Rodriguez v. USA

United States District Court
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ERIC RODRIGUEZ, #57361-177 §
v. ; CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-2278-S
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ;
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Movant Eric Rodriguez’s Motion for Resentencing Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Motion”) [ECF No. 1]. After reviewing the Motion, the Court’s Order
Requiring Movant to Respond Regarding the Statute of Limitations (“Order”) [ECF No. 4],
Movant’s Motion to File His Reply to the Order (“Response”) [ECF No. 7], and the applicable
law, the Motion is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the statute of limitations.
I. BACKGROUND
Movant was charged with one count of Felon in Possession of a Firearm in violation of 18
ULS.C. § 922(p)(1). See CR ECF No. 1.' He pled guilty to the single-count indictment on August
23, 2018. See CR ECF No. 16. On February 1, 2019, the Court entered its judgment sentencing
Movant to 78 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. See
CR ECF No. 36 at 1-3. Movant did not appeal his conviction or his sentence.
Movant asserts one ground for relief in the Motion: that “an intervening change in law”
establishes that Movant is “actually innocent of his conviction .. . as the firearm he possessed was
for self-defense purposes[.]” Mot. 2-3 (citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022)). Because the Motion appeared untimely, the Court ordered Movant to respond
regarding the application of the one-year limitations period for Section 2255 motions. See Order.
' ECF filings from the related criminal case (3:18-CR-0356-S-1) will be referred to as “CR ECF.”
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID <pageID>

In his Response, Movant acknowledges that the Court “is factually correct in alleging that [the
Motion] is untimely,” but argues that the “procedural default is excused under the ‘actual
innocence’ exception” to the applicable statute of limitations.? Resp. 2; see also id. at 3-7.
I. ANALYSIS
Section 2255 of Title 28 “establishes a ‘1-year period of limitation’ within which a federal
prisoner may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under that section.” Dodd v.
United States, 545 U.S. 353, 354 (2005). Section 2255 states that:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making
a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Movant does not allege that government action prevented him from filing a
Section 2255 motion earlier, and states that “he filed his [Motion] more than a year after the facts
supporting the claims in his [Motion] could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” Resp. 3. The Motion therefore does not trigger a limitations date pursuant to
Section 2255(f)(2) or Section 2255(H(4).
? In the Response, Movant also restates his single ground for relief as follows: “[Movant] was deprived of
a fair trial because he did not understand the scope of the convicting statute. Thus, his guilty plea facilitated
the guilty verdict of someone who is actually innocent.” Resp. 1.
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID <pageID>

Movant’s conviction became final pursuant to Section 2255(f)(1) on February 15, 2019,
when the 14-day period for appealing his criminal judgment expired. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(b)(1)(A)G@) (providing 14 days to appeal a criminal judgment); United States v. Plascencia,
537 F.3d 385, 388 (Sth Cir. 2008) (holding that when a federal prisoner does not appeal a
conviction, it becomes final for Section 2255 purposes upon the expiration of the time to file an
appeal). Movant therefore must have filed a motion pursuant to Section 2255(f)(1) by February
15, 2019, See 28 U.S.C. § 2255()(1). Movant filed the Motion no earlier than July 25, 2024, the
date he signed the Motion. See Mot. 9, 12-13. The Motion is therefore untimely under Section
2255(f)(1) because Movant did not file it until over four years after the limitations period expired.
Regarding Section 2255(f)(3), Movant seeks habeas relief under this subsection “[i]n the
wake of an intervening change in law by the U.S. Supreme Court” in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Assoc., Inc, vy. Bruen. Mot. | (citing 597 U.S. 1 (2022)). Movant argues that Bruen “created a newly
recognized right.” Resp. 3. Even if the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen set forth a newly
recognized right made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, Bruen was decided
on June 23, 2022, so a timely habeas action relying on it must have been brought by June 23, 2023.
See 28 U.S.C, § 2255((3). Movant did not file the Motion until over a year after any limitations
period premised on Bruen would have expired. See Mot. 1, 9.
Accordingly, in the absence of equitable tolling or an applicable exception to the
limitations period, the Motion is untimely. The Court addresses both exceptions below.
3 “Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s pleading is considered filed when the document is
placed in the prison mailing system.” United States v. Duran, 934 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing
Medley v. Thaler, 660 F.3d 833, 835 (Sth Cir. 2011)). Although it is not clear from the record when Movant
placed the motion in the prison mailing system, the Court assumes, in Movant’s favor, that he placed it in
the prison mailing system on the same day that he signed and dated it rather than a later date.
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID <pageID>

A, Equitable Tolling
“[T]he statute of limitations in § 2255 may be equitably tolled in ‘rare and exceptional
circumstances.’” United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (Sth Cir. 2000) (quoting Davis v.
Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). “The doctrine of equitable tolling preserves a
{party’s} claims when strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.” Davis,
158 F.3d at 810 (quoting Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (Sth Cir. 1995)). It “applies
principally where [one party] is actively misled by the [other party] about the cause of action or is
prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Rashidi v. Am. President Lines,
96 F.3d 124, 128 (Sth Cir. 1996).
A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows that: (1) “he has been
pursuing his rights diligently,” and (2) some extraordinary circumstance prevented a timely filing.
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). A movant bears the burden to show entitlement to
equitable tolling. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Phillips v. Donnelly,
223 F.3d 797, 797 (Sth Cir. 2000). Courts must examine “each case on its facts” to determine if
there are sufficient exceptional circumstances that warrant equitable tolling. Fisher v. Johnson,
174 F.3d 710, 713 (Sth Cir. 1999),
Here, Movant states in the Response that the Motion “must be entitled to equitable tolling,”
because Bruen “created a newly recognized right” as required by Section 2255(f)(3). Resp. 3
(citing 597 U.S. 1). Movant recognizes that “he relies only on federal statutes to prove that his
conduct is not prohibited by law and the [G]overnment is well aware that a movant is prohibited
from citing or arguing law in a § 2255 motion.” Jd, at 3.4 Movant appears to be referring to the
statutory provision under which he was convicted in the underlying criminal proceedings,
4 Movant also contends that “the presentation of new evidence is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a
claim under §2255,” an issue that does not appear to be in dispute or relevant to equitable tolling. Resp. 4.
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID <pageID>

18 U.S.C, § 922(g)(1). See id. at 5, 7.5
Movant does not offer facts nor evidence to explain the delay in challenging the
constitutionality of his statute of conviction between the decision in Bruen, “decided on June 23,
2022,” and the filing of the Motion “on September 5, 2024.” Resp. 3. He also does not allege facts
suggesting or showing that any extraordinary circumstance prevented a timely filing. Further, to
the extent Movant argues actual innocence as a basis for equitably tolling the limitations period, a
claim of actual innocence is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See Felder v. Johnson, 204
F.3d 168, 171 (Sth Cir. 2000). As such, Movant has not carried his burden to establish
circumstances meriting equitable tolling.
B. Actual Innocence
The Court next analyzes Movant’s argument based on actual innocence. Relying on Bruen
and applying the test set forth therein to his statutory offense of conviction, Movant contends that
the untimeliness of the Motion “is excused under the ‘actual innocence’ exception” to a procedural
default. Resp. 2. His claim appears to be premised on the argument central to the Motion that
Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the Second Amendment. See id. at 5-6;
Mot. 2-3.
“fA]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass
whether the impediment is a procedural bar... for] expiration of the statute of limitations.”
MceQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). In other words, a successful innocence claim
allows a movant “to proceed on the merits.” Floyd v. Vannoy, 894 F.3d 143, 155 (Sth Cir. 2018).
In McQuiggin, the Supreme Court determined that the one-year statute of limitations for Section
5 Movant argues in the Motion that his Second Amendment Rights “were violated because Section
922(g)(1)” is unconstitutional per Bruen; thus, the conviction “must be vacated” and the indictment must
be “dismissed with prejudice.” Mot. 3.
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID <pageID>

2255 motions could be overcome by a showing of actual innocence. 569 U.S. at 400-01. A
credible claim of actual innocence to excuse the untimeliness of a habeas petition “must be
supported by ‘new reliable evidence-——whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.’”” Vannoy,
894 F.3d at 155 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). A movant must persuade a
district court that it is more likely than not that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted the
movant in light of the new evidence and the evidence presented at trial. Jd. “This exception’s
demanding standard requires ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence
in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless
constitutional error.” fd. at 154-55 (citing McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 401).
There is a split among district courts about whether McQuiggin applies where a movant
pleaded guilty, as is the case here. See Thomas v. Stephens, No. 4:13-CV-875-A, 2014 WL 929031,
at *3 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2014) (citing cases). Even if it does, Movant’s claim fails. Here,
Movant premises his actual innocence claim on the purported “new evidence,” which is the alleged
the unconstitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) in the wake of Bruen. See Resp. 4-7. But the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed and rejected facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges to Section 922(g)(1) under Bruen. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 116
F 4th 458, 471-72 (Sth Cir. 2024). Movant does not deny that he engaged in the conduct for which
he was convicted under Section 922(g)(1), and considering binding case law, his allegations also
fail to establish that said conduct is no longer criminal such that he could establish actual innocence
of his offense of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 172 F.3d 381, 384 (Sth Cir. 1999)
(“Actual innocence means ‘factual innocence, and not mere legal insufficiency.’”), Movant
6 The McQuiggin Court noted that “untimeliness, although not an unyielding ground for dismissal of a
petition, does bear on the credibility of evidence proffered to show actual innocence.” 569 U.S. at 401.
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID <pageID>

therefore fails to show that he is actually innocent based on the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 922(g)(1).
Accordingly, even if MeQuiggin applies to guilty plea cases, Movant fails to support his
gateway claim of actual innocence with new evidence and fails to show that it was more likely
than not, in light of such new evidence, that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Movant is thus not entitled to the actual innocence exception to the
applicable limitations period, and the Motion is time-barred.
Ill. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Movant Eric Rodriguez’s Motion for Resentencing Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Motion”) [ECF No. 1], received on September 5, 2024, is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE as barred by the statute of limitations.
ite SoKAREN GREN SCHOLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED January 5, 2026.
Case 3:24-cv-02278-S Document 9 Filed 01/05/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID <pageID>