Moore et al v. Federal National Mortgage Association et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND/ODESSA DIVISION
CHRISTINE M. MOORE and
MICHAEL MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION (FANNIE MAE);
PRISCILLA ALMODOVAR; PETER
AKWABOAH; BARRETT DAFFIN
FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, LLP;
JOSEPH M. VACEK; SHELLEY NAIL
TRUSTEE; OCWEN LOAN
SERVICING, LLC; MACKIE WOLF
ZIENTZ & MANN, PC; ISRAEL
SAUCEDO; ALDRIDGE PITE LLP;
WILLIAM JARRELL; PAUL
MARCHUK; TREVOR SHOELS;
FREEDOM MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; DAVID COBOS; and
MARVIN MOORE;
Defendants.
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MO:25-CV-00326-DC-RCG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation’s
(“Defendant FMC”) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 11).1 This case is before the Court through a
Standing Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the
Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration of the Parties’
briefs and the case law, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendant FMC’s Motion to Dismiss be
GRANTED. (Doc. 11).
I. BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2025, Plaintiffs Christine Moore and Michael Moore (“Plaintiffs”) filed their
Original Petition in the 385th Judicial District Court of Midland County, Texas, asserting claims
for wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, fraud, and civil rights violations. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). Providing
1. All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.
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little factual detail, Plaintiffs broadly allege on December 15, 2015, the abovenamed defendants
foreclosed on their real property located at 1001 S. County Road 1060, Midland, Texas 79706
(“Property”) without clear and lawful authority. Id. Plaintiffs further allege Defendants
fabricated, forged, and recorded false documents to falsely assert ownership rights and “Plaintiffs
were forcibly evicted at gunpoint from their homestead based on fraudulent claims.” Id.
Plaintiffs also contend subsequent eviction proceedings were wrongfully initiated by Defendant
FMC without lawful authority. Id. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs seek actual damages in
the amount of $11,140,287.36, emotional distress damages of over $250 million, and unspecified
punitive, exemplary, constitutional and civil rights damages. Id.
After the action was removed to this Court, Defendant FMC filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss, arguing Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against it. (Doc. 11). Plaintiffs and
Defendant filed their respective Response and Reply. (Docs. 15, 21). Accordingly, Defendant
FMC’s Motion to Dismiss is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for the dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim for relief must contain: (1) “a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; (2) “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to the relief”; and (3) “a demand for
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the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). A plaintiff “must provide enough factual allegations to
draw the reasonable inference that the elements exist.” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Patrick v.
Wal–Mart, Inc.-Store No. 155, 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012)); Torch Liquidating Trust ex
rel. Bridge Assocs. L.L.C. v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he complaint must
contain either direct allegations or permit properly drawn inferences to support every material
point necessary to sustain recovery”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations from the
complaint should be taken as true, and the facts are to be construed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.
1993). Still, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘[N]aked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” and “threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the presumption
of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips,
401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Court should neither “strain to find inferences
favorable to plaintiffs” nor accept “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal
conclusions.”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) governs pleading standards for fraud claims,
including state-law fraud claims. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338–39 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“[S]tate-law fraud claims are subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”)
(citing Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002); Williams v. WMX
Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997)). Rule 9(b) provides: “In alleging fraud or
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mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). “What constitutes ‘particularity’ will necessarily differ with the facts of
each case and hence the Fifth Circuit has never articulated the requirements of Rule 9(b) in great
detail.” Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit
“interprets Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring the plaintiff to specify the statements contended to be
fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain
why the statements were fraudulent.” Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU
Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009). “At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the
particulars of time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the
person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Tel–Phonic Servs., Inc. v.
TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant FMC moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it on the grounds they lack
any factual or legal basis and fail to state a plausible claim for relief. (Doc. 11 at 1).
With regard to Defendant FMC, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition merely alleges “eviction
proceedings were wrongfully initiated by Freedom Mortgage Corporation without lawful
authority.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11). According to Defendant FMC, Plaintiffs obtained a home loan on
May 8, 2007, which was secured by a lien on the Property. (Doc. 11 at 1). After Plaintiffs
allegedly defaulted on the loan, the Property was sold at foreclosure to Fannie Mae on December
4, 2015, and Plaintiffs were evicted shortly thereafter. Id. at 2. Defendant FMC asserts Defendant
Aldridge Pite, LLP mistakenly commenced the eviction in its name rather than Fannie Mae’s. Id.
Defendant FMC admits it has no ownership interest in the Property and lacked standing to evict
Plaintiffs but contends it neither directed nor authorized Aldridge Pite to initiate the eviction
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action. Id. Instead, Defendant FMC explains its inclusion in the eviction proceeding was a
clerical error by eviction counsel, who has already initiated filings to vacate the judgment and
either dismiss or amend the eviction action to reflect Fannie Mae as the proper party and correct
any misstatement in the record. Id.
Even accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, their conclusory assertion Defendant FMC
“wrongfully initiated” eviction proceedings without lawful authority cannot survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. This allegation is a legal conclusion unsupported by factual content.
(Doc. 1-1 at 11). Under the federal pleading standard, Plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. That is, a plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts to permit “the reasonable inference that the elements exist.” Innova Hosp,
995 F. Supp. 2d at 603. Here, Plaintiffs allege no facts explaining how the eviction was
wrongful, what legal duty Defendant FMC owed, what specific conduct Defendant FMC
engaged in, or how Defendant FMC’s actions satisfy the elements of any asserted cause of
action. A single conclusory statement, devoid of supporting factual detail, cannot plausibly
establish liability under any of Plaintiffs’ theories and thus cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
challenge. See Torch Liquidating Trust, 561 F.3d at 384 (“[T]he complaint must contain either
direct allegations or permit properly drawn inferences to support every material point necessary
to sustain a recovery.”). Because Plaintiffs’ threadbare allegation fails to plead the elements of
any claim with the factual specificity required under federal law, it does not provide a reasonable
basis for recovery against Defendant FMC. In sum, even accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true,
they are insufficient to survive as Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the above discussion, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 11). The Court further RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SIGNED this 13th day of January, 2026.
RONALD C. GRIFFIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and
Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and
file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which
objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the
objections on all other parties. A party’s failure to file such objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo
determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party’s failure to file written objections to
the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
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