Pinto v. Nessinger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
GILDOMAR RICARTE PINTO,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL NESSINGER, Warden of
Wyatt Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C.A. No. 26-cv-192-MRD-PAS
ORDER
Before the Court is Gildomar Ricarte Pinto’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	ECF No. 1. 	Therein, Petitioner asserts that
after receiving a second bond hearing the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) “improperly
denied bond by relying exclusively on allegations of criminal offenses contained in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrest records for a case that was
dismissed.”
Id. ¶¶ 1, 21. 	In response to the Petition, the Government avers that
“Petitioner is seeking review of the IJ’s discretionary judgment, over which this Court
lacks jurisdiction” and that, despite Petitioner’s argument otherwise, the IJ applied
the correct standard of proof when denying him bond.1 ECF No. 6 at 6, 9.
1 The Government also argues the Petition should be dismissed because
Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, including filing an
appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals. 	ECF No. 6 at 15. 	For the reasons
stated herein, the Court dismisses the Petition on other grounds.
Case 1:26-cv-00192-MRD-PAS Document 10 Filed 04/17/26 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by
the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the
revocation or denial of bond or parole.” This applies to a petition that is essentially
seeking review of an immigration judge’s bond determination.
	See De Oliveira v.
Joyce, No. 2:25-CV-00291-LEW, 2025 WL 2916636, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 14, 2025)
(concluding “[t]his Court lacks the jurisdiction to award relief to Petitioner by means
of a habeas order that directly reviews the immigration judge’s bond determination”)
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(a)(2), & 1252(b)(9)). The Court does, however, have
jurisdiction to review an IJ’s bond determination for errors of law.
	Aguilar v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf't Div. of the Dep’t. of Homeland Sec’y et al., 510 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2007);
see Mayancela Mayancela v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 25-CV-348-LM-
TSM, 2025 WL 3215638, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 18, 2025) (concluding that Section 1226(e)
does not eliminate the district court’s habeas jurisdiction over questions of law or the
constitutionality of related proceedings).
For purposes of the instant Petition, the Court assumes, without deciding, that
it has jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s claims and concludes that Petitioner’s claims
fail on the merits. Petitioner contends that in denying bond during his second bond
hearing, the IJ relied solely on an uncorroborated Form I-213—characterized by
Petitioner as “essentially a police report”—to conclude that he posed a danger to the
community. The record before the Court tells a different story.2
2 The Court may take judicial notice of immigration proceedings and agency
actions.
See Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th 25, 52 (1st Cir. 2022).
Case 1:26-cv-00192-MRD-PAS Document 10 Filed 04/17/26 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Under seal, the Government has submitted the IJ’s Order from Petitioner’s
first bond hearing, dated February 10, 2026, his second bond hearing, dated April 2,
2026, a summary of the IJ’s April 2026 Order, an audio recording of the April 2, 2026,
bond 	hearing, 	and other 	various 	identification 	documents 	associated 	with 	the
Petition. 	A review of these materials and the IJ’s decision make clear that the IJ
considered numerous pieces of evidence beyond the challenged report to determine
that Petitioner poses a danger to the community.3
The IJ additionally made clear during the April 2, 2026, bond hearing that she
is cognizant of First Circuit case law providing that substantial weight should not be
given to an uncorroborated police report. 	Having considered the totality of the
circumstances, she determined that the challenged report is both reliable and
corroborated.
Id. While it is not this Court’s role to reexamine the IJ’s discretionary
judgment,
see Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 143 (D. Mass. 2019), it is
clear here that the IJ relied on more than just an uncorroborated police report and
that the IJ applied the burden of proof that due process requires. This Court,
therefore, finds that there is no error of law apparent in the IJ’s decision to deny bond.
As such, the Petition is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED. ECF No. 1.
3 The IJ made her determination largely based on evidence related to alleged
domestic violence. Considering the severity and nature of these allegations, and the
fact that these exhibits have been filed under seal, this Order avoids articulating any
detail about the information detailed in the materials submitted by the Government.
Case 1:26-cv-00192-MRD-PAS Document 10 Filed 04/17/26 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
4/17/2026
Case 1:26-cv-00192-MRD-PAS Document 10 Filed 04/17/26 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>