Barney v. Utah Board of Pardons et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
JEREMY BRYAN BARNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
& DISMISSAL ORDER
Case No. 4:24-CV-69-DN
District Judge David Nuffer
Plaintiff, inmate Jeremy Bryan Barney, held at Central Utah Correctional Facility, filed
this pro se civil-rights action, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2025). (ECF No. 1.) After screening
Plaintiff's original complaint (OC), the Court ordered him to cure its deficiencies. (ECF Nos. 1,
13.) In that Cure Order (CO), the Court gave specific guidance on deficiencies, along with other
details to help Plaintiff file an amended complaint with valid claims if possible. (ECF No. 13.)
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (AC). (ECF No. 16.) The AC retains many of the
flaws flagged in the CO. (ECF Nos. 13, 16.) The AC names the following defendants: Utah
Board of Parole and Pardons (UBOP); J. Scott Stephenson, UBOP chairman; and Sharla Huff,
UBOP representative. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff alleges he was assaulted, received a "Bi-Polar
Diagnosis"; and had five "suicide attempts." (Id.) The AC mentions the following possible terms
or claims: discrimination; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-
12213 (2025); and the "Federal Tort Act" (perhaps Plaintiff means the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 id. § 1346(b). (ECF No. 16.)
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Having now thoroughly screened and liberally construed1 the AC under its statutory
review function,2 the Court dismisses this action.
I. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review for Sua Sponte Dismissals
Assessing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, this
Court takes all well-pleaded factual assertions as true and regards them in a light most
advantageous to the plaintiff. Ridge at Red Hawk L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th
Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate when--though the facts are viewed in the plaintiff's favor--
the plaintiff has not posed a "plausible" right to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008). "The
burden is on the plaintiff to frame a 'complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.’" Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Twombly, 550
1The Court recognizes Plaintiff's pro se status, and so construes his pleadings liberally. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Still, such liberal reading is meant merely to overlook technical formatting
errors and other similar defects in Plaintiff's use of legal terminology and proper English. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Pro se status does not excuse Plaintiff from the duty to meet various rules and
procedures directing litigants and counsel or the mandates of substantive law; regarding these, the Court will treat
Plaintiff with the same standards applicable to counsel licensed to practice law before this Court's bar. See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
2The screening statute reads:
(a) Screening.--The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint--
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2025).
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U.S. at 556). When a civil-rights complaint contains "bare assertions," involving "nothing more
than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional . . . claim," the Court considers
those assertions "conclusory and not entitled to" an assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55).
In other words, "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some
set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court
reason to believe this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these
claims." Red Hawk, 493 F.3d at 1177 (italics in original). "[T]he complaint must contain
something more than 'unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].'" Eaves v.
Kory, No. 24-1048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12964, at *2-3 (10th Cir. May 30, 2024)
(unpublished) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Also, "[f]acts, not conclusions, must be pleaded--
'the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions,' including where a 'legal conclusion [is] couched as a factual
allegation.'" Renaud v. Ross, No. 1:22-CV-212, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19808, at *8 (D. Wy.
Jan. 27, 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The facts stated in each of the following sections are taken from the AC's allegations,
viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, and taken as true for this Order only.
B. Claims Lack Adequate Allegations of Personal Participation and Factual Support
After Plaintiff lists UBOP, Stephenson, and Huff as defendants at the beginning of the
AC, their names never appear again. (ECF No. 16.) So, where Plaintiff uses the bare terms,
"discrimination," "Americans With Disabilities Act," "Federal Tort Act" (FTCA), "assault[],"
"Bi-Polar Diagnosis," and "suicide attempts," there is no mention of any individual defendant(s)
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and how their actions may have violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights as to any of
these terms. (Id.) Indeed, there are no factual allegations, either, to support any of those cryptic
terms as causes of action. (Id.)
Meanwhile, Plaintiff was notified in the CO that his OC did "not properly affirmatively
link an individual named defendant to specific civil rights violations." (ECF No. 13.) He was
then given comprehensive detail on what it entails to properly affirmatively link a defendant to
specific violations:
• Each defendant must be named in the complaint's caption,
listed in the section of the complaint setting forth names of each
defendant, and affirmatively linked to applicable claims within the
"cause of action" section of the complaint.
• The complaint must clearly state what each individual
defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to
violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260,
1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each
named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To
state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged
to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App'x 757,
759 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or
at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations
occurred.
• Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations
that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should
be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully
explain the "who," "what," "where," "when," and "why" of each
claim. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 ("The [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.]
Twombly Court was particularly critical of complaints that
'mentioned no specific, time, place, or person involved in the
alleged [claim].' [550 U.S. 544, 565] n.10 (2007). Given such a
complaint, 'a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiff's conclusory
allegations . . . would have little idea where to begin.' Id.").
. . . .
Affirmative link. This tenet requires the following:
[A] plaintiff who brings a
constitutional claim under § 1983
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can't obtain relief without first
satisfying the personal-participation
requirement. That is, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the defendant
"personally participated in the
alleged constitutional violation" at
issue. Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d
1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018). Indeed,
because § 1983 is a "vehicle[] for
imposing personal liability on
government officials, we have
stressed the need for careful attention
to particulars, especially in lawsuits
involving multiple defendants."
Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210,
1225 (10th Cir. 2013); see also
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d
1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that when plaintiff brings
§ 1983 claims against multiple
defendants, "it is particularly
important . . . that the complaint
make clear exactly who is alleged to
have done what to whom");
Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents,
159 F.3d 504, 532-33 (10th Cir.
1998)) (holding that district court's
analysis of plaintiff's § 1983 claims
was "infirm" where district court
"lump[ed]" together plaintiff's claims
against multiple defendants--
"despite the fact that each of the
defendants had different powers and
duties and took different actions with
respect to [plaintiff]"-- and "wholly
failed to identify specific actions
taken by particular defendants that
could form the basis of [a
constitutional] claim").
Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F. App'x 784, 790-91 (10th Cir.
2019).
"A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this requirement will trigger
swift and certain dismissal." Id. at 790 n.5. Indeed, the Tenth
Circuit has "gone so far as to suggest that failure to satisfy the
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personal-participation requirement will not only justify dismissal
for failure to state a claim; it will render the plaintiff's claim
frivolous." Id.
(ECF No. 13, at 4-6.)
Plaintiff's spare and conclusory allegations do not meet the criteria of which the CO
advised Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 13, 16.) Not one of the vague terms or claims here is linked to an
individual defendant. (ECF No. 16.) Though painstakingly alerted to his pleading duties, (ECF
No. 13), Plaintiff does not "isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant," (ECF
No. 16); thus, regarding the terms or claims he suggests (without specifying supporting
allegations), Plaintiff gives inadequate notice of "the nature of the claims against each"
defendant. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. Indeed, Plaintiff does not heed the Court's direction that a
full explanation of the "'who,' 'what,' . . . 'when,' and 'why'" is required, leaving his allegations
insufficient to state a claim. (ECF No. 9 (quoting Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248).)
Moreover, Plaintiff's terse, unsupported assertions--of discrimination, ADA and FTCA,
and mental-health violations--do not "give the court reason to believe this plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Red Hawk, 493 F.3d at
1177 (italics in original). The AC does not even have the insufficient "'unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],'" warned against in Eaves, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12964,
at *2-3 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678), because he does not even try to allege what any
defendant might have done to harm him vis-à-vis any of the terms or possible claims he
mentions. Without specifying individual defendant's behaviors, Plaintiff says he was harmed but
does not provide crucial links between any one defendant and any one allegation or element of
unconstitutional treatment. And he does not provide factual details that build toward the support
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needed for each element of separate causes of action. Indeed, "[f]acts, not conclusions, must be
pleaded"; the Court is not required to accept as true "a 'legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.'" Renaud, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19808, at *8 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In sum, Plaintiff's possible claims are all, fatally, not linked to any specific defendant,
despite Plaintiff being thoroughly instructed as to his pleading duties and warned that such
omissions would require dismissal. (ECF Nos. 13, 16.) Plaintiff fails to "isolate the allegedly
unconstitutional acts of each [potential] defendant"; Plaintiff therefore gives insufficient notice
of "the nature of the claims against each" defendant. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250.
II. ORDER
For failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 16), is DISMISSED with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C.S. §
1915(e)(2)(B) (2025). Two iterations of the complaint, (ECF Nos. 1, 16), and a full round of
comprehensive guidance on curing deficiencies, (ECF No. 13), have not resulted in an adequate
pleading. It is apparent to the Court that further opportunity to amend would not lead to a
different result. This action is CLOSED.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
JUDGE DAVID NUFFER
United States District Court
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