Gluesing v. Prudentrx LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
SHEILA GLUESING,
individually and
on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRUDENTRX LLC; and CAREMARK
RX, LLC,
Defendants.
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No. 24-cv-549-JJM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Chief Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Sheila Gluesing’s Objection (ECF No. 53) to a text
order issued by Magistrate Judge Amy E. Moses,
see Text Order (Dec. 29, 2025), that
denied Ms. Gluesing’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 45). 	Ms. Gluesing requests that
this Court sustain her Objection, vacate Magistrate Judge Moses’s text order, and
order the production of discovery that she seeks. ECF No. 53 at 1.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will sustain Ms. Gluesing’s Objection,
vacate the text order, and grant the Motion to Compel.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In December 2024, Ms. Gluesing brought claims against Prudentrx LLC and
Caremark Rx LLC (collectively, the “Defendants”) under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”). 	ECF No. 1. 	She alleges that Defendants, along with CVS Specialty
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Pharmacy, engaged in a scheme to overcharge individuals for their prescription
medications.
Id. at 1-6.
Defendants 	subsequently moved to compel arbitration of Ms. Gluesing’s
claims. ECF Nos. 21, 23. They argued that Ms. Gluesing had previously entered into
an agreement with CVS Specialty Pharmacy (i.e., the “CVS Specialty Pharmacy’s
Terms of Use”) that requires arbitration of “all disputes arising out of or related to”
services and goods provided by CVS Specialty Pharmacy and/or any of its affiliates,
as well as “any aspect” of Ms. Gluesing’s relationship with CVS Specialty Pharmacy.
ECF No. 21 at 2, 18.
Ms. Gluesing opposed Defendants’ motion, asserting that she could not be
compelled to arbitrate because she was subjected to “economic duress” when she
entered into the arbitration agreement with CVS Specialty Pharmacy. 	ECF No. 24
at 20 (“It is hard to envision how CVS Specialty Pharmacy could have created a more
coercive means of forcing agreement with unfavorable terms.”). She also argued that
much of the evidence needed to resolve the issue of whether she was under duress is
likely in Defendants’ possession. ECF No. 37 at 4-5.
On June 17, 2025, the Court denied, without prejudice, Defendants’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration. 	ECF No. 38. 	The Court Order stated: “[T]he Court finds that
discovery limited to the issue of whether Ms. Gluesing was under economic duress
when agreeing to the arbitration provision in CVS Specialty’s Terms of Use is
appropriate.”
	Id. at 1. 	Thus, the Court ordered the parties to “conduct limited
discovery on the issue of economic duress.”
Id.
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Following the Court’s Order, Ms. Gluesing moved to compel the production of
discovery related to her claims of economic duress. 	ECF No. 45. 	She specifically
sought the following:
• 	Materials concerning whether Defendants’ PrudentRx Program
required Plaintiff and all targeted patients to use CVS Specialty
exclusively to fill prescriptions for their targeted medications
(“RFP No. 1”);
• 	Materials showing whether cost penalties imposed by Defendants
for refusal to use CVS Specialty precluded Plaintiff and all
targeted patients from any other economically feasible choice of
pharmacy (“RFP No. 3”);
• 	Materials 	showing 	Defendants 	knew 	or 	intended 	their
requirement that Plaintiff and all targeted patients use CVS
Specialty 	would 	force 	patients 	to 	acquiesce 	not 	only 	to
Defendants’ choice of pharmacy, but to that pharmacy’s Terms of
Use, which purported to strip them of their right to sue (“RFP No.
6”).
Id. at 2. 	Defendants objected to Ms. Gluesing’s motion. 	ECF Nos. 47, 48. 	The
principal dispute is over the scope of discovery relating to Ms. Gluesing’s economic
duress claims.
Ms. Gluesing argues that her “theory of economic duress is not tied to her
unique financial situation,” but rather that “[t]he coercion and duress are systemic
and structural.” 	ECF No. 45 at 5. 	As such, she seeks discovery on any and all
“materials of general applicability that are relevant to examining the systematic
pressure to force targeted patients into using CVS Specialty and, by extension,
forfeiting their litigation rights.”
Id. at 10.
By contrast, Defendants claim that the discovery ordered by the Court is much
more limited in scope. ECF Nos. 47, 48. They contend that they must only produce
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information specifically related to Ms. Gluesing’s CVS Specialty Pharmacy plan—and
not anyone else’s.
The Court referred this discovery dispute to Magistrate Judge Moses. 	On
December 29, 2026, Magistrate Judge Moses issued the following Text Order in which
she denied Ms. Gluesing’s motion:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Discovery Related to Claims
of Economic Duress 45 is DENIED because Plaintiff seeks discovery
beyond the limited scope ordered by the Court. On June 17, 2025, Chief
Judge McConnell found “that discovery limited to the issue of whether
Ms. 	Gluesing 	was 	under 	economic 	duress 	when 	agreeing 	to 	the
arbitration provision in CVS Specialty’s Terms of Use is appropriate.”
ECF No. 38 (emphasis added). 	Plaintiff’s attempt to compel discovery
unrelated to Ms. Gluesing—information about the cost of medications
she does not take, information about whether other individuals can
afford prescriptions, and information about a program that was not part
of her health plan when she agreed to the arbitration provision—violates
Chief Judge McConnell’s June 17, 2025 Order.
Text Order (Dec. 29, 2025).
Ms. Gluesing later filed an Objection to Magistrate Judge Moses’s text order.
ECF No. 53. She requests that this Court sustain her Objection, vacate the text order,
and compel Defendants to produce the discovery on systematic coercion that she
seeks.
Id. at 1. Defendants oppose Ms. Gluesing’s Objection. ECF Nos. 56, 57.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
District 	courts 	generally 	exercise 	“broad 	discretion 	to 	manage 	discovery
matters.”
Heidelberg Americas, Inc. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 333 F.3d 38, 41
(1st Cir. 2003). 	Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
“[u]nless otherwise limited by court order … [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
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any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any part’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
A district court judge may modify or set aside a decision of a magistrate judge
on a non-dispositive matter if it “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). An order pertaining to the production
of discovery-related material is a non-dispositive ruling.
	See, e.g.,
Plourde v. Lewis,
No. 1:23-cv-00323-JAW, 2025 WL 2723554, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 24, 2025);
Gargiulo v.
Baystate Health Inc., 279 F.R.D. 62, 64 (D. Mass. 2012).
“Under the ‘clearly erroneous’ prong, the court will accept the magistrate
judge’s 	‘findings 	of 	fact 	and 	the 	conclusions 	drawn 	therefrom 	unless, 	after
scrutinizing the entire record, [the court] form[s] a strong, unyielding belief that a
mistake has been made.’”
	Green v. Cosby, 160 F. Supp. 3d 431, 433 (D. Mass. 2016)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
This Court’s Order, unfortunately, was not as clear as it should have been. The
Court will now clarify.
When the Court found that “discovery limited to the issue of whether Ms.
Gluesing was under economic duress when agreeing to the arbitration provision in
CVS Specialty’s Terms of Use is appropriate,”
see ECF No. 38 at 1, the Court did not
mean to imply that the discovery was limited to any economic duress personally felt
by Ms. Gluesing. Rather, the purpose of the limited discovery order was to allow Ms.
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Gluesing to fully develop a record that would allow her to properly oppose Defendants’
request for arbitration. Ms. Gluesing’s Motion to Compel included her desire to show
that the “economic duress flows from structural aspects of the PrudentRx Program.”
ECF No. 45 at 2.
This Court’s Order should have read: “The Court finds that discovery limited
to Ms. Gluesing’s claim that CVS Specialty’s Terms of Use are structured to coerce
arbitration of claims through economic duress is appropriate.” 	That claim includes
her assertion that the structural aspects are designed to account for economic duress,
and that others may have also been subject to economic duress.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order is sustained.
ECF No. 53. 	Magistrate Judge Moses’s text order is vacated, and Ms. Gluesing’s
Motion to Compel is GRANTED. ECF No. 45. Defendants shall fully respond to RFP
No. 1, RFP No. 3, and RFP No. 6 within 20 days. 	Defendants may file a renewed
Motion to Compel Arbitration within 30 days after production of the documents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
February 24, 2026
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