FemHealth USA, Inc. v. Williams et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
FEMHEALTH USA, INC., d/b/a
CARAFEM,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICKEY NELSON WILLIAMS, JR.,
BEVELYN Z. WILLIAMS, and EDMEE
CHAVANNES,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:22-cv-00565
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and
expenses under 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B). (Doc. No. 238). Defendants Rickey Williams, Jr.,
Bevelyn Z. Williams, and Edmee Chavannes (collectively, “Defendants”), acting pro se, filed
responses in opposition (Doc. Nos. 243, 246), to which Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. No. 247).
Defendants have also moved to stay consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pending
resolution of the appeal. (Doc. Nos. 248, 250). The appeal has since been dismissed. (See Doc.
No. 255). 	Accordingly, the motions to stay consideration of the motion for attorneys’ fees are
denied as MOOT.
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 238) is
GRANTED with modifications.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In July 2022, Plaintiff FemHealth USA, Inc., d/b/a carafem (“carafem”) brought this action
alleging Defendants violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE Act”), 18
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U.S.C. § 248 et seq. (Doc. No. 1). Carafem was granted an emergency temporary restraining order
on July 29, 2022, and a preliminary injunction on September 14, 2022. (See Doc. Nos. 9 & 66).
The Court granted carafem’s motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2025. (Doc. No. 199).
Defendants filed a motion for relief from judgment and a motion to stay proceedings, both of which
were denied. (See Doc. Nos. 202, 203, & 204). On January 23, 2026, final judgment was entered
in favor of carafem in the amount of $5,000, jointly and severally, against Defendants. (Doc. No.
233).
Carafem now seeks an award of $314,574.63 in attorneys’ fees and $6,067.47 in expenses.
In support of the motion, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law (Doc. No. 239), declarations of
Plaintiff’s attorney Sarah Miller (Doc. No. 238-1); Matthew Gibson, Director of Litigation
Technology (Doc. No. 238-2); and two local attorneys (Doc Nos. 238-3, 238-4), as well as logs of
attorney time and litigation costs (Doc. No. 238-1).
Defendants do not object to an award of attorneys’ fees but argue the amount requested is
unreasonable and should be reduced to between $110,000 to $125,000 (approximately 60% of the
requested amount). (Doc. No. 243). Defendants also contend that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover
the full amount of requested litigation costs. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and expenses under 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(c)(1), which provides:
(c) Civil Remedies. –
(1) Right of Action
(A) In general. -- Any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct
prohibited by subsection (a) may commence a civil action for
the relief set forth in subparagraph (B), except that such an
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action may be brought under subsection (a)(1) only by a
person involved in providing or seeking to provide, or
obtaining or seeking to obtain, services in a facility that
provides reproductive health services, and such an action may
be brought under subsection (a)(2) only by a person lawfully
exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right
of religious freedom at a place of religious worship or by the
entity that owns or operates such place of religious worship.
(B) Relief. -- In any action under subparagraph (A), the court
may 	award 	appropriate 	relief, 	including 	temporary,
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as the costs of suit and
reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses. With
respect to compensatory damages, the plaintiff may elect, at
any time prior to the rendering of final judgment, to recover,
in lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory damages in
the amount of $5,000 per violation.
18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1).
The Court’s primary concern is that the requested attorneys’ fee be “reasonable.” Gonter
v. Hunt Valve Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Reed
v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999)). “A reasonable fee is ‘adequately compensatory to
attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.’” Id. (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The starting point for determining the reasonableness of a requested fee is the “lodestar”
analysis, whereby the requested fee is compared with the amount generated by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably worked on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate. Imwalle v.
Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2008). “But trial courts need not, and
indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).
“The essential goal in shifting fees ... is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection”;
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therefore, “trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates
in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” Id.
“The determination whether hours were ‘reasonably expended on the litigation’ calls for
the exercise of ‘billing judgment.’” Sinclair v. Meisner, 185 F.4th 651, 656 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983)). “Hours that are not properly billed to
one's client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Therefore, “[c]ounsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith
effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”
Id. “To arrive at a reasonable hourly rate, courts use as a guideline the prevailing market rate,
defined as the rate that lawyers of comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to
command within the venue of the court of record.” Geier, 372 F.3d at 791 (citing Adcock–Ladd v.
Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 2000)).
“Once the lodestar figure is established, the trial court is permitted to consider other factors,
and to adjust the award upward or downward to achieve a reasonable result.” Id. at 792 (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); and Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). The factors considered include: (1) the time and labor required by
a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill needed to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards
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in similar cases. Id. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that, often, these factors are naturally blended
into the reasonableness analysis. Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, n.9).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Hourly Rate
Plaintiff was represented in this case by numerous attorneys from the law firm Bass, Berry
& Sims PLC (“BBS”). Work on the case was performed by ten attorneys: Sarah Miller, Angie
Bergman, Briana Sprick Schuster, David Esquivel, Alison Acker, Ashleigh Karnell, Margaret
Dodson, Peter Rathmell, Mike Tackeff, and Emily Farmer. The team was also assisted by
paralegals, Leann Lewis and Laura Bilbrey, as well as litigation technology professionals Darin
Ipema and Jorge Molina.
 	Sarah Miller is a litigation partner at BBS, and is counsel of record for carafem in
this action. Sarah is an attorney licensed to practice law in Tennessee since 2014
and has practiced law since 2008. Her hourly rate at the time of this litigation ranged
from $540 to $634.14.
 	David Esquivel serves as the Pro Bono Partner at BBS. He received his law degree
from Duke University School of Law in 1997. His hourly rate at the time of this
litigation was $625.
 	Angie Bergman is counsel at BBS, where she has worked since 2013. Her hourly
rate at the time of this litigation ranged from $530 to $618.35.
 	Briana Sprick Schuster is counsel at BBS. She earned her law degree from Harvard
Law School in 2012. Her hourly rate at the time of this litigation ranged from $530
to $623.46.
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 	Allison Acker is a partner in the Litigation practice group at BBS. She earned her
law degree from Harvard Law School in 2014. Her hourly rate at the time of this
litigation ranged from $520 to $614.41.
 	Margaret Dodson is a partner in the Litigation practice group at BBS. She earned
her law degree from Vanderbilt University Law School in 2016. Her hourly rate at
the time of this litigation was $485.
 	Ashleigh Karnell is counsel at BBS. She earned her law degree from Belmont
University College of Law in 2017. Her hourly rate at the time of this litigation was
$575.20.
 	Emily Farmer is an associate at BBS. She received her law degree from The George
Washington University Law School in 2017. Her hourly rate at the time of this
litigation was $625.
 	Peter Rathmell was a junior associate at BBS during the pendency of this litigation.
He earned a law degree from Tulane University Law School (2020). His hourly rate
at the time of this litigation was $494.31.
 	Michael Tackeff was a junior associate at BBS. He earned a law degree from
Vanderbilt Law School in 2018. His hourly rate at the time of this litigation was
$430.
The average billing rate of the individual attorneys claiming fees in this case is $474.90 for
the group litigation (which generally occurred in 2022) and $557.53 for the litigation after that
date, which involved only Defendants. (Doc. No. 239). Plaintiff states that the attorneys’ stated
hourly billing rates reflect reduced rates lower than the fees typically charged to clients. In
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addition, the hourly rates are the rates in effect when the work was performed, rather than current
rates. Plaintiff submits that the hourly rates of their attorneys are reasonable based on their skill
and experience and the market in which they practice.
Defendants argue that the Court should reduce the hourly rates by 15% because the case
was resolved on summary judgment and the parties engaged in limited discovery. (Doc. No. 243).
The issues identified by Defendants are relevant to the reasonableness of the hours expended on
the case but have little bearing on the reasonableness of the hourly rate. Based on the information
provided and the Court’s experience, the rates are at or below the market rates in this district for
federal civil litigation. Accordingly, no reduction in the hourly rate is warranted.
B. 	Reasonableness of Time Billed
Plaintiff submitted the time log of attorney and paralegal hours totaling 566.8 hours worked
between July 28, 2022, and September 9, 2022, and between October 30, 2023, and February 27,
2025 (Doc. No. 238-1). Plaintiff asserts that the hours expended are reasonable in light of the
complexity of the litigation and the Defendants’ litigation tactics. (Doc. No. 239). Plaintiff states
that Defendants unnecessarily increased the number of hours spent on the case by filing “improper,
untimely, repetitive, and dishonest motions and appeals.” (Id.). Plaintiff acknowledges the
relatively large number of attorneys and legal professionals who billed time on this matter, and
asserts that this reflects the scope, duration, and complexity of the litigation. Plaintiff notes that
the claims against the other defendants were resolved through settlement in 2023. (See Doc. No.
135). Plaintiff asserts that the claims against Defendants likely could have been resolved at that
time, but Defendants refused to continue negotiations. (Id.). Lastly, in anticipation of an argument
concerning ability to pay, Plaintiff submits a screenshot of a fundraising page seeking donations
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for Defendant Bevelyn Williams. (See Doc. No. 238-2). The page indicates that the fundraiser
raised over $345,000. (Id.).
Defendants argue that the hours expended on the litigation are unreasonable particularly in
light of the $5,000 judgment awarded. (Doc. No. 243 & 246). Defendants argue that Plaintiff
overstaffed the case, resulting in hours unnecessarily spent on internal coordination and duplicative
work. Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s attorneys performed unnecessary tasks, including
preparation for a trial that never occurred. (Id.). Defendants assert that a reasonable fee is between
$110,000 and $125,000. (Doc. No. 243). Defendants do not dispute that Bevelyn Williams was the
beneficiary of an online fundraiser but argue that ability to pay has no bearing on the lodestar
calculation.
Here, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s work on this litigation was successful, especially
considering the unnecessary complications and frustration caused by Defendants’ conduct
throughout the litigation. Even considering that Defendants’ conduct dramatically increased the
time spent on the case, counsel for Plaintiff failed to exercise good billing judgment with regard
to case staffing and the time spent on particular tasks. For example, ten attorneys worked on the
case when the case reasonably required a fraction of that number. In addition to the unnecessary
participation by multiple attorneys in hearings and conference calls, the overstaffing resulted in
multiple levels of review and time spent on coordination that would have been unnecessary or
dramatically reduced had the case been more leanly staffed. All of this leads to the inescapable
conclusion that BBS’s requested fees are patently unreasonable. Moreover, a review of the time
log shows that some of the hours spent on motions that were never filed or on matters involving
other defendants. For example, work done by Laura Bilbrey from August 23, 2022, to August 26,
2022, concerned service on At the Well, a defendant that was later voluntarily dismissed. (See
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Doc. No. 219). The time log also includes entries regarding sentencing, which was not possible
in this civil case. Finally, concerning the overall reasonableness of the fee award, the Court notes
the disparity between the fees requested and the $5,000 judgment. This was, of course, not the
only relief awarded in this case. Plaintiff was also granted a preliminary injunction. But that award
took place at the inception of the case. The bulk of time billed occurred after entry of the
preliminary injunction.
In consideration of these factors, Plaintiff’s submissions, and the case record as a whole,
the Court finds an across-the-board reduction of 50% in the total fee award is warranted. Therefore,
the total attorneys’ fee award requested – $314,574.63 – will be reduced to $157,287.32.
C. Litigation Costs
As the prevailing party, “the court may award appropriate relief, including temporary,
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the
costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B).
Plaintiff seeks recovery of $6,067.47 in litigation costs and expenses, which includes fees
for service of process and delivery costs. Counsel for Plaintiff states that costs are only those costs
associated with the non-settling defendants. (Miller Decl., Doc. No. 238-1 ¶ 20). In addition,
Plaintiff states that it has not sought reimbursement for other typical expenses, such as phone
charges, copying, or legal research. Defendants’ sole argument against these expenses is that the
amounts expended are high compared to the number of Defendants. Defendants do not identify
any cost they contend is extraneous.
It appears to the Court that the expenses sought are reasonable and necessary. Accordingly,
Plaintiff is entitled to recover $6,067.47 in litigation costs and expenses.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a total of $157,287.32 in
attorneys’ fees and a total of $6,067.47 in litigation costs and expenses.
It is so ORDERED.
_______________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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