he seeks to assert new claims, unrelated to
the existing claims in this case, against more than eighty entities and individuals, including various
attorneys and law firms, state agencies and officials, state and federal court judges, and employees
from the United States Marshals’ Service. Noel’s conduct is consistent with his prior failures to
comply with this court’s orders and reflects a pattern of failing to pursue his existing claims.
Accordingly, for the reasons detailed below, this court recommends that the district judge dismiss
this action with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
BACKGROUND
Noel initiated this action on January 17, 2023, by filing a complaint against United Better
Homes, LLC (“UBH”), Heriberto Roman (“Roman”), Brian Coutcher, and Derek Moore in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Doc. No. 1. On July 19, 2023, that court
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entered a Pretrial Scheduling Order calling for all fact discovery to be completed by January 19,
2024, all expert discovery to be completed by April 19, 2024, and any dispositive motions to be
filed by May 20, 2024. Doc. No. 10. Noel subsequently amended his complaint and added twelve
new Defendants. Doc. No 16. In his Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in
this action,1 Noel seeks damages from his former employer and various affiliated entities and
individuals for the financial and emotional injuries he claims he suffered as a result of “Defendants’
concerted efforts to defraud, discriminate against, and unjustly enrich themselves” by
misappropriating his intellectual property, maligning his professional reputation, and engaging in
“a series of deceitful, discriminatory, and retaliatory actions.” Id. at ¶ 2.
On January 24, 2024, all judges in the District of Rhode Island recused themselves from
the action, and the case was referred to this court where it was reassigned to a District Judge and
the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Doc. No. 29; Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 5. These developments
necessitated an extension of the pretrial deadlines. Accordingly, on April 4, 2025, this court issued
a Revised Pretrial Scheduling Order directing the parties to complete all fact discovery by August
1, 2025, to complete all expert discovery by November 15, 2025, and to file any dispositive
motions by December 15, 2025. Doc. No. 87.
In the meantime, discovery disputes arose between Noel and two Defendants, UBH and
Roman.2 See Doc. No. 97 at pgs. 2-6. Between March 11, 2024 and April 24, 2025, this court
issued two orders compelling Noel to respond to UBH’s and Roman’s discovery requests, as well
1 Noel moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint on February 2, 2024 (Doc. No. 34)
which this court denied without prejudice on March 11, 2024. Doc. No. 50.
2 The court conducted an informal discovery conference on March 28, 2025. During the
conference, Noel objected strenuously to this court’s jurisdiction and to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge’s failure to recuse herself from this matter based on Noel’s unsubstantiated claims of
collusion between the undersigned and various parties and non-parties.
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as repeated orders directing Noel to provide UBH with signed and sworn copies of his answers to
UBH’s interrogatories. See id. at pgs. 3-7. Notably, on two separate occasions, this court explicitly
cautioned Noel that any failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders “may result in sanctions
up to and including dismissal of this action.” Id. at pgs. 4, 6 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Doc. No.
84 at pg. 8 and Doc. No. 88 at pg. 4). Nevertheless, Noel failed to comply with any of the court’s
discovery orders. Id. at pgs. 6-7. On May 12, 2025, UBH and Roman filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against them, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v), as a sanction for Noel’s
noncompliance. Doc. No. 93. Noel filed no opposition to the motion and on August 15, 2025, this
court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the district judge grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 97. The district judge approved the Report and
Recommendation on October 2, 2025. Doc. No. 98.
On December 8, 2025, this court held a Zoom video conference to address the status of the
case. See Docket Entry dated 12/08/2025. Counsel for four of the remaining Defendants appeared
at the hearing. See id. However, Noel did not appear. Id. Nor did he contact the court to explain
his absence. See id. During the conference, counsel for the Defendants confirmed that Noel
provided no further discovery, as required by this court’s discovery orders. He also reported that
Noel failed to appear at his noticed deposition, and that Defendants received no communication
from Noel since the prior conference before the court on March 28, 2025. Additionally, the record
demonstrates that Noel had no communications with the district court between May 8, 2025, when
he filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis in connection with an appeal of one of this
court’s orders on UBH’s motion to compel, and the December 8, 2025 Zoom video conference.
See Doc. No. 91. Thus, Noel made no attempt to explain his failure to comply with his discovery
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obligations or adhere to the August 1, 2025, discovery deadline contained in the Revised Pretrial
Scheduling Order. Doc. No. 87.
Given Noel’s refusal to comply with his discovery obligations, as well as his apparent
abandonment of his claims against the remaining Defendants, this court issued a Show Cause
Order on December 9, 2025. Doc. No. 99. Therein, this court ordered Plaintiff to show cause, by
December 23, 2025, as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. at pg.
4. This court also warned Noel that “[a]ny failure to do so will likely result in the undersigned
recommending that the district judge dismiss Noel’s claims against all remaining Defendants,
including the three Defendants who were defaulted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and Local
Rule 55(a).”3 Id. at pg. 3.
Noel filed no response to the Show Cause Order. Nor did he engage in any activities aimed
at moving this matter forward. Instead, on December 24, 2025, Noel filed a Third Amended
Complaint, unaccompanied by any motion to amend,4 against more than eighty entities and
individuals, including but not limited to, various attorneys and law firms, state agencies and
officials, state and federal court judges (including those assigned to this case), and unidentified
3 On November 8, 2024, the Clerk entered default against three Defendants pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(a) and Local Rule 55(a). Doc. No. 81. Noel took no further action against those
Defendants.
4 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “Once a party has exhausted
its one-time right to amend as a matter of course, it may make further amendments only with the
opposing party’s consent or with leave of court.” United States ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc.,
802 F.3d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). Because the deadline for
amending his complaint as a matter of course has long expired, Noel was required to obtain
Defendants’ consent or leave of court before filing his Third Amended Complaint. His failure to
do so renders that pleading ineffective.
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employees from the United States Marshals’ Service. Doc. No. 100. Therein, Noel asserts new
claims, unrelated to the claims in this action, arising out of legal proceedings in various state and
federal courts, based on allegations of misconduct by court employees, judges and others.5 See id.
at ¶1 (“This action arises from a continuous course of conduct across Massachusetts state courts,
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, in which jurisdictional safeguards failed, material docket entries were
removed or suppressed, and appellate correction was obstructed.”).
Subsequently, on December 31, 2025, Noel filed a Motion to Compel Issuance of a
Summons. Doc. No. 102. In his motion, Noel seeks an order “compelling the immediate issuance
of summons on the [Third] Amended Complaint” and confirming that “the [Third] Amended
Complaint is the sole operative pleading” in this case. Doc. No. 102 at pg. 2. Once again, Noel
failed to address the Show Cause Order or provide any indication that he intended to pursue his
existing claims against the remaining Defendants. See id. On the contrary, Plaintiff argued that
“[a]n amended complaint, once accepted supersedes all prior pleadings and resets the case to the
pleading and service stage.” Id. at pg. 3. He also asserted that because his Third Amended
Complaint “was accepted for filing and entered on the docket[,]” that Complaint “is the sole
operative pleading in this action.” Id. at pgs. 2-3.
5 Throughout the course of this litigation, Noel has accused judges from the District of Rhode
Island and this court of conspiring against him to undermine his claims. See, e.g., Doc. No. 97 at
pg. 6 n.5. The allegations in the proposed Third Amended Complaint reflect his claims of judicial
bias and improper conduct. See Doc. No. 100 at pg. 2 (alleging that “Orders were entered without
lawful authority, enforcement was executed while appellate rights were pending, and clerks and
counsel acted beyond ministerial functions, resulting in deprivations of due process, property, and
access to the courts.”).
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LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court, as part of its inherent power to manage its own docket, may dismiss a
case sua sponte for any of the reasons prescribed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” Cintrón-Lorenzo v.
Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522, 525-26 (1st Cir. 2002). That Rule
authorizes the district court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, to comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).6 Additionally,
under the Local Rules for the District of Rhode Island, which govern this case, “[t]he Court may
issue an order to show cause at any time as to why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
prosecution. If good cause is not shown within the time prescribed by the show cause order, the
Court may dismiss the case.” DRI LR Cv 41.
Notwithstanding their authority to dismiss a case with prejudice, district courts must remain
mindful of the need to “balance the court’s venerable authority over case management with the
larger concerns of justice, including the strong presumption in favor of deciding cases on the
merits.” Malot v. Dorado Beach Cottages Assocs., 478 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2007). “The
appropriateness of a particular sanction thus depends on the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 43-
44. To assist courts in that endeavor, the First Circuit “ha[s] offered several, non-exhaustive
factors to consider before entertaining dismissal[.]” Vivaldi Servicios de Seguridad v. Maiso Grp.,
Corp., 93 F.4th 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2024). Those factors include: “‘the severity of the violation, . . .
the deliberateness vel non of the misconduct, mitigating excuses, prejudice to the other side and to
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides as follows: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.
Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any
dismissal not under this rule – except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to
join a party under Rule 19 – operates as an adjudication on the merits.”
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the operations of the court, and the adequacy of lesser sanctions.’” Id. (punctuation in original)
(quoting United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 69 F.4th 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2023)).
“Pertinent procedural considerations include ‘whether the offending party was given sufficient
notice and opportunity to explain its noncompliance or argue for a lesser penalty.’” Vallejo v.
Santini-Padilla, 607 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Malloy v. WM Specialty Mortg., 512 F.3d
23, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)); see also Malot, 478 F.3d at 44 (noting “a procedural dimension” to a court’s
consideration of sanctions, “which addresses concerns such as notice, opportunity to be heard, and
the court’s explanation for its choice of sanctions.”). Ultimately, however, district courts are
“given considerable leeway in exercising their admitted authority to punish laggardly or
noncompliant litigants.” Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
I. Application of Substantive Factors to the Circumstances of the Case
Consideration of the First Circuit’s list of substantive factors supports the dismissal of this
case with prejudice. Beginning with the first factor – the severity of misconduct – the record
demonstrates that Noel repeatedly disregarded or otherwise failed to comply with this court’s
orders. This included discovery orders directing Plaintiff to serve Defendants with signed and
notarized copies of interrogatory responses, instructing Plaintiff to supplement his answers to
UBH’s initial interrogatories, directing Plaintiff to respond to UBH’s second set of written
discovery, and instructing Noel to confer with Defendants and file a proposed updated Discovery
Plan. See Doc. No. 97 at pgs. 8-9 (describing Noel’s failure to comply with discovery orders). It
also included a Scheduling Order directing the parties to complete all fact discovery by August 1,
2025. See Doc. No. 87 (Revised Pretrial Scheduling Order). More recently, Noel failed to respond
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to this court’s order to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. See Doc. No. 99. Thus, his conduct establishes a pattern of ignoring court orders.
Under the law of this circuit, “disobedience of court orders, in and of itself, constitutes
extreme misconduct (and thus, warrants dismissal)[.]” Vallejo, 607 F.3d at 8 (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2002)). This
is especially true where, as here, “a plaintiff displays a pattern of ‘repeatedly flouting court
orders.’” Nargol, 69 F.4th at 14 (quoting Malot, 478 F.3d at 44). Similarly, under Rule 41 of
Rhode Island’s Local Rules, Noel’s disregard of the Show Cause Order alone provides adequate
justification for dismissing this case. See DRI LR Cv 41. Consequently, this court concludes that
the severity of Noel’s misconduct warrants dismissal.
The next set of factors the court considers includes the deliberateness of Plaintiff’s
misconduct and the existence of any mitigating excuses. See Vivaldi Servicios de Seguridad, 93
F. 4th at 31 (listing substantive factors courts should consider before entertaining dismissal). This
court concludes that these factors weigh in favor of dismissal as well. Here, Noel provided no
justification for his failure to comply with this court’s orders and no explanation for his failure to
pursue his claims. Nor did he make any effort to get the litigation back on track. For example,
Noel never requested any extensions of time to conduct discovery, respond to outstanding
discovery requests, or extend the pretrial deadlines. Nor did he appear at his deposition or
participate in the December 8, 2025, Zoom video conference before the court. See Docket Entry
dated 12/08/2025. Moreover, Noel never contacted the court or filed any materials explaining why
he took no steps to pursue his claims against any of the remaining Defendants. On the contrary,
Noel’s effort to pursue new parties and new claims by way of a Third Amended Complaint
illustrates his intent to abandon his existing claims and dispense with the present case.
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Accordingly, this court concludes that there are no mitigating excuses for his conduct and that his
actions were deliberate.
With respect to the issue of prejudice, this court concludes that Noel’s conduct is inherently
prejudicial to the remaining Defendants and the court. By refusing to engage in written discovery
or appear for his deposition, Noel deprived all Defendants of the ability to obtain information
relevant to his claims or use his sworn answers for impeachment or other strategic purposes. He
also deprived Defendants from completing fact discovery and meeting the other pretrial deadlines.
See Vellejo, 607 F.3d at 8 (noting that “‘[r]epeated disobedience of a scheduling order is inherently
prejudicial because disruption of the court’s schedule and the preparation of other parties nearly
always results.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Robson v. Hallenbeck, 81 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1996)). Furthermore, Noel’s repeated unwillingness to comply with court orders or to move this
case forward results in a waste of Defendants’ and the court’s time and resources. Therefore, this
factor further supports dismissal of the case with prejudice.
The final substantive factor for the court to consider is “the adequacy of lesser sanctions[.]”
Malot, 478 F.3d at 45. This court finds that no sanction short of dismissal is appropriate in this
case. Noel’s repeated disregard of court orders, refusal to comply with his discovery obligations,
and overall failure to pursue the litigation in any meaningful way “can reasonably be construed as
an indication of [P]laintiff[’s] lack of interest in vindicating whatever rights [he] might have had”
against the named Defendants. Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 648 (1st Cir. 1990)
(quotations and citation omitted). Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, there is no
reasonable means other than dismissal for resolving the parties’ dispute.
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II. Application of Procedural Considerations
“There is also a procedural dimension to [the court’s] review, ‘which addresses concerns
such as notice, opportunity to be heard, and the court’s explanation for its choice of sanction.’”
Nargol, 69 F.4th at 14-15 (quoting Malot, 478 F.3d at 44). “Although prior notice is not a
prerequisite to dismissal with prejudice, it is an important consideration.” Malot, 478 F.3d at 45.
“The notice consideration can weigh in favor of imposing dismissal where the ‘disregard of a prior
warning from the court exacerbates the offense’ and can weigh against imposing dismissal where
‘the lack of warning sometimes mitigates it.’” Nargol, 69 F.4th at 15 (quoting Vallejo, 607 F.3d at
9).
Here, the court explicitly warned Noel, on two separate occasions, that his failure to comply
with discovery orders could result in the dismissal of his claims. Doc. No. 97 at pgs. 4, 6. This
court also warned Noel, in its Show Cause Order dated December 9, 2025, that his failure to show
cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute “will likely result in the
undersigned recommending that the district judge dismiss Noel’s claims against all remaining
Defendants, including the three Defendants who were defaulted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)
and Local Rule 55(a).” Doc. No. 99 at pg. 3. Nevertheless, Noel failed to comply with the court’s
discovery orders and failed to respond to the Show Cause Order. Accordingly, relevant procedural
considerations provide strong support for the dismissal of his remaining claims with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons detailed herein, the district judge should dismiss this case with prejudice,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local Rule 41, for failure to prosecute. Any objections to
this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this notice.
The fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. Failure to file any objection within the
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specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s Order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016). Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this
Report and Recommendation “are subject to review in the district court” and any issues “not
preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal.” Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Keating v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 848 F.2d
271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988)).
___________________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
January 21, 2026
cc: Arnold A. Noel, pro se
Counsel of record
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