State of Iowa v. Chester William Rave

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1977
Filed December 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHESTER WILLIAM RAVE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Robert D.

Tiefenthaler, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction for failing to register as a sex

offender. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH

DIRECTIONS.

Pamela Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

Chester Rave appeals his recidivist conviction for failure to register as a sex

offender. He challenges the State’s proof regarding the validity of the underlying

sex offense and the district court’s refusal to hold a second, bifurcated trial on the

question of his prior registry-violation conviction. We find there was sufficient

evidence regarding whether Rave was required to register. But the court erred by

denying Rave a bifurcated trial after it agreed to follow that procedure. We affirm

in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Law enforcement was tipped off that Rave was required to register as a sex

offender and was living in a Sioux City apartment without registering in June 2024.

The last address Rave had listed on the registry was in Nebraska. And the sheriff’s

office employee who manages the sex-offender registry testified that Rave was

required to register in Iowa and had not updated his Iowa registry since 2014.

A detective obtained and watched two-to-three weeks of video surveillance

footage from the apartments showing Rave coming to and going from the

apartment building. The detective also determined Rave was receiving mail at that

address.

In a police interview, Rave admitted he had been living at the apartment “off

and on.” Judicial and administrative records showed Rave had previously

registered multiple times in Iowa and had agreed in writing that he was required to

register under Iowa law. Court records established that his prior conviction was in

Nebraska, for sexual assault of a minor in the first degree in 2006. And a transcript
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of Rave’s 2014 guilty plea to violating the registry showed he knew he was required

to register in Iowa.

The county attorney charged Rave with failure to register as a sex

offender—second offense, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code

sections 692A.104 and 692A.111(1) (2024). Rave waived jury and demanded a

“bifurcated” or second trial, separating the present offense from the enhancement

for the prior conviction. In response, the assistant county attorney acknowledged

the request and sought only to admit exhibits related to the prior convictions to

show Rave’s knowledge he was required to register. At the end of the bench trial

on the present offense, the court announced:

If the Court were to find the defendant guilty with regards to
the failure to register, then a separate trial, obviously, will be
scheduled with regards to the prior—the prior convictions, obviously,
unless the defendant stipulates to those. That’s not a decision we
have to make today.

In a single verdict issued about a month later, the district court found Rave

guilty of the present offense (failing to register at the Sioux City apartment) and

that the State had proven the prior conviction for failing to register, without a

bifurcated trial. The record does not disclose any stipulation by Rave, and he

asserted in a post-trial motion that the court should not have adjudicated the prior

conviction without a second trial. The State did not respond to that claim in its

resistance. And the court orally denied the motion in arrest and proceeded to

sentence Rave to prison, then suspended his sentence. He appeals.

II. Discussion

Rave raises two issues: he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that

he was required to register as a sex offender and the implicit denial of his request
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for a bifurcated trial on the prior-convictions questions. We consider each claim

under the appropriate standard of review.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law.

See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether

the [factfinder]’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and

presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record

evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). We do not substitute our view of the evidence

for that of the factfinder. See State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).

Rave first contends that the district court should have acquitted him

because there was insufficient evidence the underlying original sex offense

required that he register as a sex offender. The State offers two responses:

(1) challenging the underlying conviction in this fashion is an impermissible

collateral attack; and (2) there was sufficient other evidence Rave was required to

register as a sex offender.

As for the State’s first argument, we recognize the General Assembly

tasked the department of public safety with determining whether one must register

as a sex offender and established a procedure by which a person may apply for

such a determination. Iowa Code § 692A.116(1)–(3). In other words, the statutory

scheme places the initial determination of whether a person must register with the

department of public safety, rather than the courts. But, for purposes of this
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appeal, we bypass whether this renders Rave’s attack impermissibly collateral and

leave that question for another day.

Assuming without deciding we can reach the merits, we conclude this

record contains substantial evidence Rave was required to register as a sex

offender. During the plea colloquy from his prior registry-violation case, Rave

admitted he was required to register:

COURT: [Y]ou have been convicted of a crime that requires
you to register as a sex offender in Iowa; true?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: And what is that particular offense?
DEFENDANT: Sexual assault in the first degree.
COURT: Okay. And that was from Iowa or Nebraska?
DEFENDANT: Nebraska.

This was likely sufficient evidence on its own for the required-to-register element,

as it was an admission made in open court. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(4). But

even if more was required, the State admitted documents Rave signed admitting

he knew he needed to register, Rave’s original registration in which he agreed to

needed to register, the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation case file for the prior

failure-to-register offense, and docket information and court records from

Nebraska (where the underlying conviction originated). Rave also stipulated to the

minutes of testimony in the prior failure-to-register case, which included much of

this same information. And, at the conclusion of that case, the court admonished

Rave that, “Should you ever return to the state of Iowa, you’ll be required to register

as a sex offender for the rest of your life.” There was substantial evidence from

which a reasonable factfinder could determine Rave was required to register in

Iowa.
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Last, we offer one additional observation about the required-to-register

element of the offense here. Regardless of the original underlying sex conviction

in Nebraska,1 Rave’s July 2014 prior conviction for failing to register triggered an

additional ten-year registration period that encompassed the date of the offense at

issue in this appeal. See Iowa Code § 692A.106(4). This means that, even if the

underlying sex-offense did not warrant his placement on the registry for purposes

of this offense, his 2014 conviction did.

B. Bifurcated Trial

As set forth earlier in this opinion, the procedural posture relating to the

bifurcation issue is quite unusual. Rave asked for a bifurcated trial and, at least

initially, the district court agreed that “obviously” a bifurcated trial would be held

unless Rave stipulated. Rave never stipulated, and yet the district court found him

guilty of the prior offense without a bifurcated trial.

Given this confused record, the State on appeal questions whether error

was preserved. We think it was. First, at a basic level, Rave obtained a ruling on

the bifurcation issue when the court initially agreed that “obviously” bifurcation was

appropriate if he did not stipulate to the prior conviction. That the court deviated

from its original ruling doesn’t negate that Rave made his demand known and the

court agreed to honor it. Second, Rave raised the issue by motion in arrest of

judgment, and the court orally denied the motion in its entirety. Admittedly, the

court’s exact reasoning for denying the motion leaves us scratching our heads a

bit—no basis, beyond reference to the written verdict, was given. But what matters

1 At least some record evidence from this trial suggested Rave was no longer

required to register in Nebraska due to the original offense.
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is that Rave obtained a ruling, even if the court’s reasoning was sparse (or absent).

See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012). Finding error at least

minimally preserved, we consider the merits, which we review for correction of

errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.

The rules of criminal procedure contemplate bifurcated trials for prior

convictions when a criminal defendant does not stipulate. See Iowa R. Crim.

P. 2.19(8). The supreme court has applied this bifurcation procedure to both trial

by jury and trial to the bench. State v. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d 814, 825–26

(Iowa 2009). And the supreme court has applied this procedure to the prior-

conviction element of this very offense. State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 147

(Iowa 2018). We don’t see any wiggle room by which the district court could have

decided the bifurcated-trial procedure need not be followed here, given the court’s

initial agreement to afford Rave that procedure.

In its appellate brief, the State suggests that perhaps there was no error

because there is no real issue as to identity or whether Rave had the assistance

of counsel when judgment on the prior offense was rendered. We do not see this

as a valid basis to depart from Johnson and related cases, which make clear that

part of the purpose in bifurcating is to sequester the factfinder from detailed

evidence regarding the prior convictions during the guilt phase for the present

offense. 770 N.W.2d at 825–26. Nor do we find Rave’s stipulation to the pre-

sentence investigation report cures the district court’s failure to honor his right to a

bifurcated trial.

We recognize Rave may not be prejudiced in the sense that, even after a

remand, a bifurcated trial on the prior offense may nonetheless result in conviction.
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But we find the due-process principles embodied in the rules and case law entitled

Rave to the bifurcated proceeding. We thus conclude, given the peculiar state of

this record, it was error for the district court to promise to honor Rave’s timely

request for a bifurcated trial only to ignore that request and summarily find guilt on

that issue using evidence admitted during trial on the present offense. We

therefore vacate the conviction for failure to register as a sex offender—second or

subsequent offense—and the resulting sentence, and we remand with directions

for the district court to either proceed with the bifurcated trial or engage Rave in

proper colloquy to obtain a stipulation to the prior offense.

III. Disposition

We affirm the finding Rave violated the sex-offender registry but vacate the

finding that he had a prior failure-to-register conviction. We reverse and remand

with directions for either the second phase of the bifurcated trial or a proper

colloquy and stipulation, followed by re-sentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH

DIRECTIONS.