Bridges v. Dudek

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RANADA BRIDGES,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO1, Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
Case No. 3:25-cv-000324
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
Magistrate Luke A. Evans
To: 	The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Renada Bridges filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review
of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) denying
her application for a closed period of disability and for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff has moved for
judgment on the administrative record (Doc. No. 7), and Defendant has responded in opposition
(Doc. No. 14).
Having considered the parties’ arguments and the administrative record (Doc. No. 6) as a
whole, and for the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that Plaintiff’s motion
for judgment on the record be Denied.
1 	Frank Bisignano was sworn in as Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Press
Release, Soc. Sec. Nat’l Press Off., Fin. Servs. Indus. Leader Frank Bisignano to be the 18th
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (May 7, 2025), https://www.ssa.gov/news/en/press/releases/2025-05-
07.html [https://perma.cc/VSC6-YCLM] (last visited Sep. 24, 2025). Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d), Bisignano is automatically substituted as the defendant in this action. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d).
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I. 	Background
A. 	Plaintiff’s DIB Application2
Plaintiff applied for DIB on January 21, 2022, alleging that she has been disabled and
unable to work since September 15, 2019, because of lower back arthritis, protruding discs, joint
disease, foraminal stenosis of discs, fissure tear, narrowing of the space between discs, anxiety and
depression disorders, fibromyalgia, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, edema, rheumatoid arthritis,
elevated liver enzymes, and swelling of her legs. (AR at 66.3) Defendant denied Plaintiff’s
application initially and on reconsideration. (AR at 77, 85.) At Plaintiff’s request, an administrative
law judge (ALJ) held a telephonic hearing regarding her application on April 18, 2024. (AR at 34–
45.) Plaintiff appeared alongside a non-attorney representative and testified. (AR 37, 38–42.) The
ALJ also heard testimony from a vocational expert. (AR 42–45.)
B. 	The ALJ’s Findings
On May 8, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act and applicable regulations and denied her claim for
DIB. (AR 16–29.) The ALJ made the following enumerated findings:
1. 	The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act on March 31, 2023.
2 	In her motion for judgment on the administrative record, Plaintiff asserts she is “seeking
reversal of [Defendant’s] decision denying Plaintiff’s eligibility for Social Security Disability and
Supplemental Security Income benefits . . . .” (Doc. No. 7 at 1.) However, the administrative
record indicates that Defendant’s final decision only considered Plaintiff’s eligibility for DIB. (AR
at 66.) As a result, the Court focuses only on Plaintiff’s claim for DIB.
3 	The transcript of the administrative record (Doc. No. 6) is referenced herein by the
abbreviation “AR.” All page numbers cited in the AR refer to the Bates stamp at the bottom right
corner of each page.
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2. 	The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period
from her alleged onset date of September 15, 2019, through her date last insured of
March 31, 2023 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. 	Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe
impairments: spine disorder and obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
* 	* 	*
4. 	Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the 	listed 	impairments 	in 	20 	CFR 	Part 404, 	Subpart 	P, 	Appendix 	1 	(20
CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
* 	* 	*
5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that,
through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) that was limited to frequent
climbing of ramps and stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent
stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, and balancing; and avoiding concentrated
exposure to work around hazardous machinery and moving parts and work at
unprotected heights.
* 	* 	*
6. 	Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past
relevant work as a receptionist and an administrative clerk. This work did not
require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
* 	* 	*
7. 	The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, at any time from September 15, 2019, the alleged onset date, through March
31, 2023, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).
(AR at 19–29.) The Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review
on February 19, 2025, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of Defendant.
(AR at 5–7.)
C. 	Appeal Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
Plaintiff filed this action for review of the ALJ’s decision on March 21, 2025 (Doc. No. 1),
and this Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff contests the ALJ’s findings on
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multiple grounds. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversable error where the ALJ
failed to find that Plaintiff suffers from severe mental impairment for purposes of the Social
Security Act. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 11.) Plaintiff also maintains that the ALJ erred in determining
Plaintiff’s “residual functional capacity” (RFC) because he failed to properly consider record
evidence of Plaintiff’s impairments and their effects on her ability to work. (Doc. No. 7-1.) On this
alleged point of error, Plaintiff argues the decision should be reversed, in part, because the ALJ
did not give sufficient consideration to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia diagnosis. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s disabling symptoms because the ALJ’s findings
were not supported by substantial record evidence and because he impermissibly “cherry-pick[ed]”
record evidence to make his determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 21.)
Defendant opposes reversal and argues that he reasonably evaluated the medical evidence
and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about her symptoms on the record and that the final decision
was ultimately supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. No. 14.) Plaintiff declined to file an
optional reply and therefore the instant motion is ripe for consideration.
D. 	Review of the Record
The ALJ and the parties have thoroughly described and discussed the medical and
testimonial evidence in the administrative record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those
matters only to the extent necessary to address the parties’ arguments.
II. 	Legal Standards
A. 	Standard of Review
This Court’s review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to determining (1) whether the ALJ’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir.
2016) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009)). “Under the
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substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether
it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but “more than a
mere scintilla” and means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Id. at 103 (quoting Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229); see also Gentry
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014) (same). Further, “[t]he Social Security
Administration has established rules for how an ALJ must evaluate a disability claim and has made
promises to disability applicants as to how their claims and medical evidence will be reviewed.”
Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723. Where an ALJ fails to follow those rules or regulations, “we find a lack
of substantial evidence, ‘even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the
record.’” Miller, 811 F.3d at 833 (quoting Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722).
B. 	Determining Disability at the Administrative Level
Plaintiff applied for DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act, which is an insurance
program that “provides old-age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals irrespective
of financial need.” Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 (1988). To receive DIB, Plaintiff must
establish that she had a disability on or before the last date she was eligible for insurance under
Title II, which is determined based on her earnings record. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1);
20 C.F.R. § 404.130. “Disability” in this context is defined as an “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
ALJs must employ a “five-step sequential evaluation process” to determine whether a
claimant is disabled, proceeding through each step until a determination can be reached. 20 C.F.R.
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§ 404.1520(a)(4). 	At 	step 	one, 	the 	ALJ 	considers 	the 	claimant’s 	work 	activity. 	Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “[I]f the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, then the claimant
is not disabled.” Miller, 811 F.3d at 834 n.6. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant
suffers from “a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment” or “combination of
impairments” that meets the 12-month durational requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). “If
the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments [that meets the
durational requirement], then the claimant is not disabled.” Miller, 811 F.3d at 834 n.6. At step
three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s medical impairment or impairments appear on a
list maintained by the SSA that “identifies and defines impairments that are of sufficient severity
as to prevent any gainful activity.” Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir.
2006); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). “If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of
the listings, then the ALJ will find the claimant disabled.” Miller, 811 F.3d at 834 n.6. If not, the
ALJ proceeds to step four. Combs, 459 F.3d at 643; see also Walker v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-1231,
2017 WL 6492621, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017) (explaining that “[a] claimant is not required
to show the existence of a listed impairment in order to be found disabled, but such showing results
in an automatic finding of disability and ends the inquiry”), report and recommendation adopted,
2018 WL 305748 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2018).
At step four, the ALJ evaluates the claimant’s past relevant work and “‘residual functional
capacity,’ defined as ‘the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations.’” Combs, 459
F.3d at 643 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Past work
is relevant to this analysis if the claimant performed the work within the past 15 years, the work
qualifies as substantial gainful activity, and the work lasted long enough for the claimant to learn
how to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant’s RFC permits her to perform past
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relevant work, she is not disabled. Combs, 459 F.3d at 643. If a claimant cannot perform past
relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five and determines whether, “in light of [her] residual
functional capacity, age, education, and work experience,” a claimant can perform other
substantial gainful employment. Id. While the claimant bears the burden of proof during the first
four steps, at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to “identify a significant number of
jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational
profile.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 652 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2011). “Claimants who can
perform 	such 	work 	are 	not 	disabled.” 	Combs, 	459 	F.3d 	at 	643; 	see 	also 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s arguments challenge the ALJ’s determination that she is not disabled under SSA
regulations where the ALJ found that, despite Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments,
Plaintiff has the RFC to perform “light work” as set forth by SSA regulations with further light
exertional limitations. (AR at 23.)
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversable error by failing to: (1) find
that any of Plaintiff’s mental health conditions constituted severe impairments for purposes of the
Social Security Act; (2) properly consider all of the record evidence when determining Plaintiff’s
RFC; and (3) properly evaluate Plaintiff’s disabling symptoms.
The Court will address each alleged point of error in turn.
A. 	Assessment of Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments
In his decision, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression disorders as
impairments, but found they were “non-severe” under SSA regulations because “[t]he record
supports a finding that these impairments have not caused more than minimal limitation in the
ability to perform basic work activities . . . .” (AR at 21.) Plaintiff’s argument on this point
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conflates two distinct considerations. Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ’s assessment is erroneous
because Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression disorders are actually severe impairments and that, in
finding otherwise, the ALJ ignored record evidence sufficient to show the severity of those
impairments. (Doc. No. 7-1.) The remainder of Plaintiff’s argument here alleges error because the
ALJ did not adequately consider the impact of Plaintiff’s severe and non-severe impairments on
her RFC. (Id.) As the ALJ correctly recognized, “[t]he limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’
criteria are not a[n] [RFC] assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments”
(AR at 23) and therefore Plaintiff’s argument will be considered in reviewing her RFC argument.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred, in part, because there is record evidence that Plaintiff
experienced depression and “was consistently diagnosed with major depressive disorder[.]” (Doc.
No. 7-1 at 11 (citing AR at 595, 624).) The ALJ stated more specifically that “there is no evidence
of any mental health treatment during” the time period between the AOD of September 15, 2019,
through Plaintiff’s DLI of March 31, 2023. (AR at 22.) However, even if there was evidence of
Plaintiff’s treatment for her mental impairments during the applicable period that “[wa]s
considered to be substantial, it is insufficient on its own to warrant reversal.” Shelton v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Case No. 2:18-cv-00093, 2020 WL 707586, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2020), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Shelton v. Saul, 2020 WL 1284628 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18,
2020). This Court must defer to an ALJ’s finding that is supported by substantial evidence “even
if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.”
Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also
id. (“The substantial-evidence standard . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)).
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Here, the ALJ explained that, in assessing the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments,
he considered record evidence, observations of SSA psychological consultative examiner, Dr.
Linda Blazina, and the effects of Plaintiff’s impairments on the four broad areas of mental
functioning colloquially known as “paragraph B criteria.” (AR at 22.) For example, he cited the
same expert assessment as Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s attachment disorder and its effects on the
paragraph B criteria. (Id.) As the ALJ and Plaintiff note, Dr. Blazina assessed that Plaintiff’s
anxiety and depression moderately impaired her abilities to sustain her concentration, attention,
and persistence, interact socially, and adapt to changes and tolerate the normal stresses of the
workplace. (AR at 22, 544.); (Doc. No. 7-1.)
However, the ALJ cited other record evidence as more persuasive than Dr. Blazina’s
assessment. Relying on the assessments of two separate psychological consultants, both of whom
reviewed Dr. Blazina’s February 16, 2023 consultative evaluation, the lack of record or testimonial
evidence of significant mental symptoms or limitations, and the lack of evidence of consistent
mental health treatment for the disability period, the ALJ found that there was substantial evidence
to support a determination that Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression disorders are non-severe mental
impairments. (AR at 22, 55–56, 66–67.) Considering the available evidence, the ALJ concluded
that, because neither disorder considered singly and in combination caused more than “‘mild’”
limitation in any one of the paragraph B criteria, Plaintiff’s impairments overall impose only
minimal limitation on her ability to do basic work activities and are, therefore, non-severe.
(AR at 23.) On this argument, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately shown that the
ALJ’s determination lacks the support of substantial record evidence.
B. 	Formulating Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff’s next argument for reversal is that the ALJ erred by not properly considering the
record evidence when formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. No. 7-1.) Plaintiff’s argument is two-
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pronged. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversable error because he failed to
“consider both the severe and non-severe impairments in the remaining steps of the evaluation.”
(Id. at 12.) Plaintiff further states that the ALJ “failed to [consider both] in this case, as the ALJ’s
RFC finding contains no mental limitations[.]” (Id.)
The ALJ’s decision plainly demonstrates that all medically determinable impairments were
considered. The ALJ’s full explanation at this step is included in the administrative record, but the
Court highlights the following relevant paragraphs:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that,
through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) that was limited to
frequent climbing of ramps and stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; frequent stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, and balancing;
and avoiding concentrated exposure to work around hazardous machinery
and moving parts and work at unprotected heights.
In making this finding, the undersigned has considered all symptoms and the extent
to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20
CFR 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p. The undersigned also considered the medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s) in accordance with the
requirements of 20 CFR 404.1520c.
(AR at 23–24.)
The SSA has promised DIB claimants that it “will consider all evidence in [the] case
record” 	when 	determining 	disability 	claims. 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 404.1520(a)(3), 416.920(a)(3).
However, “the ALJ need not expressly mention every piece of evidence” he or she considered in
the written opinion “so long as the overall decision was supported by substantial evidence.” Noto
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 632 F. App’x 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2015) (first citing Loral Def. Sys.-Akron
v. N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999); and then citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.953); see also Big
Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063, 1072 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e do not require the ALJ to
remark on every piece of evidence. . . . Our review is whether the ALJ’s decision rests on
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substantial evidence.”). The Court finds that the ALJ not only considered Plaintiff’s severe and
non-severe medically determinable impairments in formulating her RFC, the ALJ also explained
in detail how each impairment affects Plaintiff’s RFC. (see AR at 23–28.)
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC because he “failed to
properly consider the opinion offered by [Plaintiff’s medical provider] Nurse Urell[.]” (Doc.
No. 7-1 at 16.) Plaintiff correctly recognizes that, in considering medical professionals’ opinions,
an ALJ no longer gives deference or evidentiary weight to that opinion solely because she is the
treating physician (or nurse practitioner4). (Id. at 14–15 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) and
then citing Wilcoxson v. Saul, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-00145, 2020 WL 3097081, at *5
(W.D. Ky. June 10, 2020).) Instead, ALJ’s now consider five factors when assessing the
persuasiveness 	of 	medical 	opinions 	and 	prior 	administrative medical 	findings, 	including:
(1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) the relationship between the individual providing the
medical opinion and the claimant, (4) the opinion provider’s specialization, and (5) other factors
that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). Of those
factors, supportability and consistency are most important and are the only factors an ALJ must
discuss applying in their decisions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(2).
The ALJ explained the following in weighing Nurse Urell’s medical opinion in support of
Plaintiff’s claim:
Nurse Urell’s medical opinion is not persuasive as it not well-supported by their
own treatment records which document limited range of motion, tenderness, and
edema but does not specify the severity of the claimant’s edema. There is nothing
in Dr. Urell’s treatment records from the period in question to support their medical
opinion of excessive work absences or significant adverse side effects from
4 	The ALJ refers to Plaintiff’s primary provider as both “Nurse Practitioner” and “Doctor”
but record evidence reflects Urell is a Nurse Practitioner. (AR at 553.)
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medication or their opined exertional, postural, manipulative, or environmental
limitations.
Dr. Urell’s medical opinion is also not consistent with other evidence, such as
examination findings of normal gait and strength and negative straight leg raises,
the claimant’s reports of improved functioning with medication without adverse
side effects, and the claimant’s reported daily living activities.
(AR at 28.)
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s persuasiveness analysis erroneously applies the supportability
and consistency factors. First, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in examining the supportability of
Nurse Urell’s medical opinion because he improperly substituted “his lay opinion for that of a
medical professional” despite not being qualified to “determine that the findings in Nurse Urell’s
notes are insufficient to support her conclusions” and because the ALJ failed to consider record
evidence supporting Nurse Urell’s opinion. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 16.)
Plaintiff similarly argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the consistency of Nurse Urell’s
medical opinion regarding Plaintiff’s physical limitations because, for example, Dr. Johnson, one
of the medical consultants who examined Plaintiff for Tennessee’s disability determination
(AR at 536–38), and Dr. T.S. Baker (see, e.g., AR at 502–17), one of Plaintiff’s prior treating
physicians, included in their assessments instances of Plaintiff’s physical limitations due to some
of the same medical issues cited by Nurse Urell, such as bilateral edema of the knees. (Doc. No. 7-
1.)
Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s assertions for the same reasons he has argued this action
must fail: Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing the ALJ’s final decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. (Doc. No. 14.) The Court agrees. As recognized above, the
Court will not disturb a final decision where it is supported by substantial record evidence. Here,
the ALJ explained that Nurse Urell’s medical opinion was not persuasive, in relevant part, because
it was unsupported by, and inconsistent with, objective medical evidence and other medical
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opinions on the record. The ALJ specifically cites the inconsistencies internal to Nurse Urell’s
assessment when considering her persuasiveness. The ALJ explains that, despite Nurse Urell’s
opinion that Plaintiff is restricted to a high degree by her ailments, the nurse’s own medical records
from the period in question do not support such restrictions. (AR at 28.)
In short, the record evidence is such that, although a reasonable mind may disagree, that
reasonable mind could accept the record evidence as adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion.
Baker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 21 App’x 313, 315 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining what constitutes
“substantial evidence”). As a result, Plaintiff has not met her burden and the Court should not
disturb Defendant’s final decision on this point. Smith v. Berryhill, NO. 3:15-cv-00600, 2017 WL
3237794, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 2017) (“The agency's decision must stand if substantial
evidence supports it, even if the record contains evidence supporting the opposite conclusion.”)
(quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 644 F. App’x 468, 473 (6th Cir. 2016)).
C. 	Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Disabling Symptoms
Plaintiff’s third and final statement of error pertains to the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s
disabling symptoms as subjectively described by Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 7-1.) On this subject, the ALJ
explained:
In considering the claimant’s symptoms, the undersigned must follow a two-step
process in which it must first be determined whether there is an underlying
medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)--i.e., an impairment must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be
shown by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques--that
could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms.
Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably
be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms has been shown, the
undersigned must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the
claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s
work-related activities. For this purpose, whenever statements about the intensity,
persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not
substantiated by objective medical evidence, the undersigned must consider other
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evidence in the record to determine if the claimant’s symptoms limit the ability to
do work-related activities.
At the hearing, the claimant testified that they cannot work because of daily pain
and difficulty taking care of themselves on a daily basis. They stated that it takes
time for them to get out of bed or go to the bathroom and that they have to elevate
their legs daily because of swelling. The claimant stated that they have stiffness in
their fingers, arms, and hips and that their whole body feels sore. The claimant
stated that they get cramping in their hands that affects their ability to open jars and
clean and dress themselves. The claimant testified that they can be on their feet for
“maybe” five minutes before their legs start to swell and they start getting throbbing
pain in their back and aching in their hips and knees. The claimant stated that the
heaviest weight they can lift is three to five pounds but that they cannot carry five
pounds throughout their house. As for their daily living activities, the claimant
testified that they go extended periods of time in the same clothes and extended
periods of time without bathing. They stated that their husband does the cooking
and cleaning and that they take naps during the day because of fatigue.
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.
(AR at 24.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to state with any specificity the evidence upon which
he relies to find [Plaintiff’s] symptoms not disabling[.]” (Doc. No. 7-1 at 21.) At the same time
that Plaintiff asserts the ALJ did not sufficiently cite to the evidence upon which he relied, Plaintiff
also faults the ALJ for purportedly relying too heavily on, and “cherry-picking” from, the objective
medical evidence on which he did rely. (Id.)
As the Court has explained previously:
Social Security Ruling 16-3p requires the ALJ to consider and evaluate whether a
claimant's allegations concerning the severity of his symptoms “are consistent with
objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 2017 WL 5180304, at *6. This
evaluation is based on seven factors: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the
location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the alleged pain or other symptoms;
(3) any precipitating or aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medication the claimant uses; (5) the claimant's non-medication
treatment; (6) any measures other than treatment the claimant employs to relieve
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pain or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning the claimant's functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. Id. at *7-8 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)).
Gibson v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-0082, 2022 WL 1086501, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2022) (internal
footnote omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1432537 (M.D. Tenn. May 05,
2022). When reviewing an ALJ’s assessment under these factors, “‘an ALJ’s findings based on
the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an
ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility.’” Boles v. Saul,
No. 2:15-cv-00029, 2020 WL 57959, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2020) (quoting Walters v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Here, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff’s subjective complaints based on her testimony and reports
from her medical records and agreed that the symptoms Plaintiff testified to could reasonably be
expected to arise from her medically determinable impairments. (AR at 24.) Ultimately, the ALJ
found that, compared to the objective medical evidence cited throughout the decision, Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints of symptoms were “not entirely consistent[.]” (Id.) Considering the entire
record, the Court finds that the ALJ was neither too vague about, nor overly reliant on, the objective
medical evidence he considered when weighing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Neither did the
ALJ “cherry-pick” evidence. The ALJ cites numerous records containing references to Plaintiff’s
symptoms and subsequent references to symptom management and improvement. (AR at 24–26.)
Plaintiff points to no specific evidence to support these arguments and, because the ALJ as the
factfinder is entitled to deference when assessing a claimant’s subjective complaints, the Court
cannot find that the ALJ erred. Boles, 2020 WL 57959, at *2 (explaining that an ALJ did not err
where they “did not simply rely upon boilerplate or hackneyed language to make [their] credibility
determination” and “[i]nstead . . . compared [Plaintiff’s] alleged pain and its limitations to the
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record as a whole and found the subjective complaints to be inconsistent with the objective
evidence.” (citing Morr v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 616 F. App'x 210, 212 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred on this point because “the ALJ did not give any
indication that he considered whether exertional limitations based on [Plaintiff’s] fatigue would
be appropriate.” (Doc. No. 7-1 at 22.) There are two problems with this argument. First, Plaintiff
points to this claim of error as inconsistent with Social Security Ruling 12-2p, which Plaintiff
describes as “require[ing] ALJs to give special attention to pain and fatigue related limitations.”
(Id.) However, this argument fails.
At the outset, Plaintiff omits that SSR 12-2p is specific to the medically determinable
impairment of fibromyalgia. And while there is medical evidence on the record describing Plaintiff
as having fibromyalgia, Plaintiff did not explicitly seek review of the decision where the ALJ did
not find Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia to be an impairment. Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived
review here by failing to challenge this omission. (Doc. No. 14.) Defendant is correct that,
typically, “‘[i]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
developed argumentation, are deemed waived’” because “‘[i]t is not sufficient for a party to
mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to put flesh on its bones.’”
Dollinger v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 22-3359, 2023 WL 1777386, at *1 n.1 (6th Cir. Feb.
6, 2023) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). Insofar as Plaintiff
raises the ALJ’s assessment of her subjective complaints regarding pain and fatigue within the
context of her fibromyalgia, the Court agrees Plaintiff waived review.
On the narrower issue of whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider limitations caused
by pain and fatigue symptoms from any impairments, Plaintiff’s argument still fails. The ALJ
explained in his decision that, despite the record evidence as a whole supporting a finding that
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light exertional limitations is sufficient to assist Plaintiff in maintaining gainful employment, he
nevertheless found fatigue to be a factor requiring greater limitations like “no climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds and no concentrated exposure to work around hazardous machinery or moving
parts or work at unprotected heights.” (AR at 27.)
Overall, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints regarding her symptoms. The ALJ relied on specific evidence to support his conclusion
that Plaintiff's subjective complaints were not entirely consistent with the record, including
objective imaging reports and examination findings. Given such support, as well as the significant
deference that must be afforded the ALJ's credibility determination, see Hernandez v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 644 F. App'x 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e affirm if the ALJ's determination is
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted), the
Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s determination. This assertion of error is therefore
rejected.
IV. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDEDS that Plaintiff’s
motion 	for 	judgment on 	the administrative record 	(Docket 	No. 7) 	be DENIED 	and 	the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt
of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
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A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after
being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Entered this 12th day of March, 2026.
____________________________________
LUKE A. EVANS
United States Magistrate Judge
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