State of Iowa v. Jamarrion James Davis

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1783
Filed December 4, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMARRION JAMES DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt J. Stoebe,

Judge.

Jamarrion James Davis appeals his conviction for first-degree murder.

AFFIRMED.

Matthew B. De Jong, Rochester, Minnesota, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Jamarrion James Davis appeals after a jury found him guilty of first-degree

murder. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as the

person who shot and killed the victim. He also challenges the admissibility of a

phone conversation recorded from jail and evidence of a possible motive. Because

substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict and the district court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, we affirm Davis’s conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On the evening of July 4, 2023, Jameel Redding-Pettigrew walked by a

cookout that his cousin was attending at a house in Fort Dodge. When his cousin

saw him, she called Jameel over and offered him some food. The two had a short

conversation before Jameel left.

Davis, who was also at the cookout, watched from the porch while Jameel

and his cousin talked. When Jameel left, Davis put on a hoodie and started off in

the direction Jameel was heading. Davis’s girlfriend stopped Davis and spoke to

him briefly. As Davis ran down an alley with his hand on the waistband of his

pants, his girlfriend returned to the house looking “spooked” and went upstairs. A

short time later, six gunshots rang out as someone shot Jameel two blocks away.

Jameel died at the scene.

About twenty minutes later, Davis returned to the house. He entered

through the backdoor, which was unusual. One guest described Davis as “[f]rantic,

out of breath, [and] soaking wet.” Jameel’s cousin thought Davis looked “lost,” and

Davis did not respond to his name. Davis went upstairs and joined his girlfriend in

her bedroom before her mother asked him to leave. When law enforcement
3

searched the home later that night, a spent bullet casing was recovered in one of

the rooms.

Law enforcement found Davis at a friend’s apartment two days later. Davis

fled but was caught and arrested. Officers found Davis’s gun inside the apartment.

Forensic tests matched the gun to spent casings recovered from the shooting.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Davis first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction. We review claims of insufficient evidence for correction of errors at

law. State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). We affirm if substantial

evidence supports the jury’s verdicts. Id. Evidence is substantial if it would

“convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (citation omitted). When determining whether substantial evidence supports

the verdicts, we view the evidence and all legitimate inferences and presumptions

it supports it in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

Davis contends there is insufficient evidence that he shot Jameel. He

argues that he does not match the description of the shooter given by the only

eyewitness to the shooting. He also argues that his whereabouts at the time of the

shooting were never confirmed. Finally, Davis claims there is insufficient forensic

evidence to tie him to the shooting because there is no fingerprint or DNA evidence

tying him to the gun and no blood on the pants he was wearing on the night of the

shooting.

Substantial evidence supports the finding that Davis shot Jameel.

Witnesses saw Davis leave the cookout immediately after Jameel and run down

an alley in the direction that Jameel was heading. A short time later, six gunshots
4

were fired. Several people saw Davis with a firearm that day. Davis carried the

gun in the waistband of his pants, and he was holding onto his waist as he ran

down the alley. When Davis returned to the house after the shooting, he was

unresponsive, appeared frantic, and was out of breath. Uncharacteristically, he

entered the house through the back door. A spent casing was found in the house

on the night of the shooting, and Davis’s firearm was matched to Jameel’s

shooting. Although there may be gaps in the evidence or evidence that contradicts

the State’s theory, questions about weight and credibility of the evidence are for

the jury to decide. See State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Iowa 2005) (holding

that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt, “[i]t is not

the province of the court . . . to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the

credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh

the evidence; such matters are for the jury. Any inconsistencies in the testimony

of a defense witness are for the jury’s consideration, and do not justify a court’s

usurpation of the factfinding function of the jury.” (cleaned up)). When the

evidence and inferences drawn from it are viewed in the light most favorable to the

State, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

III. Evidentiary Rulings.

Davis also challenges two evidentiary rulings. We review evidentiary rulings

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2022).

The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts for reasons not supported by

substantial evidence or when it erroneously applies the law. State v. Gomez

Garcia, 904 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2017).
5

A. Recorded Phone Call.

Davis first challenges the admissibility of a recorded phone call he made

while in jail. During the call, Davis describes the testimony his friends need to

provide for his acquittal. The subject of that testimony is Davis’s whereabouts at

8:00 p.m. on July 4 and during a phone call about the shooting. Davis supplies the

“truthful” answers he expects his friends to give during their testimony.

Davis contends the recorded call is inadmissible because it is irrelevant.

See Iowa R. Evid. 5.402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). Evidence is

relevant if it tends to “make a fact more or less probable than it would be without

the evidence” and “is of consequence in determining the action.” Iowa R.

Evid. 5.401. Whether evidence is relevant “is a legal question lying within the

broad discretion of the trial court,” State v. Canady, 4 N.W.3d 661, 669 (Iowa 2024)

(citation omitted), reh’g denied (Apr. 24, 2024), and “a relatively low bar,” Thoren,

970 N.W.2d at 622 (citation omitted).

The State argues that the recording is relevant to Davis’s identity as the

shooter because it shows that Davis told his friends to lie about his whereabouts

at the time of the shooting. The evidence is relevant for this purpose. See State

v. Stufflebeam, 260 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Iowa 1977) (“An attempt by a party to

improperly, even illegally, influence a witness is thought to be an admission by

conduct. Such an admission does have independent probative value on the issue

to be tried.”). Davis disputes the State’s characterization of the call, instead

claiming that the purpose was merely to inform his friends what his attorney would

ask if they testified. Although Davis’s words on the recording are undisputed, the

inferences that can be drawn from them are open to interpretation and thus are a
6

question of fact for the jury. See State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 348, 349 (Iowa 1979)

(“When the testimony is disputed or, if undisputed, when different inferences may

be drawn from it, the question is one of fact for the jury.”).

Davis also claims that any probative value is outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 (“The court may exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,

undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). He

argues that the evidence caused the jury to question why his friends did not testify

and shifted the focus away from the State proving the elements of murder beyond

a reasonable doubt by creating an expectation that he would provide an alibi

defense. Davis also claims that the evidence allowed the State to rebut an alibi

that was never presented to the jury.

We use a two-part test in deciding whether to exclude relevant evidence

under rule 5.403. See Thoren, 970 N.W.2d at 622. We first consider the probative

value of the evidence. See id. We then balance the probative value against the

danger of its prejudicial or wrongful effect on the jury. See id. Because this test is

not an exact science, “we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge who must

make this judgment call.” State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2021)

(citation omitted). Our supreme court has cautioned that we should use rule 5.403

“sparingly.” State v. Buelow, 951 N.W.2d 879, 889 (Iowa 2020).

We have already determined that the recording of the phone call is relevant

and probative to the question of Davis’s identity as the shooter, the fighting issue

at trial. Davis’s concern that the evidence would cause the jury to misplace the
7

burden of proof is alleviated by the jury instructions, which firmly place that burden

on the State. See State v. Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Iowa 2020) (“We presume

juries follow the court's instructions.” (citation omitted)). The district court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting the recording of the phone call into evidence.

B. Motive Evidence.

Davis also challenges the admissibility of evidence of his possible motive

for shooting Jameel. At trial, one of the officers investigating Jameel’s death

testified that Jameel’s brother, DJ, was charged with first-degree murder for killing

Patrick Walker in 2023. The officer testified that Davis and Walker were connected

because they were “in the same age group,” shared “the same friends circle,” and

“lived next to each other” at one point. Davis claims the officer overstated the

relationship between Davis and Walker, so any relevance is minimal and

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This mirrors the argument that

Davis’s attorney made to the court in a discussion outside the jury’s presence:

I don’t—I don’t believe that they’re going to have much evidence on
that in terms—other than terms of just people saying, yeah, they
were friends, something along [those] lines. I don’t think there’s any
exhibits that they’ve proposed that show the nature and quality of
that relationship. I just think that it’s—on the balance that they
haven’t done enough to show that there’s a connection there to argue
that that’s a motive for a defense.

The prosecutor disagreed:

[W]e’re not just pulling DJ Pettigrew’s case out of thin air in this case
or just trying to relate it back to this. The State anticipates, and
expects testimony from law enforcement, that the defendant and the
deceased from the May ’23 murder, Patrick Walker, were very close.
They are the same age, and that they used to be next door
neighbors. That they are close. More importantly the State
anticipates testimony from one of its witnesses that on the 4th of July,
on the night of this case, when the decedent, Jameel Redding-
Pettigrew, came up to the porch where the defendant was located,
8

an individual identified him as “DJ’s little brother,”[1] and that that’s
what sparked the rest of the events on the 4th of July.
That statement is very relevant and brings in this case.
“That’s DJ’s little brother” is what the State believes helped move
forward the events of when the defendant went forward and
committed the acts that the State has accused him of. Because of
that, the May 2023 murder of Patrick Walker in which DJ Pettigrew,
the older brother of Jameel Redding-Pettigrew, is charged with
murder in the first degree of the defendant’s friend is relevant and
available for the State to address in front of the jury.

Although the State need not prove motive as an element of first-degree

murder, motive is relevant to the element of premeditation. See State v.

Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2003) (stating that the premeditation

element of murder may be shown by evidence of “motive based on the relationship

between the defendant and the victim”). A defendant’s relationship with the victim

may also be relevant to the element of malice aforethought. See id. at 49 (noting

the difficulty in proving a defendant’s state of mind and stating that “[e]vidence of

bad feelings or quarrels between the defendant and the victim are circumstances

that may be used to support a finding of malice aforethought”). At trial, Davis’s

attorney conceded the evidence is relevant and “obviously . . . something that the

State is allowed to talk about.”

Davis then contends the probative value is outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, claiming that the officer overstated the strength of his connection

to Walker or his motivation for revenge. Davis argues the evidence does not show

that he harassed or made inappropriate or suspicious statements about Jameel.

Davis further argues that there is no direct evidence of his friendship with Walker

to justify a revenge killing.

1 Witness testimony bore this out.
9

The State presented circumstantial evidence of a relationship between

Davis and Walker through the officer’s testimony that the two were the same age,

in the same circle of friends, and once lived next door to each other. “Whether the

necessary minimum level of logical connection between the offered evidence and

the fact to be proven exists is a legal question lying within the broad discretion of

the trial court.” Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 407 (citation omitted). The

circumstantial evidence showing the connection between Davis and Walker

crosses that threshold. Davis had the opportunity to attack that evidence during

cross-examination and argue its weakness during closing argument. See id. at

408 (noting that objections that go to the weight of the evidence do not justify

excluding the evidence); State v. Metcalf, 260 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Iowa 1977) (“[T]he

choice between inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence is peculiarly

the province of the jury.”).

Assuming the evidence has low probative value, the court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting it unless Davis shows a likelihood that he was unfairly

prejudiced by it. See Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 408 (“The relevant inquiry is not

whether the evidence is prejudicial or inherently prejudicial but whether the

evidence is unfairly prejudicial.”); State v. Baker, 135 N.W. 1097, 1102 (Iowa 1912)

(“While the materiality of this evidence is not very apparent, it is impossible to draw

any reasonable inference of prejudice therefrom.”). “All relevant evidence is

inherently prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to the opposing party’s

case.” Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 408 (cleaned up). Evidence is unfairly

prejudicial if it “appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,

provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action that
10

may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established

propositions in the case.” State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 242–43 (Iowa 2015)

(citation omitted). Although the motive evidence may have been prejudicial, Davis

has not shown that the evidence here was unfairly so. The district court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting it.

AFFIRMED.