Atkins v. Sutton et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
HOWARD J. ATKINS 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 3:25-cv-00115
)
DAVID SUTTON et al. 	)
TO: 	Honorable Aleta A. Trauger, United States District Judge
R E P O R T 	A N D 	R E C O M E N D A T I O N
This pro se, prisoner civil rights action has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for
pretrial proceedings. 	See Memorandum Opinion and Order entered January 2, 2026 (Docket
Entry No. 10). 	Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion (Docket Entry No. 26) for a
temporary restraining order. 	For the reasons set out below, the Court recommends that the
motion be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Howard J. Atkins (“Plaintiff”), is a prisoner of the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”) currently confined at the Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) in Tiptonville,
Tennessee. 	On January 31, 2025, he filed this pro se and in forma pauperis lawsuit against
David 	Sutton, 	the 	TDOC 	Classification 	Director; 	Linda 	Thomas, 	the 	TDOC 	Assistant
Commissioner of Tennessee Prison Operations; and, “Unknown T.D.O.C. Employee(s).” 	See
Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1).
Plaintiff asserts that he was confined at the Northeast Correctional Complex in 2024 but
was transferred to the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (“TTCC”) on September 5, 2024.
He contends that TTCC is “particularly unsuited to meet his rehabilitative, mental health, and
programmatic needs during this phase of his incarceration,” id. at 7, and that the transfer was a
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form of retaliation against him because of his success in two lawsuits that involved TDOC.
According to Plaintiff, Defendants “were involved and complicit in his retaliatory transfer by
either recommending or ordering the transfer or by submitting Atkins’ name for transfer.” Id. at
12. As relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction against Defendants requiring that he be returned to a
TDOC state-run facility “with appropriate programmatic/educational opportunities” and be
housed “in compliance with his Minimum-Restrict custody status,” punitive damages in the
amount of $500,000, and compensatory and nominal damages. Id. at 13.
After an initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A, the Court permitted the lawsuit to proceed against Defendants based on Plaintiff’s First
Amendment 	retaliation 	claim 	but 	dismissed 	his 	request 	for 	monetary 	damages 	against
Defendants in their official capacities. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6. In response to
the complaint, Defendant Sutton filed an answer (Docket Entry No. 22) and Defendant Thomas
filed a motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 20), which is currently pending before the Court. In
addition to the instant motion for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff has a pending motion
before the Court to amend his complaint, seeking to expand his factual allegations, add two new
defendants, and add new claims, see Docket Entry No. 34, the time for response to which has not
yet expired.
II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND RESPONSE
By his motion, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order under Rule 65(b) based on
allegations of recent events that have occurred. 	He asserts that, on March 10, 2026, he was
transferred from TTCC to NWCX, where is currently housed. He alleges that the transfer did not
comply with TDOC policy, that he was not assigned to an appropriate housing unit at NWCX,
and that he was convicted of the disciplinary offense of refusing a cell assignment after he
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requested protective custody instead of accepting placement in the cell into which he was
assigned. He contends that these events have placed him in danger, amount to “a loosely-veiled
attempt at further retaliation” against him, and have hindered his ability to respond to
Defendants’ filings in this case. See Docket Entry No. 26 at 6, ¶ 26. Plaintiff seeks: (1) an order
requiring his placement in a particular housing unit; (2) an order that the disciplinary conviction
be overturned and expunged from his prison record; (3) an order that Defendants and their
subordinates cease all retaliatory actions against him; (4) written findings by the Court pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3626; (5) an order appointing him counsel; and, (6) any other relief the Court
deems just and proper. Id. at 9-10. Subsequent to filing his motion, Plaintiff filed “updates” on
April 13, 2026, and May 29, 2026, stating that the first two of his requests for relief are no longer
necessary because he has now been moved to an acceptable housing unit and because the
disciplinary conviction was dismissed and expunged. See Docket Entry No. 27 at 2, ¶ 7; Docket
Entry No. 31 at 2, ¶ 2.
Defendants oppose the motion and contend that Plaintiff has not carried the high burden
of proof necessary to obtain the relief he seeks. After pointing out that Plaintiff’s motion is more
appropriately viewed as a request for a preliminary injunction, Defendants argue that his request
for a housing unit change has now become moot and that the remainder of the relief that he seeks
is procedurally and substantively inappropriate. See Response in Opposition (Docket Entry No.
29).
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s purposeful framing of his motion as one for a temporary
restraining order, as opposed to a motion for a preliminary injunction, is misguided. 	Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs requests for a temporary restraining order and requires
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that temporary restraining orders may issue without written or oral notice to the adverse party
only if:
(A) 	specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) 	the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 	Defendants clearly had notice of the motion, as evidenced by its
response in opposition, and thus the request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is
procedurally misplaced. 	See Craig v. Ezpawn Tennessee, Inc., 2010 WL 2521367, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. June 16, 2010) (“Here, the adverse party, i.e. the Defendant, has notice of Plaintiff's
Motion. This notice is evidenced by Defendant's response to the instant Motion. Since the
issuance of a temporary restraining order is premised on the idea that the adverse party lacks
notice of the relief the moving party requests, Plaintiff's Motion for a temporary restraining order
is DENIED.”). 	Further, a temporary restraining order is, by its very nature, an order of a short
and temporary duration. 	Plaintiff’s requests for relief are simply not framed as requests for
temporary relief but are framed in terms of a lasting preliminary injunction. 	For these reasons
alone, the motion is properly denied.
Further, even if considered as a request for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff’s motion
warrants denial. Pretrial injunctive relief is 	considered extraordinary relief, see Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Ass’n v. Detroit Typographical Union No. 18, Int’l Typographical Union,
471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972), and should be granted only if the movant satisfies a heavy
burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it. 	Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette
Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). The purpose of such pretrial injunctive
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relief is not to remedy an alleged wrong or to provide preemptive relief to a party but to
“preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” 	EOG
Resources, Inc. v. Lucky Land Mgmt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868, 883 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Starbucks
Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345-46). In determining whether to grant such relief, the court
must consider whether the movant has established: (1) a “strong” likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of the
equities favors the movant because the issuance of an injunction would not cause substantial
harm to others; and (4) that the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction.
Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022); Leary v.
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000). 	Whether to grant such relief is within the
discretion of the district court. Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 447 (6th
Cir. 2009).
Upon weighing of the relevant considerations, Plaintiff’s motion is properly denied.
First, much of Plaintiff’s motion has, by his own admission, become moot because he has
obtained the relief that he requests. Although Plaintiff contends that the last four of his requests
are not moot, two of these requests seek relief that is too vague and amorphous to be granted, as
is the case with his requests for order to “cease all retaliatory actions” or for “just and proper”
relief. 	The remaining two requests are simply not related to forms of injunctive relief. 	The
requirement of written findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3626 is a procedural requirement and the
appointment of counsel to a party is a discretionary decision made by the Court.
Second, “a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the
complaint.” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
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Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). The events occurring at the NECX in
2026 are simply not factually related to the alleged retaliatory transfer that occurred in
September 2024 that is the subject of Plaintiff’s compliant.
Finally, Plaintiff essentially asks that the Court actively intervene on his behalf by
overseeing aspects of his current incarceration. 	The Court finds no basis supporting such
extraordinary relief. This action was only recently filed, and Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on
the merits is no greater than that of Defendants at this point. 	Plaintiff has also not made a
persuasive showing that he will suffer irreparable harm if the requested injunctive relief is not
granted. The balancing of harms required by the third factor also does not weigh in favor of the
requested relief, and Plaintiff has not persuasively demonstrated that a public interest would be
advanced by the requested relief. 	National Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers
Hockey Club, 372 F.3d 712, 720 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003). To the contrary, there is a “public interest
in leaving the administration of state prisons to state prison administrators.” Rhinehart v. Scutt,
509 F.App'x 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2013). 	Absent extraordinary and urgently compelling reasons,
which have not been shown by Plaintiff, the Court will not intervene in the day-to-day operations
of a correctional facility. See Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 284 (6th Cir. 1988) (setting forth
various public policy concerns relating to court intrusion into prison administrative matters and
holding that a federal court should not “attempt to administer any portion of a state correctional
system program except in the most compelling situations”); Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432,
438 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that federal restraint into intrusion of a state penal institution is
counseled); Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F.App’x 411, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987)) (decisions concerning the administration of prisons are vested in
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prison officials in the absence of a constitutional violation, and any interference by the federal
courts in that activity is necessarily disruptive).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a
temporary restraining order (Docket Entry No. 26) be DENIED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation. See Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). An additional three (3) days are added to this time
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Objections must state with particularity the specific portions of this
Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. 	Failure to file written objections
within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District Court's Order
regarding the Report and Recommendation. 	See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	Any response to the objections must be filed
within fourteen (14) days after service of objections. See Federal Rule 72(b)(2) and Local Rule
72.02(b).
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________
BARBARA D. HOLMES
United States Magistrate Judge
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