In the Matter of the Estate of Lorraine Schultz

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1568
Filed January 28, 2026
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In the Matter of the Estate of Lorraine Schultz, Deceased

Katrina Moreland, Keyli Kiefer, and Krista Nebendahl,
Appellants.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County,
The Honorable Richard D. Stochl, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Matthew J. Hemphill of Bergkamp, Hemphill & McClure, P.C., Adel,
attorney for appellants.

Max E. Kirk of Ball, Kirk & Holm, P.C., Waterloo, and Molly M. Parker of
Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids, attorneys for appellees.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.

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BULLER, Judge.

Katrina Moreland, Kayli Kiefer, and Krista Nebendahl (collectively
the objectors) appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss a petition to set
aside the will in the estate of Lorraine Schultz. Because a family settlement
agreement (FSA) was included with and preempted the will in its initial
filing, we find the district court did not err in ordering the will refiled and the
statute of limitations to start from the new filing date after the FSA was
invalidated on appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case returns to us after remanded proceedings. In the first appeal
for this estate, we explained the background circumstances:
In July 2003, Lorraine—accompanied by Blaine—visited her
attorney and changed her will. Lorraine’s 2003 will divided the property
into named farms and distributed them among her four children: four
farms totaling 420 acres to Blaine; three farms totaling 151 acres for
Jacquelyn, Annette, and Debbie to share equally; and one farm of 230 acres
to be divided equally between all four children along with all of her other
property. That division amounted to more than four times as many acres
being given to Blaine compared to the other children: 477.5 acres total to
Blaine, 107.83 acres to Jacquelyn, 107.83 acres to Annette, and 107.83 acres
to Debbie. The 2003 will listed Blaine and Annette to be appointed
executors of the estate. Because Blaine accompanied Lorraine to the
attorney’s office, he was aware of the 2003 will; Jacquelyn, Annette, and
Debbie were not. Blaine and Debbie were also named Lorraine’s attorneys
in fact, though Debbie did not know this at the time. Blaine told Annette
she no longer needed to help Lorraine with her finances and bills. Around
the same time, Lorraine established a sixteen-year farm lease for Blaine
with rent set at $70 per acre per year.

When Jacquelyn, Annette, and Debbie eventually learned of the
2003 will in the summer of 2014, they, Blaine, and Lorraine met with an
attorney to restore the 1998 will. The attorney consulted Lorraine privately
and felt that she did not have testamentary capacity and thus could not

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change the 2003 will. The attorney suggested a [FSA] as an alternative,
and Lorraine’s four children entered into the July 2014 FSA that divided
the farm property to be inherited from Lorraine equally among them.

In re Est. of Schultz, 10 N.W.3d 146, 148 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Annette, as
executor, petitioned the district court to open probate, filed Lorraine’s will
along with the FSA, and mailed notice and copies of both to the beneficiaries.
After the final report was filed distributing according to the FSA, Blaine’s
children—the objectors—objected, challenging the validity of the FSA. Id.
at 149.

The district court for the initial action ruled to enforce the FSA. But
our court determined on appeal that the FSA was rendered invalid when two
of the signatory beneficiaries (Debbie and Blaine) died before the estate
entered probate and their successor beneficiaries had not joined the
agreement. Id. at 151. We observed “the district court did not expressly rule
on the will’s validity or any issues relating to timeliness, presumably because
finding the FSA valid rendered the 2003 will an academic question.” Id. So
we remanded for the district court “to hold further proceedings on the
validity of Lorraine’s 2003 will.” Id. at 152. No one applied for further review.

The day after procedendo issued, the district court ordered a review
hearing. This April 12 order said “Lorraine’s will was never offered for
probate as the matter was resolved pursuant to the FSA. Therefore, the
deadline to challenge the will does not begin to run until the will is offered for
probate.” The order went on to say, “the court will hear additional argument
on that issue but it appears from the record that the will was filed but not for
the purposes of following its direction.”

All the beneficiaries and counsel attended the review hearing, which
was not reported. There are no filings arguing about the issue of refiling the

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will or the timeliness of the same. Ten days later, the executor filed a
proposed procedure to move forward with probate and “allow all parties the
opportunity to object, present evidence, and be heard regarding the matter of
the validity of the 2003 will”:
The Executor proposes the following procedure be ordered by the
district court to allow all interested parties the opportunity to raise
objections to the 2003 will of Lorraine S. Schultz and present evidence in
support of or opposition to said objections.

a. The Executor will refile the July 9, 2003 will of Lorraine S.
Schultz with the clerk of district court of Allamakee County;

b. That the Executor shall send to all interested beneficiaries or
devisees under the above described will notice in the form of Exhibit A
advising that the will has been filed with the clerk of court for
Allamakee County and further that said parties have 30 days within
which to file any objection to the will;

c. That any party wishing to file an objection to the July 9, 2003 will
of Lorraine S. Schultz shall thereafter file a petition to set aside the
probate of the will in the manner required by Iowa Code § 633.308.

d. That upon any party filing a petition to set aside the will of July 9,
2003, the case shall then proceed in the manner of any will contest in
order that a final adjudication of the validity of the 2003 will can be
obtained, as required by the Iowa Court of Appeals.

On May 9, the court approved the executor’s proposed procedure and
directed her to proceed as outlined in her application. Again, no party filed
an objection to or appealed the court’s order.

The executor refiled Lorraine’s will a few days later and mailed notices
to all the beneficiaries. Within thirty days, Annette, Jacquelyn, and Debbie’s
children Jason and Joshua Hager (collectively plaintiffs) petitioned to set
aside the will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.
The objectors filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss, asserting the time to

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challenge the will began at the time of original filing in 2019 and was not tolled
by the intervening FSA litigation.

After a hearing—again unreported—the district court denied the
objectors’ motion to dismiss, finding
Because the parties to the settlement agreement did not intend to follow
the terms of the will, this court concludes the time to file a will contest
action did not begin to run when the will was filed with the clerk. There
was no reason for anyone to challenge the validity of the will as the parties
believed that they had legally agreed to divide the estate assets outside of
the will. The contestants should not be barred from challenging the will
when they had no reason to believe it was being presented to the court for
distribution pursuant to its terms.

The objectors appeal.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR/JURISDICTION
Before we reach the merits of the objectors’ claim, the plaintiffs claim
the objectors failed to preserve error when they failed to appeal the court’s
May 9 order approving the procedure outlined by the executor. We think this
challenge is more correctly understood as a challenge to appellate
jurisdiction—the fight is over whether an appeal was timely taken, not
whether a question was litigated below. The plaintiffs raised this issue in a
pre-briefing motion to dismiss and resistance to the objectors’ application for
interlocutory appeal. And it appears the supreme court already resolved this
question adversely to the plaintiffs by treating the objectors’ application as a
notice of appeal of right and effectively denying the plaintiffs’ motion to
dismiss. To the extent we could revisit the issue if we wanted to, we agree
with the supreme court this appeal may proceed as of right. See Iowa Code
§ 633.36 (2024) (“All orders and decrees of the court sitting in probate are
final decrees as to the parties having notice and those who have appeared

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without notice.”); In re Est. of Troester, 331 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Iowa 1983). And
we do not think the objectors’ appeal is untimely, as they contest the merits
of the motion-to-dismiss ruling rather than the procedural order by which the
matter arrived at hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
correction of errors of law.” In re Est. of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880
(Iowa 1996).

DISCUSSION
The objectors’ claim boils down to asserting any challenge to the will
had to happen in 2019 when the estate was originally opened, regardless of
the five years of intervening proceedings regarding the validity of the FSA
(which wholly altered the distribution from the 2003 will). Like the district
court, we disagree.

Although the 2003 will was filed with the FSA from the very
beginning, at no point in the probate process was the 2003 will the controlling
document as to distribution. Regardless of any valid FSA, the executor was
mandated by statute to file the 2003 will signed by Lorraine. See Iowa Code
§ 633.285 (establishing penalties for failing to deliver a will for filing). So the
original filing of the 2003 will, in and of itself, does not guide our analysis.
And where the FSA specifically renounces the will, there is not a will to
probate; instead, as here, the court advances the terms of the FSA to divide
the estate among beneficiaries. See 13 Julie L. Pulkrabek & Gary J. Schmit,
Iowa Practice Series: Probate § 15:7 (2025 update). Under these circumstances,
we think the filing of the FSA effectively served as notice of anticipated
contest of the 2003 will and also was the contest’s negotiated resolution. See

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In re Swanson’s Est., 31 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa 1948) (“[I]t is generally held
the beneficiaries under a will may agree to disregard the instrument and have
the estate distributed as intestate or in any other manner they see proper.”).
So once the FSA was filed, those wishing to contest the will but accepting the
FSA resolution had no obligation to file a contest, as it was not yet a
justiciable controversy. See Smith v. Smith, 230 N.W. 401, 403 (Iowa 1930)
(finding the destruction of objections to a will after settlement to be
consistent with good faith).

With the understanding that filing the FSA represented both a
challenge and a resolution, we think the most equitable solution is to hold the
filing and acceptance of the FSA tolled the statute of limitations under Iowa
Code section 633.309 (2024). Cf. In re Est. of Ditz, 125 N.W.2d 814, 819
(Iowa 1964) (“[W]hen any interested person . . . institutes an action of filing
his petition and serving any other interested person within the year period of
limitation, the running of the statute as to all other interested parties is tolled
and they may be added later with the same effect as though timely action was
commenced against all.”). This court invalidating the FSA on appeal thus
restarted the clock on the statute of limitations, to the extent it had begun to
run. And the district court’s resolution—directing that the 2003 will be
refiled without the FSA and notices re-sent as required by statute—was an
equitable and logical solution, consistent with Iowa courts’ treatment of
proceedings after invalidation of a will. Cf. Boehm v. Allen, 506 N.W.2d 781,
785 (Iowa Ct. App 1993) (considering a jury instruction providing if the
current will is determined to be invalid, the prior will is to be offered for
probate); Ditz, 125 N.W.2d at 818 (“[A] determination in a will contest, be it
before probate or in an original action after probate . . . , that the will is
invalid, has the effect of invalidating the will in toto and as to everyone
interested therein.”).

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Because the district court did not err in directing the refiling of the
2003 will or restarting the applicable deadlines to flow from that date, we
affirm the district court’s denial of the objectors’ motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED.

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