Smith et al v. United States of America et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
J ESSICA SMITH , ET AL .,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	No. 4:24-cv-00334-P
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA , ET AL .,
Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint (“Motion”). ECF No. 47. Plaintiffs in this case are
individuals 	who 	allege 	they 	suffered 	serious 	harm 	from 	receiving
COVID-19 	vaccines. 	Congress 	granted 	the 	manufacturers 	of 	those
vaccines near-total immunity from suit and channeled any claims of
injury into a federal compensation program. Unable to sue the vaccine
manufacturers, Plaintiffs sued the United States and various federal
officials, claiming that this legal scheme violates their constitutional
rights.
But this Court is one of limited jurisdiction. It may only proceed over
a lawsuit when plaintiffs show a plausible basis for standing to sue.
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails to request relief that would
redress 	their 	injuries. 	Having 	considered 	the 	record, 	the 	Parties’
briefing, and the applicable law, the Court will GRANT Defendants’
Motion.
BACKGROUND
A. The 	PREP 	Act 	and 	the 	Countermeasures 	Injury
Compensation Program
In 2005, Congress enacted the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”). ECF No. 48 at 3; 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d,
247d-6e. The PREP Act does two important things relevant to this case.
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First, 	the 	PREP 	Act 	grants 	near-total 	civil 	immunity 	to 	the
manufacturers 	of 	“countermeasures” 	to 	declared 	public 	health
emergencies. 	When 	the 	Secretary 	of 	Health 	and 	Human 	Services
declares that a disease or other threat poses a public health emergency,
they may designate any drugs, products, or devices designed to target
the threat as “covered countermeasures.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d(b), 247d-
6d(i)(1). The manufacturers of those countermeasures then become
“immune from suit and liability” for nearly all claims of harm or death
arising from the countermeasure’s use. Id. § 247d-6d(a). The “sole
exception” to this immunity is when the manufacturer seriously injures
or kills someone through willful misconduct. Id. § 247d-6d(d)(1). The
PREP Act’s grant of immunity lasts as long as the Secretary determines
it should, id. § 247d-6d(b)(2)(B), and federal courts have no jurisdiction
to review the Secretary’s declarations of covered countermeasures. Id. §
247d-6d(b)(7).
On January 31, 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
declared that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a public health
emergency. ECF No. 36 at ¶ 3. The Secretary further declared that any
vaccine used to treat or prevent COVID-19 constituted a “covered
countermeasure” under the PREP Act. ECF No. 36 at ¶ 3; Declaration
Under 	the 	Public 	Readiness 	and 	Emergency 	Preparedness 	Act 	for
Medical 	Countermeasures Against 	COVID-19, 85 Fed. 	Reg. 15,198
(March 17, 2020). As a result, for as long as the Secretary’s declaration
remains in effect, the manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines are immune
from most legal claims for injury arising from use of their vaccines.
Second, 	as 	an 	alternative 	to 	lawsuits 	against 	countermeasure
manufacturers, the PREP Act authorizes the Countermeasures Injury
Compensation Program (“CICP”). A person who claims they have been
seriously injured from using a covered countermeasure may file a claim
for compensation from the federal government. ECF No. 48 at 4; see 42
U.S.C. § 247d-6e (authorizing CICP). Officials within the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) administer CICP. The PREP Act
charges the Secretary of Health and Human Services with determining
which injuries may be compensated for. Id. § 247d-6e(b)(4). Those
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determinations must be based on “compelling, reliable, valid, medical
and scientific evidence.” Id.
A person seeking compensation must generally file their claim with
CICP within one year of using the countermeasure—in this case, a
vaccine. 42 C.F.R. § 110.42(a). They must support their claim with
medical records and other documentation showing their eligibility for
compensation. Id. §§ 110.50–51. The claimant’s participation in the
process more or less ends upon submitting their claim. After receiving a
claim, 	HHS 	staff 	determines 	whether 	the 	claimant 	is 	eligible 	for
compensation, and if so, in what amount. Id. § 110.70. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services then notifies the claimant of their decision
in writing. Id. §§ 110.73–74. HHS has approved exceedingly few claims
related 	to 	COVID-19 	countermeasures. 	From 	late 	2020 	through
September 1, 2026, less than 2% of claimants were found eligible for
compensation. Health Resources & Services Administration, CICP data
for 	COVID-19 	claims 	(as 	of 	September 	1, 	2026),
https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicp-data [https://perma.cc/5LSG-RX2X].
Within 	60 	days 	of 	receiving 	a 	decision, 	a 	claimant 	may 	seek
reconsideration. 42 C.F.R. § 110.90(a). Reconsideration requests are
evaluated by a panel of people independent from CICP who conduct their
own review of the claimant’s submission. Id. § 110.90(c). That panel
makes a recommendation to an official within the Health Resources &
Services Administration, a component of HHS, who then makes their
own determination. Id. That last determination is final. The claimant
may not seek any further administrative or judicial review of the
decision. Id.
B. This Lawsuit
Plaintiffs are four individuals who allege they or their minor children
were harmed from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. Dr. Joel Wallskog
applied for compensation through CICP, but was denied 19 months
later. His request for reconsideration was denied after another 17
months. ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 69–72. Jessica Smith and Theodore Cabaniss,
on behalf of his minor child, both applied for compensation through
CICP. As of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, however, neither have
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received a decision—for Smith, after three years of waiting, and for
Cabaniss, after four years of waiting. ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 52, 85. Dr.
Elizabeth Thiele has not applied for compensation through CICP as she
was 	unaware 	of 	the 	program’s 	existence 	until 	after 	the 	one-year
deadline to file a claim passed. ECF No. 36 at ¶ 104.
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this case on April 18, 2024.
ECF No. 1. That complaint alleged that the PREP Act in its entirety
violated various constitutional provisions and asked the Court for
declaratory judgments holding so. ECF No. 1 at 33–52. Plaintiffs named
as Defendants the United States and the federal agencies and officials
charged with administering both the PREP Act and CICP.
In June of 2024, Defendants moved to stay this case pending the
resolution of a motion to dismiss in a near-identical case filed before the
Western District of Louisiana. ECF No. 18. Represented by much of the
same counsel, the plaintiffs’ complaint in the companion case raised the
same 	issues 	and sought 	the 	same 	forms 	of 	relief 	as 	the 	original
complaint here. To promote judicial efficiency—and to guide the Court’s
decision here—this Court granted Defendants’ motion to stay. ECF No.
22.
C. Smith I
On September 30, 2025, the Western District of Louisiana granted
the government’s motion to dismiss in the companion case. Smith v. US
Health Res. & Servs. Admin., No. CV 23-1425, 2025 WL 3124848 (W.D.
La. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Smith I”). The court in Smith I held that the
plaintiffs had failed to plead a plausible basis for standing. Id. at *4–6.
To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a plaintiff must show
that their alleged injury “would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id.
at *4 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)).
As in this case, Plaintiffs’ complaint sought declaratory judgments that
the PREP Act violated the Constitution as applied to them.
According to the court, the requested relief was “unlikely to redress
Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Smith I, 2025 WL 3124848 at * 5. Declaratory relief
that the PREP Act was unconstitutional would resolve the legal rights
of the parties to the case—namely, plaintiffs and the federal government
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defendants. Id. But it would have no effect on non-parties outside of the
litigation. That included the manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines, who,
regardless of any declaratory judgment issued by the court, would
remain free to invoke PREP Act immunity in any case plaintiffs filed
against them. Id. at *5–6. That fact rendered the judgment plaintiffs
sought 	“little 	more 	than 	an 	advisory 	opinion.” 	Id. 	at 	*5 	(citation
omitted).
In light of Smith I, this Court lifted the stay in this case and granted
Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 35.
D. The First Amended Complaint
On March 25, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint.
ECF No. 36. The Amended Complaint changed the claims asserted by
Plaintiffs and the forms and scope of relief they requested. Plaintiffs now
allege that (1) CICP violates their Fifth Amendment right to procedural
due process because it fails to provide a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, an impartial decisionmaker, timely resolution of their claims, or
the ability to seek judicial review (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 151–183); (2) CICP
violates their Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process because
it arbitrarily deprives them of their common law right to sue vaccine
manufacturers in tort (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 184–195); and (3) the PREP
Act violates their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury because it
fails to provide for a jury trial through CICP, which replaced tort suits
against vaccine manufacturers (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 196–208).
To remedy those constitutional deprivations, the First Amended
Complaint seeks the following relief: (1) a declaration that CICP “is
unconstitutional 	and 	unlawful 	under 	the 	Fifth 	and 	Seventh
Amendments as currently administered”; (2) a permanent injunction
prohibiting 	Defendants 	from 	“implementing, 	enforcing, 	or
administrating CICP as it is inconsistent with Fifth Amendment due
process and Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury”; and (3) a
declaration that the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ “state and
common law claims” are “equitably tolled from the date of the onset of
their injuries” and that Plaintiffs may “pursue their state and common
law claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.” ECF No. 36 at 55.
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On 	May 	19, 	Defendants 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	First 	Amended
Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
ECF No. 47. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing and fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 48 at 12–37.
Because the first issue is dispositive, the Court proceeds to determine
whether Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this lawsuit.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal when a
district 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	a 	case. 	“It 	is
incumbent on all federal courts to dismiss an action whenever it appears
that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Stockman v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden to prove that
jurisdiction “does in fact exist.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158,
161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in
conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the Court should consider the
jurisdictional argument first. Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius,
635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs lack standing and, as a result, this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. The Court addresses that threshold issue upfront.1
1 Under recent Supreme Court precedent, determining whether a party has
standing to bring a lawsuit can be a very treacherous undertaking for district
court judges, comparable to exploring uncharted territory without a compass.
See, e.g., Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) (holding that a state lacks
standing to challenge federal law preempting state laws on foster child
placement, even though “Congress’s Article I powers rarely touch state family
law”); contra Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that a state
had standing to challenge the EPA's decision not to regulate emissions of
greenhouse gases because that power was preempted and greenhouse gases
affected “the earth and air within its domain”); contra United States v. Texas,
599 U.S. 670 (2023) (holding that states near an international border lacked
standing to challenge the federal government's immigration enforcement
policies because the state's financial injury was not “legally cognizable”); but
see Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023) (holding that Missouri established
standing by showing that it suffered a concrete injury “to a legally protected
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A. Plaintiffs fail to plead a plausible basis for standing.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of this
Court to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2. A case or
controversy only exists if a plaintiff has standing to sue. United States
v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023). Standing to sue under Article III
requires (1) an injury in fact, or the “invasion of a legally protected
interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent”; (2)
traceability, 	or 	a 	causal 	connection 	showing 	the 	injury 	is 	“fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct”; and (3) redressability, or that the
injury will “likely be redressed by a favorable decision” from the Court.
Vapor Tech. Ass'n v. Graham, 167 F.4th 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2026)
(cleaned up) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that
“give rise to a plausible claim of [plaintiff’s] standing.” Cornerstone
Christian Schs. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 134 (5th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). And a plaintiff must demonstrate his
standing “for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that
is sought.” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 434
(2017) (citation omitted).
Here, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
fails to satisfy the first two requirements of standing: injury in fact and
traceability. They only argue that “Plaintiffs fail to show that the relief
sought would redress their injuries.” ECF No. 48 at 13. The Court agrees
that the First Amended Complaint fails to request relief that will
“likely” redress Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. And
because failure to show one requirement of standing means failure to
show standing altogether, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ case must
be dismissed. Stringer v. Whitley, 942 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The
interest, like property or money”); contra Dept. of Ed. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551
(2023) (holding that individual loan borrowers lacked standing to allege the
federal government unlawfully excluded them from a one-time direct benefit
program purportedly designed to address harm caused by an indiscriminate
global pandemic).
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party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction … bears the burden of
establishing all three elements [of standing].”).
1. 	A declaratory judgment that CICP violates the Constitution is
unlikely to redress Plaintiffs’ injuries.
The first form of relief Plaintiffs seek is a declaration from this Court
that CICP violates the Fifth and Seventh Amendments as currently
administered. ECF No. 36 at 55. Plaintiffs allege that CICP deprives
them 	of 	their 	“liberty 	interests 	in 	redressing 	grievances 	through
common-law claims against the manufacturers of the products that
severely harmed them.” ECF No. 36 at 46.
Declaratory relief of this kind runs into the same problem addressed
by the court in Smith I, which this Court finds persuasive. A declaratory
judgment “binds the parties, but only the parties.” Smith I, 2025 WL
3124848 at *5 (citation omitted); see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J & L
Lumber 	Co., 	373 	F.3d 	807, 	814 	(6th 	Cir. 	2004) 	(explaining 	that
declaratory relief does not bind non-parties and cannot have preclusive
effect against them in a separate tort suit). If this Court declared that
CICP violates Plaintiffs’ Fifth and Seventh Amendment rights, that
might settle the issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants. But it would
not enable Plaintiffs to sue COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers in courts
of law where they would enjoy the rights they argue the CICP process
deprives them of. As non-parties to this case, vaccine manufacturers
would remain free to invoke PREP Act immunity in any other case.
Smith I, 2025 WL 3124848 at *5 (“Here, the constitutionality issues
would not be settled between Plaintiffs and the vaccine manufacturers
and/or administrators, which would leave the declaratory judgment
powerless to remedy the alleged harm.”).
That matters. The relief Plaintiffs seek must be likely to redress their
injuries. Plaintiffs claim that CICP deprives them of their “core rights”
in “redressing grievances through common-law claims” against vaccine
manufacturers in traditional courts. ECF No. 36 at 46. In a court at law,
absent PREP Act immunity, Plaintiffs may be entitled to assert tort
claims against vaccine manufacturers, have their claims tried by a jury,
or seek further judicial review. But a declaratory judgment that does not
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bind any vaccine manufacturers in future cases does not get Plaintiffs
any closer to their goal. As a result—even after permitting Plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint—the requested declaratory judgment
would not redress Plaintiffs’ injury.
2. 	An injunction eliminating CICP is unlikely to redress Plaintiffs’
injuries.
The second form of relief Plaintiffs seek is a permanent injunction
prohibiting 	Defendants 	from 	implementing, 	enforcing, 	or
administrating 	CICP 	because 	it 	violates 	the 	Fifth 	and 	Seventh
Amendments. ECF No. 36 at 55. An order enjoining CICP’s operation,
however, would not make Plaintiffs free to “pursue their injury claims
in court” against COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers. ECF No. 49 at 47.
Even if CICP disappeared, the PREP Act’s grant of immunity to vaccine
manufacturers would remain in place. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)
(granting immunity to the manufacturers of covered countermeasures)
with 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	247d-6e 	(authorizing 	CICP). 	So 	too 	would 	the
Secretary’s declarations designating COVID-19 vaccines as covered
countermeasures.
The injunction Plaintiffs request does not target either of these legal
roadblocks preventing Plaintiffs from suing vaccine manufacturers.2
Vaccine 	manufacturers 	would 	remain 	free 	to 	invoke 	PREP 	Act
immunity in any future case filed against them. And even if Plaintiffs
did seek to enjoin the PREP Act’s grant of immunity, such an injunction
would not bind non-parties to this case—namely, those same vaccine
manufacturers. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Texas at
Austin, 142 F.4th 819, 825 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Generally, one is not bound
by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated
as a party[.]”) (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008))
(cleaned up).
2 As mentioned above, this Court would have no jurisdiction to review
the 	Secretary’s 	declarations 	designating 	COVID-19 	vaccines 	as 	covered
countermeasures even if Plaintiffs sought to challenge them. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-
6d(b)(7).
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In fact, Plaintiffs offer no convincing reason why the injunction they
request would not make them worse off. Enjoining CICP’s operation
would destroy the one avenue Plaintiffs have to seek legal redress for
their injuries. Absent CICP—however inadequate and unconstitutional
it may be—Plaintiffs could not seek redress from anyone, anywhere.
This 	Court 	believes 	it 	commonsensical 	that 	a 	remedy 	making 	a
plaintiff’s injuries worse is unlikely to make those injuries better. The
requested injunction would not redress Plaintiffs’ injury.
3. 	A declaratory judgment equitably tolling statutes of limitations is
unlikely to redress Plaintiffs’ injuries.
The last form of relief Plaintiffs seek is a declaration from this Court
that the statutes of limitations for their tort claims against COVID-19
vaccine manufacturers are equitably tolled, and permitting Plaintiffs to
pursue those claims in a court of competent jurisdiction. ECF No. 36 at
55. The Court doubts it has the authority to toll statutes of limitations
in future cases that (1) do not exist, (2) feature different parties, and (3)
would be filed before other courts—including state courts. See Trump v.
CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 841–46 (2025) (explaining that the equitable
power of a federal court generally extends only to the parties before the
court).
Even if it did, this declaratory relief runs into the same problem
addressed in Smith I. See infra Part A.1. Any declaratory judgment
issued by this Court would bind only the Parties to this case. COVID-19
vaccine manufacturers would remain free to invoke PREP Act immunity
in any other case Plaintiffs may file. As a result, this relief would not
redress Plaintiffs’ injury.3
3 The Court holds that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to plead a
plausible basis for standing to sue. This removes any need to address
Defendants’ arguments that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. Even if the Court is wrong about Plaintiffs’ standing, however, it doubts
whether 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint 	survives 	dismissal 	under 	Rule
12(b)(6).
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B. Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments cannot avoid dismissal.
Plaintiffs make three remaining points on why the Court should not
grant Defendants’ Motion. None save this case from dismissal.
First, Plaintiffs note that nominal damages for the violation of
constitutional 	rights 	can 	independently 	satisfy 	the 	redressability
requirement. ECF No. 49 at 48; see Uzuebunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S.
279, 	292 	(2021) 	(“[A] 	request 	for 	nominal 	damages 	satisfies 	the
redressability element of standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on
a completed violation of a legal right.”). But no request for nominal
damages appears anywhere in the First Amended Complaint.
Recognizing this, Plaintiffs point to the catch-all provision in their
prayer for relief, which requests “any other such relief this Court deems
just and proper.” ECF No. 36 at 55. The Court declines to imply remedies
plaintiffs have not expressly requested for the sole purpose of saving
their complaint from dismissal. On a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs bear
the burden to demonstrate standing from the face of their complaint.
Cornerstone Christian Schools, 563 F.3d at 134; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Second, on a similar note, Plaintiffs argue that this same catch-all
provision 	enables 	the 	Court 	“to 	craft 	relief 	in 	whatever 	manner
necessary to put a stop to the ongoing constitutional violations at issue.”
ECF No. 61 at 3 n.2. Because the Court could fashion any final judgment
it 	pleases, 	the 	argument 	goes, 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint
necessarily pleads a plausible basis for redressability.
But again, Plaintiffs bear the burden at this stage to show that they
have standing—including that the relief they request would likely
redress their injuries. Stringer, 942 F.3d at 720 (“The party seeking to
invoke federal jurisdiction … bears the burden of establishing all three
elements [of standing].”). In determining whether Plaintiffs have met
that burden, the Court has no obligation to imagine requests for relief
absent from the face of the complaint. See Malik v. United States Dep't
of Homeland Sec., 78 F.4th 191, 199 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e will not rely
on conjectural or hypothetical facts to find that standing is present…”).
It declines to do so here.
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Third, 	Plaintiffs 	request 	leave 	to 	amend 	as 	an 	alternative 	to
dismissal. ECF No. 49 at 49. District courts often afford plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend their pleadings before dismissing a case. In this
case, however, the Court has already given Plaintiffs leave to amend
their complaint. ECF No. 35. And that leave was given after the Western
District of Louisiana’s decision in Smith I dismissing a similar lawsuit
on the same grounds. Smith I, 2025 WL 3124848 at *4–6. Under these
circumstances, the Court does not believe the deficiencies in Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint are curable. It therefore denies Plaintiffs’
second request for leave to amend. See Fletcher v. Shulman, No. 3:13-
CV-2090-D, 2014 WL 222990 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2014), aff'd, 583
F. App'x 394 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying request to amend when court had
already permitted amendment once before and the plaintiff’s case was
“similar” to a previous case dismissed on “similar grounds”).
CONCLUSION
A judgment granting Plaintiffs the relief they request would amount
to an advisory opinion—a ruling on the law that, in practical effect,
changes next to nothing. See Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 2 U.S. 408
(1792) (explaining it violates the separation of powers for the courts to
recommend to the Secretary of War what benefits should be paid to
veterans 	if 	the 	Secretary 	remains 	free 	to 	ignore 	those
recommendations).
That fact matters. Hearing a case beyond this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction 	“isn’t 	a 	mere 	technical 	violation, 	but 	is 	instead 	an
unconstitutional usurpation of power.” Satanic Temple Inc. v. Young,
681 F. Supp. 3d 685, 690–91 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522 (3d ed.)); see
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to
the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing
unrestricted ... standing would significantly alter the allocation of power
at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of
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government.”). Our Constitution does not commit every grievance about
the law to the inside of a courtroom.4
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED. The above-captioned
case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 8th day of October 2026.
4 In these divisive times, perhaps the last thing our Republic needs is
unelected lawyers in black robes opining on the lawfulness of statutes enacted
by Congress when the plaintiffs challenging them lack standing to do so. See,
e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Hammond (Aug. 18, 1821), in 15
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 330–33 (Albert Ellery Bergh Ed.) (1905)
(“It has long however been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its
expression ... that the germ of dissolution of our federal government is the
constitution of the federal judiciary ... working like gravity by night and by day,
gaining a little-to-day and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step
like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction ... [t]o this I am opposed because ... it
will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another”);
Hon. James C. Ho, Not Enough Respect for the Judiciary—Or Too Much?
Arrogance and the Myth of Judicial Supremacy, 24 H ARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y PER
CURIAM 6 (2026) (“There's a reason why there are jokes about God wishing that
he was a federal district judge . . . [I]t's vital that district judges exercise their
powers carefully and with integrity.”).
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 4:24-cv-00334-P Document 62 Filed 10/08/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID <pageID>