USA v. Haney, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No.: 	3:24-CR-113-TAV-JEM
)
TIFFANY HANEY, 	)
ANNE WARREN, and 	)
TINA ROPER, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This criminal case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Reargument for
an Evidentiary Hearing on Spoilation and to Compel Production of Giglio and Jencks
Material [Doc. 306], which the Court construes as a motion to reconsider the prior denial
[Doc. 269] of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third Superseding Indictment and, in
the alternative, for an Evidentiary Hearing and Sanctions for Discovery Violations and
Potential Spoliation [Doc. 260].
“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly authorize motions for
reconsideration, but defendants may file them in criminal cases.” 	United States v.
Delgado, 685 F. Supp. 3d 500, 501 (E.D. Mich. 2023); see also United States v. Mack,
831 F. App’x 787 (mem.) (6th Cir. 2020) (“Although the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not authorize motions for reconsideration, the Supreme Court determined
many years ago that defendants may file them” (citing United States v. Healy, 376 U.S.
75, 78 (1964)). “‘Motions for reconsideration in criminal cases are generally treated like
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motions for reconsideration in civil cases.’” United States v. Jackson, No. 1:16-cr-20347,
2023 WL 36067, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2023) (quoting United States v. Estrada, No.
14-CR-20425, 2022 WL 17682630, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2022)). 	“Justifying
reconsideration requires a moving party to: (1) demonstrate an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) establish that new evidence is available; or (3) prove that a clear error
occurred or reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” 	United States v.
Boia, No. 1:24-cr-191, 2025 WL 610645, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2025); see also
United States v. Durante, No. 11-277, 2012 WL 113557, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2012).
As 	with 	defendants’ 	prior 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	or 	in 	the 	alternative, 	for 	an
evidentiary hearing [Doc. 260], defendants’ allegations in the instant motion amount to
no 	more 	than 	unsupported 	speculation 	that 	text 	messages 	must 	exist, 	despite 	the
government’s assertion that such text messages do not exist [See Doc. 306]. 	The Court
has already determined that such “speculation that additional evidence exists . . . does not
warrant an evidentiary hearing” [Doc. 269, p. 10]. Although the instant motion provides
more detail of various dates and times where defendants believe text messages are
“missing” from the text message log of Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Agent
Emily Celeste’s phone, it provides no more support for such allegation than the original
motion.
In fact, some of defendants’ suggestions seem to be clearly mistaken. 	For
example, defendants suggest that text messages on July 31, 2024, between Agent Celeste
and Michelle McKnight prove that Agent Celeste did not preserve a text message to
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McKnight “in which she questioned why McKnight had disclosed the information at the
top of her 7:24 p.m. Facebook message to Heather Radu, to which McKnight responded:
‘oops.’” [Doc. 306, p. 4]. Essentially, defendants appear to assert that Agent Celeste sent
McKnight an image of a Facebook conversation between McKnight and Radu, and
questioned McKnight as to why she disclosed information to Radu, with McKnight
responding “oops” [See id.]. 	But defendants’ own exhibit of the actual text message log
belies this assertion. 	That log shows that on July 31, 2024, at 7:28 p.m., McKnight sent
Celeste a photograph, presumptively the image of the Facebook conversation between
herself and Radu, and stated “Well oops, I thought this girl knew. 	I think I will not say
anything. I looked her up, she is pediatric ER doc and friends with Tiffany and Anne”
[Doc. 306-4, p. 6]. Thus, contrary to defendants’ implication, the actual text message log
reflects that McKnight sent the image of the conversation to Agent Celeste, with an
explanatory message, rather than Agent Celeste sending that image to McKnight to
question 	her 	about 	it. 	And 	nothing 	about 	that 	conversation 	supports 	defendants’
speculative assertion that additional, undisclosed text messages between Agent Celeste
and McKnight exist.
In another instance, defendants allege that Agent Celeste’s phone is missing a
series of text messages from July 31, 2024, sent to Radu’s husband [Doc. 306, p. 4].
Defendants suggest that they discovered these missing text messages based on an image
of the conversation on FBI Agent Bryan Cross’s phone, but that the text messages
accompanying that image are “missing” [Id.]. 	The attached “screenshot” photograph of
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that conversation indicates that Agent Celeste sent a message to Radu’s husband,
identifying herself and stating that she was trying to get in touch with Radu about the
investigation [Doc. 306-5, p. 2]. 	Radu’s husband responded back questioning whether
Agent Celeste was actually a Knoxville FBI agent, and Agent Celeste responded that he
could call the Knoxville FBI’s main number to verify her identity [Id.]. Radu’s husband
responded that he would check the credentials and pass along the message, and Agent
Celeste responded “Thank you” [Id.]. 	Defendants, however, do not explain why such a
conversation between Agent Celeste and Mr. Radu is discoverable at all. 	There is no
indication that Mr. Radu is a government witness, and, therefore, such conversation could
not be considered Jencks or Giglio material. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (also known as the
Jencks Act, addressing production of “any statement . . . of the witness. . .” (emphasis
added)); 	United 	States 	v. 	Maury, 	695 	F.3d 	227, 	249 	(3d 	Cir. 	2012) 	(“Giglio
material . . . is a subset of Brady material insofar as it addresses situations in which
certain evidence about a witness’s credibility or motivation to testify exists . . .”
(emphasis added)). 	Moreover, there is no indication from defendants as to how this
conversation between Agent Celeste and Mr. Radu is favorable to them. 	See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or
to punishment . . .”). 	Thus, defendants have not even established the basic premise that
they were entitled to text messages between Agent Celeste and Mr. Radu.
The Court finds it unnecessary to address each specific instance of allegedly
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“missing” text messages referenced throughout defendants’ motion, which is often
rambling. 	Suffice it to say, the Court has fully reviewed the motion and the attached
exhibits, and finds that defendants have provided no more than speculation that additional
Brady, Jencks, and/or Giglio material exists.
Accordingly, 	upon 	review 	of 	the 	defendants’ 	motion, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
defendants have not persuaded the Court that any of the circumstances warranting
reconsideration exist. Defendants’ Motion for Reargument for an Evidentiary Hearing on
Spoilation and to Compel Production of Giglio and Jencks Material [Doc. 306] is
therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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