In the Interest of A.B., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0773
Filed December 3, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF A.B.,
Minor Child,

M.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2025). AFFIRMED.

John Bishop, Cedar Rapids, and Elizabeth M. Wayne (until withdrawal) of

Papenheim Law Office, Parkersburg, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Joseph G. Martin, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy,

JJ.
2

SANDY, Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother of a child

born in 2014. The mother appeals. She challenges the statutory grounds

supporting termination, the determination that termination is in the child’s best

interests, and the finding that an exception to termination did not apply. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A.B. was born in 2014 to the mother and an unknown father. The Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became involved with the family

after the mother was arrested for driving under the influence and possession of

methamphetamine in September 2023. After HHS investigated concerns

regarding the mother’s mental health,1 substance use, and her inability to take care

of the child, the State filed a petition for the court to adjudicate A.B. a child in need

of assistance (CINA) in October. The child was adjudicated a CINA in January

2024 and placed with the child’s maternal grandmother and step-grandfather,

where the child continues to reside.

Throughout the proceedings, the mother has struggled to maintain her

sobriety. Although the mother has provided some urinalysis, and many of the tests

have been negative, she has continued to self-report drug use throughout the

case. The mother reported using methamphetamine the month before the

termination trial. She has also refused to participate in hair-stat testing or drug-

sweat-patch testing throughout the proceedings.

1 Prior to any proceedings in this case, the mother had been committed for mental

health issues in July 2023.
3

Although the mother has maintained continuous visits with the child, she

has not progressed beyond supervised visits to semi-supervised, unsupervised, or

overnight visits. At trial, the HHS social worker on this case, Jessica Suhr, testified

that the mother’s residence had bare walls with no drywall. Suhr also testified that

the floors were unfinished, and that the mother relied on space heaters for warmth

in the winter. The mother testified, however, that she had a furnace installed. The

mother was unemployed at the time of the trial, and HHS described her residence

as barely sufficient. She does not have her driver’s license and was not

participating in any substance-use or mental-health treatment at the time of trial.

In April 2025, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the mother’s

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2025).2

II. Standard of Review

We review juvenile court orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re

J.V., 13 N.W.3d 595, 603 (Iowa 2024). We use a three-step process to determine

whether a statutory ground has been established, if the termination is in the child’s

best interest, and if any permissive exceptions should be applied to preclude

termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021).

III. Analysis.

A. Grounds for Termination

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f). Section 232.116(1)(f) permits termination upon clear and

convincing evidence that: (1) “[t]he child is four years of age or older”; (2) “[t]he

2 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights to any putative fathers. No
putative fathers have filed a notice of appeal.
4

child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section

232.96”; (3) “[t]he child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s

parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve

consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days”;

and (4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child

cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section

232.102.” Our supreme court has interpreted the phrase “at the present time” to

mean at the time of the termination trial. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa

2018).

The mother challenges only the fourth element. She argues that she had

stable housing and that regular visits occurred at her residence safely.3 She further

argues that her participation in services with Pathways and her good familial

support show the child can return to her custody. We applaud the mother for

making best efforts to maintain housing and her work with Pathways. But in the

end, we agree that it is insufficient to alleviate all of the safety concerns that still

exist.

At the termination trial, Suhr testified that she did not believe the mother

was able to safely take the child into her custody at the time of trial. Suhr also

testified that she did not believe the mother has been able to meaningfully address

her substance abuse issues. This is exemplified by the mother’s refusal to

participate in hair stat or patch drug testing, as well as her admission she had used

methamphetamine the month before the trial. The mother has a history of using

3 The mother did admit in her petition that her residence “needed some work.”
5

methamphetamine and has struggled to maintain sobriety. Although she has

participated in some urinalysis testing, the mother’s refusal to fully cooperate with

drug testing services and inability to progress beyond fully supervised visits with

the child give us pause. The trial testimony indicates that she has no real plan to

reach and maintain sobriety. She simply testified that if she got her child back, she

“would never touch [methamphetamine]. [She] would have no reason.” We cannot

simply take the mother’s word that she will maintain her sobriety when she has

continued to refuse drug testing, was not participating in substance-use treatment

services at trial, and admitted to using methamphetamine the month before the

termination trial.

The juvenile court properly found the grounds for termination under Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(f) were met.

B. Best Interests

The mother also challenges the juvenile court’s ruling that the termination

of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. We must “give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Our analysis considers

the child’s long-term and immediate interests. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171

(Iowa 2020). This requires us to look at what the future may hold for the child if

they are returned to the parents. Id. We may consider a parent’s past performance

as it can help predict the quality of care the parent is able to provide in the

future. Id.
6

We conclude that termination is in the child’s best interests. In its analysis,

the juvenile court reasoned: “[the mother] has, however, been unable or unwilling

to address the issues that resulted in [the child] being placed outside her care.

[The mother] cannot safely care for her son until she addresses her mental health

and substance abuse issues.” We agree. Given that the mother has been unable

or unwilling to address these concerns, the child’s current placement with his

grandparents is the best placement for his short and long-term nurturing, growth,

health, and needs. The child’s grandparents have become a licensed foster home

and are willing to adopt the child. Suhr testified that the grandparents get the child

to school, make sure he is fed and receiving medical attention, and provide him

with a “suitable living environment.” Suhr testified that the child has bonded with

his grandparents. The child’s grandparents have shown that they can provide a

safe, stable, and nurturing home.

We cannot deprive a child permanency simply because we hope that

“someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home

for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). This is all the more true

considering that the child’s grandparents are ready, willing, and able to adopt the

child and provide for his short- and long-term interests. Termination is in the best

interests of the child.

C. Permissive Exception

The mother argues that her closeness and bond with the child should

preclude termination under section 232.116(3)(c). Our consideration focuses on

whether termination will disadvantage the child and whether the disadvantage
7

overcomes the parent’s inability to provide for the child’s developing needs. In re

D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010).

We have no doubt the mother loves her child. However, love is not enough

to warrant our application of the exception. Id. The mother’s recent drug use,

unwillingness to fully cooperate with drug testing, failure to meaningfully participate

in substance abuse treatment, and inability to make progress past fully supervised

visits all indicate that any disadvantage termination will cause does not overcome

the mother’s inability to provide for the child’s developing needs. Id. We decline

to apply the permissive exception.

AFFIRMED.