State of Iowa v. Andrew Michael Popp

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0609
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Andrew Michael Popp,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., West Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J. Partial Dissent by Ahlers, P.J.

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SANDY, Judge.

A robbery at a Dubuque Dunkin’ Donuts resulted in Andrew Michael
Popp’s plea to reduced charges and concurrent ten-year prison terms. On
appeal, the questions are narrow: did the district court lawfully exercise its
sentencing discretion, and did it commit error in suspending Popp’s fines.
We conclude it committed no abuse of discretion or legal error and affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In the early morning hours of September 29, 2022, a robbery occurred
at a Dunkin’ Donuts located in Dubuque, Iowa. At approximately 5:10 a.m.,
a man entered the store and demanded money from the cash register. During
the encounter, the man placed a handgun on the counter and cocked it,
prompting the employee to surrender the cash contained in the drawer. Store
employees provided law enforcement with a description of the suspect,
including his clothing and physical characteristics.

Law enforcement reviewed nearby surveillance footage and identified
a red 2017 Chrysler 200 with Wisconsin license plates in the vicinity of the
store around the time of the robbery. Investigation revealed the vehicle’s
owner reported it stolen that morning, stating she had not given permission
for anyone to take or operate it. The vehicle was subsequently found in the
parking lot of a Walmart in Maquoketa, Iowa. Officers observed a man—
identified as Popp—who matched the robbery suspect’s description asleep
inside the vehicle. A search of the vehicle uncovered items connecting the
occupant to the robbery, including clothing matching the description given
by witnesses, cash, personal identification documents, and a handgun. The
vehicle also contained property belonging to its owner.

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In October, the State charged Popp by trial information with robbery
in the first degree and possession of stolen property in the first degree. The
State later supplemented the trial information to include a dangerous-weapon
sentencing enhancement. After an extended pretrial period that included
competency-related proceedings, the parties reached a plea agreement.
Under the agreement, Popp agreed to plead guilty to robbery in the second
degree as a lesser-included offense and to possession of stolen property in the
first degree. Under the agreement, the parties were free to argue for any legal
sentence, and the State agreed not to pursue the sentencing enhancement.
The district court accepted the guilty pleas and ordered a presentence
investigation report.

Sentencing occurred in January 2025. The district court imposed
concurrent indeterminate prison terms of ten years on each count. For the
robbery conviction, the court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of
sixty percent pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.12 (2022). The court
imposed fines on both counts but suspended the fines and surcharges. The
court also ordered restitution and made a finding that Popp lacked a
reasonable ability to pay category “B” restitution. The court committed
Popp to the custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections and entered
additional orders related to mental-health evaluation, firearm prohibition,
and no-contact provisions. Popp subsequently filed a motion to reconsider,
enlarge, or amend the sentence, which the district court denied. Popp now
appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Popp challenges his sentence, contending the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a ten-year concurrent prison sentence with a
mandatory sixty-percent minimum and alleging that the sentencing court

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illegally suspended his fines. We review a court’s sentencing decision for
abuse of discretion. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015). The
chosen sentence is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor. State v.
Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 455 (Iowa 2024). We review the legality of a court’s
sentence for correction of errors at law. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103
(Iowa 2020).

DISCUSSION
Popp contends in his appellate brief that the district court promised
him that, at sentencing, it “would not do anything more onerous than what
is recommended by the presentence investigation report [(PSI)].” And thus,
he claims, when the PSI was silent on the mandatory minimum, the district
court had to sentence him to no mandatory minimum. And to the extent the
court’s statements do not warrant relief, he argues, the court otherwise
abused its discretion. We disagree for three reasons.

First, assuming without deciding the district court’s promise about the
PSI was actionable, the court did not break its word. The PSI did not
recommend no mandatory minimum be imposed; instead the PSI writer
consciously chose to leave that issue in the court’s hands. The court thus did
not impose a sentence more “onerous” than what the PSI recommended.

Second, the State is correct in its assertion that the district court could
not impose a ten-year sentence with no mandatory minimum as Popp
requests. To do so would constitute an illegal sentence. See Iowa Code
§§ 902.12(4), 901.11(4); State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 85 (Iowa 2024)
(discussing illegal sentences); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(b) (“An illegal
sentence is a sentence that could not have been lawfully imposed for the
defendant’s conviction or convictions.”). Thus, the court did not abuse its

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discretion when it imposed a mandatory minimum sentence for the second-
degree robbery conviction. To the extent Popp claims that the court abused
its discretion by setting the mandatory minimum at sixty percent, we
disagree. Iowa Code section 902.12 required the court to impose a mandatory
minimum between fifty and seventy percent, and the court expressly
considered the factors set forth in section 901.11(4), including the nature of
the offense, Popp’s mental health history, rehabilitation efforts, and the
impact on the victims. The sentence imposed fell squarely within the
permissible statutory range and was supported by articulated reasons in the
record.

Third, nothing in our review of the record reflects that the sentencing
court was operating under the impression that it did not have the discretion
to suspend the imposed prison sentence for Popp’s first-degree theft
conviction. Rather, because the court was imposing a prison sentence for the
second-degree robbery conviction, and because the court ran the sentences
concurrent to one another, imposition of sentence made good sense.

Popp’s final argument claims that the sentence imposed was illegal
because of imposition of prison but suspension of fines. His argument is
based entirely on the dissenting opinion in State v. Laue, No. 23-0208, 2023
WL8448475, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Ahlers, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). But our court has rejected that position while
sitting en banc. State v. Cullum, No. 23-0911, 2025 WL 2057904, at *4–5
(Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025) (en banc). Accordingly, we are not convinced
that suspension of fines in this case amounts to an error at law. See State v.

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Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 304 (Iowa 2025) (declining to endorse the Laue
dissent’s reasoning).

AFFIRMED.

Buller, J., concurs; Ahlers, P.J., dissents in part and concurs in part.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority opinion as it relates to the imposition of the
minimum sentence on Andrew Popp’s second-degree robbery conviction and
the imposition of the prison sentence on his theft conviction. But I
respectfully dissent from the decision to reject Popp’s challenge to the
suspension of his fines on those charges.

For the reasons stated in my partial dissents in State v. Laue, No. 23-
0208, 2023 WL 8448475, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Ahlers, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and State v. Cullum, No. 23-0911,
2025 WL 2057904, at *10–12 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025) (en banc)
(Ahlers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), our sentencing statutes
require a defendant to be placed on probation if any part of a sentence is
suspended. Since the district court suspended the fines on Popp’s two
charges, it was required to place him on probation. See Iowa Code
§§ 901.5(3) (giving the court authority to suspend execution of any part of a
sentence “as provided in chapter 907”), 907.3(3) (2022) (requiring the court
to place the defendant on probation upon suspension of a sentence). Because
the court did not couple the suspension of Popp’s fines with probation, the
suspension of the fines runs afoul of our sentencing statutes and constitutes
an illegal sentence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that part of the
majority opinion that does not vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.

I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that Cullum
answered the question here. The Cullum majority identified the issue as
“whether a district court has the flexibility to impose a term of incarceration
and suspend the fines.” 2025 WL 2057904, at *4. As I pointed out in my
partial dissent, that’s not the issue. Id. at *10. No one disputes that the court

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has the authority to impose a term of incarceration while also suspending the
fine, so the lengthy discussion in the Cullum majority opinion addressing that
undisputed issue doesn’t answer the question presented here. The pertinent
question is this: If the fine is suspended, do the governing statutes require the
court to also place the defendant on probation? For the reasons highlighted
above and discussed in more detail in my partial dissents in Laue and Cullum,
I conclude they do.

This issue has been lingering for several years. I believe this is the first
time we’ve had adversarial briefing on it.1 It is my hope that Popp will seek
further review, and our supreme court will grant it. While I believe the
relevant statutes unambiguously require the outcome I’ve described, there
continues to be disagreement on this court. At the risk of begging, I believe
it is in everyone’s best interest for the supreme court to take the case on
further review to resolve the disagreement, whatever that resolution may be.

1
In Cullum, we invited an attorney to volunteer to submit an amicus brief to defend
the district court’s position, which was the same position I take here—that the district
court could not suspend fines without placing the defendant on probation—because
neither party defended that position. 2025 WL 2057904, at *4.

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