USA v. Boykin, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	3:25-CR-86-KAC-JEM-3
)
MARC DAVIS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO REVOKE DETENTION ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Marc Davis’s “Motion to Revoke or Amend Magistrate
Judge’s Detention Order” [Doc. 84]. For the below reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion.
I. 	Procedural Background
A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiring to (1) distribute a mixture and substance
containing 400 grams or more of a detectable amount of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A); and (2) commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956
[See Doc. 3 at 1-2]. 	The conduct charged allegedly occurred “from on or about December 20,
2023, up to and including on or about August 20, 2025” [Id. at 1]. Defendant filed a motion for
pretrial release on conditions [Doc. 67]. United States Magistrate Judge Jill E. McCook held an
evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion [Doc. 78].
After the hearing, Judge McCook ordered Defendant detained pending trial [Doc. 82, see
also Doc. 83]. 	Judge McCook determined that the United States proved (1) by clear and
convincing evidence, that “no condition or combination of conditions w[ould] reasonably assure
the safety of any other person and the community,” and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence,
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that “no condition or combination of conditions w[ould] reasonably assure” Defendant’s
appearance as required [Doc. 82 at 2, see also Doc. 83].
Then, Defendant filed the instant Motion, asking the undersigned to “revoke or amend” the
detention order [Doc. 84]. 	In support, Defendant asserts that release on conditions would
reasonably guarantee the safety of the community and his appearance because (1) he would return
to Detroit, live with his mother there, and work with his stepfather there; (2) he is not alleged to
have committed any crimes in Detroit, only in East Tennessee; and (3) his prior criminal history
is limited [See id. at 4-5]. The United States opposes the Motion [Doc. 94].
II. 	Analysis
If a magistrate judge orders a defendant detained pending trial, the defendant “may file,
with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment
of the [detention] order.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). 	The district court must generally review the
magistrate judge’s order de novo and may do so without holding a further hearing. See United
States v. Marcrum, 953 F. Supp. 2d 877, 880 (W.D. Tenn. 2013), aff’d, No. 13-6008 (6th Cir. Nov.
1, 2013); see also United States v. Oaks, 793 F. App’x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2019). 	Here, the
undersigned need not hold an additional hearing because the information Defendant presents is
already in the record from the initial detention hearing [See Doc. 84 at 1-2, 4 (arguing that the
Court erred in evaluating the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors in light of the evidence presented at the
detention hearing); see also Doc 104]. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Williams,
No. 20-CR-142, 2020 WL 6866404, *2-5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2020) (reviewing magistrate judge’s
detention order de novo without a hearing).
18 U.S.C. § 3142 governs the release or detention of a defendant pending trial. Where, as
here, the United States moves for detention of a defendant charged with “an offense for which a
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maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances
Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), the Court must determine whether any “condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of [the defendant] as required and the safety
of any other person and the community,” see id. at § 3142(e)(1), (f). The factors that the Court
considers are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
offense is a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, a Federal crime of
terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive,
or destructive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the
history and characteristics of the person, including (A) the person’s character,
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length
of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to
drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court
proceedings; and (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person
was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal,
or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the defendant’s release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also United States v. Hoilman, No. 22-6108, 2023 WL 4074630, *1 (6th
Cir. Apr. 24, 2023) (citations omitted).
Under Section 3142(e)(2), the Court presumes, subject to rebuttal, that “no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required
and the safety of the community” if the Court concludes that “there is probable cause to believe
that the [defendant] committed” a qualifying offense under the Controlled Substances Act. 	18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). A grand jury’s indictment “by itself, establishes probable cause to believe
that a defendant committed the charge with which he is charged.” United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d
939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985)). 	To
rebut the presumption, Defendant must “introduce at least some evidence” that he is not a flight
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risk and does not pose a danger to the community. 	Id. at 945, 947 (noting that the defendant’s
burden of production is “relatively light”).
Judge McCook concluded that the presumption applies and Defendant “presented evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption” [See Doc. 82 at 2]. 	No Party disputes those conclusions,
[see Docs. 84 at 3, 94 at 4], and the undersigned sees no reason for doing so. 	Even still, “the
presumption favoring detention does not disappear entirely;” it “remains a factor to be considered
among those weighed by the district court.” See Stone, 608 F.3d at 945 (quoting United States v.
Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).
In the end, the United States “must prove risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence,
and it must prove dangerousness to any other person or the community by clear and convincing
evidence.” United States v. Hinton, 113 F. App’x 76, 77 (6th Cir. 2004); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)
(addressing the United States’s burden as to “the safety of any other person and the community”).
The United States has met its burden.
The Section 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of detaining Defendant. First, the nature and
circumstances of the offenses charged favor detention. 	Defendant allegedly conspired “to
distribute 400 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
fentanyl,” over an approximately twenty (20) month period [Doc. 3 at 1]. And the evidence the
United States proffered at the detention hearing placed over 140 grams of fentanyl directly in the
control of Defendant and an alleged co-conspirator during the charged conspiracy period
[See Doc. 104 at 10-12]. Fentanyl is an exceptionally dangerous drug that poses serious risks to
the community. 	See United States v. Taylor, 449 F. Supp.3d 668, 673 (E.D. Ky. 2020). 	The
Indictment charged Defendant with a serious offense involving a controlled substance that presents
a grave threat to the safety of the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1).
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Second, Defendant’s alleged conduct highlights the danger that his potential release
represents. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). This second factor “only goes to the likelihood that the
defendant will pose a danger to the community and is not a pretrial determination of guilt.” United
States v. Foster, No. 20-5548, 2020 WL 6791572, at *2 (6th Cir. July 20, 2020). As discussed
above, Defendant is charged with an offense that poses a serious risk of danger to the community.
The United States presented evidence at the detention hearing that Defendant and a co-conspirator
sold over 140 grams of fentanyl during FBI controlled purchases alone [See Doc. 104 at 10-12].
The United States also presented evidence of Defendant selling drugs to others [See id. at 11-12].
Additionally, the United States presented evidence that when law enforcement executed a search
warrant of an apartment Defendant allegedly resided in, they found him attempting to flush over
700 grams of fentanyl down the toilet [See id. at 12-13]. 	Willingness to destroy evidence
demonstrates at least some inclination to avoid criminal responsibility and a danger to the
community. 	See United States v. Lamar, 600 F. Supp.3d 714, 723 (E.D. Ky. 2022). 	And
Defendant is potentially subject to a ten (10) year mandatory minimum sentence for the fentanyl
charge, creating an incentive for him not to appear. See United States v. Brown, 601 F. Supp.3d
196, 204 (E.D. Ky. 2022) (citing United States v. Shuklin, No. 19-4171, 2020 WL 2992522, at *1
(6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2020)). If the crime charged were proved, this mandatory minimum would hold
unless Defendant met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) or § 3553(e). Even if Defendant
did not engage in any violence or possess a firearm in connection with this offense, Defendant’s
conduct during the instant offense, which itself is inherently dangerous, weighs against his release.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
Third, Defendant’s history and characteristics likewise weigh in favor of continued
detention. 	Defendant is a forty-two (42) year old man. 	He allegedly is a lifelong resident of
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Detroit, Michigan [See Doc. 84 at 4]. That representation is blunted by the fact that the United
States presented evidence showing that Defendant spent significant time in Knoxville, Tennessee
selling drugs [See Doc. 104 at 11-13]. 	He has a long criminal history that includes three (3)
controlled substance convictions, a firearm conviction, a domestic violence conviction, and a no
contest plea to resisting a police officer [See Pretrial Services Report at 3-8].1 He also violated his
probation on at least one occasion, and he failed to appear for court multiple times [See id.].
Defendant argues that his criminal convictions are dated, failures to appear are mostly for
civil traffic violations, and that he has now paid off his outstanding court costs [See Doc. 84 at 5].
Even still, his criminal history and history of nonappearance demonstrates a risk of danger, a
disregard for the law, and a risk of nonappearance or flight here. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A),
(4). 	Considering the other relevant factors, while Defendant now has a job lined up if he were
released, he has not held lawful employment since 2023 [See Pretrial Services Report at 2]. And
Plaintiff’s ties to family in the Detroit area cut both ways. Family support is a mitigating factor.
But if Defendant was residing in Detroit with his mother during the charged conspiracy, he was
able to leave for periods of time and allegedly traffic fentanyl in East Tennessee without detection,
an aggravating factor. 	And Defendant’s lack of personal substance abuse does not reasonably
assure his appearance in this case or the safety of the community if he was released. On balance,
Defendant’s history and characteristics favor detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
Last, Defendant’s release would pose a serious danger to the community. 	See 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4). 	As discussed above, Defendant’s criminal history before this case and his
1 Information related to Defendant’s criminal history is contained in the Pretrial Services Report
compiled by the United States Probation Office, made available to the Parties before Defendant’s
detention hearing, and on file with the Court. The United States Probation Office recommended
that Defendant remain detained pending trial.
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alleged conduct demonstrates the risk of further illegal activity—and its concomitant potential
danger to the community—that his release would present. 	See id. 	So this factor, too, supports
detention.
To alleviate these concerns, Defendant proposes “conditions of a third-party custodian,
employment, random drug testing, electronic monitoring and travel restrictions plus any other
conditions the court might impose” [Doc. 84 at 5]. But weighing the pertinent factors in light of
the evidence in the record, the United States has met its burdens to show that these conditions, or
others the Court might impose, would not “reasonably assure” Defendant’s appearance as required
and “the safety of any other person and the community.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), (f); Hinton,
113 F. App’x at 77. Defendant’s proposed third-party custodian, his mother, does not reasonably
assure Defendant’s appearance and the safety of the community given that she also testified that
he lived with her in Detroit or saw him “every day” since 2023 [See Doc. 104 at 8-9]. 	Neither
does his proposed employment, given that he left a similar job around the time the charged
conspiracy allegedly began and has not been formally employed since 2023 [See Pretrial Services
Report at 2]. Nor does random drug testing weigh strongly in Defendant’s favor considering that
he denies a history of substance abuse [See id.]. And electronic monitoring and travel restrictions,
standing alone, do not alleviate the Court’s concerns and the factors weighing against Defendant’s
pretrial release, particularly given the evidence that he as dealing drugs from a residence in
Knoxville and his history of nonappearance [See Doc. 104 at 11]. In total, Defendant’s proposed
conditions do not mitigate the risk of future illegal behavior or nonappearance if he is released.
Defendant’s inherently dangerous alleged conduct in this case coupled with his history and
characteristics demonstrate the risk of nonappearance and danger that his release poses. See 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g).
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III. 	Conclusion
Considering the relevant factors, no conditions of release would reasonably assure “the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s “Motion to Revoke or
Amend Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order” [Doc. 84]. Defendant shall remain detained.
SO ORDERED.
KATHERINE A 	YTZER
United States District Judge
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