In the Interest of M.A., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1364
Filed December 3, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.,
Minor Child,

S.A., Father,
Appellant,

M.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant father.

Cole J. Mayer of Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, for

appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Emily Drenkow Carr of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and

Ahlers, JJ.
2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

A mother and father each appeal from the order terminating their parental

rights to M.A., born in 2017. On her end, the mother, M.M., does not contest that

the State proved the grounds for termination under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f) (2025).1 Instead, she argues the child would be best served

if the juvenile court allowed the mother an additional six months to prepare for the

child’s return to the mother, or, as an alternative, that a guardianship be put in

place.2 She also urges that it is not in the child’s best interests to terminate her

parental rights.

The father, S.A., who lives out of state and has never met the child in

person, appeals asserting the State did not prove the fourth element under

section 232.116(1)(f)—that the child could not be placed in the custody of the

father at the time of the termination hearing. He also contends that a six-month

1 Under this section, the State must prove that all of these four grounds have

occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.
2 The mother mentions a guardianship option in her appellate brief but did not

request that option in the proceedings below, and she failed to develop any
argument about that option in her appellate brief, including who would be the
guardian. We do not address her guardianship argument because that claim was
neither raised nor decided in the juvenile court proceedings. See In re K.C., 660
N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (noting issues must be presented to and ruled upon by
the court to preserve error for appeal.).
3

extension would have provided “time to rectify any potential concerns.” Finally, he

argues it is not in the child’s best interests to terminate his rights. Both parents

appeal.

On our de novo review, we find that the State met its burden to show the

grounds for termination of parental rights for both the mother and the father and

that neither parent met the burden to prove an exception to termination. We also

find it is in the child’s best interests to terminate her parents’ rights and move

toward permanency. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In March 2024, the family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services (HHS) when concerns arose over the child’s

allegations that she had been sexually abused by her older brother and that the

mother was not addressing the child’s resulting issues. Although the abuse had

been going on for years and the mother knew about it, she did nothing to stop it

and, even worse, allowed the older brother to continue as a caretaker of the child.3

Finally, as others became aware, she took the child to the hospital and child

protective services became involved. HHS sought removal of the child from

parental custody to a foster family, which was accomplished through a temporary

order on May 2, 2024. The child was placed in the temporary legal custody of HHS

in June. The child has remained in foster care since that time.

3 The juvenile court found in the termination order that there was clear and
convincing evidence that the child was sexually abused multiple times by her
brother.
4

Once involved with the family, HHS also became concerned about the

mother’s failure to support the child’s mental-health needs and the mother locking

the child in her bedroom from the outside of the door. When raising these

behaviors, the mother became defiant with HHS; discounting the actions and the

child’s allegations. Two founded child abuse reports related to the mother cited

denial of critical care and failure to provide adequate supervision by the mother

and a safety plan was put in place. The child was adjudicated a child in need of

assistance (CINA) on June 28.

The mother was offered services and ordered to provide a psychosocial

evaluation, including an intellectual assessment. HHS noted she had struggled

with caring for the child even before HHS’s involvement, so HHS offered a parent

partner referral and various classes. And although the mother believed the child

suffered from a number of psychological and other disorders,4 in February 2021,

after the three-year-old child was evaluated by a psychologist, the report noted

that the mother was “invested” in the child being disabled and the child did not

have the conditions the mother had described. The only confirmed diagnoses for

the child were ADHD and prenatal drug exposure. Yet, before and during the case

proceedings, the mother did not engage in any disability and developmental

services for the child, and she stopped the child’s medications without medical

guidance.

The mother also reported that the child was aggressive and would try to

wander away from the home, so she installed locks on the outside of the child’s

4 The mother reported that the child had been diagnosed with ADHD, autism,

bipolar disorder, and may be schizophrenic when she gets older.
5

bedroom door. The child reported that she would be locked in her room until her

mother and her boyfriend woke up. Apparently, this had been going on as early

as 2021.

The mother was diagnosed with many disorders, including depression,

panic attacks, and post-traumatic stress disorder, but she had stopped taking her

prescribed medications years before the proceedings here. To her credit, she had

attended therapy since 2022, but she was discharged from seeing that particular

therapist in June 2024 for missing appointments. In August, the mother was

evaluated, and it was recommended that she engage in therapy and other services

to address anxiety, self-esteem, healthy relationships, and parenting skill

development. Therapy did not resume until end of January 2025. The mother

began seeing a new therapist in May, but the mother had only four appointments

with that therapist before the termination hearing.

Turning to the father, he has been twice imprisoned since the child was born

and currently is on parole.5 At the time of the termination trial, the father had been

unemployed for less than a week and was living in Arkansas with his girlfriend. He

started contact with the child after the child was removed to foster care in May

2024 and has maintained regular phone and video contact. The father blamed the

mother for his lack of contact before HHS involvement, but as noted, he has never

been with the child in person and never acted as a caretaker. When proceedings

began, the father was living in a place with conditions described as deplorable, but

5 The father testified that he has been in prison two different times; the last
imprisonment was for nine months, but because of his stated memory problems,
he was not clear about the specific dates.
6

he claimed to have secured a two-bedroom RV. The father had no driver’s license

and was not able to utilize the fuel card HHS provided to come to Iowa for any in

person visitation with the child.

The State petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights, and the juvenile court

ultimately held a termination trial over three days in July. The juvenile court

terminated both the mother’s and father’s parental rights, and they separately

appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

“We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839,

843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). “We will uphold an order terminating parental

rights where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for

termination.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). “Evidence is

clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the

correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. “Our primary

concern is the best interests of the child.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798

(Iowa 2006).

III. Discussion.

We apply a three-step analysis when reviewing the juvenile court’s decision

to terminate parental rights, asking whether (1) a statutory ground for termination

is satisfied, (2) the child’s best interests are served by termination, and (3) a

permissive exception applies and should be exercised to preclude termination.

See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)–(3). We address each parent’s appeal separately.
7

A. Mother’s Appeal. The mother concedes that the State proved the

grounds required to terminate her parental rights. See L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 854

N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Where a party has failed to present any

substantive analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been waived.”).

Instead, she emphasizes the efforts she has made over the course of these

proceedings to improve her parenting deficiencies and requests additional time to

show she can “implement what she has learned to be reunified.” The mother

contends that HHS was seeking perfection from her, not minimal adequacy. She

asserts the child’s best interests would be served by a six-month extension so she

can reunite with the child. She also points to her strong bond with the child as a

compelling reason to apply a permissive exception under section 232.116(3).

1. Best interests. We take up the mother’s argument that it was not in the

best interests of the child to terminate the mother’s parental rights. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2); see also In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)

(“Even if a statutory ground for termination is met, a decision to terminate must still

be in the best interests of a child after a review of section 232.116(2).”). We “give

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). This

question would be made easier if there were a clear path toward a permanent

home for this child.6 See id. § 232.116(2)(b) (allowing the court to consider

“whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into

6 The current foster family is not an adoption option, but HHS was exploring
another family who knew the child.
8

the foster family” when considering best interests). Here, HHS has not yet

identified a family willing to adopt. Even so, we are required to address the

section 232.116(2) factors to address what is in the child’s best interests as it

relates to this mother-child relationship. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40–41

(Iowa 2010).

“We hold no crystal ball, and to some extent, the [best-interests]

determination must be made based upon past conduct.” In re M.M., No. 16-1685,

2016 WL 7395788, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). Turning to considerations

involving the child’s long-term needs, several concerns impact our decision. First,

the mother looked the other way while the young child was being sexually abused

by an older sibling over a period of years. As noted in the HHS termination report

to the juvenile court:

Family preservation services were put in place from 4/4/24 until
5/2/24. Multiple concerns were reported during family preservation
on [the mother’s] parenting and accountability. Often, [the mother]
would appear to defend [the older brother] and state he needs help
and an attorney. [The mother] did not believe the sex abuse
happened until after the investigation was complete. [The mother]
reported to [Family Centered Services] that she informed neighbors
and other strangers that her daughter had been sexually abused by
her brother.

Yet, despite these findings, the mother had not pursued any treatment or therapy

for the child and had not during the proceedings addressed her own lack of

engagement. And although the child had been in therapy during these

proceedings, it was not until late in the process that the mother even reached out

to the child’s therapist for an update.

Even shortly before the termination trial in July, the mother’s new therapist

reported to the HHS social worker that “[the mother] mentioned the concerns
9

related to this case, but she feels very justified in her actions and there has been

little progress addressing the concerns” as she primarily wanted to discuss the

remodel of her trailer. And as to her insight, at the termination trial, the mother

failed to understand the reasons for the proceedings, testifying that the only reason

was the locking of the child in the bedroom. As for the sexual abuse, the mother

minimized the abuse by justifying her lack of response as “brothers and sisters . . .

play[ing] around” and that the child had only told her that the siblings had “kissed.”

Second, as for the safety issue involving the bedroom, HHS summarized in

its termination report, the following:

The Department is concerned with [the mother’s] parenting
capabilities. [The mother] locked [the child] in her bedroom. [The
child] was unable to get out. Prior to removal, [the mother] had a
makeshift toilet in [the child’s] bedroom and stated this was due to
[the child] not being able to make it to the bathroom on time. [The
child’s] bedroom was directly next to the bathroom. [The mother] had
been redirected on multiple occasions she was asked to remove the
lock on the door and toilet and did not. [The mother] eventually
removed the lock but not the toilet. [The child’s] bedroom had writing
all over the walls, had minimal items in it, and often the bed would be
flipped over or missing sheets and blankets.

Third, the juvenile court also noted various examples where the mother’s

conversations were inappropriate and caused the child stress: (1) saying that the

mother was dying of cancer, although not true; (2) saying the father killed someone

in Arkansas, although not proven; and (3) saying that children in the area were all

dying from a virus, again not true. The foster parents reported that these

conversations caused the child to be stressed and, in some cases, to act out.

In sum, the evidence does not show that the mother has the insight to

recognize her parenting deficiencies and has not acted on the services that HHS

offered to develop that insight. Once the child was placed in foster care, her school
10

teacher reported that she saw an immediate change for the better in the child. The

child has since been enrolled in special education with additional educational aid

to address her educational delays. All of which went to the concern that the mother

was not able to understand or take action to meet the child’s needs. Likewise, the

child has now been able to participate in therapy and has been safe and secure

with the foster family.

Given that history, we find that termination of the mother’s rights is in the

child’s best interests.

2. Six-month extension. Because the foster family is not available to adopt,

the mother argues that the six-month extension will be unintrusive for the child

especially because the mother has shown “substantial growth” and “insight.” The

mother emphasizes that it is important that she has acknowledged that her

previous actions were harmful to the child. She points to her participation in the

services offered, including counseling. On top of that, the mother emphasizes how

hard she has worked on improving the trailer she purchased so the child can have

appropriate living conditions. We applaud the work the mother has done, but we

also must look at what still needs to be accomplished to provide a safe, stable, and

permanent home. And, as noted above, the mother overstates her progress.

Examining the mother’s late efforts to engage in services, the juvenile court noted

that there was “no way to know how much change [the mother] is able and willing

to make.”

To extend the statutory time guidelines, the court must “enumerate the

specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the

basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child . . . will no longer
11

exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).

On this request, the juvenile court was “unable to conclude that change could be

made within the next six months that would allow for [the child] to return to the

custody of [the mother].” We agree.

3. Exception to termination under section 232.116(3). On the mother’s final

challenge, we note that the case worker testified that the child and mother “have a

good bond.” Yet, the child’s therapist opined that the child’s “level of attachment

to anyone in general is difficult to discern, but certainly a termination of rights would

be difficult for [the child].” So, the mother asserts that she has established “that

there is clear and convincing evidence that termination would be detrimental at the

time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” “The factors weighing

against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory, and the

court may use its discretion, based on the unique circumstances of each case and

the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save

the parent-child relationship.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014)

(cleaned up).

“[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an

exception to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). While the

mother and child have a good relationship, we must look at the amount of time that

the child has spent out of the mother’s care and how much growth and stability the

child has gained outside of that relationship. That weighs against the strength-of-

the-bond argument. And in other cases, we rejected an extension of time “in part

because of all the uncertainty caused by [the parent’s] only recent progress and

the court’s inability to confirm her progress.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa
12

Ct. App. 2005). While the child has a good relationship and looks forward to seeing

the mother, there have been occasions where the child’s behavior deteriorated

because of the mother’s actions and statements. Thus, the mother has not met

her burden to prove that a permissive exception to the termination of her rights

should be applied.

B. Father’s Appeal. The father argues that “the only concern” of HHS was

his living situation and that because he has corrected that issue and has a suitable,

stable, and safe home, his parental rights should not have been terminated. He

points to the testimony of the HHS social worker that there were no concerns with

the interaction between him and the child on the video calls. He contends the

mother’s actions are what placed this situation under the eye of HHS.

1. Statutory grounds for termination. The father asserts that the State failed

to prove termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) by clear and

convincing evidence. Pursuant to this section a juvenile court may terminate

parental rights when the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent at

the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4). “It is well-

settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved

a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.M., 843

N.W.2d at 112 (citation omitted). At the time of the termination hearing, although

the father had shown commitment to maintaining contact with the child once the

foster care placement was made, he had never met the child in person, let alone

assumed any parental responsibilities. He was offered fuel cards to make the trip

from Arkansas to Iowa, but he did not have a driver’s license and claimed not to
13

know anyone with a reliable vehicle who could drive him. Thus, he had no proven

record that he was in a place or had the skills to have a child he had never met in

person transition to his care. While video calls are essential to stay in contact, the

skills associated with good parenting involve more than talking over the phone or

computer. “[P]arental responsibilities include more than subjectively maintaining

an interest in a child. The concept requires affirmative parenting to the extent it is

practical and feasible in the circumstances.” In re Goettsche, 311 N.W.2d 104,

106 (Iowa 1981). The father has not shown that level of involvement from the

child’s birth forward.

Yet, the father complains his home state failed to complete an Interstate

Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study, after he corrected

some of the previous deficiencies centered around his housing. He asserts that

he was ready and able to provide care for the child, which the home study results

should have supported. But the ICPC home study is done to assure the juvenile

court that the out-of-state parent has adequate parenting skills along with stable

and safe housing for the family. Here, the father submitted to three ICPC home

studies in Arkansas and was rejected three times. An early ICPC report reflected

“deplorable conditions” with the father’s living arrangement, and that the child could

not live there. His probation officer told the ICPC coordinator that he felt “strongly”

that the father could not care for the child for a number of reasons. He told the

HHS social worker that the father had “hygiene” issues as well and that the father

was “constantly having law enforcement come out for fights with his neighbors.”

A third attempt to obtain a passing home study was initiated in early

June 2025. Because the father maintained he alleviated the housing concerns,
14

the coordinator did conduct a home inspection of the RV where the father now

lived, noting he now had “working electric and running water.” But, that same

month, the coordinator could not reach the father for an interview, even though the

coordinator contacted the father’s girlfriend by email, who confirmed she would

have the father contact the coordinator. After the father made no effort to contact

the ICPC coordinator, on July 14, 2025, the coordinator reported that “due to failure

to comply, this request [for a home study] has been denied.”

On our de novo review, we find that the State presented clear and

convincing evidence to show that the child could not, for the first time, be

transferred to the custody of the father at the time of the termination trial.

2. Best interests. Next, the father argues the juvenile court failed to give

reasons why termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See

In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (“Even after we have determined that

statutory grounds for termination exist, we must still determine whether termination

is in the children’s best interests.”). After a termination trial, the juvenile court may

decide not to terminate parental rights if it finds there is clear and convincing

evidence that CINA proceedings should continue. It can then enter an order to

extend the time for reunification in accordance with Iowa Code

sections 232.104(2)(b) and 232.117(5).

The father argues that although he has not been present in person with the

child, the online visits go well and he has established a “true bond” with the child.

The relationship has only recently been developed. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41

(“We do not find a closeness of the parent-child relationship. Father and daughter

were just getting to know each other.”). Arguing he lives out of state, he claims he
15

was never given an opportunity to serve in a caretaker role with the child. But as

the juvenile court noted, there is no evidence that the father can meet the factors

that frame our best-interests decision: protecting the child’s safety and meeting the

physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child. “In deciding whether to

terminate parental rights based on a particular ground, we must give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, the best placement for furthering the long-term

nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical, mental, and emotional condition

and needs of the child.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2010) (cleaned

up). Here, the best interests of the child require a placement that can be safe,

stable, and permanent. The father has not established the track record for that

role given his limited contact with the child and inability to get past a home study.

3. Additional time. As a final contention, the father argues he should be

given additional time to reunite with the child. After a termination trial, the juvenile

court may decide not to terminate parental rights if it finds there is clear and

convincing evidence that CINA proceedings should continue. It can then enter an

order to extend the time for reunification in accordance with section 232.104(2)(b).

The court may continue the proceedings for an additional six months if it finds “the

need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month

period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). On this record, we have no assurance that

circumstances will be any different after a six-month extension and so we deny the

father’s request for more time.
16

IV. Conclusion.

For all the reasons set out above, we affirm the juvenile court’s decisions

terminating the mother’s and father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.