Garcia Delgado v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
RONALD ALEXANDER GARCIA
DELGADO,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant
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Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-637
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Rule 50(b)
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative Rule 59(a) Motion for New Trial
(Dkt. #233). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the
Motion should be DENIED. Defendant’s request for oral argument is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
violated 	15 	U.S.C. 	§ 1681e(b) 	by 	mixing 	Plaintiff’s 	credit 	file 	with Plaintiff’s 	son’s 	file
(Dkt. #194 at pp. 1–2). The case proceeded to a jury trial. Defendant made a motion for judgment
as a matter of law (“JMOL Motion”) (Dkt #230 at p. 105). The Court denied the JMOL
Motion (Dkt #230 at p. 5). The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff (Dkt. #219 at p. 1). On July 20,
2026, the Court entered Final Judgment for Plaintiff (Dkt. #219). Defendant filed a Rule 50(b)
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative Rule 59(a) Motion for New
Trial (Dkt. #233) (“RJMOL Motion”). Plaintiff filed a response (Dkt. #244). Defendant filed a
reply (Dkt. #245). Plaintiff filed a sur-reply (Dkt. #246).
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LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Judgment as a Matter of Law
Under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that
a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or
defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a
favorable finding on that issue.
F ED . R. C IV . P. 50(a)(1). Upon a party’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
following a jury verdict, the Court should properly ask whether “the state of proof is such that
reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict.” Am.
Home Assurance Co. v. United Space All., 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); F ED.
R. CIV. P. 50(a). “A JMOL may only be granted when, ʻviewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party
that the court believes that reasonable jurors could not arrive at any contrary conclusion.’” Versata
Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dresser-Rand Co. v.
Virtual Automation, Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, a court should be “especially deferential” to a jury’s verdict
and must not reverse the jury’s findings unless substantial evidence does not support the findings.
Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is defined
as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of
impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d
887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied
“unless the facts and inferences point ʻso strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that
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reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.’” Baisden, 693 F.3d at 498 (quoting Flowers
v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir.2001)). However, “[t]here must be more
than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the
movant.” Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must “draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that [the
court] might regard as more reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 452 (5th
Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citation omitted). “[T]he court should
give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ʻevidence supporting the
moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence
comes from disinterested witnesses.’” Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
II. 	Rule 59(a) Motion for New Trial
Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial can be granted to any
party to a jury trial on any or all issues “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 59(a)(1)(A). “A new trial may be
granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its
course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). However,
[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence—or
any other error by the court or a party—is grounds for granting a new trial . . . . At
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every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that
do not affect any party’s substantial rights.
F ED . R. C IV . P. 61. To be entitled to a new trial, Defendant must show that the verdict was
against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence.
Dresser–Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation, Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 838–39 (5th Cir. 2004); Shows v. Jamison
Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982). A jury verdict is entitled to great deference.
Dresser–Rand Co., 671 F.2d at 839. “Weighing the conflicting evidence and the inferences to be
drawn from that evidence, and determining the relative credibility of the witnesses, are the province
of the jury, and its decision must be accepted if the record contains any competent and substantial
evidence tending fairly to support the verdict.” Gibraltar Savings v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d
1275, 1297 (5th Cir. 1988).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Defendant’s Rule 50(b) Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Defendant argues in its RJMOL Motion that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support
the jury’s economic and emotional distress damages findings (Dkt. #233 at p. 12).
A. 	Waiver
Plaintiff first argues Defendant waived its RJMOL Motion arguments (Dkt. #244 at p. 8).
The Court begins with this preservation issue. “ʻAny argument made in a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) must have been previously made in a motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a).’” Innovation Scis., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
4:18-cv-474, 2021 WL 2075677, at *5 n.4 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2021), aff’d, No. 2021-2111, 2022 WL
2824675 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2022) (quoting OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs., 841 F.3d
669, 767 (5th Cir. 2016)). Consequently, “[i]f a party fails to move for judgment as a matter of law
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) on an issue at the conclusion of all of the evidence,
that party waived both its right to file a renewed post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion and also its right
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on that issue on appeal.” Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician
Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also In re Isbell Records,
Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Since a Rule 50(b) motion is ʻtechnically only a renewal of
the Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . it cannot assert a ground that was not
included in the original motion.’”) (quoting Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th
Cir. 1985)). The Court typically needs to inquire into “whether the evidence and law supporting
the pre-submission challenge are the same as the evidence and law supporting the post-judgment
challenge.” Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir 2000) (citations omitted).
As relevant here, in Defendant’s JMOL Motion, Defendant argued:
Additionally, we would move in terms of meeting actual damages.
There’s – there’s not sufficient evidence that would give this to the
jury related to actual damages in this case. The only denials that we
have are either based on TransUnion’s reporting or the denials, in
fact, were incomplete applications. And then as it relates to
emotional distress here, Plaintiff himself never made any comments
about emotional distress. So that leads the question of what could
the damages be here that are sufficient to – to make this a jury
question? They haven’t made any essential elements of their claim.
(Dkt #230 at p. 105). As to economic damages, Defendant’s RJMOL Motion argues Plaintiff failed
to provide any evidence of out-of-pocket expenses (Dkt. #233 at p. 13).1 These motions relate to
the 	same 	legal 	claim, 	FRCA 	§ 1681e(b), 	the 	only 	legal 	claim 	that 	proceeded 	to
trial (Dkt. #188 at p. 1). As to the evidence, the JMOL Motion challenged Plaintiff’s ability to
1 	Defendant attempts to provide “context” for its JMOL Motion by noting that the Court told the jury the motions
“may take a little more than 15 minutes” (Dkt. #245 at p. 3). The Court need not consider this “context” because
it concludes Defendant did not waive its RJMOL arguments.
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“meet actual damages” (Dkt #230 at p. 105). The RJMOL Motion challenges Plaintiff’s ability to
prove his economic damages (Dkt. #233 at p. 13). So, both motions challenge Plaintiff’s evidence
supporting the jury’s economic damages award. Thus, Defendant did not waive its economic
damages argument.
Defendant 	also 	argues 	there 	was 	no 	evidence 	of 	emotional 	distress
damages (Dkt. #233 at p. 15). Plaintiff again argues waiver, asserting Defendant waived the
RJMOL Motion’s argument as to lack of corroborating testimony (Dkt. #244 at p. 17–19).
However, to defeat Defendant’s JMOL Motion, Plaintiff needed to provide evidence of emotional
distress damages. While Plaintiff could provide testimony directly from Plaintiff, Plaintiff could
also provide evidence of corroborating testimony or the “observations of others.” Bacharach v.
Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 827 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Cousin v. Trans Union
Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2001)). So, both motions challenge Plaintiff’s evidence
supporting the jury’s emotional distress damages award. Thus, Defendant did not waive its
RJMOL Motion’s arguments.
B. 	Economic Loss Damages
Regardless of whether Defendant waived its economic damages argument, there is
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s economic damages award. Plaintiff argues a creditor’s
denial based on an erroneous report is sufficient damages evidence even without additional
evidence of out-of-pocket damages (Dkt. #244 p. 16). A plaintiff must provide evidence for the jury
to rely on in assessing economic damages. See Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (holding there was “no evidence” of out-of-pocket expenses after plaintiff was denied
credit). In June 2024, Plaintiff obtained vehicle financing at a “high cost,” needing to put $6,000
down (Dkt. #227 at p. 126). Plaintiff 	obtained 	$15,357 	in 	vehicle 	financing 	from 	GM
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Financial (Dkt. #228 at p. 39). Ally Financial accessed Plaintiff’s erroneous report on June 10,
2024, 	providing 	evidence 	linking 	this 	financing 	to 	Defendant’s 	erroneous
report (Dkt. #215–5 at p. 4–5). The Court is persuaded that the amount of economic damages the
jury awarded is sufficiently supported by the evidence admitted at trial. See Smith v. Santander
Consumer USA, Inc., 703 F.3d 316 at 318 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming finding that plaintiff
refinancing home mortgage and suffering “an increased interest rate because of his erroneous
credit rating” was sufficient evidence of damages). Therefore, Defendant’s argument as to
economic damages is DENIED on these grounds.
C. 	Emotional Distress Damages
Regardless of if Defendant waived any part of its RJMOL Motion argument, Plaintiff’s own
testimony provided sufficient evidence of emotional distress damages. Under the FCRA, a plaintiff
can recover “for humiliation and mental distress.” Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 435-36 (quoting Sapia v.
Regency Motors of Metairie, Inc., 276 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir. 2002). An emotional distress claim
“requires a ʻdegree of specificity’ and ʻmust be supported by evidence of genuine injury.’” Id. at
436 (quoting Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371). Emotional distress damages do not always require “medical
evidence or corroborating testimony in addition to [Plaintiff’s] own testimony.” Migis v. Pearle
Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998).
In Bacharach, the Fifth Circuit held testimony that a plaintiff was “a complete wreck” who
“had seen a number of medical professionals due to her ʻanxiety and stress’” was not evidence
supporting emotional distress damages. Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 436. In Cousin, the Fifth Circuit
vacated an emotional distress award when Plaintiff testified he was upset, angry, felt like “nobody
was listening,” and felt like “being trapped inside of something that [he] [could not] get out of.”
Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371. However, the Fifth Circuit has also held that a plaintiff’s testimony “that
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he was embarrassed and humiliated about the credit denials . . . should support an award of some
damages.” Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff provided evidence of his specific conduct as required under Bacharach and Cousin.
Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 436; Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371. Plaintiff testified that he was scared because
Pablo Motors said he had two unpaid credit cards (Dkt. #227 at p. 111). After seeing this, he took
the specific acts of purchasing his report and calling Defendant (Dkt. #227 at pp. 111–17). Plaintiff
also testified he was frustrated because he went to Nebraska Furniture Mart and could not purchase
furniture (Dkt. #228 at p. 61). Plaintiff’s life was degrading and hard because he lived without
furniture (Dkt. #227 at p. 107). He felt sadness because of his and his wife’s living conditions,
including needing to eat on the floor (Dkt. #227 at p. 107). The Court is persuaded that the amount
of emotional distress damages the jury awarded is sufficiently supported by the evidence admitted
at trial.
Defendant also argues Plaintiff provided no evidence that Defendant caused the emotional
distress damages (Dkt. #233 at p. 8). As to causation, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude Plaintiff’s credit denial at Pablo Motors and subsequent fear was due to Defendant’s
erroneous report (Dkt. #227 at p. 111). There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude
the 	Nebraska 	Furniture 	Mart 	credit 	denial 	was 	due 	to 	Defendant’s 	reporting
error (Dkt. #228 at p. 92).2 Finally, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Plaintiff’s
2 Plaintiff also cites his testimony that he felt embarrassment because he brought his son into the
home (Dkt. #227 at p. 108). However, Defendant is correct that this occurred in October 2023, months before the
Nebraska Furniture Mart denial, and therefore cannot support Plaintiff’s emotional distress damages
(Dkt. #227 at p. 108). Regardless, the Court is persuaded that the amount of emotional distress damages the jury
awarded is sufficiently supported by the evidence admitted at trial.
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emotional distress due to living without furniture would extend to the period of time after Nebraska
Furniture Mart denied him credit. Therefore, Plaintiff provided sufficient causation evidence.
Defendant also argues there is insufficient corroboration evidence because Plaintiff’s
corroborating witness testimony is unspecific (Dkt. #233 at p. 16). The “observations of others”
and “corroborating testimony” are both potential categories of evidence that can support an FCRA
emotional distress claim. Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 436 (citing Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371). In Picou, the
Fifth Circuit held that a spouse’s testimony that a plaintiff was “very upset and distraught” was
conclusory and therefore not evidence of emotional distress. Picou v. City of Jackson, MS, 48 F.
App’x 102, 2002 WL 31016468 at *4, *5 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion). Here, Plaintiff’s
wife testified that Plaintiff was serious, sad, and worried (Dkt. #227 at p. 30). This is similar to the
testimony the Fifth Circuit held was conclusory and therefore is no evidence of emotional distress
damages. See Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 436. The Court concludes that this testimony is not evidence
of emotional distress damages.
However, Plaintiff relies on additional corroborative testimony relating to Plaintiff’s
specific acts. Plaintiff’s wife testified that Plaintiff did not explain their financial situation to her to
protect her (Dkt. #227 at p. 30).3 She also testified that they lived without furniture, corroborating
Plaintiff’s reasons for feeling his emotional distress (Dkt. #227 at p. 30–31). This evidence of
Plaintiff’s conduct, corroborated by Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony, supports the jury’s damages
3 	Plaintiff also attempts to rely on Plaintiff’s son’s testimony (Dkt. #226 at p. 21). Plaintiff’s son testified about how
his father used to be “like a lion,” but when living without furniture he was “like a cat.” (Dkt. #226 at p. 143).
Plaintiff’s son’s testimony lacks specificity and is conclusory, as it does not “show the nature and extent of the actual
emotional harm.” Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 436. Plaintiff argues Defendant relies on documents that are not in
evidence (Dkt. #244 at p. 21). Because the Court concludes Plaintiff’s son’s testimony is no evidence, without
relying on this evidence, the Court need not consider this argument.
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award. Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371. For these reasons, Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as
a Matter of Law is DENIED on these grounds.
Finally, 	Defendant 	requests 	a 	remittitur 	in 	a 	footnote, 	only 	citing 	Pinner
(Dkt. #233 at p. 17 n.11).4 The Pinner court analyzed damages under the “ʻmaximum recovery
rule’ . . . which permits reduction of the verdict only to the maximum amount the jury could
properly have awarded.” Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d at 1265 (citing Keyes v. Lauga, 635 F.2d 330
(5th Cir. 1981). The maximum recovery rule “essentially provides that we will decline to reduce
damages where the amount awarded is not disproportionate to at least one factually similar case from
the relevant jurisdiction.” Lebron v. U.S., 279 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Douglass v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1990). In Pinner, the Fifth Circuit remitted
plaintiff’s compensatory damages to $25,000 in 1986. Pinner, 805 F.2d at 1266. Plaintiff argues that
adjusting 	for 	inflation, 	$25,000 	is 	$77,800.09 	in 	July 	2026, 	when 	this 	case 	was 	tried.
(Dkt. #244 at p. 18 n.4). The jury awarded $75,000 here (Dkt. #219 at p. 2). Defendant offers no
reason 	the 	maximum 	amount 	should 	be 	lower 	here 	(Dkt. #233 at p. 17 n.11). 	Therefore,
Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED on these grounds.
II. 	Defendant’s Motion for New Trial
Defendant also argues it is entitled to a new trial because the Court should have instructed
the 	jury 	to 	consider 	Plaintiff’s 	failure 	to 	mitigate 	his 	emotional 	distress 	damages
(Dkt. #233 at p. 17). Defendant requested a jury instruction that Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate
“any item of damage which he could have avoided through reasonable effort,” (Dkt. #186 p. 67).
The Court rejected this instruction (Dkt. #230 at p. 107). The Court instead instructed the jury
4 Defendant repeats this request in its Reply, again in a footnote citing only Pinner (Dkt. #245 at p. 8 n.8).
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that “[y]ou should not consider mitigation of damages when assessing an award of emotional
distress damages, if any,” (Dkt. #213 at p. 12).
The Court must first discuss the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 181 F.4th 536 (5th Cir. 2026). In SkyWest, the Fifth Circuit
discussed whether there is a duty to mitigate emotional distress damages under Title VII. Id. at
543. The Fifth Circuit first discussed the statutory text of Title VII. Id. Title VII allows a plaintiff
to recover compensatory damages. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3)). Under a different
provision, a plaintiff can also recover backpay. Id. (citing §§ 1981a(b)(2), 2000e-5(g)(1)). This
backpay provision “explicitly excludes the amount a plaintiff could have made ʻwith reasonable
diligence’ to mitigate losses.” Id. (citing § § 1981a(b)(2), 2000e-5(g)(1)). The Fifth Circuit read
these provisions as a whole. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that because there was a mitigation
provision for backpay, and none for emotional distress damages, Congress did not intend to include
a mitigation provision limiting emotional distress damages. Id.
Without textual support for a duty to mitigate, the Fifth Circuit then discussed whether the
duty to mitigate emotional distress damages is a well-established common-law principle. Id. If a
principle is well established, courts can “take it as given that Congress has legislated with an
expectation that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.” Id. (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)). The Fifth
Circuit concluded that there is no well-established common-law principle that a plaintiff has a duty
to mitigate emotional distress damages. Id. at 545. The Fifth Circuit further concluded that this
principle was not well established when Congress adopted Title VII’s compensatory damages
provision in 1991. Id.
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Unlike Title VII, the FCRA does not have an analogous mitigation provision elsewhere in
the statute. So, the Court cannot rely on the SkyWest opinion’s reasoning reading the statue as a
whole. However, like Title VII, FCRA § 1681o does not have a textual requirement that a plaintiff
must mitigate compensatory damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o; see Garcia v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,
No. 8:22-cv-1987-WFJ-UAM, 2024 WL 2293042 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2024). Without textual
support for a duty to mitigate, the Court must rely on the common law to identify any duty to
mitigate emotional distress damages as the SkyWest opinion did. SkyWest, 181 F.4th at 543-44.
Defendant agrees that Congress enacted the FCRA and “relevant text concerning
damages” in 1970 (Dkt. #245 at p. 11). 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. If there was no well-established common
law principle in 1991, there could not be a well-established common law principle in 1970. So, the
Court cannot assume Congress intended to apply a common law duty to mitigate emotional distress
damages to the FCRA based on “well-established common-law principles.” SkyWest, 181 F.4th at
545. Instead, the Court was correct to refuse Defendant’s mitigation instruction.5 For these
reasons, Defendant’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED on these grounds.
5 	In its Reply, Defendant argues the mitigation decisions Plaintiff should have made were different from the mitigation
discussed in SkyWest (Dkt. #245 at p. 9). Defendant argues its mitigation evidence was focused on preventing “the
underlying source” of the emotional harm, whereas the SkyWest opinion focuses on mitigating damages with therapy
or medication (Dkt. #245 at p. 9). However, Defendant still ultimately argues the jury should have been instructed
to consider mitigation of emotional distress damages, which would have been improper.
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CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Rule
50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative Rule 59(a) Motion for New
Trial (Dkt. #233) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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