Higiro v. Nessinger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
FRANK HIGIRO,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL NESSINGER,
Warden,
Wyatt Detention Facility; DAVID
WESLING,
Field Office Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, New England Field
Office; TODD M. LYONS,
Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; MARKWAYNE
MULLIN, 1
Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and
TODD BLANCHE, 2
Acting Attorney
General,
Respondents.
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No. 26-cv-105-JJM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief Judge United States District Court.
Frank 	Higiro 	is 	currently 	in 	the 	custody 	of 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility in Central Falls,
Rhode Island (the “Wyatt”). 	ECF No. 1. 	He previously filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in which he challenged the constitutionality of his initial bond hearing
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Markwayne Mullin has been substituted
for Kristi Noem as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security in this action.
2 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Todd Blanche has been substituted for
Pamela J. Bondi as Acting Attorney General.
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at which the presiding immigration judge (“IJ”) failed to consider alternatives to
detention before denying his request for release on bond.
Id. at 8-10.
Finding that Mr. Higiro’s due process rights had been violated, the Court
granted Mr. Higiro’s petition and ordered the Government to provide him with a new
bond hearing at which the IJ was to meaningfully consider alternatives to detention
before making any determination as to bond. ECF No. 8 at 16-18;
see also Higiro v.
Nessinger, No. 26-cv-105-JJM-AEM, 2026 WL 710297, at *7-8 (D.R.I. Mar. 13, 2026).
Now pending before the Court is Mr. Higiro’s Amended Motion to Enforce
Judgment. 3 	ECF No. 12. 	He argues that the second bond hearing he was provided
was also deficient because it failed to comply with the Court’s order.
	Id. at 2. 	The
Government objects to Mr. Higiro’s motion and asserts that it has already satisfied
the Court’s order. ECF No. 14 at 1.
For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with the Government. As such,
the Court DENIES Mr. Higiro’s Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court’s earlier order set forth the factual and procedural background of
this case in detail.
	See Higiro, 2026 WL 710297, at *1-2. 	Nevertheless, the Court
will briefly recount a few facts relevant to this motion.
Mr. Higiro is a citizen from Rwanda who came to the United States on a
student visa in 2015.
Higiro, 2026 WL 710297, at *1. Since 2023, Mr. Higiro has had
3 Mr. Higiro filed an initial Motion to Enforce Judgment,
see ECF No. 11, but
that motion was amended shortly thereafter.
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three encounters with law enforcement: (1) he was arrested in Maine for the charge
of operating under the influence (“OUI”), but that charge was later dismissed; (2) he
was arrested in New Hampshire and charged with the offense of prohibited sales of
alcohol to a minor, but that charge was also later dismissed; and (3) he was arrested
in Maine again and charged with assault, criminal restraint, and furnishing liquor to
a minor, but this case was later closed after police officers were unable to reach the
alleged victim.
See id. at 1-2.
ICE officers took Mr. Higiro into custody on February 20, 2025, charging him
with having failed to maintain the terms or conditions of his student visa.
	Id. at 2.
Since then, he has remained in detention at the Wyatt for nearly fifteen months.
Id.
He was provided with an initial bond hearing, but the IJ in his case denied bond after
finding Mr. Higiro to pose a danger to the community due to his three recent
encounters with law enforcement.
Id.
Mr. Higiro later filed a habeas petition in which he argued, among other things,
that the IJ who conducted his bond hearing violated his due process rights by failing
to consider alternatives to detention before denying his request for release on bond.
ECF No. 1 at 8-10. The Court agreed with Mr. Higiro and granted his petition.
	See
Higiro, 2026 WL 710297, at *7-8. In its order, the Court directed the Government to
take the following actions:
The Government is hereby ORDERED to provide Mr. Higiro with a bond
hearing before an IJ under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten (10) days,
during which the Government must show that alternatives to detention
to ensure the safety of the community would be inadequate. The IJ shall
meaningfully consider alternatives to detention
	before making any
determination as to flight risk or dangerousness.
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Higiro, 2026 WL 710297, at *8. The Government thereafter provided Mr. Higiro with
another bond hearing before the Chelmsford Immigration Court. 	ECF No. 12 at 3.
In the present motion, Mr. Higiro argues that his second bond hearing was also
deficient, and he asks the Court to enforce its prior order.
Id. at 1.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As 	various 	courts 	of 	appeals 	have 	recognized, 	a 	district 	court 	retains
jurisdiction 4 to ensure compliance with its earlier order granting a petitioner habeas
relief.”
España v. Nessinger, No. 26-cv-014-JJM-PAS, 2026 WL 821788, at *6 (D.R.I.
Mar. 25, 2025) (citing
Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011));
see
also Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] federal court always
retains jurisdiction to enforce its lawful judgments, including habeas judgments,
[and] the court has the authority to see that its judgment is fully effectuated.”);
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (“[C]ourts have inherent power
to enforce compliance with their lawful orders . . . .”). 	The “district court has the
authority to determine whether all of the conditions contained in its previous habeas
order were followed—that is, whether the petitioner received the due process to which
4 The Government claims that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) deprives the Court of
jurisdiction to review an IJ’s bond determination. ECF No. 14 at 4-6. As this Court
has 	found 	repeatedly, 	Section 	1226(e) 	does 	not 	deprive 	it 	of 	jurisdiction 	over
“constitutional claims or questions of law.”
See, e.g.,
Garcia v. Hyde, 817 F. Supp. 3d
112, 124 (D.R.I. 2025);
Mavungo-Raymond v. Nessinger, No. 26-cv-013-JJM-AEM,
2026 WL 161358, at *8 (D.R.I. Jan. 21, 2026);
Picado v. Hyde, No. 26-cv-065-JJM-
PAS, 2026 WL 352691, at *4-5 (D.R.I. Feb. 9, 2026);
Higiro, 2026 WL 710297, at *4;
España, 2026 WL 821788, at *4-6. Because Mr. Higiro alleges a due process violation,
see ECF No. 12 at 5, Section 1226(e) does not preclude review of the IJ’s bond
decision.
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they were entitled.”
España, 2026 WL 821788, at *6 (citing
Hechavarria v. Whitaker,
358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235-36 (W.D.N.Y. 2019);
Mathon v. Searls, 623 F. Supp. 3d 203,
213 (W.D.N.Y. 2022)).
“[I]n cases involving challenges to IJs’ bond determinations, federal courts
retain ‘habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law.’”
	Picado v.
Hyde, No. 26-cv-065-JJM-PAS, 2026 WL 352691, at *4-5 (D.R.I. Feb. 9, 2026)
(quoting
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2017)). “Thus, to obtain
habeas relief, the noncitizen must show that the IJ ‘failed to place the burden of proof
on the Government’ to either show dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence
or flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id. (quoting
Mayancela Mayancela
v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 25-cv-348-LM-TSM, 2025 WL 3215638, at *5 (D.N.H. Nov.
18, 2025)). “The noncitizen can make this showing either by: (1) demonstrating that
the IJ erred because the evidence itself could not, as a matter of law, have supported
the IJ’s decision to deny bond; or (2) pointing to the IJ’s opinion itself and showing
that the IJ failed to apply the correct standard to the facts.”
	Id. (citing
Garcia v.
Hyde, 817 F. Supp. 3d 112, 126 (D.R.I. 2025)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The 	IJ 	in 	Mr. 	Higiro’s 	case 	ultimately 	denied 	bond 	after 	finding 	that
alternatives to detention would be inadequate to address concerns of danger posed by
Mr. Higiro. ECF No. 12 at 1. Mr. Higiro contends that the “hearing did not comply
with this Court’s order because the [IJ] did not meaningfully consider alternatives to
detention before finding danger.”
	Id. at 7. 	He also claims that the IJ’s renewed
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dangerousness determination was “legally insufficient because it rests on disputed,
unadjudicated police reports without the reasoned explanation required by due
process.”
	Id. at 9;
see also ECF No. 15 at 7-8. The Government disagrees with both
contentions and asserts that it has fully complied with the Court’s order. ECF No. 14
at 1. 	After reviewing the record, including the exhibits submitted to the IJ and an
audio recording of the bond hearing itself,5 the Court agrees with the Government on
both fronts.
A. 	The IJ’s Consideration of Alternatives to Detention
Over the course of almost an hour, the IJ conducted a bond hearing at which
she carefully considered a range of alternatives to detention proposed by Mr. Higiro’s
attorney, Connor Futch (“CF”), and Mr. Higiro himself (“FH”). These alternatives to
detention included: (1) GPS ankle monitoring; (2) SmartLINK monitoring;6 (3)
telephonic reporting; (4) third-party supervision/observation of Mr. Higiro; (5) regular
check-ins with ICE; (6) enrollment in ICE’s Intensive Supervision Appearance
Program 	(“ISAP”); 7 	and 	(7) 	home 	detention. 	Bond 	Hearing, 	at 	10:37-11:30,
Chelmsford Immigr. Ct. (recorded Mar. 19, 2026) (hereinafter “Bond Hearing”).
5 The Government submitted an audio recording of the bond hearing pursuant
to this Court’s text order.
	See Text Order (Mar. 27, 2026); ECF No. 13. 	The Court
has listened to the bond hearing in its entirety and quotes relevant portions of it
throughout this Order.
6 SmartLINK is a phone application that uses biometric information, including
facial comparison and recognition, to monitor, track, and surveil noncitizens in
immigration 	removal 	proceedings.
	See 	Sarah 	Sherman-Stokes,
	Immigration
Detention Abolition and the Violence of Digital Cages, 95 U. Colo. L. Rev. 219, 237
(2024).
7 ISAP is an alternative to detention program that is maintained by ICE’s
Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) department.
	See Isaí Estévez, Note,
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The transcript reflects that the IJ weighed several of these alternatives to
detention and considered whether Mr. Higiro would be a suitable candidate for any
of them given his particular background and criminal history.
IJ: 	Counsel, does GPS monitoring prevent [Mr. Higiro] from being a
danger of drinking and driving?
***
CF: 	“[S]peaking to that, an ankle monitoring system, yes, I’m not
entirely sure how that would prevent him from entering a car
intoxicated and driving. 	However, with the ankle monitors, I
know it is specifically tied to a region around a certain point. If it
would see fit and if it truly is a concern that [Mr. Higiro], you
know, potentially get into a car and drive, I would ask then if the
ankle monitor system be at least limited to his house. That seems
to be a very fruitful alternative to the situation.
IJ: 	So, are you suggesting home detention, that [Mr. Higiro] would
not be able to leave his house? Is that your proposal?
CF: 	Yes.
IJ: 	Where would he live?
CF: 	At his house with his wife and children.
***
IJ: 	Alright, counsel, was [Mr. Higiro] working or would you expect
him to work upon his release? 	Did he have a job prior to his
detention?
CF: 	Prior to his detention, yes, I believe he did have a job. He would
like to continue working after he is released.
IJ: 	What was his job? 	How would he do that if he were detained at
home?
CF: 	My client, would you like to respond?
IJ: 	Go ahead briefly, sir.
FH: 	Thank you, your honor. 	And again, it’s whatever the court sees
fit today, but I’d really like to be able to go to work. My wife and
I own a small business. 	We take care of the elderly in Maine.
We’ve been doing this small business for over two years now. We
go to homes where elderly people live and provide services to
A Case for Community-Based Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 64 Ariz. L. Rev.
1185, 1196 (2022). The program consists of varying degrees of supervision monitoring
options, and ERO officers determine the type and manner of monitoring that is
appropriate for each participant, which can include GPS monitoring, telephonic
reporting, SmartLINK monitoring, and/or office or home visits.
Id. at 1197.
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them. 	And so, I’d like to do that, your honor. 	But also, not to
mention, that’s where we get the money to pay for our mortgage
and 	to 	take 	our 	children 	to 	school, 	and 	my 	wife 	has 	been
struggling 	without 	my 	assistance, 	and 	so, 	I 	think 	a 	home
confinement, again, if the court sees fit that that’s the only option,
then I’ll take it, but I’d really plead with the courts today that I
would have conditions 	that would enable me to provide for my
family.
IJ: 	Counsel for [Mr. Higiro], when you said “third party watch him,”
who did you have in mind?
CF: 	It could be an alternative, such as community members as well.
He’s heavily involved within his church community. 	Or excuse
me, his religious community. 	Primarily ICE check-ins. 	A third-
party watch system, such as that. 	Those are the two main
alternatives as a third party essentially watching him that we
would be looking for.
Bond Hearing, at 28:22-28:28;
id. at 29:46-30-34:23.
The IJ then heard arguments from the attorney representing the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) as to why these alternatives to detention would be
inadequate in Mr. Higiro’s case:
IJ: 	[DHS], can you speak to [DHS’s] position on the suggestion that
[Mr. Higiro] have a GPS monitor that would require home
confinement or possibly home confinement with an allowance to
go to a workplace or various workplaces based on his description
of his employment and this third-party option idea?
DHS: Your honor, the alternatives to detention, be they third-party
watch, ankle monitor, etc., may mitigate potential flight risk, but
they do not, in [DHS’s] opinion, mitigate any potential danger
risk. To your question about the DUI, and whether any of those
alternatives to detention options could prevent that, clearly the
answer is no. 	Additionally, [Mr. Higiro’s] other arrests were for
threats and assault, including sexual assault. 	Clearly such
monitoring would not be able to mitigate other instances of that.
Alternatives to detention cannot mitigate danger. 8
8 The DHS attorney also cited 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for the general proposition
that, “where a finding of potential dangerousness to the community is found, that
bond is unavailable, it renders the [petitioner] ineligible for bond.” Bond Hearing, at
35:41-35:55;
see also id. at 37:11-37:51 (DHS) (“[U]nder INA 236(c), it requires
mandatory detention for those deemed to be a danger to the community.”).
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Bond Hearing, at 34-28-35:36.
Ultimately, the IJ determined that Mr. Higiro was not a suitable candidate for
any alternative to detention program. She explained as follows:
IJ: 	The court believes it has meaningfully, in this case, considered
the alternatives to detention here. 	The court is not persuaded
that the alternative to detention of a GPS monitor, even if there
were a condition of home confinement in conjunction with GPS
monitoring, 	would 	be 	sufficient 	in 	this 	case 	because 	of 	the
underlying facts in the dismissed or annulled or essentially
dropped charges. The court recognizes these are not convictions,
and 	that 	[Mr. 	Higiro] 	currently 	has 	no 	pending 	charges.
Nevertheless, the court is able to consider the police reports and
the evidence in the record that the underlying facts did or may
have occurred in fact.
***
IJ: 	And the court will note that the fact that, at least a significant
portion of these events are related to facts or alleged conduct at
least 	in 	[Mr. 	Higiro’s] 	own 	home, 	specifically 	negates 	the
argument that a GPS monitor or home confinement in this case
would be effective to essentially negate [Mr. Higiro’s] danger to
the community. 	He could certainly provide alcohol to minors in
his own home, and the nature and the specific fact that these
events 	actually, 	or 	at 	least 	some 	of 	these 	events, 	allegedly
occurred in his own apartment tends to suggest the GPS monitor
here, third-party watch, telephonic reporting, regular check-ins .
. ., or intensive supervision would not be sufficient.
Bond Hearing, at 41:54-43:00;
id. at 46:46-47:43.
It is important to note, however, that Section 1226(c) is not relevant to this
Court or the immigration court’s analysis. 	That provision of the INA, which makes
detention 	mandatory, 	specifically 	“applies 	to 	noncitizens 	convicted 	of 	specified
crimes,” such as those convicted of an “aggravated felony.”
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 35 (1st Cir. 2021);
see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18 (2003). Mr.
Higiro has not been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as is defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43). 	That is why, correctly so, the IJ did not rely on Section 1226(c) in
determining that Mr. Higiro could not be released on bond.
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It is clear from the record that the IJ meaningfully considered alternatives to
detention, as the Court directed her to in its prior order. The questions posed by the
IJ to each party were thoughtful, and they demonstrated that the IJ was not simply
rubber-stamping DHS’s decision to pursue Mr. Higiro’s continued detention. Rather,
the IJ undeniably engaged in reasoned analysis that led her to conclude that Mr.
Higiro was not a suitable candidate for an alternative to detention program given his
background and criminal history.
Even if this Court were to “have reached a different conclusion regarding the
possibility of suitable alternatives to detention, ‘it is not this Court’s role to engage in
a re-weighing of the evidence considered by the IJ.’”
	Tucker v. Searls, No. 22-CV-
608-LJV, 2023 WL 3267085, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 5, 2023) (quoting
Adejola v. Barr,
439 F. Supp. 3d 120, 130 (W.D.N.Y. 2020));
see also Vides v. Searls, No. 6:20-cv-06293
EAW, 2021 WL 6846277, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 13, 2021)
Sheriff v. Searls, No. 21-cv-
6073-FPG, 2021 WL 6797495, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2021). Accordingly, the Court
finds no legal error in the IJ’s conclusion.
B. 	The IJ’s Renewed Dangerousness Determination
Moreover, the Court discerns no legal error in the IJ’s renewed dangerousness
determination. To determine whether a noncitizen poses a danger to the community,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) instructs IJs to weigh nine factors.
Matter
of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006),
abrogated on other grounds,
Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	The IJ “may” consider “any or all of
the following”: (1) whether the noncitizen has a fixed address in the United States;
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(2) the noncitizen’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the noncitizen’s family
ties in the United States, particularly those which could confer immigration benefits
on the noncitizen; (4) the noncitizen’s employment history; (5) the noncitizen’s record
of 	appearance 	in 	court; 	(6) 	the 	noncitizen’s 	criminal 	record, 	including 	the
extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of
the offenses; (7) the noncitizen’s history of immigration violations; (8) any previous
attempts to escape from authorities or avoid prosecution; and (9) the noncitizen’s
manner of entry to the United States.
See id.
Here, in making her dangerousness determination, the IJ gave considerable
weight to Mr. Higiro’s criminal history, observing that he “has had three encounters
with police since 2023: one conviction for disorderly conduct, an OUI charge, and
pending criminal investigation for assault, criminal restraint, and furnishing a place
for minors to consume alcohol.” Bond Hearing, at 43:25-43:42. 9 The IJ acknowledged
that “there has been a significant change in circumstances in that charges were
dismissed or annulled or essentially are no longer pending, and that [Mr. Higiro] has
no longer any pending charges.”
	Id. at 45:13-45:29. 	Nevertheless, the IJ reasoned
that, “despite the fact that the charges were no longer being pursued, the court here
is still able to consider the underlying facts and evidence, including any police reports
and evidence,” and that she found this information to be “reliable and corroborated[.]”
9 	The 	IJ 	found 	persuasive 	and 	quoted 	directly 	from 	the 	previous 	IJ’s
memorandum of decision in which that IJ also found Mr. Higiro to pose a danger to
the community.
See ECF No. 1-1 at 56.
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Id. at 45:38-46:01. As such, the IJ found Mr. Higiro to pose a danger to the community
and denied his renewed request for release on bond.
Mr. Higiro primarily takes issue with the IJ’s reliance on “police reports and
unadjudicated allegations,” arguing that they are “uncorroborated” and “cannot be
given substantial weight . . . without conviction or corroboration.” ECF No. 12 at 10.
It is important to note, however, that IJs are “are not limited to considering
only
criminal 	convictions 	in 	assessing 	whether 	[a 	noncitizen] 	is 	a 	danger 	to 	the
community.”
	Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40 (emphasis in original). The IJ is
permitted to consider “[a]ny evidence in the record that is probative and specific,”
including “evidence of criminal activity.”
Id. at 41.
It is permissible, for example, for an IJ to rely on a police report—even if it
does not result in a criminal conviction—so long as the allegations contained therein
are supported by corroborating evidence.
	See Rosa v. Garland, 114 F.4th 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 2024) (quoting
In re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 21 I&N Dec. 38, 42 (BIA 1995)).
Indeed, this Court has now held several times that an uncorroborated police report
cannot, by itself, establish dangerousness as a matter of law.
	See, e.g.,
Picado, 2026
WL 352691, at *7 (“Without more, an uncorroborated police report is simply not clear
and convincing evidence sufficient for a finding of dangerousness.”);
Rosa Pineda v.
Nessinger, No. 25-cv-522-MSM-AEM, 2025 WL 3267328, at *1 (D.R.I. Nov. 24,
2025) (“[A]n uncorroborated police report cannot, alone, be ‘clear and convincing
evidence sufficient for a finding of dangerousness.’”);
Alvarez Puerta v. Nessinger,
No. 25-cv-108-JJM-AEM, 	slip 	op. 	at 1 	(D.R.I. 	June 17, 	2025) 	(finding 	that 	an
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uncorroborated police report was not clear and convincing evidence sufficient for a
finding of dangerousness);
cf. España, 2026 WL 821788, at *11-13 (finding an I-213
form to be “nothing more than a police report created by a DHS officer” and
concluding that it was legally erroneous for an IJ to have relied on it given its multiple
inconsistencies and its lack of corroborating evidence).
But the IJ in Mr. Higiro’s case relied on much more than a police report. 	In
fact, she made reference to multiple police reports that described the three different
encounters Mr. Higiro has had with law enforcement since 2023.
See Bond Hearing,
at 47:53-48:38. What is more, she found these reports to be corroborated and, as such,
sufficiently reliable given the additional evidence contained in the record before her,
including an interview with the alleged assault victim, as well as photographs and
video footage supporting the charges brought against Mr. Higiro.
Id. at 49:01-49:20.
The IJ acknowledged that each of the charges described in the police reports
had either been dismissed by a court or dropped by the police, but she nevertheless
concluded that the underlying facts “show[ed] a concerning and escalating pattern of
[Mr. Higiro] engaging in dangerous and violent actions to others.”
Id. at 47:49-48:04.
The IJ also emphasized “the recency and number of encounters with police since 2023,
involving 	very 	serious 	potential 	actions 	that 	clearly 	relate 	to 	danger 	to 	the
community.”
Id. at 48:06-48:30.
Based on the totality of the evidence before her, the Court cannot conclude that
the IJ’s dangerousness determination was “legally insufficient.” Indeed, the “logical
underpinnings” surrounding the IJ’s decision to deny bond are quite clear from her
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oral order.
Cf. Mayancela Mayancela v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 25-cv-348-LM-TSM,
2025 WL 3215638, at *6 (D.N.H. Nov. 18, 2025) (reaching same conclusion with
respect to the IJ’s “flight risk” determination based on review of IJ’s memorandum of
decision);
Lopez-Gomez v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2025) (“[T]he BIA need not
spell out every last detail of its reasoning where the logical underpinnings are clear
from the record . . . .”).
The IJ gave considerable significance to Mr. Higiro’s multiple encounters with
law enforcement since 2023. 	In doing so, the IJ evaluated perhaps “‘[t]he
Guerra
factor most pertinent to assessing dangerousness,’” which is Mr. Higiro’s “‘criminal
record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity,
and the seriousness of the offenses.’”
Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 783 (9th Cir.
2024) (quoting
Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Guerra,
24 I&N Dec. at 40)). Even though Mr. Higiro’s criminal charges were later dismissed
or 	dropped, 	the 	underlying 	facts 	to 	support 	those 	charges 	were 	sufficiently
corroborated by “probative and specific” evidence of criminal activity in the record.
See Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40;
In re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 21 I&N Dec.
at 42.
Other cases in which this Court has found the IJ’s bond determination to be
“legally insufficient” do not counsel in favor of reaching a different result here. 	For
instance, in
Garcia v. Hyde, an IJ found the petitioner to pose a flight risk based
solely on a Guatemalan arrest warrant, but the hearing transcript revealed that the
IJ did not actually know what the alleged charges against the petitioner were. 	817
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F. Supp. 3d at 127-29. 	That was properly considered legal error by the IJ.
Additionally, in
Picado v. Hyde, as well as in
Alvarez Puerta v. Nessinger, the Court
held 	that 	IJs 	could 	not 	make 	findings 	of 	dangerousness 	based 	solely 	on
uncorroborated police reports because that too would be considered legal error.
Picado, 2026 WL 352691, at *6-7;
Alvarez Puerta, slip op. at 1. In Mr. Higiro’s case,
however, the evidence upon which the IJ based her dangerousness determination is
considerably more reliable, probative, and specific than that in
Garcia,
Picado, or
Alvarez Puerta.
The Court recognizes that Mr. Higiro has now spent nearly fifteen months in
ICE detention. 	But ultimately, “[t]he question before this [C]ourt is not whether it
would have ordered [Mr. Higiro’s] release on bond had it been in the IJ’s position . . .
.”
Acero v. FCI Berlin, Acting Warden, No. 26-cv-159-LM-AJ, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026
WL 821896, at *4 (D.N.H. Mar. 25, 2026). 	Instead, “the [C]ourt may only consider
whether the evidence submitted at the bond hearing was insufficient as a matter of
law” to find that Mr. Higiro posed a danger to the community by clear and convincing
evidence.
Id.;
see Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. Here, because a reasonable jurist
could have found, based on Mr. Higiro’s particular background and criminal history,
that he posed a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence, the Court
is compelled to find that the IJ’s decision to deny bond was not legally insufficient.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Mr. Higiro’s Motion to
Enforce. ECF No. 12.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
May 13, 2026
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