Rivas Mendizabal v. Faria Meat Market LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
RIVAS MENDIZABAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FARIA MEAT MARKET LLC,
Defendant.
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No. 26-cv-062-JJM-AEM
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Carmen Rivas Mendizabal brings this suit against her former employer, Faria
Meat Market, LLC (“Faria Market”), alleging she was subjected to ongoing wage
theft, sexual harassment, physical assault in the workplace, and unlawful retaliation
that led to her termination. 	Her claims are brought under the Rhode Island Civil
Rights Act (“RICRA”), the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Act (“RIPWA”), the Rhode
Island Minimum Wage Act (“RIMWA”), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
Faria Market has moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Faria Market’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Ms. Mendizabal was employed by Faria Market as a cook and alleges that she
regularly worked more than 60 hours per week. 	ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17-18. 	She alleges
that, 	although 	Faria 	Market 	purported 	to 	pay 	her 	on 	an 	hourly 	basis, 	they
compensated her for only 40 hours at a straight rate through direct deposit and paid
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a flat cash amount for all additional hours worked, regardless of the number of
overtime hours.
	Id. ¶¶ 19-20. She states that this compensation scheme functioned
as a fixed salary and resulted in her receiving less than the legally required overtime
premium.
	Id. ¶¶ 	20, 22. 	According to the Complaint, despite an increase in her
stated hourly rate during her employment, Faria Market maintained the same pay
structure, causing her to be consistently underpaid for overtime over several years.
Id. ¶ 21.
Ms. Mendizabal further alleges that she was subjected to repeated sexual
harassment and physical assaults by a coworker who was related to Faria Market’s
owners.
	Id. ¶ 25. She states that conduct included unwelcomed sexual harassment
and physical assault, creating a hostile and abusive work environment.
Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
She alleges that she reported this conduct to Faria Market’s management and to law
enforcement, but Faria Market failed to take appropriate remedial action.
Id. ¶¶ 28-
30. 	She further alleges that, shortly after making these complaints, Faria Market
terminated her employment in retaliation.
	Id. ¶¶ 32-33. 	She states that Faria
Market maintained policies and practices that failed to comply with wage and hour
laws, 	tolerated 	workplace 	harassment, 	and 	retaliated 	against 	employees 	who
engaged in protected activity thereby causing her significant damages.
Id. ¶¶ 36, 38-
40.
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW1
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ms. Mendizabal must lay
out a “plausible claim.”
	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). In other words,
she must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
	Id. at 678. 	Determining
whether a complaint sets forth a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”
	Id. at 679. In evaluating a claim’s plausibility, the Court must “assume the
truth of all well-pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences therefrom.”
	Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2007) (citing
Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Wage and Hour Law Claims
Ms. Mendizabal alleges that Faria Market violated the FLSA, RIPWA, and
RIMWA. First, Faria Market argues that the FLSA claim fails to state a claim on its
face and is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 	Second, Faria Market
argues, in the alternative, that the RIPWA claim is preempted by the FLSA, thereby
1 The Court agrees with Ms. Mendizabal’s argument that, because Faria
Market filed its Answer with its Motion to Dismiss, the pleadings are closed, and the
Motion is properly considered under Rule 12(c). However, characterization as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 12(c) motion is substantively unimportant – “[t]he standard
of review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under [Rule] 12(c) is the same as
that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”
	Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). 	The federal rules explicitly allow a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim to be raised in a Rule 12(c) motion.
See Rule 12(h)(2)(B).
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foreclosing relief under the corresponding state law. 	Lastly, they argue that the
RIMWA claim must be dismissed because the statute does not provide a private right
of action.
1. 	FLSA (Count I)
Ms. Mendizabal states that Faria Market failed to pay her overtime premium
for the hours worked more than 40 per week in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.
Specifically, she alleges she was paid a $100 flat fee in cash per week for all overtime
hours.
Section 207(a)(1) of the FLSA “requires employers to compensate employees
for each hour worked more than forty hours during a workweek ‘at a rate not less
than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [they are] employed.’”
Lalli v.
Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., 814 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1))
(alteration in original). To succeed on a claim for unpaid overtime wages, Plaintiffs
must show that they were “employed ‘for a workweek longer than forty hours’ and
that any hours worked more than forty per week were not compensated ‘at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate.’”
Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp.,
725 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). 	Plaintiff must also
show that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of that work.
Manning,
725 F.3d at 44.
Here, the Complaint alleges that Ms. Mendizabal worked approximately 66 to
72 hours per week and identifies her hourly rate, Faria Market’s alleged pay scheme,
her estimated weekly overtime shortfall, and the relevant period.
Id. ¶ 18. It further
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alleges that for about 4 years, Faria Market paid only 40 hours at her normal hourly
rate and gave a flat $100 cash payment for overtime, regardless of hours worked.
Id.
¶¶ 20-24. She also identifies her hourly rates over time and estimates weekly unpaid
overtime.
	Id. 	The Complaint also alleges that Faria Market created and managed
the payment system, overseeing both the direct deposit and weekly cash payments.
Id. ¶¶ 20-22. 	These facts, taken in toto, are sufficient to establish a plausible
inference of Faria Market’s knowledge.
Furthermore, under the FLSA, an action for unpaid compensation must
commence within two years after a cause of action accrues and three years if the
cause of action arises out of a willful violation.
See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A violation is
willful if “the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the [FLSA].”
	McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe
Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988).
Faria Market denies that they knew or recklessly disregarded state of federal
law. 	Ms. Mendizabal maintains that Faria Market carried out a deliberate multi-
year scheme to disguise a fixed weekly salary as hourly pay specifically to avoid
overtime obligations. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22, 36-41. Willfulness is genuinely disputed and
is more appropriately resolved on more fully developed factual records, typically
available at summary judgment or trial.
	Sebren v. Harrison, 552 F. Supp. 3d 249,
259 (D.R.I. 2021).
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Taken as a whole, those allegations supporting the FLSA claim are sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss and warrant application of the three-year statute of
limitations.
2. 	FLSA Preemption (Count II)
Ms. Mendizabal brings a claim under RIPWA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-1 et seq.,
alleging that Faria Market failed to properly compensate her for overtime wages.
Faria Market argues that the RIPWA claim is preempted by FLSA because it relies
on the same factual allegations — failure to pay proper overtime compensation.
“The FLSA does not expressly prohibit state legislation in the area of wages
and working conditions,”
Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perez-Rosado, 641 F.2d 45,
46 (1st Cir. 1981), nor does its plain text expressly preempt state-law claims seeking
relief for minimum wage and overtime violations,
see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 2 The mere
fact that both claims arise from the same alleged unpaid wages does not render them
legally indistinguishable, nor does it furnish a basis for preemption. 	At the
appropriate juncture, while Ms. Mendizabal may not obtain duplicative recovery for
the same injury under both federal and state overtime statutes, they are nonetheless
entitled to plead their claim in the alternative.
	See generally Maccabees Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 641 F.2d at 46.
Faria Market’s reliance on
Seavey is unpersuasive.
	See Seavey v. A Caring
Experience Nursing Servs., Inc., No. CV 15-342ML, 2016 WL 11652882, at *10 (D.R.I.
2 It also does not “implicitly prohibit state regulation by occupying the whole
field and leaving no room for supplementary state provisions.”
Maccabees Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 641 F.2d at 46.
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Feb. 29, 2016). Accepting Faria Market’s position would nullify Rhode Island’s wage
enforcement scheme for any worker who also holds federal overtime rights, a result
that cannot be reconciled with the text of 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) or Congress’s intent to
permit states to provide protection above the federal floor. 	Thus, the RIPWA claim
should proceed.
3. 	RIMWA (Count III)
Faria Market argues that Ms. Mendizabal cannot state a claim for overtime
violations because R.I. Gen. Laws § 28–12–1 et seq. provides no private, independent
cause of action for an aggrieved employee seeking overtime pay. 	However, Ms.
Mendizabal’s Count III is premised on the Defendant’s alleged failure to pay overtime
wages under the Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act (R.I. Gen Laws § 28-12-1 et seq.).
There is a private right of action for violation of the RIMWA. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-
19.2 (“Any employee or former employee, or any organization representing the
employee or former employee aggrieved by the failure to pay wages and/or benefits or
misclassification in violation of chapter 12 of this tittle and/or this chapter may file a
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain relief.”). 	Faria Market
motion to dismiss Count III is denied.
B. Hostile Work Environment (Count IV)
Ms. Mendizabal also claims that she was subject to a hostile work environment
when she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment and physical assault by a
male coworker.
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“To make out a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [a plaintiff]
must point to evidence showing, inter alia, that facts and circumstances of her
employment viewed objectively were so ‘severe,’ ‘pervasive,’ and ‘abusive’ as to ‘alter
the conditions’ of her job.”
Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2011)
(quoting
Vega-Colon v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 625 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010)).
However, a “plaintiff need only show that her work environment was severe or that
it was pervasive.”
Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2019).
Courts consider several factors “including the frequency and severity of the
discriminatory conduct, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and
whether it unreasonably interfered with [the plaintiff’s] work performance.”
Kosereis
v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 216 (1st Cir. 2003). 	The “‘accumulated effect’ of
behaviors that individually fall short may, taken together, constitute a hostile work
environment.”
	Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, 876 F.3d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 2017). Further, the Court is conscious of its role at this stage of the proceedings.
“At the motion to dismiss phase in particular, subject to some policing at the outer
bounds, the issue of whether harassment was severe or pervasive is commonly one of
degree–both as to severity and pervasiveness–to be resolved by the trier of fact.”
Rae
v. Woburn Pub. Schs., 113 F.4th 86, 111 (1st Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Ms. Mendizabal sufficiently alleges that a coworker who was related to Faria
Market subjected her to a hostile work environment by: (a) inappropriate touching
without consent; (b) physically slamming her against a wall; (c) pulling her by the
hair; (d) attempting to suffocate her; and (e) closing a door on her hand, causing
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physical injury. ECF No. 1 ¶ 26. Given the frequency of the harassment and violent
nature, the allegations state a claim based on a hostile work environment.
Furthermore, Faria Market’s timeliness argument is likewise unpersuasive.
Under the continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff may recover for otherwise time
barred acts of discrimination “so long as a related act fell within the limitations
period.”
	Ayala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2015). 	A hostile work
environment is a “classic example of a continuing violation” because the actionable
wrong consists of an accumulation of “‘individual acts that, taken together, create the
environment.’”
	Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir. 2009).
Thus, all the “component acts” alleged in a hostile work environment claim may be
considered in determining liability, even if some occurred outside the limitations
period.
Id.
Here, Ms. Mendizabal stated she was subjected to abusive working conditions
throughout her employment. 	While some of the alleged acts began outside the
limitations period, she alleges that they culminated in her termination, which
occurred in May 2023. As already explained, Ms. Mendizabal has sufficiently alleged
that her termination was connected to the prior sexual harassment and physical
assault. 	Thus, she has sufficiently alleged a severe and pervasive hostile work
environment, and the continuing violation doctrine applies.
C. Retaliation Claim (Count V)
To state a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Mendizabal must allege that “(1)
[she] engaged in protected activity, (2) [she] suffered some materially adverse action,
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and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to her protected activity.”
	Dunbar v.
Providence Coll., No. CV 24-251 WES, 2025 WL 1687595, at *7 (D.R.I. June 16, 2025)
(quoting
Stratton v. Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2024). In addition,
a termination constitutes an adverse employment action.
	Kinzer v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc., 99 F.4th 105, 117 (1st Cir. 2024). Further, temporal proximity between
the protected conduct and the adverse employment action “is sufficient to meet the
relatively light burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.”
Id. (cleaned
up).
Ms. 	Mendizabal’s 	factual 	allegations 	sufficiently 	support 	a 	claim 	for
retaliation. On or around May 2023, she complained to Faria Market’s management
about the assaults and harassment and reported it to the police concerning the same
issues. ECF No. ¶ 47. She further states that shortly thereafter her employment was
terminated.
Id. At this stage, these allegations state a claim based on a hostile work
environment. As with the hostile work environment claim, the statute of limitations
argument fails. 	Ms. Mendizabal retaliation claim encompasses alleged acts of
harassment 	throughout 	her 	employment, 	which 	she 	plausibly 	connects 	to 	her
termination in May 2023. Thus, the continuing violation doctrine applies.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Faria Meat Market LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
April 9, 2026
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