G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Taco City Y Mas LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
G&G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS,
LLC, as Broadcast Licensee of the
January 7, 2023 Gervonta Davis v.
Hector Luis Garcia Championship
Fight Program,
Plaintiff,
v.
TACO CITY Y MAS, LLC,
individually, and d/b/a TACO CITY
Y MAS; and JUAN RODRIGUEZ,
individually, and d/b/a TACO CITY
Y MAS,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:26-CV-0015-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AND
FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff G&G Closed Circuit Events (G&G) sued Taco City Y Mas, LLC and
Juan Rodriguez for illegally intercepting the closed-circuit telecast of the January 7,
2023 Gervonta Davis v. Hector Luis Garcia Championship Fight Program (Event).
G&G obtained the clerk’s default on liability. (Doc. 13). Now G&G seeks a default
judgment against the defendants that includes statutory damages, additional
damages, and attorney’s fees. (Doc. 15). For the reasons below, the Court
GRANTS IN PART the motion for default judgment and enters final judgment in
favor of G&G.
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I. Background
G&G has exclusive authority to sublicense the Event at closed-circuit locations
such as theaters, arenas, bars, clubs, lounges, restaurants, and the like throughout
Texas. G&G never authorized the defendants to show the Event at their
Establishment. Nor did the defendants pay G&G a licensing fee to show the Event
at their Establishment.
II. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides that, in proceedings not
involving a certain sum:
the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A default
judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if
represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary
who has appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is
sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its
representative must be served with written notice of the application at
least 7 days before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings or
make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial—
when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:
(A) conduct an accounting;
(B) determine the amount of damages;
(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or
(D) investigate any other matter.1
A default requires a court to accept as true a plaintiff’s well-pled allegations in a
complaint.2
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
2 See, e.g., Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 499 (5th Cir. 2015) (a
complaint is well-pled when “all elements of [a] cause of action are present by implication”); Matter of
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In determining whether to enter a default judgment, courts conduct a two-part
analysis. First, courts examine whether a default judgment is appropriate under
the circumstances.3 Relevant factors (called the Lindsey factors) include:
(1) whether disputes of material fact exist; (2) whether substantial prejudice
occurred; (3) whether grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether a good
faith mistake or excusable neglect caused the default; (5) the harshness of a default
judgment; and (6) whether the court would be obliged to grant a motion from the
defendant to set the default judgment aside.4 Second, the Court assesses the merits
of the plaintiff’s claims and whether those claims have a sufficient basis in the
pleadings.5
III. Application
The Court deems admitted the facts on liability and finds that the defendants
are neither incompetent or minors. While Rule 55 allows for hearings, it does not
command them. G&G’s supported its motion with a declaration. As a result, the
Court can properly rule without a hearing.
A. Procedural Appropriateness of Default Judgment
The Court now turns to the six Lindsey factors. First, there are no material
facts in dispute because the defendants have failed to appear or otherwise defend the
Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It is universally understood that a default operates as a
deemed admission of liability.”).
3 Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).
4 Id.
5 Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hou. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
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action. Second, the defendants’ failure to defend the action has brought adversarial
proceedings to a halt and thus has prejudiced G&G. Third, the defendants’ failure
to appear via licensed counsel to defend this action renders default proper. Fourth,
the defendants have not offered any evidence that they acted under a good faith
mistake or excusable neglect. Fifth, nothing suggests that it would be too harsh to
enter default judgment against the defendants, who received ample notice of the
action and sufficient time to respond. Sixth, the defendants’ lack of defense
indicates a lack of good cause for the Court to set aside the default judgment should
the defendants file a motion to set aside in the future. So the Court concludes that
a default judgment is appropriate under these circumstances.
B. Sufficiency of G&G’s Claim
Next, the Court must assess the merits of G&G’s piracy claim. Although the
defendants, by virtue of their default, are deemed to have admitted G&G’s well-pled
allegations, the Court must nonetheless review the complaint to determine whether
it established a viable claim for relief.6
The Federal Communications Act (FCA) combats against the piracy of radio
and television signals.7 The FCA prohibits “intercept[ing] any radio communication
and divulg[ing] or publish[ing] the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person” without authorization
6 Id.
7 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605.
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from the sender.8 Because the FCA operates as strict-liability statute, G&G need
only show that (1) the defendants’ Establishment showed the programs; (2) G&G did
not authorize the defendants to show the programs; and (3) G&G has an exclusive
license to show the programs.9
G&G has demonstrated each of these elements, so default judgment is proper.
First, G&G alleges that the defendants’ Establishment showed the Event.10 Second,
G&G alleges that it did not authorize the defendants to show the Event.11 Third,
G&G alleges that it had exclusive authority to sub-license the event.12 Because these
allegations sufficiently raise G&G’s right to relief above the speculative level, the
Court finds that default judgment is warranted here.13
Accordingly, G&G’s claim has substantive merit. While default judgments
are “a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules,” G&G’s entitlement here is
beyond dispute.14 So the Court must next “determine what form of relief, if any, the
plaintiff should receive.”15
8 47 U.S.C. § 605(a).
9 J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. El 33, LLC, No. EP-11-CV-519-KC, 2013 WL 164521, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. Jan. 14, 2013).
10 Doc. 1 at 4; see Doc. 15-1 at 24–31 (affidavit of eyewitness Everett New who visited the
Establishment).
11 Doc. 1 at 5.
12 Id. at 3–4.
13 See Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498.
14 See Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989).
15 J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 809, 814 (N.D. Tex
2015) (Boyle, J.).
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C. Damages
G&G seeks $10,000 in statutory damages, $50,000 in additional damages, and
$20,000 in attorney’s fees and of costs.16
Statutory Damages
G&G seeks statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. section 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II).17
G&G presents evidence that the defendants would have paid G&G a sublicensing fee
of at least $610.50 to lawfully broadcast the Event.18 Because only awarding the
amount a defendant would have been charged for a sublicense fee insufficiently deters
piracy, courts generally disfavor only awarding that amount.19 But $10,000.00 is
excessive and the Court concludes that three times the licensing fee is reasonable.
Thus, the Court awards $1,831.50 in statutory damages in this action.
Willful Damages
G&G maintains that “because of the absence of any way in which the
defendants could have ‘innocently’ accessed the broadcast of the Event, it is apparent
that [the defendants] specifically and willfully acted to illegally intercept the
transmissions of the Event for the defendants’ commercial advantage.”20 Courts
16 Doc. 15 at 12.
17 Id.
18 Doc. 15-1 at 24–25, 33. G&G does not present specific evidence of Taco City Y Mas, LLC’s
capacity at the Mesquite location, but counted “42 patrons and 4 staff in the business.” Id. at 25.
19 See G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Dallas Tacos Pancho Inc., No. 3:23-CV-2778-S, 2025
WL 1757296, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025) (Horan, M.J.) (collecting cases), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:23-CV-2778-S, 2025 WL 1756378 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2025) (Scholer,
J.).
20 Doc. 15 at 8.
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have generally accepted this reasoning.21 G&G seeks $50,000—five times its
requested statutory damages. But courts generally reserve a multiplier such as this
for illegal transmissions for a large number of patrons.22
Here, G&G’s submits evidence that only forty-two patrons went inside the
defendants’ Establishment on one occasion.23 So a five-times multiplier is
unwarranted, and the Court concludes that it should award additional damages
amounting to three times the statutory damages award given the circumstances. So
the Court awards G&G $5,494.50 in additional damages.
Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Finally, G&G seeks an award of attorney’s fees under
47 U.S.C. section 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) for one-third of the amount of its recovery. While
the Court will award fees, the Court prefers the time-honored lodestar method to
ensure G&G’s attorney recovers no more but no less than he earned. Fortunately,
counsel proved up his hourly rate times hours worked as an alternative basis for fees.
The Court finds his hourly rate of $300 an hour for anti-piracy litigation (given his
experience in the field) and his 10 hours worked on the matter (proven by line-item
entries) reasonable and necessary.24 Accordingly, the Court awards attorney’s fees
21 Dallas Tacos, 2025 WL 1757296, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025) (Horan, J.).
22 See G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Bar Sante Fe LLC, No. 3:23-CV-370-S, 2024 WL
3237175, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2024) (Horan, J.) (collecting cases), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:23-CV-0370-S, 2024 WL 3240675 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2024) (Scholer, J.).
23 Doc. 15-1 at 24–25.
24 Doc. 15-1 at 39–40.
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of $3,000 in addition to statutory damages. In the event the defendants engage in
litigation in the future, the Court will award supplemental fees at the appropriate
time.
G&G is also entitled to costs of Court. It should file a bill of costs within
fourteen days.
Finally, G&G is entitled to post-judgment interest as allowed by law.25
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS G&G’s motion for default
judgment against the defendants. The Court awards G&G $1,831.50 in statutory
damages, $5,494.50 in additional willful damages, $3,000 in attorney’s fees, and
post-judgment interest of 4.22%. This is a final judgment. The Court denies all
relief it did not expressly grant.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of October, 2026.
___________________________________
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case
recovered in a district court. . . . Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the
judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of
the judgment.”). The 1-year average Treasury yield on October 7, 2026, was 4.22%. See Selected
Interest Rates (Daily) - H.15, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 8, 2026, at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/.
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