State of Iowa v. Joshua Kelly Uranga

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1001
Filed July 2, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOSHUA KELLY URANGA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Bethany Currie,

Judge.

A sex offender appeals his conviction for violation of sex offender registry

requirement. AFFIRMED.

Alexander Smith (argued) of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino (argued),

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
2

SANDY, Judge.

Joshua Uranga appeals his conviction for violation of sex offender registry

requirements, a class “D” felony, pursuant to Iowa Code sections 692A.103, .105,

and .111 (2021). Uranga argues there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction and that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State

had to prove that Uranga stayed away from his principal residence for more than

five days. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Uranga is a registered sex offender who is required to register as such

under chapter 692A. Around September 2021, local authorities in Boone began

to suspect that Uranga was not living at his registered address. Deputy Dan Ruter

and other officers unsuccessfully attempted to locate Uranga at his residence

between the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. approximately five to ten times

between September and November. Uranga was unemployed. Uranga and his

friend Jodi Cory testified that he was taking care of his grandmother at her property

and was there for most of the day. They testified he would only return to his

residence after 10:30 p.m.

Deputy Ruter testified that he served and executed a search warrant on

November 17. After searching the property, he found no signs that Uranga had

been living there and could not find any personal property belonging to Uranga.

He stated that the residence and items inside were covered in dust, and it did not

appear as if anyone had been living there. When asked what he looks for to

determine whether someone is living at a residence he stated, “[a]nything you can

imagine. I mean, toiletries, cell phone chargers, pillows, blankets, you know,
3

anything to indicate that he’d been sleeping or living there. Clothing, things of that

nature.” When asked if he found anything to indicate Uranga had been living there

he responded, “No.” Uranga was evicted from his registered address on

November 18 but contends that he was aware of the eviction proceedings before

then and that he and his mother had begun moving everything out before the

official eviction notice.

Uranga reported a new residence—in person—to the Boone County Sheriff

on the 30th of November. He reported the start date as November 19. The Boone

County Sheriff filed a criminal complaint that same day. The State filed a trial

information charging Uranga with two counts of violation of the sex offender

registration requirements. The trial information was later amended to remove the

second count. At trial, the State argued that Uranga was not living at his listed

residence prior to the formal eviction but, even if he was, Uranga’s appearance at

the sheriff’s office on the 30th of November was more than five business days

since his November 18th eviction constituting the change in his residency. Uranga

however contended that he was living at his principal residence until November

18, and he did not obtain new lodging until November 19. Thus, Uranga contends

the change in his residency was the 19th of November. Such distinction is the

difference between conviction or acquittal as will be explained below.

During trial, Uranga moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the

State’s evidence, which the district court denied. Uranga renewed the motion on

close of defense’s evidence, and the district court again denied the motion. The

jury found Uranga guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Uranga to a term

of five years, with the sentence fully suspended.
4

Uranga now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review sufficiency of the evidence and questions of statutory

interpretation for errors at law. State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666

(Iowa 2018). “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether

the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” State v.

Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). “[S]ubstantial evidence exists

when the evidence would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d at 666 (cleaned up).

Jury instructions are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Ross,

986 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Iowa 2023). “Jury instructions are considered as a whole

to determine their accuracy and are judged in context, not in isolation . . . .” Id.

(cleaned up).

III. Discussion

Uranga argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and

that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had to prove

that Uranga stayed away from his principal residence for more than five days.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Uranga challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in two ways, first arguing

that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him as charged, and

second, that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him under Iowa

Code section 692A.105.

Uranga first contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for violating the sex offender registration requirements. For the State to
5

prevail they needed to prove that on or around November 17 to November 29,

2021: (1) “Uranga was required to register as a sex offender”; (2) “Uranga resided

in Boone County, Iowa”; (3) “Uranga changed his location from his principal

residence”; (4) “Uranga failed to appear in person to notify the Boone County

sheriff that he changed his location from his principal residence within five business

days of the change”; and (5) “Uranga knew or reasonably should have known he

was required to appear and register before November 30, 2021.” To determine

when the five-business day registration has passed, Iowa Code section 4.1(34)

states that “in computing time, the first day shall be excluded and the last included.”

Uranga does not contest that the State established the first, second, third,

and fifth elements. There is no dispute that Uranga was required to register as a

sex offender, he resided in Boone County, or that he changed his location from his

principal residence. And Uranga himself testified that he was aware of the

registration requirements to which he was required to adhere. The only element

that is disputed between the parties is that Uranga failed to appear in person within

five business days of a change occurring.

Uranga’s primary argument in support of his claim that the State presented

insufficient evidence is that the required “change” of his location did not occur on

November 18 as the State alleged. He argues he moved to his new principal

residence on November 19, and thus, the five-business-day countdown began on

November 22 (the first business day following his November 19 “change”). But

under section 692A.101(5), “change” means to “add, begin, or terminate.”

(Emphasis added.) As our supreme court clarified in Coleman v. State, the

registration requirement mandates that a sex offender report his or her location
6

within five business days of a “change”—which can occur at the beginning of a

new residence or at the termination of an old one. See 907 N.W.2d 124, 133–34

(Iowa 2018). So even if we accepted Uranga’s theory that November 19 was a

“change” date due to his new move-in, November 18 would also be a “change”

date due to the termination of his residence. The marshaling instruction simply

requires the jury to determine the date he “changed his location.” The termination

of his residence would be a change in his location.

And overwhelming evidence was presented showing Uranga’s residence

terminated on or before November 18. In addition to his eviction and Deputy

Ruter’s testimony, Patrick Fairchild testified that he was living on the property with

Uranga and did not see him on the property the week before the search warrant

was executed. Fairchild also testified that the items that were still in the house

such as clothes, towels, and toiletries were his and not Uranga’s. He testified that

Uranga did not keep many personal items at the residence and would take

whatever he brought elsewhere the next day. He also confirmed that the mess

that was found when the search warrant was executed had been there prior to

Uranga living there. Uranga countered asserting that the lack of personal items

was because of the impending eviction, or that the items were his and not

Fairchild’s.

And Uranga’s own testimony supported a conclusion that he changed his

principal residence on the 18th of November as well. For example, Uranga

testified that he and his mother were in the process of moving out and had packed

up most of their belongings prior to the eighteenth. They spent the entire night of
7

the seventeenth packing up after the search warrant was served, and on the

eighteenth, there wasn’t anything left because they had moved it all.

Uranga further testified that he did not want to go back to the residence after

the eviction. Once the November 18th eviction hearing concluded he never

returned. He also testified that on the night of the eighteenth he began staying

with a friend at the Pinnacle apartments—the address of which he later registered

with the sheriff. Uranga—through his own testimony—established that the last day

he lived at his former principal residence was the eighteenth, making it the first day

of the change and excluded from the five-business-day countdown.

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Uranga violated the sex

offender registry requirements. A reasonable fact finder, based off the evidence

presented, testimony heard, and reasonable inferences made could have found,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Uranga changed residence prior to

November 19th and was in violation of the five-day-registration requirement.

Uranga contends, in his second sufficiency argument, that he could not

have been convicted under Iowa Code section 692A.105 because that section

pertains to changes in temporary lodging rather than changes in a permanent

residence covered under section 692A.104. Because the State alleged that he

changed his permanent residence and did not charge him with violating

section 692A.104, he argues the State could not convict him under

section 692A.105, which he argues is not triggered by a change of permanent

residence.

But Uranga misreads section 692A.105. Section 692A.105 concerns the

same “changes” contemplated by section 692A.104. Let us begin by looking at
8

the pertinent portion of section 692A.104, which we will analyze as they would

relate to Uranga:

2. A sex offender shall, within five business days of changing
a residence, employment, or attendance as a student, appear in
person to notify the sheriff of each county where a change has
occurred.
3. A sex offender shall, within five business days of a change
in relevant information, other than relevant information enumerated
in subsection 2, notify the sheriff of the county where the principal
residence of the offender is maintained about the change to the
relevant information. The department shall establish by rule what
constitutes proper notification under this subsection.

Under these subsections, there are two “change” dates that may be relevant to

Uranga for the purpose of determining the date of a potential violation—first, the

date on which he terminates his residence, and second, the date on which he

begins his new residence. See Iowa Code § 692.101(5) (defining “change” to

mean “add, begin, or terminate”). But what of transient habitation with no new

principal place in sight? That is where section 692A.105 enters:

In addition to the registration provisions specified in
section 692A.104, a sex offender, within five business days of a
change, shall also appear in person to notify the sheriff of the county
of principal residence, of any location in which the offender is staying
when away from the principal residence of the offender for more than
five days . . . .

Under this section, a sex offender who was evicted from their residence but does

not immediately establish a new residence must meet multiple reporting

requirements.1 See id. The sex offender must report, within five business days,

1 We primarily entertain a scenario that applies to Uranga. There are numerous
other ways to trigger a section 692A.105, such as when a sex offender’s primary
residence does not terminate, but he stays in a different temporary location for
more than five days.
9

both (1) the termination of his old residence and (2) his current transitory location,

if he has been at such transitory location for more than five days.

As our supreme court stated in Coleman, “we read statutes as a whole

rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation.” 907 N.W.2d at 136 (cleaned

up). Section 692A.105 expressly sets forth that the sex offender must adhere to

section 692A.104 to be in compliance with section 692A.105. See Iowa Code

§ 692A.105 (requiring the offender to comply with “the registration provisions

specified in section 692A.104”). And section 692A.105’s use of “change” is the

same as section 692A.104’s “change” relative to the five-business-day countdown.

Thus, Uranga’s termination of residence triggered a change under

section 692A.105 just as it would have under section 692A.104—temporary or

permanent.

Accordingly, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to convict

Uranga as charged and find no error in the district court’s entry of judgment on the

jury verdict finding Uranga guilty of a violation under Iowa Code section 692A.105.

B. Jury Instruction

In a similar vein to his second sufficiency argument, Uranga contends that

the district court erred in instructing the jury that he could be convicted if he failed

to notify the sheriff that he “changed his location from his principal residence within

five business days.” He argues that the instruction should have instead instructed

the jury that he could be convicted if he failed to notify the sheriff that he “stay[ed]

away from the principal residence for more than five days.”

Indeed, section 692A.105 requires the sex offender to notify the sheriff “of

any location in which the offender is staying when away from the principal
10

residence of the offender for more than five days.” But section 692A.105 also

requires the sex offender “to notify the sheriff” “within five business days of a

change” under section 692A.104. As detailed above, there is no difference

between section 692A.105’s use of “change” and 692A.104’s use. And our

supreme court has held that the requirement that a sex offender “make notification

of his absence when he changes his location from his principal residence,

reasonably construes the statute in a way that is consistent with the legislature's

purpose and intent.” Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 136.

And in Uranga’s situation, the termination of his permanent residence was

the first “change” relevant to compliance under section 692A.105. Again, similar

to his sufficiency arguments, Uranga tries to negate his eviction change with a later

new residence change. He provides no citation to case law standing for the

proposition that a sex offender may fail to report residency changes when multiple

changes occur within a short period. To the contrary, “[t]he purpose of the registry

is protection of the health and safety of individuals, and particularly children, from

individuals who, by virtue of probation, parole, or other release, have been given

access to members of the public.” Id. (citation omitted).

The district court did not err in its instructions to the jury. We therefore affirm

the district court in all respects.

AFFIRMED.