al-Taie v. Traveller et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
RECEIVER FERDOSE AL-TAIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHANE TRAVELLER, KENNETH
WIEDRICH, KIM CRAVEY, ROBERT
SHEAR, DAVID TRAVELLER, PHILIP
MCELROY, JOHN COLLIER,
MICHAEL KAMINSKI, JOHN H.
DIESEL, MIC FUHRMAN, ADRIAN
GARCIA, TRENT KELLEY, SKYLAR
COTTON, KRISTI EVANS, MONTE
FAUSETT, WILLIAM ABT, BRANDY
FIELDS, ROBIE WILLIAMS,
JEREMY NEENAN, HALEIGH M.
OWENS, NANCY CRAVEY,
TRAVELLER CONSULTING, INC.,
GSET MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, CLYDE CAMERON
CRAVEY, TAMARA TRAVELLER,
ANGELA RAE WIEDRICH, JAMES
LOOKABAUGH, RICHARD
BARBER, JIM MCCANN, CARLO E.
CARAVETTA, JOSHUA HUKILL,
CLAUDE SHANNON CRAVEY, JOHN
CAMERON CRAVEY, JOSEPH
MICHAEL SIERAKOSKI, BRYON
THOMAS WARNES, CHAUNCEY
SAYRE, ALEXIS CRAVEY COTTON,
TIMOTHY ROBERTS, JOEL
HUKILL, DEAN LOVELAND, CARY
ROTHMAN, JOHN KENNEY,
SHARISSA WARD, HALEY CRAVEY,
TRAVELLER AND COMPANY, LLC,
DESERT RIDGE, LLC, OIL RIG
CONSULTING, LLC, TROY ABBOTT,
ALAN THOMAS, RAY BOYKIN,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:25-CV-00362-
JCB
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is pro se Defendant Clyde Cameron Cravey’s (“Defendant” or “Clyde”)
omnibus unopposed motion for sanctions, Rule 11 motion for future sanctions, motion to quash,
motion for a protective order, and motion for suppression of evidence unlawfully received (Doc.
No. 126.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court ORDERS that Defendant’s omnibus motion
(Doc. No. 126) be GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this federal securities action against numerous Defendants on September
15, 2025 (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff’s claims arose under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and state law. (Doc. No. 3, at 24.) The first motion to dismiss was filed on
December 1, 2025. (Doc. No. 15.) Dozens of additional motions to dismiss followed. (See Doc.
No. 164, at 2.) These motions remained pending until September 30, 2026. (Doc. No. 184.) While
these motions were pending—on March 30, 2026—Plaintiff apparently served a third-party
subpoena on Defendant Clyde’s bank. (Doc. No. 126, at 2.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant Clyde argues that Plaintiff’s subpoena violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45 and the automatic discovery stay provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”). Id. at 3–4. Defendant asks this Court to (1) quash the subpoena, (2) order Plaintiff to
return to the Bank all materials received by way of the subpoena, (3) order Plaintiff to destroy all
materials received by way of the subpoena, (4) suppress all evidence received by way of the
subpoena, (5) issue a protective order enforcing the PSLRA’s automatic discovery stay, (6) hold
Plaintiff in contempt and impose “significant contempt fines” for violating the automatic stay, (7)
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order Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s “actual damages and costs” resulting from the subpoena, and (8)
further sanction Plaintiff for fees and costs under Rule 11 “in the future.” Id. at 3–4.
I. Motion to Quash
Defendant argues that the Court must quash the instant subpoena because Plaintiff failed
to give him proper notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(4).
Under Rule 45(a)(4), if a subpoena “commands the production of documents, electronically
stored information, or tangible things . . . then before it is served on the person to whom it is
directed, a notice and a copy of the subpoena must be served on each party.” Courts routinely quash
subpoenas served in violation of Rule 45(a)(4). See Plotner v. Diving, Civ. No 22-553, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 241498, at *8 (E.D. La. July 22, 2022) (collecting cases).
Here, Defendant claims that Plaintiff served the instant subpoena on his bank without
sending him prior notice. The subpoena apparently sought Defendant’s “banking records,” (Doc.
No. 126, at 2), which were ostensibly either “documents” or “electronically stored information,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4). Plaintiff failed to respond to the instant motion and thus waives any
argument to the contrary. See E.D. Tex. Local Rule CV-7(d) (“A party’s failure to oppose a motion
. . . creates a presumption that the party does not controvert the facts set out by movant and has no
evidence to offer in opposition.”). Accordingly, the Court will quash the subpoena.
II. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Next, Defendant asks the Court to order that any evidence obtained by way of the subpoena
be (1) returned to the bank, (2) destroyed, and (3) excluded from the prosecution of this case. (Doc.
No. 126, at 3–4.)
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For two main reasons, the Court will deny Defendant’s exclusionary requests. First,
Defendant does not explain what evidence Plaintiff obtained from the bank. Defendant thus fails
to show what specific records or documents the Court should even address here. Second,
Defendant’s motion is extraordinarily premature. This case is still in the early pleading stages: the
Court has not even issued a scheduling order yet, and Plaintiff is due to file an amended complaint
within weeks. (Doc. No. 184, at 7.) Excluding hypothetical evidence at such an early juncture is
inappropriate and unwise. See Kelly v. Patel, Civ. No. 1:20-cv-01291, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113210, at *4 (W.D. La. June 16, 2021) (denying motion in limine as “premature” where Court
had not yet issued scheduling order) (and collecting cases).
III. Motion for Sanctions
Next, the Court considers Defendant’s requests for various sanctions. Defendant asks the
Court to (1) hold Plaintiff in civil contempt for violating the PSLRA’s discovery stay and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 45’s notice requirement, (2) impose significant fines on Plaintiff for
violating the PSLRA’s discovery stay, and (3) require Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s “actual damages
and costs” resulting from the subpoena. (Doc. No. 126, at 4.)
The Court will not hold Plaintiff in civil contempt. To justify civil contempt, Defendant
must show that Plaintiff violated a court order. See Ingalls v. Thompson (In re Bradley), 588 F.3d
254, 264 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he elements of civil contempt are ‘(1) that a court order was in effect,
and (2) that the order required certain conduct by the respondent, and (3) that the respondent failed
to comply with the court’s order.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
LeGrand, 43 F.3d 163, 170 (5th Cir. 1995)). But here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff violated a
statutory discovery stay and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Neither, standing alone, would
justify holding Plaintiff in civil contempt.
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Similarly, the monetary sanctions which Defendant requests are inappropriate under the
circumstances. Pursuant to its inherent power,1 the Court may impose monetary sanctions for
violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court orders, or other “lawful mandates.”
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227
(1821)). However—to justify such sanctions—Defendant must show that Plaintiff acted
vexatiously, abusively, or otherwise in bad faith. See City of Alexandria v. CLECO, 547 F. App’x
568, 569–70 (5th Cir. 2013) (sanctions under the inherent power require a “specific finding” of
“bad faith”); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (“[I]nherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion.”) (citations omitted), superseded on other grounds by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1927. To show bad faith—in a case with dozens of defendants—Defendant
Clyde alleges that Plaintiff served one subpoena on one third-party bank one time. (Doc. No. 126,
at 1–2.) If Plaintiff wanted to abusively circumvent the PSLRA’s discovery stay, the Court would
expect to see more than a single stray subpoena.
IV. Rule 11 Motion
Defendant also requests that the Court “in the future, impose significant costs on Plaintiff’s
counsel under Rule 11” as “sanctions” for “abusive litigation.” (Doc. No. 126, at 4.)
Defendant’s Rule 11 motion suffers from fatal procedural defects. A Rule 11 motion must
“be made separately from any other motion,” and must first “be served under Rule 5.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(c)(2). The motion cannot be filed until at least 21 days after service occurs. Id. Here,
1 Neither Rule 45 nor the PSLRA provide for the monetary sanctions Defendant seeks. Rule 45 empowers the Court
to modify or quash a subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv). Meanwhile, the PSLRA imposes a mandatory and
automatic stay on discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending in a private securities litigation action. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). But the PSLRA does not specify how district courts should approach non-compliance.
The statute does not even provide for sanctions in this context, much less mandate or encourage them. See id.
Therefore, to adjudicate Defendant’s sanctions request, the Court must look to its inherent powers for a rule of
decision.
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Defendant used the same moving papers to raise the Rule 11 issue and all the other purported bases
for relief discussed above. Further, Defendant filed his motion only five days after attempting to
serve it on Plaintiff via physical mail. (Doc. No. 126, at 4.) Therefore, Defendant’s Rule 11 motion
is procedurally defective and must be denied.
V. Motion for Protective Order
Lastly, Defendant requests that the Court issue a protective order “enforcing the PSLRA
automatic, mandatory stay.” (Doc. No. 126, at 4.)
A protective order is unnecessary here. The PSLRA imposes a mandatory stay on all
discovery while motions to dismiss are pending in a private securities litigation action. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). The stay operates independently and automatically on the filing of
a motion to dismiss; no court order is needed to carry it into effect. See, e.g., Lapicola v. Alternative
Dual Fuels, Civ. No. 3-02-cv-0299, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5941, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002).
The stay is in effect now because two motions to dismiss remain pending. (See Doc. Nos. 169;
181.) Therefore, the Court need not issue a separate protective order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Defendant’s omnibus motion (Doc.
No. 126) be GRANTED as to Defendant’s request to quash the March 30, 2026 subpoena served
on Bank of America and DENIED as to Defendant’s requests for: (1) current and future sanctions,
(2) the return, destruction, and suppression of evidence, and (3) a protective order.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 14th day of October, 2026.
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