Guardianship of Nicolas R. Aragon Jr. and Regina Ward v. MidAmerican Energy Company and Blattner Energy, LLC.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1066
Filed November 13, 2025

GUARDIANSHIP OF NICOLAS R. ARAGON JR. and REGINA WARD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY and BLATTNER ENERGY, LLC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Nelmark

(negligence) and Samantha Gronewald (breach of contract), Judges.

Nicolas Aragon Jr. and Regina Ward appeal a grant of summary judgment

for the defendants. AFFIRMED.

Christopher Johnston of The Law Group of Iowa, A Johnston Martineau

LLP, Windsor Heights, and Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud &

Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellants.

Michael S. Jones of Patterson Law Firm, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellee

MidAmerican Energy Company.

Mark E. Weinhardt, Danielle M. Shelton, and Jason R. Smith of the

Weinhardt Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellee Blattner Energy, LLC.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Nicolas Aragon Jr.1 and his mother, Regina Ward (collectively “the

plaintiffs”), appeal a grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs

allege the district court erred in dismissing (1) their negligence claim because

Aragon was a trespasser and (2) the breach-of-contract claim because the

plaintiffs did not have third-party beneficiary rights. Upon our review, we affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On June 27, 2019, Aragon, who was a minor at the time, was a passenger

in a car driven by his friend. They drove off the public road onto a private driveway

in Adair County. The private driveway led to land leased by MidAmerican Energy

for the construction of a wind turbine farm. MidAmerican had agreements with the

county for the use of the road and with Blattner Energy for construction of the wind

farm. The driveway and construction site were not open to the public, but no

signage or fencing stopped the vehicle from accessing the land.

While on private property, Aragon stood up through the sunroof of the car

while his friend continued to drive. Eventually, they drove into a wind turbine blade

which lay on the ground. Because of the crash, Aragon’s head hit the turbine

causing him to be injured. Aragon and his friend did not have permission to be on

the property where the accident occurred.

1 Although an amended petition lists the plaintiffs as Guardianship of Nicolas R.

Aragon Jr. and Regina Ward, the only reference to a guardianship in the district
court’s ruling and the parties’ appellate briefs is in the case caption. Because it
does not affect our analysis, we do not address this further.
3

Aragon and his mother filed this personal injury action for negligence,

breach of contract, and loss of consortium. In September 2023, the district court

granted summary judgment on the negligence claims finding Aragon was a

trespasser as a matter of law. Then in June 2024, the district court granted

summary judgment on the remaining claims finding the plaintiffs are not third-party

beneficiaries of the agreement between MidAmerican and Blattner.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling for correction of

errors at law. Susie v. Fam. Health Care of Siouxland, P.L.C., 942 N.W.2d 333,

336 (Iowa 2020). “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Id. at 337. Grant of summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Id. at 336 (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)).

III. Discussion

a. Trespasser

First, the plaintiffs assert the district court erred in finding Aragon was a

trespasser. Iowa has adopted the common law rule that “a possessor of land owes

no duty to a trespasser other than not to injure him willfully or wantonly, and to use

reasonable care after his presence becomes known to avoid injuring him.”

Champlin v. Walker, 249 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Iowa 1977). “A trespasser is one who

has no legal right to be upon another’s land and enters the land without the express

or implied consent of the owner.” Alexander v. Med. Assocs. Clinic, P.C., 646

N.W.2d 74, 76 (Iowa 2002) (cleaned up); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 329 (A.L.I. 1965) (defining trespasser as “a person who enters or remains upon
4

land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the

possessor’s consent or otherwise”). “The general rule in Iowa is that every

unauthorized entry is a trespass, regardless of the degree of force used, even if

no damage is done, or the injury is slight. It will be presumed that injury resulted

even if it was no more than the trampling of herbage.’” White v. Harkrider, 990

N.W.2d 647, 654 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up).

The record in this case demonstrates Aragon was a trespasser. He

admitted as such in his deposition. The statement of undisputed facts before the

district court stated, “Nicolas Aragon was injured while trespassing on private

property and while standing in a vehicle operated by Bobby Lynch.” The plaintiffs

did not contest that statement. Upon our review of the record, we find no evidence

suggesting Aragon had any legal right to be present on the construction site. See

Alexander, 646 N.W.2d at 76. There is also no evidence to suggest that

MidAmerican and/or Blattner willfully or wantonly injured Aragon. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment because Aragon was a

trespasser.

b. Third-Party Beneficiary

Second, the plaintiffs argue the district court erred when it granted summary

judgment because the plaintiffs did not have third-party beneficiary rights in the

contract between MidAmerican and Blattner. The plaintiffs were not parties to the

contract between MidAmerican or Blattner. Instead, they argue they were third-

party beneficiaries to the agreement between MidAmerican and Blattner “to

provide and maintain all traffic control as required for the safe and efficient

operation of traffic as a result of its construction activities.” To sue for breach of
5

contract, one must be a party to the contract. See Davis v. Clinton Water-Works

Co., 6 N.W. 126, 127 (Iowa 1880) (“It is a rule of law, familiar to the profession,

that a privity of contract must exist between the parties to an action upon a

contract.”). Nonparties generally have no legal claim to enforce contracts. Id.;

see, e.g., Uhl v. City of Sioux City, 490 N.W.2d 69, 72–73 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)

(holding that landowner near a potential road that the city contracted with the State

to build had no right to enforce the contract). But Iowa law recognizes an exception

where an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract may sue under the contract

to remedy a breach of a duty. See Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 588

N.W.2d 420, 423–24 (Iowa 1999) (holding that homeowners were intended third-

party beneficiaries of a contract between their bank and an appraiser to monitor

progress of the construction of their home and thus could sue to remedy the

appraiser’s breach of contract by preparing faulty progress reports).

Contracting parties may expressly agree in the contract that they do not

intend to benefit any third party. And if they do so unambiguously, the contract’s

express disclaimer ends the inquiry, and we must enforce the contract as written

and cannot find a contrary intent. See RPC Liquidation v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,

717 N.W.2d 317, 320–25 (Iowa 2006) (holding that subcontractor was precluded

from being a third-party beneficiary by contract term that “it is not intended by any

of the provisions of any part of the contract documents to create in the public or

any member thereof a third party beneficiary hereunder” (emphasis omitted)); cf.

Walters v. Kautzky, 680 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Iowa 2004) (holding that inmates were not

third-party beneficiaries of a legal services contract between the State Public

Defender and an attorney because the contract implemented another agreement
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between the State Public Defender and Department of Corrections including a term

that “there are no third party beneficiaries to this Agreement” (cleaned up)).

Here, we find the contracting parties expressly disclaimed third-party

beneficiaries. The contract contained the following provision:

17.4 No Rights in Third Parties. Except with respect to the
rights of indemnitees under Article X (a) nothing in this Agreement
nor any action taken hereunder shall be construed to create any duty,
liability or standard of care to any Person that is not a Party, (b) no
person that is not a Party shall have any rights or interest, direct or
indirect, in this Agreement or the services to be provided hereunder
and (c) this Agreement is intended solely for the benefit of the
Parties, and the Parties expressly disclaim any intent to create any
rights in any third party as a third-party beneficiary to this Agreement
or the services to be provided hereunder.

Because the contract unambiguously disclaims third-party beneficiaries, that is the

end of our inquiry. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this

ground.

IV. Conclusion

Because the record demonstrates Aragon was a trespasser, and further that

the plaintiffs did not have third-party beneficiary rights under MidAmerican and

Blattner’s contract, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.