Rodney Fitzgerald Jackson v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0834
Filed December 18, 2024

RODNEY FITZGERALD JACKSON,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Tod Deck, Judge.

Rodney Jackson appeals from an order granting summary disposition of his

application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

Rodney Jackson appeals the summary disposition order denying his

application for postconviction relief (PCR) following the State’s motion for summary

judgment. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

Jackson pled guilty to serious assault, a serious misdemeanor, for

physically attacking a woman after the two exited a public bus. Jackson filed an

appeal but voluntarily dismissed that appeal.

He later brought a PCR action claiming he pled guilty under duress and was

actually innocent. The PCR court denied his application. He appealed, and a

panel of court affirmed. See generally Jackson v. State, No. 21-0140, 2022 WL

951191 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022). The panel did not reach the merits of

Jackson’s duress claim, concluding that he should have brought his duress claim

through a motion in arrest of judgment or explained why he failed to do so as he

did not claim that his plea counsel was ineffective. Id. at *1–2. The panel also

rejected his actual-innocence claim. Id. at *2.

Jackson then initiated this PCR action.1 In his pro se application, Jackson

claimed his “appointed counsel deprived [him] of his constitutional rights under the

14th Amendment equal protection clause where the appointed counsel allowed

[him] to waive his rights. Appointed counsel failed to file an arrest[] of judgment.”

He stated that he “believe[d] that this appointed counsel action was ineffective

1 Jackson initiated another PCR action prior to the instant action, but it was
dismissed less than a month later because Jackson failed to identify the underlying
criminal file.
3

assistance of counsel.” The PCR application form prompted Jackson to provide

“[f]acts supporting [the] application within [his] personal knowledge.” The form also

prompted Jackson to list “documents, exhibits, affidavits, records, or other

evidence supporting this application [that] are attached to the application.” In

response to both prompts, Jackson wrote down “see case # SRCR 105206”—the

case number of the underlying criminal proceedings.

The State filed a motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on the

motion, Jackson’s counsel clarified that Jackson intended to claim that his first

PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his plea counsel was

ineffective. The PCR court then permitted Jackson’s counsel to question him.

Counsel inquired, “[D]o you want to at this stage answer some of my questions . . .

as to what your claims are ultimately going to be?” Jackson responded, “Later

because I’m not prepared for it.”

The PCR court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. Jackson

appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We typically review the summary disposition of PCR applications for legal

error. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). “However, our review is

de novo when the basis for [PCR] implicates a constitutional violation.” Id. And

“PCR applications alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raise a constitutional

claim.” Id.

III. Discussion

A PCR court “may grant a motion . . . for summary disposition . . . , when it

appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
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admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa Code § 822.6 (2022). This language is

consistent with Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981, which governs motions for

summary judgment in a civil proceeding. Accordingly, “[w]e apply our summary

judgment standards to summary disposition of [PCR] applications.” Linn, 929

N.W.2d at 730 (quoting Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018)).

Once an application for summary disposition is made, the resisting “party

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but the

response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). This

requires the resisting party “to go beyond generalities” and provide “specific facts[,]

which constitute competent evidence showing a prima facie claim.” Feeback v.

Swift Pork Co., 988 N.W.2d 340, 348 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Slaughter v. Des Moines

Univ. Coll. Of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 808 (Iowa 2019)).

With these standards in mind, we turn our focus to Jackson’s PCR action.

His PCR application broadly asserted that “counsel was ineffective.” Ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claims require the applicant to establish (1) that counsel

breached an essential duty by a preponderance of the evidence and (2) that

prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The

applicant must be able to establish both elements to be successful. Id.

First, we note that Jackson’s application made no mention of his first PCR

counsel or claimed that first PCR counsel was ineffective. However, he clarified at

the hearing that he intended to claim that first PCR counsel was ineffective. Yet
5

Jackson never provided any specific facts or evidence that could support either

element of an ineffective-assistance claim. When given an opportunity to verbally

identify his specific claims, Jackson could not. He stated that he was “not

prepared” to do so.

Second, while Jackson urges us to consider his PCR application as an

affidavit sufficient to generate a question of material fact because he “certif[ied]

under pains and penalty of perjury and pursuant to the laws of the State of Iowa

that the information [he] provided in th[e] application is true and correct,” it does

not generate a material fact question. The application only contained Jackson’s

broad assertion of ineffective assistance and notations to “see case # SRCR

105206.” It does not identify any specific evidence or specific facts to support his

claim. It is not the job of the PCR court or this court to comb the record of Jackson’s

criminal case file in search of facts or evidence to support his claim. That is his

responsibility as the PCR applicant.

Jackson argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present facts

and evidence to establish his ineffective-assistance claim. But he had that

opportunity following the State’s motion. “Summary judgment is not a dress

rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a

nonmoving party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of

fact to accept its version of the events.” Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 348 (cleaned up).

Jackson simply failed to avail himself of the opportunity. As such, there is no

evidence supporting Jackson’s claim to generate a fact question and overcome

the motion for summary judgment.
6

IV. Conclusion

Because Jackson presented no evidence to generate a question of material

fact, the PCR court correctly granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and

entered summary disposition denying Jackson’s PCR application. We have given

due consideration to all of Jackson’s appellate arguments, including those not

specifically discussed herein, and find them to be without merit.2 We affirm the

PCR court’s entry of summary disposition denying Jackson’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.

2 We note that the extent that Jackson tries to raise an actual-innocence claim in

his appellate brief, this court previously rejected Jackson’s actual-innocence claim.
Jackson, 2022 WL 951191, at *2.