Walker v. Hadco Construction

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
JAMES W. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
HADCO CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Case No. 1:25-cv-00184-JCB
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
Plaintiff James W. Walker (“Mr. Walker”) moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“IFP Statute”).1 For the reasons explained below, the court recommends
denying Mr. Walker’s IFP motion and ordering him to pay the full filing fee.2
Under the IFP Statute, the court may authorize a plaintiff to commence a civil case
without payment of the filing fee if he submits an IFP motion that demonstrates a financial
1 ECF No. 2.
2 In Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a magistrate judge does not have the authority to enter an
order denying an IFP motion but instead must issue a report and recommendation under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Accordingly, the court issues this report and recommendation on Mr. Walker’s IFP
motion rather than an order. Additionally, because all parties have not yet consented to
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the court issues this report and recommendation to Chief District
Judge Jill N. Parrish under DUCivR 72-3(f), which provides that until such consent is obtained
from all parties, “a magistrate judge’s assignment as presiding judge is a referral from the Chief
Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).”
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inability to pay the filing fee.3 When assessing an IFP motion, the court should consider whether
the plaintiff can pay the filing fee and “still be able to provide himself and dependents with the
necessities of life.”4 “[P]roceeding [IFP] in a civil case is a privilege, not a right . . . .”5 “The
decision to grant or deny [IFP] status under [the IFP Statute] lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court.”6
Mr. Walker’s IFP motion does not demonstrate that he is unable to pay the filing fee. To
the contrary, he indicates that his home is valued at $650,000 and that he has three vehicles.7
Additionally, many of his monthly expenses appear to be excessive and discretionary.8 For
example, his monthly expenses include: (1) $500 payments for a cell phone; (2) $800 for
gasoline, maintenance, and tires for his vehicles; (3) $350 for a trailer; and (4) $500 for a utility
terrain vehicle. For those reasons, Mr. Walker has the financial ability to pay the full filing fee
and should be required to do so.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); DUCivR 3-2(a)(1); see also Lister, 408 F.3d at 1312; DeBardeleben v.
Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991).
4 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (citation modified).
5 White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation modified).
6 Cabrera v. Horgas, 173 F.3d 863 (Table), 1999 WL 241783, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 1999).
7 See, e.g., Jackson v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. 14-4034, 2014 WL 2761142, at *2 (D. Kan. June
18, 2014) (considering the plaintiff’s assets when denying the plaintiff’s IFP motion); Scherer v.
State, No. 06-2446-JWL, 2006 WL 3147731, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2006) (same).
8 See, e.g., Jackson, 2014 WL 2761142, at *1 (relying on discretionary expenses as a reason for
denying the plaintiff’s IFP motion).
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RECOMMENDATION
Because Mr. Walker fails to establish that he is unable to pay the filing fee, the court
HEREBY RECOMMENDS that his IFP motion9 be DENIED. If that recommendation is
adopted, the court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Mr. Walker be ordered to pay the full filing
fee within 14 days of the order adopting the recommendation and that he be warned that his
failure to do so will result in this case being dismissed without prejudice.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Copies of this Report and Recommendation are being sent to all parties, who are hereby
notified of their right to object.10 The parties must file any objections to this Report and
Recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy of it.11 Failure to object may
constitute waiver of objections upon subsequent review.
DATED this 30th day of December 2025.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
9 ECF No. 2.
10 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
11 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
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