Travis v. Williams et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DATRIN TRAVIS, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 3:24-cv-00145
) 	Judge Richardson/Frensley
SARAH-ANN WILLIAMS, et al, 	)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Robert Gipson’s motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute and memorandum of law in support. Docket No. 39. The Plaintiff has not responded to
the motion despite several extensions. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned
recommends that the motion be GRANTED, and this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
This pro se action brought by a former inmate of the Sumner County Jail in Gallatin,
Tennessee asserts claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiff’s First, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law medical malpractice occurring while in the custody of
the Davidson County Sherriff’s Office Downtown Detention Center in Nashville, Tennessee.
Docket No. 14. On initial review, the Court dismissed a number of Plaintiff’s claims however, it
allowed claims against several of the Defendants to proceed. Docket No. 20.
On August 7, 2025, Defendant Robert Gipson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution. Docket No. 39. The motion asserts that the Plaintiff has failed to comply with the
rules and orders of the Court regarding his address as evidenced by the return of multiple mailings
from the Clerk of Court as undeliverable. Id. The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff’s failure to
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comply with the rules prevents the Parties from advancing the litigation and that the Plaintiff has
otherwise failed to participate in this case.
The Plaintiff failed to timely respond to the motion to dismiss and on September 12, 2025,
the Court entered a show cause order requiring Plaintiff to respond September 26, 2025, as to why
his claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Clerk of Court mailed a copy of
the order to the Plaintiff but it is was returned as undeliverable on October 21, 2025. Docket No.
52. On October 15, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a notice updating his address with the Court. Docket
No. 50. On October 31, 2025, the Court entered a second show cause order directing the Clerk of
Court to send the Order to the Plaintiff’s newly filed address and requiring the Plaintiff to respond
to the show cause order no later than November 21, 2025. Docket No. 54. To date, the Plaintiff
has failed to respond to the show cause order or the motion to dismiss.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “confers on district courts the authority to dismiss
an action for failure of a Plaintiff to prosecute the claim or comply with the Rules or any order of
the Court. Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Department, 529 F. 3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008)(citing
Knoll v. AT & T, 176 F. 3d 359, 362-3 (6th Cir. 1999)); Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F. 3d 700,
704 (6th Cir. 2013)(“It is well settled that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a
lawsuit for failure to prosecute.”). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules provides that “[c]ivil suits
that have been pending for an unreasonable period of time without any action having been taken
by any party may be summarily dismissed . . . without prejudice to refile or to move the Court to
set aside the order of dismissal for just cause.” Local Rule 41.01(a)(dismissal for unreasonable
delay. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a tool for district courts to manage their dockets and
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avoid unnecessary burdens on opposing parties and the judiciary. See Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 736
(quoting Knoll, 176 F. 3d at 363).
The Court considers four factors in determining whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) is
appropriate: (1) the willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the plaintiff; (2) whether the opposing party
has been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s conduct; (3) whether the plaintiff was warned that failure to
cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) the availability and appropriateness of other, less drastic
sanctions. 	Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t, 529 F. 3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008). 	A
dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) constitutes an adjudication on the merits unless
the dismissal order states otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has noted, however, that dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh sanction” and should only
apply in extreme situations where there is a “clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
plaintiff.” Carter, 636 F. 2d at 161, quoting Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F. 2d 382,
385 (5th Cir. 1978).
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal of
an action if a Plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the Court. See, Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F. 2d 108, 109 (6 th Cir., 1991). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be granted some latitude
when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is
no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a lay person
can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se litigants has limits.”
Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F. 3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
When a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court-imposed deadline,
there is no basis for treating that party more favorably than a party who is represented. Id.
Additionally, Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars
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of cases that have remained dormant because of inaction or dilatoriness of the party seeking relief.”
Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630 (1962).
This is not a case of a plaintiff simply filing documents past deadlines or filing inadequate
briefs. See Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F. 3d 586, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
district court abused its discretion by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute).
Giving due consideration to each of the factors, the Court finds that dismissal for failure to
prosecute is an appropriate and necessary sanction, as no alternative sanction “would protect the
integrity of pre-trial procedures.” Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F. 2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980).
B. 	The Case at Bar
The undersigned finds that dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is appropriate because the four relevant factors, considered under the “relaxed” standard
for dismissal without prejudice show a record of delay, refusal to advance the case and failure to
comply with the Court’s orders by the Plaintiff.
1. 	Bad Faith, Willfulness, or Fault
A plaintiff’s actions demonstrate bad faith, willfulness, or fault where they “display either
an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [plaintiff’s] conduct
on those proceedings.” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F. 3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mulbah,
261 F. 3d at 591(6th Cir 2001)). Although there is no indication that the Plaintiffs’ failure to file a
response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss by the deadline was driven by bad faith, he is still
“at fault for failing to comply with the Court’s Order[ ].” Malott v. Haas, 2017 WL 1319839, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1244991 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 5, 2017); see id. (finding that first factor weighed in favor of dismissal where plaintiff
had failed to respond to the defendants’ summary judgment motion, despite receiving additional
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time to do so, and had failed to respond to the court’s show-cause orders). This factor weighs in
favor of dismissal.
2. 	Prejudice
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] defendant is prejudiced by a plaintiff’s dilatory conduct
if the defendant is ‘required to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the
plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide.’” Carpenter, 723 F. 3d at 707 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F. 3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also
Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 739 (same). Such prejudice typically arises in the discovery context. See,
e.g., Harmon, 110 F. 3d at 368 (finding prejudice where plaintiff failed to respond to defendant’s
interrogatories and a related motion to compel); Wright v. City of Germantown, 2013 WL 1729105,
at *2 (W. D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2013) (finding prejudice where defendant “expended time and money
pursuing [plaintiff’s] required initial disclosures and deposition testimony”). Notably, time and
effort spent on “typical steps in the early stages of litigation[,]” such as answering a complaint or
filing pretrial motions to advance the defendant’s position, are not actions “necessitated by any
lack of cooperation” and therefore do not weigh in favor of dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 739. The Sixth Circuit explained in Schafer v. City of Defiance Police
Department that “[i]f such efforts . . . [were] alone sufficient to establish prejudice,” for the purpose
of Rule 41(b), “then every defendant who answers a complaint and responds minimally to a lawsuit
would be able to claim prejudice[,]” a “result [that] would defy common sense.” 529 F. 3d at 740.
Here, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Docket No. 39. The Plaintiff’s failure to take
any steps to advance the litigation does prejudice the Defendant. All parties are entitled to a just
and prompt resolution of their cases. The failure to advance litigation, as the Plaintiff has here,
prejudices the parties and reflects the type of situation where the Court should intervene. The
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failure of a party to respond to dispositive motions deprives the Court of that party’s opposition,
reflects a lack of interest in the litigation and forces the Court to address matters without the benefit
of the nonmoving party’s advocacy. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3. 	Prior Notice
Whether a party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal “is a ‘key
consideration’” in the Rule 41(b) analysis. Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 740 (quoting Stough, 138 F. 3d at
615). The Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss in the time required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Court entered a show cause
order further extending Plaintiff’s deadline to September 26, 2025, to indicate why his claim
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Docket No. 49. The Show Cause Order further
warned the Plaintiff that his failure to respond to the Order may lead to a recommendation that his
claims be dismissed. Id. The Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss or this Court’s
Show Cause Order. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
4. 	Appropriateness of Other Sanctions
The less-drastic sanction of dismissal without prejudice is available and appropriate here.
Dismissal without prejudice balances the Court’s interest in “sound judicial case and docket
management” with “the public policy interest in the disposition of cases on their merits.” Muncy,
110 F. App’x at 557 n. 5; see also Mulbah, 261 F. 3d at 590–91. That is so even though the
defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. See Watsy v. Richards, No. 86-1856, 1987 WL 37151,
at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 1987) (affirming dismissal of action for failure to prosecute where plaintiff
had not provided the court with a current mailing address or responded to the defendants’ motion
dismiss despite a sixty-day extension); Thomas-Wilson v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 3:14-cv-
01968, 2016 WL 4775738, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 15, 2016) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s claims
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without prejudice for failure to prosecute and finding defendants’ pending motion for summary
judgment moot). Such a sanction is particularly appropriate in cases of prolonged inactivity and
where, as here, the plaintiff appears pro se. See Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 737 (noting that courts apply
the four-factor test “more stringently in cases where the plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct is
responsible for the dismissal.” Id. (quoting Harmon, 110 F. 3d at 367)).
All four factors set forth above weigh in favor of dismissal of this case. While dismissal
under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh” sanction. Plaintiff has been given every opportunity to participate in
this litigation and has chosen not to do so. The Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to cure
the defects and specifically advised that his failure to cooperate and comply with the Court’s orders
could lead to dismissal. No further less drastic sanction would be appropriate in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	undersigned 	RECOMMENDS 	that 	this 	action 	be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute and that the
Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 39) be GRANTED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
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