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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
13-FEB-2026
07:49 AM
Dkt. 58 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

In the Matter of the Request for Payment of,
CHRISTOPHER LAWINSKI, M.D., as Provider for Sean Tilton,
Appellant-Provider-Appellant,
vs.
SCOTT SAIKI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
CONSUMER AFFAIRS, STATE OF HAWAI‘I,1
Appellee-Appellee,
and
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION,
Appellee-Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 3CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

1 Pursuant to Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule
43(c)(1), Scott Saiki, the current Insurance Commissioner, Department of
Commerce and Consumer Affairs, is automatically substituted as Appellee-
Appellee herein in place of Colin M. Hayashida.
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SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Leonard and McCullen, JJ.)

This secondary appeal involves Appellant-Provider-
Appellant Christopher Lawinski, M.D.'s (Dr. Lawinski) challenge
to Appellee-Respondent-Appellee United Services Automobile
Association's (Insurer) denial of personal injury protection
(PIP) benefit reimbursement on grounds that the treatment
provided to the patient was not "substantially comparable to the
requirements for prepaid health care plans" under the PIP
statute, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-103.5(a).2 We
affirm.
Dr. Lawinski appeals from the Circuit Court of the
Third Circuit's (Circuit Court)3 March 20, 2023 "Findings of Fact
[(FOFs)] and Conclusions of Law [(COLs)]; Order" (Circuit Court
Order), and December 19, 2023 Final Judgment. The Circuit Court
Order affirmed the July 26, 2022 Final Order of Appellee-

2 HRS § 431:10C-103.5 (2019), entitled "Personal injury protection
benefits; defined; limits," defines PIP benefits as follows:

(a) Personal injury protection benefits, with respect to
any accidental harm, means all appropriate and reasonable
treatment and expenses necessarily incurred as a result of
the accidental harm and which are substantially comparable
to the requirements for prepaid health care plans,
including medical, hospital, surgical, professional,
nursing, advanced practice nursing licensed pursuant to
chapter 457, dental, optometric, naturopathic medicine,
chiropractic, ambulance, prosthetic services, medical
equipment and supplies, products and accommodations
furnished, x-ray, psychiatric, physical therapy pursuant to
prescription by a medical doctor, occupational therapy,
rehabilitation, and therapeutic massage by a licensed
massage therapist when prescribed by a medical doctor.

(Emphasis added.)
3 The Honorable Henry T. Nakamoto presided.

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Appellee Scott Saiki, Insurance Commissioner, Department of
Commerce and Consumer Affairs, State of Hawaiʻi (Commissioner)
that adopted the June 15, 2022 "Hearings Officer's [FOFs],
[COLs], and Recommended Order" (Hearings Officer's Order), which
concluded that Dr. Lawinski did not establish that "the claims
for [Erchonia Low Level Laser Therapy (LLLT)] treatment charged
under [billing] code 97039 are compensable [PIP] benefit [sic]
as defined under HRS § 431:10C-103.5(a)."
On appeal, Dr. Lawinski contends that the Circuit
Court erred by: (1) holding LLLT treatments were not PIP
benefits under HRS § 431:10C-103.5(a), concluding the PIP
statute was "unambiguous," failing to confirm the legislative
intent of HRS § 431:10C-103.5(a) was "to provide generous PIP
benefits," and giving "deference" to the Hearings Officer's
Order; (2) entering FOFs and COLs "based upon [Insurer's]
Exhibits F to L, which had been erroneously received into
evidence over [Dr. Lawinski]'s objections"; and (3) denying Dr.
Lawinski's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses.4
Upon review of the record on appeal and relevant legal
authorities, giving due consideration to the issues raised and
arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve the contentions as
follows.
"Review of a decision made by the circuit court upon
its review of an agency's decision is a secondary appeal."

4 Dr. Lawinski's points of error (POEs), which we have consolidated
and condensed for clarity, do not comply with HRAP Rule 28(b)(4). The POEs
are not numbered and do not contain where in the record the alleged error
occurred and was preserved before the lower court or agency. See HRAP Rule
28(b)(4). Despite the noncompliance, we address Dr. Lawinski's arguments.
See Marvin v. Pflueger, 127 Hawaiʻi 490, 496, 280 P.3d 88, 94 (2012)
(addressing case on the merits despite noncompliance with HRAP Rule 28 "where
the remaining sections of the brief provide the necessary information to
identify the party's argument" and to "afford[] litigants the opportunity to
have their cases heard on the merits, where possible" (citation modified)).
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 104 Hawaiʻi 261, 264, 88 P.3d 196,
199 (2004) (citation omitted). We apply "the standards set
forth in HRS § 91–14(g)" to determine whether the Circuit
Court's decision was "right or wrong." Id. (citation omitted).
The Hearings Officer's Order contained the following
analysis supporting the determination that Dr. Lawinski failed
to establish that the LLLT treatment in this case was
"substantially comparable to the requirements for prepaid health
care plans," which is required for reimbursement as a PIP
benefit:

In determining whether [Dr. Lawinski] is entitled to
reimbursement of [PIP] benefits for the LLLT treatment
. . . , the Hearings Officer must consider not only whether
the treatment was appropriate and reasonable, but also
whether the treatment is substantially comparable to the
requirements for prepaid health care plans.

[Dr. Lawinski] submitted little, if any, evidence
that the LLLT treatment provided to [the patient] is
substantially comparable to the requirements for prepaid
health care plans. In support of his position that the LLLT
treatments provided are compensable [PIP] benefits, [Dr.
Lawinski] submitted exhibits of payment for claims of LLLT
treatment charged under code 97039 from DTRIC/Corvel, State
Farm, Allstate and GEICO. See Exhibits 36-43. However, [Dr.
Lawinski] admitted those claims were initially denied and
payments made only after [Dr. Lawinski] requested
administrative review of the claim denials. Further, [Dr.
Lawinski] acknowledged that the disputes were all settled
and the matters were dismissed. The Hearings Officer does
not consider these exhibits relevant and assigns no weight
to [Dr. Lawinski]'s exhibits of payments made by
DTRIC/Corvel, State Farm, Allstate and GEICO.

The Hearings Officer notes exhibits submitted by both
parties indicate Aetna, Cigna, and HMSA do not consider
LLLT treatment reimbursable. [Dr. Lawinski] objected to
acceptance of [Insurer] Exhibits "F" through "L" consisting
of documents from Aetna, Cigna, HMSA, Medicare, and Kaiser
on the basis the authors of the documents were
unavailable for cross-examination. The Hearings Officer
received the documents into evidence over [Dr. Lawinski]'s
objection. However, the Hearings Officer notes [Dr.
Lawinski]'s Exhibits "48" – "50" and "59" are similar to
[Insurer]'s documents from Aetna, Cigna, and HMSA that [Dr.
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Lawinski] objected to. Based on the evidence submitted, the
Hearings Officer concludes Aetna, Cigna, and HMSA do not
cover LLLT. The record further establishes Medicare,
arguable [sic] the larges [sic] prepaid health plan, does
not consider LLLT reasonable and necessary and considers
LLLT procedures non-covered billed under any [current
procedural terminology (CPT)] code, including procedure
code 97039. The Hearings Officer notes [Dr. Lawinski]'s
witness Steven Shanks [(Shanks)][5] testified he did not know
if LLLT treatment was covered by prepaid health care plans
in Hawaii. The Hearings Officer also notes [Dr. Lawinski]'s
testimony that his practice does not contract with prepaid
health care plans. [Dr. Lawinski] further testified he has
never billed or been reimbursed by a prepaid health care
plan for claims of LLLT treatment.

In determining whether the LLLT treatment [Dr.
Lawinski] administered to [the patient] is substantially
comparable to the requirements for prepaid health care
plans, the Hearings Officer considers the evidence that
Aetna, Cigna, HMSA, Medicare do not cover LLLT treatment.
The Hearings Officer does not consider [Insurer]'s Exhibit
"K", a document from Kaiser Foundation Health Plan. The
Hearings Officer considers Steven Shanks [sic] testimony
that he did not know if LLLT treatment was covered by
prepaid health care plans in Hawaii. The Hearings Officer
also considers [Dr. Lawinski]'s testimony that [Dr.
Lawinski] has never been reimbursed charges for LLLT
treatment by a prepaid health care plan. The Hearings
Officer notes [Dr. Lawinski] did not submit any evidence
that LLLT treatment is reimbursed by prepaid health care
plans. Based on the record, the Hearings Officer concludes
[Dr. Lawinski] has failed to establish the LLLT treatment
provided to [the patient] is substantially comparable to
the requirements for prepaid health care plans.

(Footnote and emphases added.)
The Circuit Court Order affirmed the Hearings
Officer's Order and concluded that LLLT treatment was not a PIP
benefit under HRS § 431:10C-103.5(a), as follows:

5. The primary issue on appeal is "whether the Commissioner
and Hearings Officer correctly concluded that the []LLLT
treatments administered by [Dr. Lawinski] were NOT [PIP]
benefits" under [HRS] § 431:10C-103.5(a).

. . . .

5 Shanks is the president of Erchonia Corporation, the manufacturer
of the LLLT treatment laser.
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8. Hearings Officer Hikida rightfully held that HRS §
431:10C-103.5(a) is unambiguous, and statutory
interpretation is unnecessary.

9. [HRS] § 43l:10C-103.6(a) provides in pertinent part:

The benefits provided under section 431:10C-103 shall
be substantially comparable to the requirements for
prepaid health care plans, as provided in chapter 393
. . . [sic]

10. [HRS] Chapter 393, the Prepaid Health Care Act, sets
forth the requirements for prepaid health care plans. To
wit, to qualify as a prepaid health care plan under HRS
Chapter 393, a health care plan must provide "health-care
benefits equal to, or medically reasonably substitutable
for, the benefits provided by prepaid health plans of the
same type. [sic] . . which have the largest number of
subscribers in the State. . . ." See HRS §393-7(a).

11. [Dr. Lawinski] failed to present any evidence
establishing that LLLT therapy are [sic] substantially
comparable to the requirement for prepaid health care
plans.

12. The [Certified Record on Appeal] supports that LLLT
treatment has not been approved by Hawaii prepaid
healthcare plans or Medicare that consider it experimental
and investigational. Among the major prepaid health care
carriers that have deemed LLLT treatment experimental and
investigational are Aetna, Cigna, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, HMSA and Kaiser.

13. The Commissioner and Hearings Officer correctly
concluded that []LLLT treatments administered by [Dr.
Lawinski] were NOT [PIP] benefits.

(Internal CROA citations omitted and first ellipses added.)
(1) Dr. Lawinski argues that the clause "substantially
comparable to the requirements for prepaid health care plans" in
HRS § 431:10C-103.5(a) is ambiguous and requires statutory
interpretation. Dr. Lawinski asserts that the statute provides
no "method or procedure or objective criteria by which one could
go about measuring the substantial comparability of Erchonia
LLLT . . . to the long list of general types of required health
care benefits listed in HRS [§] 393-7."
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Commissioner and Insurer contend that the phrase,
"substantially comparable to the requirements for prepaid health
care plans," is not ambiguous, and statutory interpretation is
not necessary. They point to a related statute, HRS § 431:10C-
103.66 as providing the explanation for the language at issue in
the PIP statute. Dr. Lawinski does not address HRS § 431:10C-
103.6 in his briefs.
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
which this court reviews de novo." Rosehill Tr. of Linda K.
Rosehill Revocable Tr. Dated Aug. 29, 1989 v. State, 155 Hawaiʻi
41, 49, 556 P.3d 387, 395 (2024) (citation omitted). We are
guided by the following statutory interpretation principles:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
statutory construction is our foremost obligation to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
ambiguity exists.

Id. (citation omitted).

6 HRS § 431:10C-103.6 (2019), entitled "Personal injury protection
benefits tied to prepaid health care plan for description of coverage only,"
provides in pertinent part:

(a) The benefits provided under section 431:10C-103.5 shall
be substantially comparable to the requirements for prepaid
health care plans, as provided in chapter 393 and rules of
the department of labor and industrial relations,
pertaining to the Prepaid Health Care Act. The reference to
the Prepaid Health Care Act is only for purposes of
describing the coverages and exclusions, without regard to
any specific insurer or plan, and shall not be construed to
transfer coverage to the prepaid health care plans.

(Emphasis added.)
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The plain language of the PIP statute, HRS § 431:10C-
103.5(a), does not define or explain the phrase "substantially
comparable to the requirements for prepaid health care plans."
No definition of this phrase is provided in the applicable
definitions section, HRS § 431:10C-103. Contrary to the Circuit
Court's and the Hearings Officer's rulings that the PIP statute
is unambiguous, we conclude there is doubt and uncertainty on
the meaning of "substantially comparable to the requirements for
prepaid health care plans." This ambiguity, however, is readily
resolved by looking to the immediately following statute, HRS §
431-10C-103.6, which specifically cross-references HRS §
431:10C-103.5 and provides explanation for the "substantially
comparable to the requirements for prepaid health care plans"
language. See HRS § 1-16 (2009) ("Laws in pari materia, or upon
the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to
each other" and that "[w]hat is clear in one statute may be
called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.").
HRS § 431:10C-103.6 expressly applies to "[t]he
benefits provided under section 431:10C-103.5." Its title
states that "[PIP] benefits" are "tied to prepaid health care
plan for description of coverage only," and the statutory text
states that PIP benefits "shall be substantially comparable to
the requirements for prepaid health care plans, as provided in
chapter 393 and rules of the department of labor and industrial
relations [(DLIR)], pertaining to the Prepaid Health Care Act."
(Emphasis added.) HRS § 431:10C-103.6 further explains that
"[t]he reference to the Prepaid Health Care Act is only for the
purposes of describing the coverages and exclusions[.]"
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the reference in both HRS §§ 431:10C-
103.5 and 431:10C-103.6 to the prepaid health care plans under

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the Prepaid Health Care Act is "for purposes of describing the
coverages," i.e., what benefits are covered. Construing HRS §§
431:10C-103.5 and 431:10C-103.6 in pari materia, PIP benefits
must be "substantially comparable" to benefits that are required
to be covered under prepaid health care plans "as provided in
chapter 393"7 and DLIR Rules.
Here, the Hearings Officer concluded that LLLT
treatments were not "substantially comparable to the
requirements for prepaid health care plans" based on the
following evidence: exhibits that showed that other prepaid
healthcare plans, such as "Aetna, Cigna, HMSA, Medicare," did
"not cover LLLT treatment"; Shanks's testimony "that he did not
know if LLLT treatment was covered by prepaid health care plans
in Hawaii"; and Dr. Lawinski's testimony that he "has never been
reimbursed charges for LLLT treatment by a prepaid health care
plan." The Hearings Officer determined that Dr. Lawinski "did
not submit any evidence that LLLT treatment is reimbursed by
prepaid health care plans" and therefore "failed to establish"
that the LLLT treatments in this case were "substantially
comparable to the requirements for prepaid health care plans."
The Hearings Officer's mixed finding and conclusion in this
regard was supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.
See Kilakila ʻO Haleakala v. Bd. of Land, 138 Hawaiʻi 383, 396,
382 P.3d 195, 208 (2016) ("A conclusion of law that
presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard because the conclusion is dependent

7 HRS § 393-7(a) (2015) explains the "requirements for prepaid
health care plans" shall include "health care benefits equal to, or medically
reasonably substitutable for, the benefits provided by prepaid health plans
of the same type, . . . which have the largest numbers of subscribers in the
State." This qualification requirement "applies to the types and quantity of
benefits as well as to limitations on reimbursability[.]" Id.
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upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case."
(citation omitted)). Further, where mixed questions of fact and
law are presented, we defer to the agency's expertise and
experience in the particular field and will not substitute our
judgment for that of the agency. Dole Haw. Div.-Castle & Cooke,
Inc. v. Ramil, 71 Haw. 419, 424, 794 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1990).
We conclude the Circuit Court was not wrong in COLs 11
and 13 to affirm the Commissioner's and Hearings Officer's
determination that the LLLT treatments were not PIP benefits
under HRS §431:10C-103.5(a) based on a lack of evidence that
LLLT treatment was substantially comparable to the requirements
for prepaid health care plans. See Schmidt, 104 Hawaiʻi at 264-
65, 88 P.3d at 199-200. The Circuit Court was not wrong to
apply the principle of agency deference in COL 4.8 See id.
(2) Dr. Lawinski challenges COL 12 on grounds that it
relies on Insurer's Exhibits "F" through "L," which should not
have been admitted because the "documents contained hearsay,"
the documents "were not authenticated," and "the authors of the
documents were not available for cross examination."
Commissioner responds that the Hearings Officer was
"permitted to receive the documents into evidence[,]" where
Insurer's Exhibits "F" through "L" consisted of "documents

8 COL 4 in the Circuit Court Order stated:

4. While courts are "free to reverse the agency's decision
if affected by an error of law," the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court
has said that "[w]here both mixed questions of fact and law
are presented, deference will be given to the agency's
expertise and experience in the particular field and the
court should not substitute its own judgment for that of
the agency." Camara v. Agalsud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d
794, 797 (1984); Dole Hawaii division-Castle & Cooke, Inc.
v. Ramil, 71 Haw. 419, 424, 794 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1990).

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relating to whether LLLT is reimbursable by Aetna, Cigna,
Medicare, HMSA, and Kaiser[,]" which all "go directly to the
requirements for prepaid health care plans[.]" Commissioner
also points out that Dr. Lawinski admitted evidence "similar" to
the challenged evidence. Insurer argues that the challenged
exhibits were admissible under Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR)
Rule § 16-201-21(a),9 and the exhibits do not change the fact
that Dr. Lawinski nevertheless "failed to present any evidence
that []LLLT treatments were 'reimbursed by prepaid care
plans[.]'"
The record reflects that Insurer's Exhibits "F"
through "L" consisted of documents from Aetna, Cigna, HSMA,
Medicare, and Kaiser.10 The Hearings Officer's Order pertinently
noted that Dr. Lawinski's Exhibits 48, 49, 50, and 59 were
"similar to [Insurer]'s documents from Aetna, Cigna, and HMSA"
that Dr. Lawinski had "objected to." Based on Insurer's

9 HAR Rule § 16-201-21(a) (1990) provides that "[t]he admissibility
of evidence at the hearing shall not be governed by the laws of evidence and
all relevant oral or documentary evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort
of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct
of serious affairs."
10 Exhibit F was Aetna's 2017 policy stating that Aetna considered
LLLT to be "experimental and investigational"; Exhibit G was Cigna's 2017
policy stating that LLLT was considered "experimental, investigational or
unproven" for "any indication"; Exhibit H was a document that discussed
"infrared therapy devices" and stated that such devices had no "Nationally
Covered Indications"; Exhibit I was a document that stated LLLT therapy was
"considered not reasonable and necessary" and "not payable by Medicare";
Exhibit J was a 2018 HMSA document that discussed "chiropractic services" and
stated "laser therapy . . . d[id] not meet payment determination criteria as
there [wa]s no evidence from published, controlled clinical studies which
demonstrate[d] their efficacy"; Exhibit K was Kaiser Permanente's 2014
"Clinical Review Criteria" for LLLT "for pain," which stated that LLLT did
"not meet the Kaiser Permanente Medical Technology Assessment Criteria";
Exhibit L was a 2017 HMSA document that discussed "physical therapy" and
stated that "laser therapy . . . d[id] not meet payment determination
criteria as there [wa]s no evidence based on published, controlled clinical
studies which demonstrate[d] their efficacy."

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Exhibits "F" through "L," the Hearings Officer found that:
"Aetna, Cigna, and HMSA do not cover LLLT"; and that "Medicare,
arguable [sic] the larges [sic] prepaid health plan, d[id] not
consider LLLT reasonable and necessary and consider[ed] LLLT
procedures non-covered billed under any CPT code[.]" The
Circuit Court concluded in COL 12 that the Hearings Officer's
findings were supported by the record, stating, "The CROA
supports that LLLT treatment has not been approved by Hawaii
prepaid healthcare plans or Medicare that consider it
experimental and investigational."
Dr. Lawinski's arguments tether the challenged
admission of Insurer's Exhibits "F" through "L" as the basis for
the "clearly erroneous" conclusion in COL 12 that LLLT treatment
is "experimental and investigational." Dr. Lawinski points to
the testimony of Shanks and himself that "LLLT is not
experimental or investigational" because it had "FDA
clearances," and that he was denied the opportunity to cross-
examine "the false factual conclusions that LLLT is experimental
and investigational" that were later adopted by the Hearings
Officer and Circuit Court.
"[R]ules of evidence in administrative
hearings, unlike those applicable to judicial proceedings, allow
admission of hearsay evidence." Price v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals
of City & County of Honolulu, 77 Hawaiʻi 168, 176, 883 P.2d 629,
637 (1994) (citation omitted).
Here, Insurer's Exhibits "F" through "L" consisted of
copies of various prepaid health care plans' coverage policies
regarding LLLT. Hearsay evidence is permissible in
administrative hearings. See id. The policies in the
challenged exhibits were relevant because the disputed issue was

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whether LLLT treatments were "substantially comparable to the
requirements of prepaid healthcare plans," i.e., whether LLLT
treatment was a covered benefit under prepaid health care plans.
The Hearings Officer did not err in admitting them. See HAR
Rule § 16-201-21(a).
Even assuming arguendo the "experimental or
investigational" language in the Circuit Court's COL 12 was
error, Dr. Lawinski has not shown prejudice resulting from the
exhibits' admission, where Dr. Lawinski admitted similar
exhibits into evidence, and where the Hearings Officer
determined that Dr. Lawinski "did not submit any evidence that
LLLT treatment is reimbursed by prepaid health care plans." See
S. Foods Grp., L.P. v. State, Dep't of Educ., 89 Hawaiʻi 443,
453, 974 P.2d 1033, 1043 (1999) (to reverse or modify an agency
decision under HRS § 91-14(g), "the appellate court must
conclude that an appellant's substantial rights were prejudiced
by the agency" (citation omitted)). The Circuit Court's
conclusion in COL 11, that Dr. Lawinski "failed to present any
evidence establishing that LLLT therapy are [sic] substantially
comparable to the requirement for prepaid health care plans" was
dispositive and correct. See Schmidt, 104 Hawaiʻi at 264-65, 88
P.3d at 199-200.
(3) Dr. Lawinski argues that he should be awarded
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses "for his successful
prosecution of this matter" because "the statute is clear that
[Dr. Lawinski] will be entitled to all of the costs and fees
which he has incurred in this matter," "[w]hen this Court rules
that Erchonia LLLT is a reimbursable PIP benefit[.]"
While the Circuit Court Order did not expressly
address attorney's fees and costs, the Commissioner's Final

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Order ordered the parties to bear their own attorney's fees and
costs. In light of our resolution, Dr. Lawinski's contention
lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the March 20,
2023 Circuit Court Order and December 19, 2023 Final Judgment
entered by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, February 13, 2026.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Leslie K. Iczkovitz,
Chief Judge
for Appellant-Provider-
Appellant.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Associate Judge
Andrew I. Kim,
Deputy Attorney General
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Appellee-Appellee Scott
Associate Judge
Saiki, Insurance Commissioner,
Department of Commerce and
Consumer Affairs, State of
Hawai‘i.

Keith K. Kato,
for Appellee-Respondent-
Appellee United Services
Automobile Association.