Smith v. Evans et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JASON FINIS SMITH, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-01871-K (BT)
§
MAYA HARRIS EVANS, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se plaintiff Jason Finis Smith filed a complaint alleging civil rights
claims relating to family court child support enforcement proceedings in Dallas
County. See Compl. at (ECF No. 3); First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 12). Smith also
seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). See Mot. (ECF No. 4). Having
screened the complaint, the magistrate judge recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a
claim.
Background
Smith has filed three cases in this District relating to the same family court
proceedings since July of this year. See Smith v. Airen, No. 3:25-cv-3270-E-BK
(filed Nov. 26, 2025); Smith v. Evans, No. 3:25-cv-3365-N-BN (filed Dec. 8, 2025).
In this action, Smith purports to assert claims against staff of the Title IV-D family
court and the “Child Support Enforcement Agency.” See First Am. Compl.
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Specifically, he claims that various actions by the family court between 2016 and
2024 ruined his relationship with his children, caused him to lose several jobs, and
forced him into involuntary servitude. See Compl. at 4–5, 45–48, 105–09; First
Am. Compl. at 2–3.
Smith asks that the Court “overturn” the underlying family court
proceedings, grant him compensatory and punitive damages, and issue an
injunction “to prevent future harm or compel specific actions.” Id. at 124.
Legal Standard
A district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes
the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007),
and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the
plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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Analysis
I. Judicial Immunity
“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate
assessment of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11) (citing, in
turn, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). This immunity extends to
others who perform judicial functions in accordance with a court directive,
including court staff. See Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001). There
are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity can be overcome.
“First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not
taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted).
“Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12 (citations omitted). Allegations of
bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity. Id.
Here, Smith’s allegations show that Maya Harris Evans and Rachael Airen
were performing work “ ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge” by issuing
orders and judgments relating to child support obligations. See Compl. at 4–5, 45–
48; First Am. Compl. at 2–3. And Smith’s complaint does not plausibly allege any
circumstance overcoming judicial immunity.
Accordingly, the claims against Evans and Airen are barred by judicial
immunity and should be dismissed.
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II. Prosecutorial Immunity
As for Smith’s claims against the “Child Support Enforcement Agency,”
“prosecutors . . . enjoy absolute immunity for damages asserted under [42 U.S.C.]
§ 1983 for actions taken in the presentation of the state’s case.” Watson v. Walton,
68 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 1995). “[S]tate prosecutors are absolutely immune from §
1983 damages based on activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process.” Singleton v. Cannizzato, 2020 WL 1922377, at *3 (5th Cir.
Apr. 21, 2020). “Absolute immunity shields prosecutors even when they act
maliciously, wantonly, or negligently.” DuBose v. Campbell, 2024 WL 3419031, at
*10 (W.D. La. June 25, 2024), rec. accepted 2024 WL 3417393 (W.D. La. July 15,
2024) (citing Lope v. O’ Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Prosecutorial immunity also applies to prosecutors in the child support
division of the Texas Attorney General’s Office. See Nixon v. Abbott, 589 F. App’x
279, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Ramirez v. Arteaga, 2023 WL 11931496, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2023). Accordingly, Smith’s claims against the “Child Support
Enforcement Agency” are barred by prosecutorial immunity and should be
dismissed.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this action with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim.
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SO RECOMMENDED.
December 17, 2025.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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