USA v. Broussard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
versus § CASE NO. 1:22-CR-114
§
CHASTITY SHYNE BROUSSARD §
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant Chastity Shyne Broussard’s (“Broussard”) pro se
Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release (#37) wherein Broussard seeks early
termination of her three-year term of supervised release. Broussard’s United States Probation and
Pretrial Services (“Probation”) officer in the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the file and is
opposed to Broussard’s request for early termination of her term of supervised release and
recommends that her supervision be continued as ordered. The United States Attorney’s Office
in the Eastern District of Texas is also opposed to the early termination of Broussard’s supervised
release. Having considered the motion, the position of Probation, the Government’s position, the
record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that Broussard’s motion should be
denied.
I. Background
On November 2, 2022, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont
Division, returned an Indictment charging Broussard with possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person (#2). Broussard appeared with counsel before the court on February 28, 2023, and pleaded
guilty to this offense without a written plea agreement. On October 20, 2023, the court sentenced
Broussard to a term of twenty-one months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of
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supervised release (#34). On April 19, 2024, Broussard began serving her term of supervised
release, which is projected to expire on April 18, 2027.
In her motion, Broussard, age 45, asks the court to terminate her supervision at this time,
having served almost two and a half years of her three-year term of supervised release. Broussard
maintains that since the beginning of her supervision, she has complied fully with all terms and
conditions of her supervised release. She asserts that she has a commercial drivers license and has
held a job since being released. Broussard explains that she hopes to continue her progress by
starting a new career as a tankerman on vessels, which requires significant travel.
II. Analysis
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3583(e) authorizes a district court to terminate
supervised release at any time after the expiration of one year if, after considering certain of the
factors set forth in Section 3553(a),1 “it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct
of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); accord United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000); United States v. Peters, 856 F. App’x 230, 233
(11th Cir. 2021); Herndon v. Upton, 985 F.3d 443, 446 n.5 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Cochran, 815 F. App’x 361, 363 (11th
Cir. 2020); United States v. Davies, 746 F. App’x 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018). In addition, the
1 These factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history
and characteristics; the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; the need to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds
of sentences and sentencing ranges established for defendants with similar characteristics under applicable
Sentencing Commission guidelines and policy statements; any pertinent policy statement of the Sentencing
Commission in effect on the date of sentencing; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).
2
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United States Sentencing Guidelines list supplemental factors that the court may wish to consider
when determining whether to terminate the remaining term of supervised release.2 “Early
termination of supervised release is not an entitlement.” United States v. George, 534 F. Supp.
3d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Instead, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that early
termination is warranted. Id.; United States v. Luna, No. 1:95-cr-05036-AWI, 2018 WL
10156108, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018), aff’d, 747 F. App’x 561 (9th Cir. 2018). Early
termination “is not warranted as a matter of course.” United States v. Morris, No. 3:99-cr-264-17
(VAB), 2022 WL 3703201, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2022). “To the contrary, it is only
‘occasionally’ justified.” United States v. Shellef, No. 03-CR-0723 (JFB), 2018 WL 3199249,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018) (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997)).
In fact, in United States v. Bowe, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated
that “Congress has manifested an intent to require full service of supervised release for
rehabilitative purposes.” 309 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Johnson, 529 U.S. at 53).
District courts enjoy considerable discretion in determining when the interest of justice
warrants early termination. United States v. Tacker, 672 F. App’x 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lynn, No.
2 Specifically, the Guidelines list: (i) any history of court-reported violations over the term of
supervision; (ii) the ability of the defendant to lawfully self-manage (e.g., the ability to problem-solve and
avoid situations that may result in a violation of a condition of supervised release or new criminal charges);
(iii) the defendant’s substantial compliance with all conditions of supervision; (iv) the defendant’s
engagement in appropriate prosocial activities and the existence or lack of prosocial support to remain
lawful beyond the period of supervision; (v) a demonstrated reduction in risk level or maintenance of the
lowest category of risk over the period of supervision; and (vi) whether termination will jeopardize public
safety, as evidenced by the nature of the defendant’s offense, the defendant’s criminal history, the
defendant’s record while incarcerated, the defendant’s efforts to reintegrate into the community and avoid
recidivism, any statements or information provided by the victims of the offense, and other factors the
court finds relevant. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.4, Application Note B.
3
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S90-00053(P), 2022 WL 2446328, at *3 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2022); see Melvin, 978 F.3d at 52.
Compliance with the terms of supervised release and with the law alone is not enough to merit
early termination; such conduct is expected and required. United States v. Taylor, 729 F. App’x
474, 475 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[M]ere compliance with the terms of supervised release is expected,
and without more, insufficient to justify early termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).”); United
States v. Bondy, No. 19-232, 2026 WL 1282742, at *2 (E.D. La. May 11, 2026) (“[F]ull
compliance . . . is merely what is expected of all people serving terms of supervised release.”
(quoting Karacsonyi v. United States, No. 97-1220, 1998 WL 401273, at *1 (2d Cir. June 10,
1998))); United States v. Seymore, No. CR 07-358, 2023 WL 3976200, at *1 (E.D. La. June 13,
2023) (“[C]ourts have generally held that something more than compliance with the terms of
[supervised release] is required to justify an early termination . . . .” (quoting United States v.
Smith, No. 10-cr-53-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL 68796, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 8, 2014))); Lynn, 2022
WL 2446328, at *4 (although the defendant adhered to the conditions of his release, a balancing
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not support early termination, noting that the defendant
“engaged in constant serious criminal behavior when he was given chances before”); United States
v. Sandles, No. 11-CR-204-PP, 2021 WL 3080995, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2021) (“[C]ourts
have held ‘that the conduct of the defendant necessary to justify early termination should include
more than simply following the rules of supervision; otherwise, every defendant who avoided
revocation would be eligible for early termination.’” (quoting United States v. O’Hara, No.
00-cr-170, 2011 WL 4356322, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 16, 2011))); United States v. Boudreaux,
No. 2:19-CR-00377-01, 2020 WL 7635708, at *1 (W.D. La. Dec. 22, 2020); United States v.
Pittman, No. 3:15-CR-221-O(1), 2020 WL 6564724, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020) (citing 18
4
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U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)) (finding that the conduct of the defendant did not warrant early termination
of supervised release, as the defendant sought relief based on his circumstances and the alleged
conduct of others); see United States v. Berger, No. CR 09-308, 2021 WL 2354517, at *5 (W.D.
Pa. June 9, 2021) (“Compliance with the conditions of supervision, including refraining from
engaging in criminal conduct and paying restitution, however, is required behavior while serving
a term of supervised release.”). As courts have observed, “if every defendant who complied with
the terms of a supervised release were entitled to early termination, ‘the exception would swallow
the rule.’” United States v. Kassim, No. 15 Cr. 554-3 (KPF), 2020 WL 2614760, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020) (citing United States v. Medina, 17 F. Supp. 2d 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
1998)).
While the court need not find extraordinary, compelling, or changed circumstances to
justify an early termination of supervised release, this does not mean that such circumstances are
irrelevant to ruling on a motion under § 3583(e)(1). United States v. Ferriero, No. 13-0592 (ES),
2020 WL 6701469, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2020) (citing Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53); accord United
States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2016). This is because if a sentence was “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” when first pronounced, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it would
be expected that something has changed that would justify an early end to a term of supervised
release. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53; United States v. Jackson, No. 11-55, 2022 WL 2789870, at *2
(W.D. Pa. July 15, 2022); United States v. Santoro, No. 21-76 (MAS), 2022 WL 37471, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2022); Ferriero, 2020 WL 6701469, at *2. In other words, extraordinary
circumstances may be sufficient to justify early termination of a term of supervised release, but
they are not necessary for such a termination. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53; United States v.
5
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McClamma, 676 F. App’x 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2017) (“New or unforeseen circumstances can
justify a modification, but such circumstances are not necessary.”); Parisi, 821 F.3d at 347
(recognizing that “changed circumstances may in some instances justify a modification” of a term
of supervision). Nonetheless, “‘generally, early termination of supervised release under
§ 3583(e)(1)’ will be proper ‘only when the sentencing judge is satisfied that new or unforeseen
circumstances’ warrant it.” Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53 (quoting Davies, 746 F. App’x at 89); United
States v. Baptiste, No. 98-207, 2025 WL 871520, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 2025) (noting that
early termination is generally warranted “only in cases where the defendant shows changed
circumstances, such as exceptionally good behavior” (quoting United States v. Jones, No.
V-11-21, 2013 WL 2417927, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2013))); Smith, 2014 WL 68796, at *1.
Courts have generally denied requests for early termination of supervised release where
a defendant claims that early termination will improve her employment prospects without
providing concrete support for this contention. See United States v. Lagone, No. 10-CR-818
(JFB), 2017 WL 606016, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2017) (denying early termination in part
because the defendant “merely generally contended that early termination would bolster his job
prospects” and did not provide more detailed information); United States v. Olivieri, 72 F. Supp.
3d 401, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (determining that the defendant’s circumstances did not warrant
early termination in part because he “advanced no basis for his contention that ‘the restrictions and
general weight of supervised release’ impede[d] his employment”); United States v. Ogele, No.
CR 06-546 PJH, 2012 WL 6035537, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (refusing to grant early
termination in part because the defendant “offer[ed] no details of prospective business
opportunities” and failed to “explain why fulfilling his term of supervised release would inhibit
6
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his ability to make a reasonable living”). Importantly, a defendant’s disclosure of a legitimate
“potential employment opportunity” is not necessarily sufficient to warrant early termination. See
United States v. Silverio, No. 99-CR-1044 (LDH), 2022 WL 493177, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2022) (concluding that the defendant’s participation in the “pre-employment process” with a
prospective employer did not outweigh the court’s other considerations under the Section 3553(a)
factors).
According to Broussard’s Presentence Report (“PSR”), prepared on September 11, 2023,
her offense of conviction entails possession of a firearm by a felon. On August 14, 2022, two
Beaumont Police Department officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop on a vehicle being driven
by Broussard for having an expired license plate. Broussard failed to stop for nearly one mile and
was subsequently arrested for fleeing from a police officer. The officers discovered crack cocaine
in the vehicle. During her intake at Jefferson County Jail, Broussard was found to have a fully
loaded Jennings Firearm, Model J22, .22 caliber pistol concealed in the front of her underwear.
Broussard had been convicted of a prior felony offense and, therefore, was prohibited from
possessing a firearm.
Broussard’s criminal history includes two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated
with a child under the age of fifteen as well as other convictions for driving while intoxicated,
failure to identify, and violating the civil rights of a person in custody. In addition, she failed to
comply with two previous terms of probation, resulting in their revocation. On April 14, 2003,
Broussard’s one-year term of probation was revoked due to her violating the terms of her
probation by refusing to attend drug counseling, failing to remain in a residential program, and
failing to pay supervision fees. On July 13, 2012, Broussard’s five-year term of probation was
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similarly revoked due to her committing a new offense, admitting to using marijuana on April 18,
2012, failing to meet her community services hours, failing to abide by her curfew, and failing
to fulfill her financial responsibilities.
Broussard has a long history of substance abuse. While on supervised release for her
offense of conviction, she has successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program and
a random drug testing program. She continues to attend mental health counseling sessions.
Broussard, however, has not maintained full compliance with the terms and conditions of
her release. On January 6, 2026, a probation officer in the Northern District of Texas reported
that Broussard was in an unauthorized relationship with Nyree Burdine (“Burdine”), who has a
prior felony conviction and was also on supervised release, and that Burdine was attempting to
move from the Northern District of Texas to this district to live with Broussard. The relationship
began when they were housed at the same unit while in custody of the Bureau of Prisons prior to
beginning their respective terms of supervised release. Eastern District of Texas General Order
17-3, which adopts the standard conditions of supervision, provides: “[i]f you know someone has
been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person
without first getting the permission of the probation officer.” The standard conditions of
supervision were disclosed in Broussard’s PSR and are included in her judgment.3 Broussard did
not have permission from her probation officer to be in a relationship with Burdine. Broussard
failed to disclose the relationship either to her probation officer in this district or to Burdine’s
probation officer in the Northern District of Texas. On June 16, 2026, the United States Marshals
3 Probation notes that Broussard previously signed a copy of her judgment acknowledging the
conditions of supervision, reviewed those conditions during intake, and again reviewed the conditions with
her probation officer in January 2026, after the relationship was reported.
8
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Service reported to the Probation Office that Burdine had been arrested on June 4, 2026, at
Broussard’s residence in the Beaumont area on a warrant out of the District of Nebraska. During
this incident, Broussard was questioned by law enforcement but failed to report this contact with
law enforcement to her probation officer as required under the conditions of her supervised
release.
Moreover, when a probation officer questioned Broussard about her contact with Burdine,
Broussard stated that Burdine had moved in with family in the Beaumont area and that she was just
visiting Broussard. Yet, the Northern District of Texas probation officer confirmed that Burdine
has no family in the Beaumont area. Broussard’s apparently untruthful explanation is consistent
with the lack of candor she displayed when stating that she was unaware she could not be in a
relationship with someone with a prior felony conviction and that she did not know she had to
inform the Probation Office when having contact with law enforcement.
Regarding her employment, Broussard claims that she holds a commercial driver’s license.
Probation confirms that Broussard has maintained full-time employment since her release from
custody. Broussard seeks early termination in order to “look into starting a new career” as a
tankerman, which she maintains would require travel and being on vessels. Broussard, however,
appears to rely on aspirations and speculation, as she has not provided any specific examples or
evidence of sought after or denied employment opportunities due to her travel restrictions.
Instead, she expresses mere interest in a prospective career change. Broussard also has not
pointed to any instances where she submitted a request to travel to her probation officer and was
denied. Thus, Broussard has not shown that the terms of her supervised release hinder her ability
to make a reasonable living.
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In this situation, the court finds that Broussard’s post-release conduct does not warrant
early termination of her supervised release. Broussard has again failed to comply fully with the
terms of her release and identifies no new or exceptional circumstances or needs that would merit
early release from supervision. While her achievements to date should be commended, continuing
Broussard on supervision will provide her the best opportunity for success in reentry in view of
her reported violations during this term of supervised release, her criminal history, her failure to
comply with previous terms of parole, and her history of substance abuse. Requiring Broussard
to complete her entire three-year term of supervised release safeguards against the reoccurrence
of criminal activity and drug use, while imposing only a limited burden on Broussard.
Generally, early termination of supervised release is not granted unless there are significant
medical concerns, substantial limitations on employment, or extraordinary post-release
accomplishments that would warrant such a release. Broussard does not identify any such
circumstances in her motion and is instead seeking early termination of her supervision due to her
purported compliance with the conditions imposed by the court and her interest in a prospective
career change. Therefore, although Broussard appears to be on the right path, the court believes
that completion of her full term of supervised release appropriately reflects the seriousness of her
offense, deters future criminal conduct, and provides needed structure for her continued
rehabilitation. See Lynn, 2022 WL 2446328, at *4. “Supervised release is meant as a safety net
to support reentry into the community.” Bondy, 2026 WL 1282742, at *3. In this instance, there
is no reason to terminate this safety net prematurely as to Broussard. “Allowing U.S. Probation
to continue to monitor and guide [Broussard] is advantageous as it is able to offer resources,
guidance and accountability to [Broussard] to ensure [s]he successfully continues [her]
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rehabilitation journey.” United States v. Clausell, No. 1:20cr0091-LG-RPM-1, 2026 WL
1008154, at *2 (S.D. Miss. April 14, 2026).
As Probation points out with regard to Broussard:
It should be noted that she has considerable criminal history involving multiple
prior felony convictions and revocation of earlier supervision terms. She has a
prior conviction of violation of civil rights of person in custody and two prior
convictions of driving while intoxicated with a child under the age of 15 and other
criminal conduct. Ms. Broussard appears to have remained lawful since her most
recent release from imprisonment; however, her probation violations suggest a
heightened risk for recidivism. . . . In review of Ms. Broussard’s case, there is no
reference to any extraordinary accomplishments or compelling reasons for granting
the motion at this time. Moreover, she has not maintained compliance during this
term of supervised release as indicated in earlier violation reports. Given the
extent of her violations and prior criminal activity, and lack of any compelling
justification for early termination, our office respectfully recommends the Court
deny this motion for early termination and continue the supervision term through
the current expiration date.
The court concurs with the assessment of the situation by the Probation Office and finds
that the early termination of Broussard’s three-year term of supervised release would not serve the
interest of justice.
III. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Broussard’s Motion for Early Termination of Supervised
Release (#37) is DENIED.
11
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 13th day of October, 2026.
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