USA v. Pouha

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SIONE POUHA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING RESTITUTION
AND SETTING RESTITUTION
PAYMENT SCHEDULE
Case No. 2:23-cr-00170
Judge Tena Campbell
In this criminal action, Defendant Sione Pouha pled guilty to one count of Felon in
Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (See Indictment,
ECF No. 1; Statement in Advance of Plea, ECF No. 95 at 4.) The court held a sentencing
hearing on November 25, 2025, at which the court sentenced Mr. Pouha to 57 months in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons, with a three-year term of supervised release to follow. (Min.
Entry, ECF No. 104.) But the court allowed the parties to provide further briefing on the issue of
restitution, as the parties disputed the appropriate amount of restitution that the court should
impose.
In his Statement in Advance of Plea, Mr. Pouha indicated that he understood “that the
United States will request and that the Court may order that [he] pay restitution.” (ECF No. 95
at 6.) And he agreed to pay “all restitution as ordered by the Court.” (Id.) Nevertheless, Mr.
Pouha asserted at sentencing that the restitution requested by the government—$247,060—was
too high.
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For the following reasons, the court agrees, and instead orders that Mr. Pouha pay
restitution in the amount of $123,530.
BACKGROUND
The charge to which Mr. Pouha pled guilty is connected to an incident that occurred at
this courthouse. On April 30, 2023, at approximately 4:00am, police officers from the Salt Lake
City Police Department were investigating an unrelated case nearby when they heard gunshots
near the United States Courthouse. (Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), ECF No. 99 at ¶ 6.)
The officers found shell casings—four in total, two 9mm and two .45 caliber—on the courthouse
steps. (Id.) They also discovered that two windows, including the large central window, on the
west side of the courthouse had been struck by gunfire. (Id. ¶ 7.)
A short time after, officers discovered Mr. Pouha moving through the bushes at the
nearby Little America Hotel and then attempting to hide in the underground parking structure.
(Id. ¶ 8.) The police later found his jacket on the north side of the hotel between a bush and a
brick wall. (Id. ¶ 10.) Meanwhile, back at the courthouse, a third security officer found a
Ruger 1911 semiautomatic pistol near the guard station where courthouse security guards had
witnessed someone squatting down. (Id.) In his Statement in Advance of Plea, Mr. Pouha
admitted that he knowingly possessed the Ruger 1911 semiautomatic pistol and .45 caliber
ammunition. (ECF No. 95 at 4.)
At sentencing, the government played a video that had been recorded by the courthouse
security cameras. The video shows a group of men walking past, followed by a second group of
men of which Mr. Pouha is a member. Mr. Pouha then climbs the courthouse steps, draws a
pistol, and fires towards the first group. Although the video has no sound, the court agrees with
the government that Mr. Pouha appears to have been the first person to fire. The other men from
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the second group who are visible on camera after the first group has passed do not show any
reactions until Mr. Pouha fires his weapon. But it is undisputed that Mr. Pouha fired away from
the courthouse, and that it was not his bullets that broke the two windows. Rather, it appears that
the windows were damaged by an unknown shooter returning fire on Mr. Pouha.
ANALYSIS
The court’s authority to impose restitution on Mr. Pouha and the procedure for issuing
and enforcing an order of restitution are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3664. These
provisions were originally enacted through the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) of
1982, which allowed, but did not mandate, restitution for most crimes. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)(1) (1995) (“The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this
title[,] … may order … that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense.”
(emphasis added)).
In 1996, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which
amended §§ 3663 and 3664 and added a new provision, § 3663A, which required courts to
impose restitution for certain crimes, such as crimes of violence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1),
(c)(1)(A)(i). As amended, § 3663 still allows the court discretion to impose restitution for other
crimes not covered by the MVRA. Specifically, the court may order that “the defendant make
restitution to any victim” of an offense under title 18, as well as certain offenses under titles 21
and 49. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A). In addition, the court may “order restitution in any criminal
case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.” Id. § 3663(a)(3).
Before exercising its discretion to award restitution under § 3663(a)(1), the court “shall
consider … the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the
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defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and such other factors as the court deems
appropriate.” Id. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i).
Where a court determines that an award of restitution is appropriate, whether such award
is mandatory or discretionary, the procedures for issuing the restitution order are contained in
§ 3664. First, the court determines the amount of restitution owed: “In each order of restitution,
the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as
determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the
defendant.” Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A). Any dispute about this amount shall be resolved by the court
by a preponderance of the evidence and “[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss
sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government.” Id.
§ 3664(e).
After determining the amount of restitution owed, the statute permits the court wide
latitude in structuring how a defendant must pay that restitution. For instance, the court may
“direct the defendant to make a single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified
intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind
payments.” Id. § 3664(f)(3)(A). But the court must consider the defendant’s financial
circumstances when determining an appropriate repayment plan. See id. § 3664(f)(2); see also
United States v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The defendant’s economic
circumstances are relevant in fixing a payment schedule.”). Specifically, the statute instructs the
court to consider:
(A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether
any of these assets are jointly controlled;
(B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and
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(C) any financial obligations of the defendant, including obligations to
dependents.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2).
The statute also allows the court to adjust a defendant’s payment schedule after receiving
a notification of a change in the defendant’s economic circumstances: “Upon receipt of the
notification, the court may, on its own motion, or the motion of any party, including the victim,
adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice
require.” Id. § 3664(k).
Courts have noted that the restitution statute, as amended by the MVRA, contains
potentially conflicting directions about whether a court may consider a defendant’s economic
circumstances when determining not just whether to order restitution, but also the appropriate
amount of restitution. The Seventh Circuit has summarized the competing provisions as follows:
The amendments to § 3664 …, read in conjunction with the language of § 3663,
appear to create some tension with respect to the criteria employed by district
courts in deciding whether to order restitution and those employed by a district
court in deciding the amount of the restitution order. Specifically, restitution
pursuant to § 3663 is discretionary; and, in determining whether to exercise this
discretion, the district court is required to consider the financial resources of the
defendant. However, § 3663(d) also requires that any restitution order be issued
and enforced in accordance with § 3664. Section 3664, in contrast to § 3663,
forbids a district court from considering the economic circumstances of a
defendant in fashioning a restitution award; rather, the district court must order
restitution in the “full amount” of the victim’s losses. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A).
Under § 3664, a district court may consider the defendant’s financial
circumstances only in determining the method of payment and in setting the
payment schedule.
United States v. Day, 418 F.3d 746, 753–54 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Seventh Circuit resolved this tension by mandating a bifurcated approach. Under
this framework, a district court must first determine whether there is to be an award of
restitution. Id. at 754 (citing United States v. Cummings, 189 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72
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(S.D.N.Y. 2002)). When making this discretionary determination, the court must consider the
defendant’s financial circumstances. Id. But once the decision to award restitution has been
made, the court has no discretion to limit the amount of restitution awarded. Instead, the court
must award the full amount of the victim’s loss. Id.
That framework has been adopted by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. See United States v.
Diaz, 865 F.3d 168, 180–81 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Sizemore, 850 F.3d 821, 826–27
(6th Cir. 2017). And it is the framework that the government urges the court to adopt here,
although the government has candidly admitted that, at the sentencing hearing, it “suggested the
court may order partial restitution based on the discretionary nature of § 3663 ….” (Gov’t’s
Position on Restitution, ECF No. 106 at 5.) Having now carefully reviewed the statute, the
United States points to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f) and maintains that the court must order restitution “in
the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of
the economic circumstances of the defendant.” (Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)).)
But it does not appear that the Tenth Circuit has directly considered the tension described
above, and not all district courts have adopted the approach followed by the Seventh Circuit.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for instance, has questioned
whether the discretionary restitution statute should be read to preclude the district court from
adjusting the amount of restitution ordered:
[U]nlike the MVRA, the VWPA is a statute intended to vest the sentencing court
with discretion. It includes a specific provision permitting courts to consider “the
financial resources of the defendant, [and] the financial needs and earning ability
of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents” in determining whether to order
restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II). Yet under the interpretation of
the VWPA and Section 3664 adopted by the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits,
once a court determines in its discretion that restitution to the victim is
appropriate under the VWPA, it must award full restitution without regard to the
defendant’s financial resources and future earning ability. But is the discretion
vested in sentencing courts through the VWPA really so limited?
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United States v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2019).
The District of Columbia court found that where there is tension between the substantive
provisions of § 3663, which vest the court with discretion to order restitution and mandate that
the court consider a defendant’s financial resources, and the procedural provisions of § 3664,
which preclude consideration of a defendant’s financial resources, the substantive provisions
must prevail. Id.; see also United States v. Thompson, 792 F.3d 273, 277–78 (2d Cir. 2015)
(noting that the procedural provisions of § 3664 do not “impose any independent restitution
obligations on a defendant but simply … set the procedures by which the sentencing court
imposes [the] restitution order [already] calculated”). The District of Columbia court therefore
held as follows:
The Court rejects the all-or-nothing approach of the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits and concludes that the two provisions may be read together to permit
courts to exercise the discretion Congress intended to give them under the
VWPA. Courts must be able to set or reduce the amount of restitution based on
the defendant’s present and future economic circumstances when determining
both whether to order restitution and in setting the amount of restitution.
Otherwise there is little discretion left for courts to exercise and no relevant
distinction between the mandatory MVRA, which Congress enacted in 1996, and
the VWPA. Congress intended to vest courts with discretion when it enacted the
VWPA in 1982, and that did not change in 1996.
Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 26–27 (citations omitted).
The court agrees with the approach adopted by the District of Columbia court. It is
impractical to read the restitution statute to require the court to consider a defendant’s financial
resources when determining whether to order restitution while simultaneously requiring the court
to blind itself to any consideration about the amount of restitution that the court will order. After
all, almost all defendants can pay some amount of restitution—but the total amount of restitution
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that a defendant can pay is highly dependent on a defendant’s financial resources, and the needs
and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents.
Mr. Pouha’s case illustrates the difficulties of the all-or-nothing framework, as such an
approach would present the court with two equally unattractive options. Having discussed Mr.
Pouha’s work history and financial situation with the United States Probation Office, the court
finds that Mr. Pouha does have some ability to pay restitution. But the repayment of $247,060 in
restitution is outside Mr. Pouha’s reach absent a significant change from his past work history.
The court finds that Mr. Pouha’s conduct in this matter warrants a sizeable restitution
order. His actions were reckless in the extreme, exhibiting a disregard not only of property but
of life. And as the Tenth Circuit has noted, a restitution order “serves punitive purposes.”
United States v. Anthony, 25 F.4th 792, 797–98 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Paroline v. United
States, 572 U.S. 434, 456 (2014)).
But the Tenth Circuit has also recognized that “the primary purpose of restitution is to
make victims whole,” not to punish a defendant. Id. And a restitution order on the scale of a
quarter of a million dollars is disproportionately punitive for the crime for which Mr. Pouha pled
guilty. The court did not impose a fine in this case, finding that Mr. Pouha did not have the
ability to pay a fine, but it is notable that the guideline provisions indicate a fine range from
$10,000 to $95,000 for this offense level. USSG § 5E1.2(c)(3); (see also PSR ¶ 78). Indeed, the
statutory maximum fine for any felony is $250,000. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3). The proposed
restitution order of $247,060 is 2.5 times the high end of the guideline range for a fine imposed
in this matter and nearly exceeds the statutory maximum for any fine. And while the statutory
provisions for the imposition of a fine are distinct from those for the imposition of an order of
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restitution—and in no way preclude the court from imposing a restitution order that exceeds
$250,000—, the court finds the comparison helpful.
The court is also concerned about whether Mr. Pouha knowingly and voluntarily agreed
to a restitution order of this magnitude, as he pled guilty before the General Services
Administration (GSA) had provided the parties with a breakdown of the cost of replacing the two
windows.1 It is undisputed that Mr. Pouha was unaware of the potential scale of the restitution
order when he entered his guilty plea. And while a reasonable person would have recognized
that replacing the custom windows would be expensive, such a person would likely contemplate
that cost within a range of $50,000 to $150,000. The total replacement cost—surprising even the
court—was much higher.2
At sentencing, the court provided Mr. Pouha the opportunity to move to withdraw his
guilty plea. Mr. Pouha rejected that offer and chose to proceed with sentencing. But, as noted
above, all parties at the sentencing hearing believed that the court could adjust the restitution
order based on Mr. Pouha’s financial circumstances. The court therefore finds there is at least
some question about whether Mr. Pouha has knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a restitution
order of $247,060.
1 Mr. Pouha’s counsel goes even further, suggesting that the government has unclean hands for
negotiating a plea offer without providing Mr. Pouha the total cost analysis. (Def.’s Position on
Restitution, ECF No. 105 at 1–2.) But the court finds no evidence that the prosecution engaged
in any chicanery. The prosecution only received a cost breakdown from GSA—which was later
adjusted slightly—in late September 2025. (ECF No. 106 at 2.) The prosecution then promptly
provided this information to the defense. (Id.)
2 The court has confirmed with GSA that the replacement cost for the two windows is accurate.
The high cost resulted from the size of the largest of the two windows, the specialized material,
and the high labor cost of replacement, which involved transportation logistics and significant
difficulties detaching and reattaching the protective metal sunscreens in that section of the
building.
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Mr. Pouha did make an alternative suggestion at sentencing—namely, to pay half the full
restitution amount. He emphasized that the gunshots he fired were not, in fact, the shots that
broke the two windows. And while the court finds there is no question that Mr. Pouha’s actions
led to the broken windows, it is true that at least one other shooter was involved.
The court is persuaded that Mr. Pouha’s suggestion is reasonable. The court also notes
that there is statutory support to cut the full cost of the window replacement in half for two
reasons. First, § 3664 permits the court to apportion liability “among the defendants to reflect
the level of contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each defendant”
where more than one defendant contributed to a victim’s loss. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). The court
has found no cases where courts have apportioned liability among a defendant and an unknown
actor who contributed to a victim’s loss where that actor has not been indicted as a co-
defendant—but the court has also found no case prohibiting the court from considering a known
defendant’s contribution to the overall loss suffered by the victim. And as noted above, the court
reads the procedural provisions of § 3664 expansively where possible so as not to intrude upon
the discretion permitted to the court under the substantive provisions of § 3663.
Second, the court finds relevant that § 3663 provides two separate circumstances under
which the court may issue a discretionary restitution order. First, the statute authorizes
restitution for crimes listed in title 18, as well as some crimes under titles 21 and 49. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)(1)(A). The parties do not dispute that the court may order Mr. Pouha to pay restitution
under this provision. But the statute also permits the court to order restitution “to the extent
agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.” Id. § 3663(a)(3). This provision applies to “any
criminal case[,]” not simply other crimes that are not covered by § 3663A or § 3663(a)(1), and
therefore serves as an alternative basis under which the court may order restitution here. The
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court has identified its concern about whether Mr. Pouha can be said to have agreed to pay
$247,060 in restitution in his plea agreement. But given the back-and-forth with Mr. Pouha at
sentencing, the court has no qualms about finding that Mr. Pouha has agreed to pay half that
amount.
The presence of § 3663(a)(3) further supports the court’s interpretation that, despite the
procedural provisions of § 3664, the discretionary restitution statute continues to allow the court
some discretion in determining the amount of restitution owed. The framework adopted by the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits essentially ignores § 3663(a)(3), as that framework requires a
district court to order restitution under § 3664 for the full amount of each victim’s losses,
regardless of the extent to which the parties agreed to restitution in a plea agreement.3 See id.
§ 3663(d) (requiring all orders of restitution under § 3663, including restitution orders under
§ 3663(a)(3), to be issued and enforced according to § 3664).
While recognizing that several circuit courts have adopted a contrary interpretation of the
restitution statute, the court is persuaded that § 3663 should be read to permit the court some
discretion about the amount of restitution ordered. The court is also persuaded that, under the
unique facts of this case, a restitution order for half the amount of the GSA’s losses is
appropriate. A restitution order for $123,530 accounts for the extent to which Mr. Pouha can be
said to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to restitution; it also reflects the extent to which
Mr. Pouha contributed to the damage that GSA suffered.
3 To avoid a conflict with the provision of § 3664 requiring the court to order restitution in the
full amount of each victim’s losses, § 3663(a)(3) could be read to permit an order of restitution in
any criminal case to the extent that the parties agree on the identity of the victims or other
individuals to whom the defendant owes restitution. But this interpretation adds a limitation that
is not present in the text of the statute. A plain reading of the phrase “to the extent agreed to”
suggests that the provision allows the parties to negotiate the amount of restitution as well as the
identity of any victims or individuals to whom the defendant owes restitution.
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Regardless of the amount of restitution ordered, the statute is clear that the court must
consider Mr. Pouha’s resources when determining an appropriate repayment plan. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(f)(2). As the court has noted, Mr. Pouha’s financial circumstances are limited, but he
does have some work history and an ability to pay. Having consulted with the United States
Probation Office, the court sets the following repayment schedule: $15 per month while Mr.
Pouha is incarcerated, followed by $150 per month once Mr. Pouha is released from the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons. Mr. Pouha is reminded that he must “notify the court and the Attorney
General of any material change in [his] economic circumstances that might affect [his] ability to
pay restitution.” Id. § 3664(k).
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Mr. Pouha is ordered to pay restitution to the General Services Administration in
the amount of $123,530.00.
2. 	Restitution shall be made at a rate of $15.00 per month while Mr. Pouha is
incarcerated. Upon release from imprisonment, payments will be made at a minimum rate of
$150.00 per month or as otherwise determined by the United States Probation Office.
3. 	The court waives interest on the restitution award.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________________
Tena Campbell
United States District Judge
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