Villantes George v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
OSCAR VILLANTES GEORGE 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-2935-S-BW
§
KRISTI NOEM, et al., 	§
Respondents. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Oscar Villantes George, a person originally arrested and detained at
the Dallas ICE-ERO Field Office, a facility in this district, filed this habeas action
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 29, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1 (“Pet.”.) He also filed an
emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and/or preliminary
injunction. (Dkt. No. 2.) On November 20, 2025, he filed an amended petition (Dkt.
No. 9 (“Am. Pet.”)) and an amended emergency motion for TRO (Dkt. No. 11
(“Mot.”)). On December 12, 2025, Respondents filed a response to the petition and
motions (Dkt. No. 14 (“Resp.”)), supported by an appendix (Dkt. No. 15 (“App.”)).
On December 15, 2025, Villantes George filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 16 (“Reply”).)
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned magistrate judge
recommends that the Court grant in part Petitioner Villantes George’s application for
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. Nos. 1,9) and require
1 This habeas action has been referred for case management to the undersigned
magistrate judge by Special Order 3-251. (See Dkt. No. 4.)
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Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing before an immigration judge and
deny the motions for a TRO (Dkt. Nos. 2, 11).
I. BACKGROUND
Villantes George seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
challenge his recent detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
(See generally Am. Pet.) He alleges that he cannot be subject to mandatory
immigration detention but rather must be given an individualized bond hearing in
connection with his pending removal proceeding. Villantes George additionally
seeks a temporary restraining order that likewise asserts he is entitled to an
individualized bond determination.
Villantes George alleges the following facts in his amended petition. He is a
citizen of Mexico who has lived in the United States for more than a decade since
last entering the country without inspection. (Am. Pet. ¶ 1.) 	His wife is a Lawful
Permanent Resident (“LPR”); he is the sole financial provider for the family; he has
filed his tax returns for well over a decade; and he has been a valued member of St.
Jude Catholic Church for years. (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 21-22.)
On June 6, 2023, Villantes George was placed in removal proceedings when
ICE issued him a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging him as removable under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), based on being present in the country after entering
without inspection (“EWI”). (Am. Pet. ¶ 23.) After being processed and issued the
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NTA in June 2023, ICE released him on his own recognizance, with a removal
hearing scheduled for November 17, 2027. (Id.) Villantes George was arrested at the
ICE-ERO Dallas Field Office on October 28, 2025, when he reported as directed by
ICE. (Id.) No bond was set. (Id.)
Respondents provide the following supplemental factual information.
Villantes George illegally entered the United States in 2014 without inspection or
parole by an immigration officer. (Resp. at 1; App. 003, 008.) On June 4, 2023,
Villantes George was encountered by ERO after an arrest by Mansfield Police in
Tarrant County, Texas, on a charge of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). (Resp. at
1; App. 003.) After ERO officers determined that Villantes George was a Mexican
national and was present with no legal entry, he was arrested and transferred to the
Bluebonnet Detention Facility. (Id.) Villantes George was detained, and on June 6,
2023, he was placed into removal proceedings through issuance of an NTA, charged
as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), and released on his own recognizance.
(Resp. at 1.) On February 13, 2024, Villantes George filed an EOIR-42B,
Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain
Nonpermanent Residents, with the Dallas Immigration Court. (Id.) When he
reported to the Dallas ERO Field Office on October 28, 2025, he was arrested and
detained. (Id.)
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Villantes George alleges that he is entitled to a bond hearing under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), but he has not been provided a bond
hearing “based solely on the government’s new claim that a decades old statute
subjects any noncitizen who entered without inspection to mandatory detention for
the duration of removal proceedings.” (Am. Pet. ¶ 24.) He asserts claims for
violation of the INA (id. ¶¶ 150-152), violation of due process (id. ¶¶ 153-156), and
ICE’s violation of its own regulations by failing to provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing (id. ¶¶ 157-158). As relief, he seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring his
immediate release or that he be provided a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Am. Pet. at Prayer.) He also seeks
“[d]eclaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring that EWI
noncitizens encountered in the interior long after their entry who are placed in
removal proceedings and are not described in § 1226(c) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2),
are entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator;” an award of attorney’s
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”);” and “any other and
further relief that this Court deems just and proper.” (Id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Because it concerns the Court's power to decide the case, “[j]urisdiction is
always first.” Louisiana v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024)
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(quoting Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2021)); see also United
States v. Willis, 76 F.4th 467, 479 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)). “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’
possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v.
Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (citation omitted). Although Respondents do not
challenge the Court's jurisdiction over this matter (see generally Resp.), the Court “is
duty-bound to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.” Burciaga v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Ins. of Ir.,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); H&D Tire & Auto.–
Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2000).
Several provisions of the INA “curtail the jurisdiction of federal district courts
in immigration cases.” Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL
2691828, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
292–96, (2018)). But “the Court retains jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s
detention insofar as that detention presents constitutional issues, such as those raised
in a habeas petition.” 	Id. at *5 (cleaned up); accord Barrientos v. Baltazar, No. 5:24-
CV-00005, 2024 WL 5455686, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2024) (“Noncitizens may
challenge their immigration detention under § 2241, although Congress has limited
this Section’s reach.” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001); Nielsen v.
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Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 419-20 (2019))), adopted, 2025 WL 744703 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7,
2025).
Villantes George challenges the validity of the agency’s new policies relating
to mandatory detention and a detainee’s entitlement to a bond hearing (see Am. Pet.
¶¶ 150-152, 157-158), but he also challenges his ongoing detention on constitutional
due process grounds (see id. ¶¶ 153-156). Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to assess
whether these policies have been applied to Villantes George in an unconstitutional
manner. See Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (citing Perez v. Kramer, No. 25-
cv-3179, 2025 WL 2624387, at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2025) (declining to consider
“the validity of the government's argument that [the p]etitioner should be
mandatorily detained under § 1225” or the applicability of Yajure Hurtado and
considering, instead, the due process question)).
B. 	Mandatory Detention under the INA
“This habeas action is another in a flood of similar actions filed after the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) eliminated the ability of immigration judges
(“IJs”) to make individualized bond determinations as to certain persons placed in
removal proceedings.” Perez v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-2920-K-BN, 2025 WL 3532430,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025), adopted 2025 WL 3530951 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025)
(internal citation omitted); see also Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL
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2950097, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. CV H-25-
3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025).
Two statutes in the [INA] principally govern [these] detention: 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1226 provides the general process for
arresting and detaining noncitizens who are present in the United States
and eligible for removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The Supreme Court has
explained that Section 1226(a) “sets out the default rule: The Attorney
General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an alien
‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting § 1226(a)). “[T]he
Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained under § 1226(a) ‘on
bond or conditional parole.’” Id. (citation modified). But “aliens who
are covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process”
and “‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding’ if an immigration
officer ‘determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted’ into the country.” Id. (quoting § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
Hence, “noncitizens detained under section 1225(b)(2) must remain in
custody for the duration of their removal proceedings, while those
detained under section 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing before an
IJ at any time before entry of a final removal order.” See, e.g., Rodriguez
v. Bostock, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2782499, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
30, 2025).
Covarrubias, 2025 WL 2950097, at *2.
“The principal issue” in these cases “is whether [the habeas petitioner] has
been erroneously categorized as a detainee subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which
prescribes mandatory detention during removal proceedings, or if he is subject to 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention and a bond hearing
regarding whether the noncitizen is a flight risk or poses a danger to the
community.” Id. The difference in interpretation emanates from the Government’s
recent reevaluation of its immigration detention authority. On July 8, 2025, ICE
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issued interim guidance (“Interim Guidance” or “Guidance”) announcing that the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “has revisited its legal position on
detention and release authorities.”2 The Guidance concludes that INA Section 235
(8 U.S.C. § 1225) rather than Section 236 (8 U.S.C. § 1226), is the applicable
immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission.” See Interim
Guidance; see also Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at *3. 	As a result, and “it is [now] the
position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under INA § 235(b) and
may not be released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) parole. These
aliens are also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing (‘bond hearing’)
before an immigration judge.” Interim Guidance. Then, on September 5, 2025, the
BIA issued a decision affirming this new DHS interpretation. See In re: Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In Hurtado, the BIA affirmed “the
Immigration Judge’s determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond
request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are
applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.”
Id. at 220.
2 A copy of the Interim Guidance is available at https://www.aila.org/library/ice-
memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission;
https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/ice-issues-memo-eliminating-bond-hearings-for-
undocumented-immigrants/#/tab-policy-documents (last visited Dec. 18, 2025).
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Respondents base their arguments on this new interpretation of agency policy.
(See generally Resp.) Respondents also argue that there is no procedural due process
violation because a noncitizen detained without bond while awaiting a removability
decision “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by
statute.” (Resp. at 13 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
104 (2020)). They argue that, because Section 1225 “says nothing ‘whatsoever about
bond hearings’ ... [n]o procedural due process claim is stated.” (Resp. at 5 (citing
Jennings, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018)).
“[C]ourts across the country have held that this new, expansive interpretation
of mandatory detention under the INA is either incorrect or likely incorrect.” Lopez-
Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (collecting cases). “Many of these decisions have
been made in the context of requests for preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. at *7 n.6.
Respondents concede that the decision in In re Hurtado represents a departure from
the way that the agency has interpreted the law since 1996. (See Resp. at 6 n.1.)
C. 	The INA
For the reasons explained above, and succinctly explained in Covarrubias, 2025
WL 2950097, at *2, which, in turn, relied on almost every other federal district court
in this circuit and elsewhere that has addressed this issue, the undersigned first
concludes that detaining Villantes George without a bond hearing under Section
1225(b) violates the INA:
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[Villantes George] contends that he is being detained under Section
1226(a) and should have a bond hearing, but Respondents argue that he
is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2), and
therefore, not entitled to a bond hearing.
* * *
[W]hether [Villantes George] falls under Section 1226(a) or 1225(b)(2)
is a matter of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is the
province of the courts, not agencies. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024).
The [undersigned] finds that Section 1226, not Section 1225, applies to
[Villantes George's] detention. As almost every district court ... has
concluded, “the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional
intent, and § 1226(a)'s application for the past three decades” support
application of Section 1226. Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL 2886346, at
*3 (collecting cases).
Covarrubias at *3 (cleaned up); see also Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3
(“The court need not repeat the ‘well-reasoned analyses’ contained in these opinions
and instead simply notes its agreement. The respondents have failed to provide
controlling authorities or persuasive reasons that would justify reaching a different
result. Section § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to [the petitioner].” (cleaned up)).
D. 	Procedural Due Process
1. 	Availability of Procedural Due Process Protections
The undersigned also finds that detaining Villantes George without a bond
hearing violates his Fifth Amendment rights. In the context of detention under
Sections 1225(b) and 1226(a), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has “expressly left open the constitutional due process question” for lower
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courts to consider. Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *8 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S.
at 312).
Although Respondents cite but do not expressly rely on Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103 (2020), to oppose Villantes George’s due process arguments (see Resp. at 11-
13), because the undersigned concludes that Villantes George is erroneously
categorized as detained under Section 1225(b)(2), the undersigned also recommends
that the Court reject Respondents’ related argument that, because Section 1225 “says
nothing ‘whatsoever about bond hearings’ … [n]o procedural due process claim is
stated.” (Resp. at 13 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).)
And, to the extent that Respondents may rely on Thuraissigiam to deny this
due process claim, the undersigned agrees with the court in Lopez-Arevelo and other
courts in the Fifth Circuit that have found Thuraissigiam to be distinguishable in this
context. See Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828 at *7-10; see also, e.g., Vieira v. De Anda-
Ybarra, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, No. EP-25-cv-432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880, at *4-5
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025); Gonzales Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-cv-430-KC, 2025
WL 2965859, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-cv-361-
KC, 2025 WL 2792588, at *7-10 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); Hernandez-Fernandez v.
Lyons, No. 5:25-cv-773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, at *7-8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025).
In Thuraissigiam, “[t]he [Supreme] Court did not address whether noncitizens
mandatorily detained under § 1225(b) have a constitutional due process right to
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challenge the fact or length of their detention, as [Villantes George] does here.”
Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *8. Unlike in Thuraissigiam, where the petitioner
challenged his deportability and the denial of his asylum admission, here Villantes
George challenges his detention without a bond hearing. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 114-15. Further, the petitioner in Thuraissigiam was stopped and detained “within
twenty-five yards of the border” and was not released or permitted to reside in the
United States. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 114. But Villantes George has resided in
the United States since 2014 (see Am. Pet. ¶ 15; see also App. 008). Lopez-Arevelo,
2025 WL 2691828, at *9 (distinguishing Thuraissigiam because petitioner had resided
in the United States for three years). Therefore, Villantes George is entitled to
procedural protections under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the
undersigned will consider his claim that his detention violates those rights.
2. 	Mathews Balancing Test
“To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process
rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).” Martinez v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-1007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. Sept. 8, 2025) (cleaned up). The three factors to consider are (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s
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interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424
U.S. at 335 (cleaned up). “The essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a
person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it.” Id. at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 171-72 (1976) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
a. 	Private Interest
“Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 at 690).
District courts have held that noncitizens who have been released from custody on
their recognizance have a “liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”
Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *11 (collecting cases). 	Villantes George was
released on his recognizance in June 2023. Upon his release, he acquired a
“cognizable interest in his freedom from detention that deserves great weight and
gravity.” Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6. Therefore, the first factor weighs in his
favor.
b. 	Risk 	of 	Erroneous 	Deprivation 	and 	Value 	of 	Additional
Safeguards
As to the second factor, Villantes George is in custody. Without a bond
hearing, it is very likely that he will remain in custody. The risk of an arbitrary
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deprivation is greater given the BIA’s new interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). See
Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *7; Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *11. “[A]gency
decisionmakers regularly ‘conduct[] individualized custody determinations …
consider[ing] flight risk and dangerousness.’” Gonzales Martinez, 2025 WL 2965859,
at *4 (cleaned up). So, a bond hearing would “give [Villantes George] the
opportunity to be heard and receive a meaningful assessment of whether he is
dangerous or likely to abscond.” Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *11. Because a
bond hearing would reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Villantes George’s
liberty, the second factor therefore weighs in favor of Villantes George.
c. 	Government’s Interest
Respondents argue that the government has the constitutional power to detain
Villantes George without bond “for the limited purpose of removal proceedings and
determining his removability.” (Resp. at 11.) But they do not explain their interest
in making those determinations while detaining Villantes George without bond. He
has no history of absconding, he reported as directed on October 28, 2025, and his
next removal hearing was not scheduled until November 2027 (see Am. Pet. ¶ 23).
And, in any event, the government’s interest in ensuring that Villantes George
appears for his removal proceedings “would be squarely addressed through a bond
hearing.” Gonzalez Martinez, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4. Thus, the third factor also
weighs in favor of Villantes George.
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Because all three Mathews factors support Villantes George, the undersigned
concludes that denying him a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2) deprives him of
his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Because the denial of
a bond hearing violates Villantes George’s procedural due process rights, the
undersigned declines to address any substantive due process claim that Villantes
George may make. See Santiago, 2025 WL 2792588, at *6 n.2 (“[B]ecause the Court
grants [the petition] on procedural due process grounds, the Court need not reach
[the petitioner’s] substantive due process . . . claims.”).
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As “[a] TRO is simply a highly accelerated and temporary form of preliminary
injunctive relief,” “[t]o obtain a temporary restraining order, an applicant must show
entitlement to a preliminary injunction.” Horner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
665-D, 2017 WL 978100, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (cleaned up).
But granting a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy which
requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance.” Valley v.
Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc.
v. C.D.L. Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989))
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant must unequivocally “show
(1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat
that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his threatened
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injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin, and
(4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Bluefield
Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up); accord Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.
1974).
And the Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly cautioned that [such relief] should not
be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on
all four requirements.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.
2013) (cleaned up). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent
irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision
on the merits.” Canal Auth., 489 F.2d at 576 (cleaned up). So the decision on a
motion seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction does “not amount to a ruling on the
merits” of a plaintiff’s claims, Jonibach Mgmt. Trust v. Wartburg Enters., Inc., 750 F.3d
486, 491 (5th Cir. 2014), considering that “the findings of fact and conclusions of law
made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the
merits” and “may be challenged at a later stage of the proceedings,” id. (cleaned up).
In short, a TRO or preliminary injunction is not a device “to give a plaintiff
the ultimate relief he seeks” through his claims. Peters v. Davis, No. 6:17CV595, 2018
WL 11463602, at 2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2018); accord Lindell v. United States, 82 F.4th
614, 618 (8th Cir. 2023) (“This Court has repeatedly recognized that the purpose of
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injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo; it is not to give the movant
the ultimate relief he seeks.”); Kane v. De Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 163 (2d Cir.
2021) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to award the movant
the ultimate relief sought in the suit but is only to preserve the status quo by
preventing during the pendency of the suit the occurrence of that irreparable sort of
harm which the movant fears will occur.” (cleaned up)). Therefore, a motion or
application for a TRO or preliminary injunction is properly denied when it is no
more than a “motion to win.”
Here, the arguments supporting Vilanntes George’s TRO motion focus on the
harms of mandatory detention without bond, and therefore, he appears to seek the
same or similar relief in the habeas petition and the TRO motion. Insofar as
Villantes George seeks the same ruling on the merits as the habeas petition, the
undersigned finds that the TRO motion improperly seeks ultimate relief. See
Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL 2886346, at *4 (denying TRO as moot because it sought
the same relief as the petitioner’s habeas petition – to release the petitioner from
custody or order a bond hearing). Accordingly, the TRO motions (Dkt. Nos. 2, 11)
Court should be denied.
IV. REMEDY
Most courts confronting this issue have determined that the appropriate relief
is a bond hearing. See Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *12-13 (collecting cases);
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Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *7 (collecting cases). The Court therefore should order
that Villantes George be given a bond hearing before an IJ and decline to award any
other requested relief at this time.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court
grant in part Villantes George’s application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. Nos. 1,9) to require Respondents to provide him with a bond
hearing before an immigration judge and deny the motions for a TRO (Dkt. Nos. 2,
11).
SO RECOMMENDED on December 19, 2025.
____________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation will be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this
report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after
being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made,
state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. 	An objection that
merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is
not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from
appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are
accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 	See
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified
by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to
14 days).
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