In the Interest of H.C., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-2161
Filed April 1, 2026
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In the Interest of H.C., Minor Child,
H.G., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Cheryl Traum, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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G. Brian Weiler, Davenport, attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Jean Capdevila, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

1
TABOR, Chief Judge.

A young mother, Harmony, appeals the dispositional order continuing
the removal of her three-month-old daughter, H.C., from her custody. She
contends the Iowa juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the child and
challenges the removal, child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) adjudication,
and dispositional orders. Harmony also argues that the Iowa Department of
Health and Human Services failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent the
removal. Because we find the court properly exercised its jurisdiction and
there are no grounds to reverse the juvenile court’s order, we affirm.1

Seventeen-year-old Harmony has three children. 2 The first, born in
2023, died when he was eight months old. That infant and the parents were
living with Harmony’s mother, Rachel, in Illinois. Although his cause of
death was undetermined, the infant had healing rib fractures, and the Illinois
child-welfare agency found the child abuse report against the parents
“indicated” that he suffered “death by neglect.”

Harmony gave birth to her second child, A.M., in 2024 while she and
the father were living in Davenport. Because of domestic violence in their
household, the Iowa juvenile court ordered that A.M. be removed from the
parents’ custody at five weeks old; the department placed him in foster care.
During A.M.’s CINA proceedings, Harmony did not disclose to the

1
We review CINA proceedings de novo. In re A.J., 821 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2012). We also review jurisdictional issues raised under the Uniform Child-Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) de novo. In re E.D., 812 N.W.2d 712, 715
(Iowa Ct. App. 2012); see Iowa Code chapter 598B (2025). We give the juvenile court’s
findings of fact weight, especially regarding witness credibility, but they do not bind us. In
re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020).
2
The father of the children is not involved in this appeal.

2
department or her mother that she was pregnant again and going to Illinois
for prenatal care. In fact, she lied when asked if she was pregnant.

Harmony gave birth to H.C., her third child, at a hospital in Sterling,
Illinois. The plan was for the newborn to live with Rachel, under a voluntary
guardianship, according to Harmony’s testimony. But the State petitioned
for an ex parte removal of H.C. from Harmony’s custody in Scott County.
The Iowa juvenile court granted the petition, and the department removed
H.C. from Harmony’s custody at the Illinois hospital, placing her with the
same foster family who was caring for A.M.

After a hearing, the court affirmed the removal. In that order, the court
found that Iowa was H.C.’s home state and it had jurisdiction over the case.
In a post-hearing motion, Harmony asked the court to find that she intended
to place H.C. in a guardianship with Rachel as soon as they left the hospital,
there were no safety risks associated with that placement, and the department
did not have grounds to remove H.C. from Rachel’s custody.

The court heard argument on that motion at the adjudication hearing.
In its adjudication order, the court reaffirmed that it had jurisdiction,3 and
that the State proved the grounds for adjudication. The court also ordered
3
The court said: “The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter
herein. Service and notice was provided by the parents signing a notice of service and
receipt of petition on September 9, 2025. In addition, the parents appeared and submitted
to the jurisdiction of this Court.” But the UCCJEA confers subject matter jurisdiction,
which parties cannot waive by appearance or consent. In re Jorgensen, 627 N.W.2d 550,
554–55 (Iowa 2001) (citing the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),
codified at Iowa Code chapter 598A.1 (1997), repealed and replaced by the UCCJEA in
1999); accord E.D., 812 N.W.2d at 715–16 (referring to the UCCJEA, codified at Iowa Code
chapter 598B); cf. In re Guardianship of Cerven, 334 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983)
(holding personal jurisdiction can be conferred by consent of the parties through
appearance and participation in the proceedings).

3
the department to set up a jurisdictional hearing “with a judge from the
appropriate county in Illinois.”

At that telephonic hearing, the Iowa court heard from the judge who
would have presided over the child-welfare proceeding in Illinois. The Illinois
judge declined to exercise jurisdiction, finding that H.C. had more significant
connections to Iowa. So the Iowa juvenile court found that Iowa was the
appropriate forum under Iowa Code section 598B.201(1)(b) and (c).

The next day, the court held a dispositional hearing where Harmony
reiterated her argument that removal was from Rachel as legal custodian.
Relatedly, Harmony asserted that the Iowa court’s jurisdiction would have to
extend “not over the [child’s] mother, but over the voluntary placement and
that home.” Rachel also testified that she and her paramour had moved to
Davenport to facilitate placement of A.M. and H.C. with them. The court
entered a dispositional order finding it had jurisdiction because the Illinois
court “declined jurisdiction of the child and found that Iowa is the more
appropriate forum.” The court also affirmed the removal of H.C. from the
parents and the adjudication grounds.4

Harmony appeals.

Jurisdiction. We address jurisdiction first.5 Under the UCCJEA, Iowa
courts have “jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination”

4
At the adjudication hearing, the court took judicial notice of A.M.’s CINA file.
5
We agree with the State that Harmony’s petition on appeal cites no authority for
her contention that Iowa courts lack jurisdiction over H.C. See In re D.M., 965 N.W.2d
475, 480 n.2 (Iowa 2021). But we address the question because “jurisdictional
requirements are mandatory, not discretionary. . . . If the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, it is without authority to hear the case and must dismiss the petition.” In re
B.C., 845 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (cleaned up).

4
under four scenarios. See Iowa Code § 598B.201(1)(a)–(d). We elect to
resolve jurisdiction on the third scenario. See In re N.N., No. 99-1488, 2000
WL 1027558, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2000) (bypassing father’s
contention that Iowa was not the child’s home state and finding the Iowa
court properly exercised jurisdiction under alternative grounds provided in
the UCCJA, Iowa Code section 598A.3(d)).

Moving to that ground, Iowa courts have jurisdiction if “[a]ll courts
having jurisdiction under [scenarios one and two] have declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child under section 589B.207 or
598B.208.” Iowa Code § 598B.201(c). Sections 589B.207 and .208 set out
factors for when a court determines it is an inconvenient forum. Illinois and
Iowa are the only states that could have jurisdiction under the first two
scenarios because they are the only states where Harmony has lived or where
the child had been physically present. See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 36/204
(2025) (providing Illinois courts temporary emergency jurisdiction of child
present in the state); Iowa Code § 598B.204 (Iowa’s analogous provision).

At the jurisdictional hearing, the Illinois court stated its rationale for
declining jurisdiction: the mother “is residing in Iowa” and “there’s already
an open CINA case with another [sibling] . . . which would mean . . . Iowa’s
court services and Iowa’s child protective services are involved.” That

Harmony also contends that the ex parte jurisdictional hearing violated her due
process rights and that the court erred by holding the jurisdictional hearing after removal
and adjudication, stating, “[ J]urisdiction cannot be a post hoc determination.” We don’t
see where Harmony preserved error on the due process argument, nor does she cite any
authority for either claim. The timing of the hearing isn’t important here because subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Id. Harmony didn’t raise it until the
adjudication hearing, and the court promptly set a hearing.

5
determination is consistent with the factors for inconvenient forum set out in
Iowa Code section 598B.207(2). See Iowa Code § 598B.201(c) (referencing
id. § 598B.207 and .208). Thus, the Iowa juvenile court correctly determined
that Illinois “declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that [Iowa] is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child,” under
section 598B.201(c). The court properly exercised its jurisdiction of H.C.6

Merits. We now address Harmony’s remaining claims. First, she
challenges the removal, the finding of an imminent risk of harm, and the
department’s efforts to prevent removal. She maintains that H.C. was
“placed with the grandmother,” and the department had no safety concerns
6
The State’s response to the petition on appeal points out that the “mother’s
jurisdictional argument centers on H.C.’s maternal grandmother . . . , and on the
contention that the juvenile court must have jurisdiction over the maternal grandmother.”
But the court exercises its jurisdiction to enter a custody determination for the child.
True, the location of the parent or “person acting as a parent” is relevant to the
“home state” determination if that is how the court derives its jurisdiction. Iowa Code
§ 598B.102(7). But under the UCCJEA, a “person acting as a parent” means someone
other than the parent who both “has physical custody of the child or has had physical
custody for a period of six consecutive months” and “has been awarded legal custody by
a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state.” Id. § 598B.102(13).
Rachel doesn’t meet that definition. So we agree with the State that Harmony’s plan to
have Rachel assume custody of the infant after her discharge from the hospital is of no
legal significance to the jurisdiction question.
Harmony further contends the Illinois court mistakenly believed Rachel lived in
Iowa at all relevant times when she lived in Illinois at the time of removal. We disagree
with that characterization of the Illinois court’s statement; the court explained that no
guardianship had been created in Illinois and any such proceeding would be “in the state
of Iowa as well.” To the extent it impacts other questions, the child was removed from
Harmony’s legal custody while they were still in the hospital, and Rachel had neither legal
nor de facto custody of the child. The juvenile court also disbelieved that Harmony
planned for a guardianship with Rachel since she didn’t tell Rachel she was pregnant until
two weeks before H.C. was born.

6
about Rachel’s care. We agree with the State that those issues were moot after
the court entered its dispositional order. See In re M.P., No. 25-1311, 2025 WL
3022811, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2025) (citing In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d
867, 871 (Iowa 1994)).

Next, Harmony challenges the grounds for the adjudication and
continuing removal. The court adjudicated H.C. as a CINA under Iowa Code
section 232.96A(3)(b). 7 The State must prove the grounds by clear and
convincing evidence. Iowa Code § 232.96(2). Under paragraph (3)(b), the
court may adjudicate if “[t]he child has suffered or is imminently likely to
suffer harmful effects as a result of . . . [t]he failure of the child’s parent,
guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child
resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.” On
this record, the State met its burden.

The department worried about Harmony’s dishonesty and lack of
accountability. When she had her first child in her early teens, she gave
inaccurate accounts of his death and did not explain how the baby’s ribs were
broken. And during the CINA proceedings for A.M., her second child, she
wasn’t truthful about her third pregnancy, even when she was asked directly.

7
The court also adjudicated H.C. as a CINA under Iowa Code section 232.96A(7)
and (14). For these grounds, Harmony argues that the State failed to offer evidence
concerning the grandmother, Rachel, with whom Harmony allegedly planned to place the
baby. But Rachel was never appointed as H.C.’s guardian. By not contesting these grounds
for adjudication concerning her own conduct, Harmony has waived her challenge to these
alternative bases for the CINA adjudication. Cf. In re G.N., No. 20-1128, 2020 WL
7022388, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (affirming termination of parental rights
based on unchallenged statutory grounds and collecting cases doing the same). Thus, we
also affirm on these grounds.

7
Harmony also misled the department about her relationship with the
father and their volatile interactions. A.M. was removed from her care after
she assaulted the father in a bed where A.M. was also sleeping. After the
removal, concerns about domestic violence in the home continued. The
department’s reports show Harmony has a long history of mental-health
concerns, has been involuntarily committed eleven times, and only
intermittently engaged in the therapy that was ordered.

Beyond the concerns for her credibility and mental health, case
workers did not believe that Harmony could safely parent H.C., much less
H.C. and A.M. together. Visits have been fully supervised. And Harmony has
struggled to implement parenting lessons, unable to handle two very young
children at once. As an illustration, during a recent visit, Harmony forgot to
bring food or wipes and couldn’t change H.C.’s diaper while also supervising
A.M. Those basic safety concerns—along with the troubling family history—
supply clear and convincing evidence that Harmony is unable to exercise a
reasonable degree of supervision, and H.C. is imminently likely to suffer
harm as a result. See id. § 232.96A(3)(b).

Finally, Harmony contends that placing H.C. in foster care was not the
least restrictive option, as relative care with the grandmother was available.8
After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court “shall make the least
restrictive disposition appropriate considering all the circumstances of the
case.” Id. § 232.99(4). In increasing order of restrictiveness, the court can
continue the proceedings for twelve months, id. § 232.100; return custody to

8
The State asserts Harmony waived error in the dispositional order by failing to
identify any issue for review and failing to present argument or cite authority. But we have
identified the issue clearly enough to address it. Harmony has urged throughout the
proceedings that H.C. should be placed with the grandmother.

8
the parent, id. § 232.101; appoint a guardian, id. § 232.101A; or transfer
custody to the department for placement, id. § 232.102(1)(a). If the court
transfers custody to the department, the department places the child in any
of five categories, with “adult relative” being the top priority. Id.
§ 232.102(1)(a)(1). We agree with the juvenile court that transfer of custody
to the department was the least restrictive option consistent with H.C.’s best
interests.

The department bypassed grandmother Rachel to place the child in
foster care because it determined she was not a safe placement option. When
Rachel asked to care for A.M., the department ordered an Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children (ICPC) study of her home in Illinois. The home
was not approved. Rachel testified the denial related to a child abuse report
against her in 2022 and her paramour’s criminal history. The county attorney
stated that Rachel was not truthful with the ICPC investigator. The juvenile
court also found Rachel lacked credibility and questioned her parenting of
Harmony and the death of Harmony’s eight-month-old while living with
Rachel.

Given these circumstances, H.C.’s best interests require continued
removal from Harmony’s custody. The juvenile court properly transferred
custody to the department, and placement with the foster family where H.C.
lives with her brother is the least restrictive option. Finding no grounds to
modify the dispositional order, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

9