In the Interest of C.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1836
Filed January 28, 2026
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In the Interest of C.M., Minor Child,
E.M., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County,
The Honorable Mark Fowler, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Mark J. Neary, Iowa City, attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Jeannette Keller of Bowman, DePree and Murphy, West Liberty, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.

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AHLERS, Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents of a
child born in 2019. Only the mother appeals. She challenges the court’s
determination that the State proved a statutory ground for termination.

I. Standard and Process of Review

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B.,
957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile
court’s fact findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially when
assessing the credibility of witnesses. Id.

Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether
statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the child’s
best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination.
Id. at 294. But we do not address any step in this process that is not
challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

II. Analysis

On appeal, the mother only challenges the first step in the three-step
process—whether a statutory ground exists to support termination. The
juvenile court terminated her parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(f ) (2025). That section permits termination if (1) the
child is four years old or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in
need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the parent’s custody
for twelve of the last eighteen months; and (4) “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to
the custody of the child’s parents.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ). The mother
only challenges the last element—whether there was clear and convincing
evidence that the child could not be returned to her custody at the time of

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the termination hearing. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2025) (en banc) (recognizing “at the present time” as used in Iowa
Code section 232.116(1) means at the time of the termination hearing).

The juvenile court’s involvement with this family began when it was
discovered that both parents were using methamphetamine while the child
was in their care. As a result, the child was removed from their custody. The
mother took immediate steps to address her illegal drug use. By all accounts,
the mother has made great strides. She has been sober for almost two years,
has maintained employment, has gone to therapy, and has consistently
attended visits with the child. Unfortunately, she has been unable to clear
one significant barrier that continues to undermine her reunification efforts.
That barrier is her husband—the child’s father.

The father has continued to use methamphetamine, drained their bank
account multiple times, and physically abused the mother. In February 2024,
the mother obtained a no-contact order against the father after his abuse
forced her to flee to a domestic-abuse shelter. In March, the father left for
inpatient treatment. While he was there, due to the mother’s progress, the
child was returned to the mother’s custody with the condition that she would
not allow the father access to the child. Unfortunately, as soon as the father
left treatment, he went back to the mother’s home, where he had
unsupervised access to the child. Both the mother and father directed the
child not to tell anyone that the father was living with them. Despite their
efforts to hide the father’s presence at the home, the father was arrested for
violating the no-contact order.

Because the mother permitted the father to have access to the child,
the juvenile court again removed the child from the mother’s custody.
Rather than cutting ties with the father at that point, the mother bailed him

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out of jail, took steps to drop the no-contact order, and continued to live with
him even though it meant she could only have supervised visits with the
child. Also, despite knowing that the father tested positive for illegal drugs
several times, the mother continued to deny the father’s drug use. To make
matters worse, the parents’ home was raided by law enforcement in
April 2025 when methamphetamine was mailed to their home addressed to
the father.

Based on these facts, the juvenile court found that the child could not
be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing,
so grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f ) were established. See
id. The mother challenges this finding. She contends the child could be
returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing, highlighting
her progress in maintaining sobriety, employment, and housing. She also
points to the fact that she has been the victim of domestic violence, and
evidence was presented that it is common for such victims to make several
attempts before successfully breaking free from their abusers. She contends
her actions in filing for divorce from the father establishes her commitment
to making that break.

Following our de novo review, we find clear and convincing evidence
that the child cannot be returned to the mother’s custody. We first note that
we are sympathetic to the fact that the mother is a victim of domestic violence
and that it is the conduct of the abuser that is the root of the problem here.
Our conclusion that the child cannot be returned to the mother’s custody is
not an infliction of punishment on the mother for her inability to separate
herself from the abusive father. Indeed, it is not the purpose of juvenile law
to punish a parent for the parent’s mistakes. See In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518,
523 (Iowa 2020) (“[ J]uvenile law is not a fault-based edifice like tort law.”).

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Rather, it is the purpose of juvenile law to make sure a child is in a safe home.
See id. at 523–24 (noting that national and state child welfare laws are
designed to provide children with appropriate custodial care). Here, the
mother’s home is not safe because she has not shown the ability to separate
herself from the drug-addled and abusive father. The evidence establishes
that the mother has repeatedly denied the father’s methamphetamine use
despite clear evidence that he continued to use. The evidence also
establishes that the mother has little insight into the harmful effects the
father’s drug use will have on the child, so we have little confidence that she
can protect the child if the child were returned to her custody. See In re D.D.,
955 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa 2021) (“It’s folly to think the mother will stand
sentinel to protect against a foe she doesn’t acknowledge exists.”).

We are also not persuaded that the mother’s actions of filing for
divorce and testifying that she now recognizes how toxic the father is to her
and the child is enough to make it safe to return custody to her at this time.
The mother has a track record of claiming that she is going to distance herself
from the father only to later let him back into her and the child’s orbit.
Further, the mother’s contentions are based on her testimony, and the
juvenile court made stark findings that the mother’s testimony was not
credible, noting she “has used up any credibility she may have had.” See
A.B., 957 N.W.2d at 293 (noting the deference the appellate court is to give
to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations). Given this finding, we do
not place great weight on the mother’s claims. We also note that the mother
waited to file for a divorce for well over a year after the child was removed
from her custody for giving the father access to the child and three months
after she found out the father had methamphetamine delivered to the house
where she resided. She also waited until the weekend before the termination
hearing to remove the father’s personal belongings from the house. These

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last-minute efforts to try to demonstrate distance from the father do not
persuade us that she has made the needed break from the father.
Accordingly, we agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be
returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See
In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994) (finding efforts “of very recent
origin” to be an unpersuasive “eleventh hour attempt to prevent
termination”).

III. Conclusion

Although the mother has made great strides toward bettering herself,
her consistent failure to place her child’s needs above the father’s needs
makes it clear that the child cannot be safely returned to her custody. As
such, her claim that the State failed to prove a ground for termination of her
parental rights fails. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling
terminating her parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

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