Shields v. Alexander

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
CARALE SHIELDS,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:24-cv-01082-JDB-jay
v.
JONATHAN SKRMETTI,
Respondent.
ORDER
DISMISSING § 2254 PETITION AS TIME BARRED,
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
CERTIFYING THAT APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,
AND
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
Before the Court is the pro se petition of Carale Shields, an inmate at Federal Correctional
Institution Forrest City, Arkansas, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 	. (Docket Entry
1.) The Respondent, Jonathan Skrmetti, has filed a motion to dismiss the Petition (D.E.
18), to which the inmate has responded (D.E. 19).
BACKGROUND
Shields was indicted in the Obion County, Tennessee, Circuit Court on five counts for the
sale of a controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-417(a)(3).1 	He
pleaded guilty to all five counts, which bore different case numbers. On March 5, 1997, the state
trial court sentenced him
Community Corrections Act (the 	for each of the five convictions.2 	The court ordered the
1Petitioner was charged in five separate indictments.
2Under the Tennessee Community Corrections Act, 	state funds [are used] to contract with
local governments and qualified private entities to develop community-based alternatives to
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sentence in case number 7-471 to be served consecutively to case number 7-470, and the sentences
in case numbers 7-472, 7-473, and 7-474 to be served concurrently with case number 7-470,
resulting in a total effective sentence of sixteen years. Shields did not file a direct appeal, a state
post-conviction petition, or a state post-conviction appeal relative to those convictions.
The inmate violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, and the state trial
court revoked his community corrections sentence on July 23, 1999, ordering him to serve an
effective sixteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (the 	On
April 5, 2002, the court entered amended judgments, imposing a ten-year custodial sentence,
suspended to one year in the county jail and nine years 	probation, for case numbers 7-470 and 7-
471. Petitioner received a six-year custodial sentence, suspended to one year in the county jail and
five years 	probation, for case numbers 7-472, 7-473, and 7-474.
On August 3, 2007, following a probation violation, the state
-day jail sentence, and ordered that Shields be
[Tennessee] Department of Probation for the remainder
of the 	(D.E. 16-1 at PageID
240.) The 	ing the sixteen-year TDOC sentence to
a probationary period of the same duration. 	Petitioner violated the terms of his probation again
incarceration that provide a treatment-centered pathway and community-based supervision for
offenders 	§ 40-36-103(1). 	One of the stated purposes of the statute is to
educe the number of felony offenders committed to state penal institutions, local jails, and
workhouses for whom a treatment-centered pathway and appropriate evidence-based community
supervision will result in less recidivism and more effective outcomes. 	Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-
36-103(3). 	Although a sentence there
under Tennessee law. 	State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991).
probation proceeding, a new and longer sentence, so long as within the range prescribed by statute,
discretion [following a violation of the conditions of a community
State v. McNack, 356 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Tenn. 2011).
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and, on October 7, 2011, the court revoked his probationary status, this time reducing the original
sentence from sixteen years in TDOC custody to ten years.
The Petition herein, filed February 27, 2024,3 	(D.E. 1 at PageID 15), alleges that: 	(1)
Petitioner 	s 1997 convictions for sale of a controlled substance violated his right to due process as
he was wrongfully removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system and prosecuted as
an adult; (2) his guilty plea was invalid because, at the time of his plea, he
; and (3) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel (D.E. 1-4 at PageID 52).
ANALYSIS
Respondent argues in this dispositive motion that the Court need not address the merits of
the inmate 	Petition is time barred. A § 2254 petition is subject to a
one-year limitations period, commencing from four possible dates:
(A) 	the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) 	the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) 	the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(D) 	the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
3This is the date Shields signed the Petition and certified that he had placed it into the prison
mail system. (D.E. 1 at PageID 15.) 	established in 	Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988) 	to civil
actions by pro se prisoners in 	Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 812-13 (6th Cir. 2002)
it in the prison mail system to be forwarded to
the Clerk via first-class, postage-prepaid mail.
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Application of § 2244(d)(1)(A)
The district court must analyze the procedural history of a p
Here, this analysis includes
consideration of the impact, if any, of the state trial court 	amended judgments, revocation orders,
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (per curiam) (citation
omitted). 	However, 	[t]he entry of a new judgment normally resets the statute-of-limitations
King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 2015). 	hen courts engage in a full
Freeman v. Wainwright, 959 F.3d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 2020). When 	benefits
Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673,
678 (6th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (cleaned up). 	-than-before sentence, by contrast,
Id.
As outlined above, t
challenged convictions on March 5, 1997. Those judgments sentenced him to an effective period
of sixteen years in the community corrections program. 	The court later revoked his community
corrections sentence on July 23, 1999, and ordered him to serve sixteen years in the TDOC. On
April 5, 2002, the court entered amended judgments, sentencing him to a total effective sentence
of sixteen years in custody, suspended to fourteen years 	probation.
The prisoner had thirty days to seek review of the amended judgments by the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals (the 	, Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), but did not do so. Accordingly,
his judgments of conviction became final on May 6, 2002, for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), when
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the thirty-day period expired.4 	See Ross v. Freeman, No. 4:14-cv-22-HSM-SKL, 2015 WL
1285366, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2015).
The statute of limitations began to run the following day, May 7, 2002. 	See 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(a)(1)(A) ( 	hen the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time . . . exclude the day of
it expired on
May 7, 2003. Shields declared that he placed the Petition in the prison mail system on February
27, 2024, over twenty years after the limitations period had expired. Accordingly, the Petition is
time barred unless statutory or equitable tolling applies.5
4The thirty-day period following entry of the amended judgments actually fell on May 5,
2002. 	Because that date was a Sunday, however, they became final the next day, May 6, 2002.
See 	Tenn. R. App. P. 21(a) ( 	shall be included unless it is a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday . . . , in which event the period runs until the end of the next
day which is not one of the aforementioned days
5
purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A)
August 2007
entered the same day. 	The latter suspended Shields 	sixteen years of
probation, but the former stated that he
D.E.
16-1 at PageID 240). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Probation Order extended
probationary period, that order would not be construed as a new judgment for
purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it merely altered the probationary period; it did not change
TDOC sentence imposed by the amended judgments entered on April 5,
2002. 	Cf. 	Creasy v. Frink, Case No. 3:22-cv-00033, 2022 WL 16825182, at **2-3 (M.D. Tenn.
given a new sentence when his Community
Corrections placement was revoked but was merely
[sixteen] years at [forty-five percent] in TDOC custody, the revocation proceedings
Furthermore, even if the Probation Order did
new, worse-than-before sentence 	Freeman,
959 F.3d at 228, the Petition would still be untimely by over a decade.
sixteen to ten years in TDOC custody. 	Even if the
it resulted in 	-than-
and therefore does not qualify as a new judgment under § 2244(d)(1)(A). 	Id. 	at
230.
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A. 	Application of § 2244(d)(1)(D)
Petitioner alleges that he
received [information] that the action was illegal. 	(D.E. 1 at PageID 5.) 	This allegation could
reasonably 	be 	construed 	as 	an 	argument 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	statutory 	tolling 	under 	§
2244(d)(1)(D), which provides that the one- 	date on
which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through
The prisoner argues that the Petition is not time
of sentencing, received ineffective assistance of counsel, and was not yet aware that he [was]
Id. 	at PageID 13.) In determining whether
statutory tolling is warranted under § 2244(d)(1)(D), a district c
Smith v. Meko 	DiCenzi v. Rose, 452 F.3d
Id.
Shields 	assertion is that his case was unlawfully transferred from juvenile
court to adult court. 	In support of his claim, he cites to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-134,
[which] [t]he disposition of the child shall be
as if the child were an adult. 	Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a). He contends that, because the sale
of a controlled substance is not 	under the statute, his case should
not have been transferred from juvenile court. (D.E. 1-4 at PageID 52.)
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Petitioner does not explain why the factual predicate of his claim could only recently have
been discovered, however; he merely insists that, as he was a minor at the time of sentencing, he
D.E. 1
at PageID 13.) Although Petitioner 	37-1-
134 in relation to his case, he was aware of the charges he faced, his age, and his juvenile status at
the time of sentencing in circuit court. 	See Smith 	. Because the
relevant to his claims were discoverable long ago, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the
limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(D). 	See id.
B. 	Equitable Tolling
The one-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling. 	Holland v. Florida, 560
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way
Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts are cautioned
that t 	Robertson v. Simpson,
624 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 2010). It is the petitioner who bears the burden of showing that he is
entitled to such relief. 	Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2004).
With the benefit of liberal construction, the inmate appears to argue that he is entitled to
equitable tolling of the limitations period
receiv[ed] ineffective assistance of counsel, and was not yet aware that he [was] transferred
illegally to adult court from juvenile court. 	(See 	D.E. 1 at PageID 13.) Additionally, he submits
[the] sentencing court having a lack of
Id. at PageID 14.)
He has failed, however, to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Regarding his claim
yet
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Griffin v. Rogers, 399
F.3d 626, 637 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 	Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991)).
equitable tolling. That is because the
lawyer acts as the agent of his client, and the client therefore
Wershe v. City of Detroit, 112 F.4th 357, 367 (6th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted), 	cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1128 (2025). 	Shields
period. The jurisdiction of the convicting court cannot be challenged at any time during habeas
review as Petitioner argues. 	Rather, 	[w]hen Congress enacted the limitations period in [§
Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233, 1245 (10th Cir.), 	cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2672 (2023). Moreover,
even if he could show an extraordinary circumstance, he cannot demonstrate that he was diligent
in pursuing his rights given that he filed the Petition over twenty-five years after pleading guilty.
Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish that equitable tolling of the limitations period is warranted
in this case.
C. 	Actual Innocence
innocence. 	McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). 	Shields, however, fails to raise a
credible claim of actual innocence that would entitle him to equitable tolling of the limitations
period.
The prisoner does not make an explicit claim of actual innocence, but his statement in the
Petition
attempt to raise such a claim. (See 	D.E. 1 at PageID 5.) However, he pleaded guilty to his state
-innocence
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Shofner v. Green, No. 0:20-CV-23-
KKC-HAI, 2020 WL 8475034, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 16, 2020) (collecting cases). 	This approach
makes sense [given that,] [i]n general, 	a valid guilty plea relinquishes any claim that would
contradict the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty. 	Id. at *5
(quoting 	Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 183 (2018)) (cleaned up).
Here, the inmate does challenge the validity of his guilty plea, claiming that it was not
knowing and intelligent because he was a minor and his attorney was ineffective. Even if his guilty
plea does not foreclose his claim of actual innocence, Shields has failed to show that the exception
to the limitations period should apply.
new evidence shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the
Davis v. Bradshaw, 900 F.3d 315, 326 (6th Cir. 2018).
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623
(1998). A credible claim of actual innocence 	requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence 	whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence
Schlup v. Delo 	he Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the
actual- 	Hubbard v. Rewerts,
98 F.4th 736, 747 (6th Cir. 2024), 	cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1201 (2025).
Petitioner states in his response to the dispositive motion
evidence. 	(D.E. 19 at PageID 456.) 	He insists, however, that his circumstance is an
[] 	-innocence exception should apply because he was
sentenced under the wrong statute. (Id. at PageID 454-56.) 	[A] petitioner may not pass through
Hubbard, 98 F.4th at 743.
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Rather, he must demonstrate that he 	factually 	Id. 	Shields 	ssertions
do not relate to factual innocence.
Because Petitioner has failed to present any new reliable evidence that proves he did not
factually commit the crimes to which he pleaded guilty, the exception for claims of actual
innocence does not excuse the untimely filing of the Petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time
barred. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.
APPELLATE ISSUES
See 	28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); 	see Dennis v. Burgess,
conclude the issues presented 	Miller-
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). If the district court denies relief on a procedural ground
without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner
tition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedura 	Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Because jurists of reason would not debate the
DENIES a COA.
A party seeking pauper status on appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along
with a supporting affidavit. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). If the district court certifies that an appeal
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would not be taken in good faith or otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner
must file his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the appellate court. 	See 	Fed. R. App. P.
24(a)(4)-(5). For the same reason it denies a COA, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal would
not be taken in good faith. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.6
IT IS SO ORDERED this 	9th day of February 2026.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6If Petitioner files a notice of appeal, he must pay the full $605 appellate filing fee or file a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
within thirty days of the entry date of this order. 	See 	Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).
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