East Vernon Heights Association, Inc. v. Cobie Brewster

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1155
Filed August 21, 2024

EAST VERNON HEIGHTS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

COBIE BREWSTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Lars G. Anderson

(order granting summary judgment), Andrew Chappel (order quieting title), and

Chad Kepros (order denying motion to reconsider), Judges.

Appellant appeals the district court order granting summary judgment on a

quiet title action. AFFIRMED.

Cobie Brewster, Cedar Rapids, self-represented appellant.

Steven C. Leidinger of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Cobie Brewster appeals the district court ruling that denied reconsideration

of the order granting East Vernon Heights Association, Inc.’s motion for summary

judgment on their quiet title action. The district court granted summary judgment

after Brewster failed to file a resistance to the summary judgment motion. Brewster

argues the court should have granted him additional time to respond due to his

lack of understanding of Iowa law, disability, and inexperience with the Iowa court

system, specifically the Electronic Data Management System (EDMS).

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

The East Vernon Condominium Association is a non-profit corporation that

exists as the owner’s association. The Association includes both residential units,

common elements, and limited common elements. Each residential unit owner is

a mandatory member of the association.

Established in 1974, the “Declaration of Condominium for East Vernon

Heights” established garages as “limited common elements to be reserved for the

use of a particular Residence Unit from time to time.” The fifth amendment filed of

record in March 1984, provided:

After assignment by the Developers to an owner or owners of a
Residence Unit, the right to use a garage shall be an appurtenance
to said Residence Unit. As to such garage, a unit owner may only:
(a) transfer the right to use such garage to a purchaser, lessee,
donee, or legatee (or heirs at law) of his unit, (b) transfer the right to
use said garage to another unit owner, or relinquish the right to use
said garage to the association.

Article IV of the declaration sets out the interests of residents in common elements:

The owner of each Residence Unit shall also own as an
appurtenance thereto an undivided one-twelfth interest and share in
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A. The lands and other common elements of the regime, both
limited and general[,] . . . notwithstanding any exclusive right of use
of any limited common element which may be appurtenant to a
particular Residence Unit.

In other words, no individual owner of a residential unit owns a garage.

Rather, the unit owner has a right to use a garage, which like other common

elements, is owned collectively.

On June 8, 2017, the Linn County treasurer purportedly transferred

ownership of Garage N-8 to Home Investors 124, LC. On the same day, the Linn

County Treasurer purportedly transferred ownership of Garage N-12 to OHP 160,

LC. Both garages were transferred pursuant to a tax sale deed. Neither Home

Investors 124 LC nor OHP 160 LC owned a unit at the time of the transfer. In

2021, Brewster received quitclaim deeds for the two garages, N-8 and N-12, from

Home Investors 124 LC and OHP 160, LC, respectively. Brewster has never

owned a residential unit in the Association.

The Association brought this action to quiet title as to the garages against

Brewster. Brewster registered for EDMS early in the case proceedings. In its quiet

title action, the Association argued Brewster’s possession of the garages was

unauthorized under the Condominium’s declaration. The Association moved for

summary judgment. Despite a notification regarding a required response from

Brewster, he did not file a resistance to the summary judgment motion. The district

court, relying on the unresisted facts set out by the Association, granted the motion

for summary judgment. In the subsequent order quieting title, the court stated, “On

June 16, 2023, this Court entered an Order granting Petitioner’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment, as unresisted, with entry of judgment consistent with the relief

sought in the Petition and Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment to follow.”

Brewster subsequently filed an unspecified motion, which the court treated

as a motion to reconsider. Brewster argued he was not notified of the motion for

summary judgment. The court denied Brewster’s motion. Brewster appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Although actions to quiet title are in equity and reviewable de novo, we

review the court’s order for summary judgment for correction of errors at law.

Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1981).

III. Discussion

Brewster argues the district court erred in granting the Association’s motion

for summary judgment because he had “no knowledge, no insight on Iowa law

procedures[,] . . . no counsel preparing him for Iowa procedures, processes, or its

e-filing system.”

Brewster represented himself for the proceedings. In considering the

arguments of an unrepresented party “[w]e do not utilize a deferential standard

when persons choose to represent themselves.” Metro. Jacobson Dev. Venture

v. Bd. of Rev. of Des Moines, 476 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). Further

“[t]he law does not judge by two standards, one for lawyers and the other for lay

persons. Rather, all are expected to act with equal competence. If lay persons

choose to proceed pro se, they do so at their own risk.” Id. Because of this, we

consider Brewster’s arguments with the same scrutiny whether he had legal

representation or not. See id.
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Brewster primarily argues that he did not know Iowa’s procedure, but

Brewster “acted as his own lawyer and knowingly took on the risks associated with

pro se representation.” State v. Johnson, 756 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Iowa 2008). And

Brewster is a registered user of EDMS and received notice of the Association’s

motion under the Iowa Rules. Iowa Rule of Electronic Procedure 16.315(1)(b)

states:

When a document is electronically filed, EDMS serves the document
on all parties who are registered filers. Service occurs by the posting
of a notice of electronic filing or presentation into the filer’s EDMS
account along with a link to the document or documents presented
or filed. The posting of the notice of electronic filing or presentation
constitutes service of the document for purposes of the Iowa Court
Rules. No other service on those parties is required.

After the summary judgment motion was filed, Brewster was informed that

“[i]f no resistance is filed within fifteen days from the time when a copy of the motion

was served, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the Motion for Summary

Judgment may be granted without further notice to the parties.”

Summary judgment is warranted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Banwart v. 50th St. Sports, L.L.C., 910

N.W.2d 540, 544 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). There is a

genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on how the issue

should be resolved, and “[a] fact is material when it might affect the outcome of a

lawsuit.” Id. It is the burden of the moving party to show summary judgment is

appropriate, but “the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations of

his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine
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issue for trial.” Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Iowa 2005). Even still, “[a]

failure to file a resistance to a motion for summary judgment . . . is fatal only if the

movant has sustained its burden of proof.” In re Eickman’s Est., 291

N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 1980).

Brewster never filed a resistance to the Association’s motion for summary

judgment. The district court relied on the record, which shows that the Declaration

of Condominium established the garages as limited common elements and

restricted their transfer. The condominium was also established under the Iowa

Code chapter 499B, which includes sections governing common elements. Iowa

Code § 499B.7 (2023). This section states:

Any conveyance, encumbrance, lien, alienation, or devise of an
apartment under a horizontal property regime by any instrument
which describes the land and apartment as set forth in
section 499B.4 shall also convey, encumber, alienate, devise, or be
a lien upon the fractional or percentage interest appurtenant to each
such apartment under section 499B.4, subsection 6, to the general
common elements, and the respective share or percentage interest
to limited common elements where applicable, whether such general
common elements or limited common elements are described as in
section 499B.4, subsections 4 and 5, by general reference only, or
not at all.

Brewster presented no evidence to create a question of fact here. See

Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 549 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Iowa 1996) (“The party

resisting a motion for summary judgment must set forth specific facts to support

the claim and ‘[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’”

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))). And on

appeal, Brewster only argues that he should be given different treatment than an

attorney, given his self-represented litigant status. Although, “the failure to file a
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timely resistance, standing alone, is not sufficient reason to grant summary

judgment,” the Association laid out sufficient facts for summary judgment that the

district court adopted. Watson-Boehmer v. City of Winterset, No. 00-0196, 2001

WL 427340, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2001) (“If no resistance is filed, the party

takes the risk of standing on the record established by the moving party.”). The

district court properly granted summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.