In the Matter of the Guardianship of O.C.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0061
Filed May 13, 2026
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In the Matter of the Guardianship of O.C.
E.C., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Jordan Brackey, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Shannon M. Hounshell of SMH Law, PLLC, Des Moines,
attorney for appellant mother.

Alexandra M. Nelissen of Advocate Law, PLLC, Clive, attorney
for appellee guardian S.K.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Badding, J., and Telleen, S.J.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

Within days of giving birth to O.C., the mother left the infant with
Shawna—the mother’s stepmother. The next month, Shawna filed a
petition to be appointed as the child’s temporary and permanent guardian.
The mother consented to the guardianship at first but later moved to
terminate the temporary guardianship that had been established. After a
hearing, the juvenile court granted Shawna guardianship of O.C. under Iowa
Code section 232D.204 (2024). The mother appeals.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

O.C. was born in mid-July 2024. The mother and child were
discharged from the hospital two days later. That evening, the mother asked
her stepmother, Shawna, to watch the baby because the mother was not
feeling well. Shawna claims that O.C. has been in her care since then. The
mother disagreed, testifying that she picked the child up from Shawna on
July 19 and cared for her until July 24. Messages between the two show that
while the mother may have had the child on July 19, she brought O.C. back
to Shawna the next day because the mother’s boyfriend was “talking about
going to the [car] races.”

In the weeks that followed, the mother only asked about O.C.
occasionally. Otherwise, her messages to Shawna were focused on other
things—like the mother’s health, problems at work, and her rocky
relationship with her boyfriend. On August 15, Shawna petitioned for
guardianship of O.C., alleging the mother “has demonstrated a lack of
consistent parental participation in the life of the minor child and has
demonstrated that she is not willing or able to act as the legal parent and
caretaker of the child.” In an ex parte order, the juvenile court appointed
Shawna as emergency temporary guardian. The next week, the mother

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signed an affidavit consenting to the guardianship because of “a physical or
mental illness that prevents [her] from providing care and supervision” to
O.C.

The mother’s consent was short-lived. On September 5, she moved
to terminate the temporary guardianship, alleging that she was “capable of
taking care of [O.C.]” and that Shawna was refusing to let her see the child.
The juvenile court set the mother’s motion for hearing on September 11. But
because of a health emergency that day—the mother had her gallbladder
removed—the mother missed the hearing.

At the continued hearing in October, Shawna testified that the mother
had seen O.C. only a handful of times since she was born. And on those
visits—which were short—Shawna said the mother was on her phone.
According to Shawna, the mother had not “shown any interest in taking care
of the hourly day-to-day, minute-by-minute needs of a newborn.” The
mother testified differently. She maintained that when she signed the
consent to the guardianship, she thought it meant that “if something
happened to [her], that [O.C.] would be able to go to Shawna and [her] dad.”
The mother testified that there was nothing physically or mentally that
would prevent her from caring for O.C. and that she wanted the child back.

In its December ruling, the juvenile court found the mother and
Shawna had a “very complicated relationship,” especially when it came to
O.C. After reviewing 102 pages of Facebook messages between the two, the
court was concerned about their credibility because of differences between
the “messages and the testimony received.” Finding “that both parties are
hiding certain facts,” the court relied on testimony from Lorrie—the
mother’s grandmother.

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Lorrie testified that the mother, who tended “to lie a lot,” had a long
history of avoiding responsibility and would not be able to safely care for O.C.
She was concerned about the mother’s overall stability, noting that she was
living in her short-term boyfriend’s home, that she often changed jobs, and
that she liked to just “[g]et in the car and go.” The court found Lorrie “was
highly credible” and relied on her testimony, noting O.C.’s “current
situation” supported Lorrie’s concerns about the mother:
With difficulties mounting in her life, [the mother] decided that this was
an inconvenient time for her to be a parent and that she could not care for
[O.C.] Thus, she placed her child with Shawna. While she loves [O.C.]
and truly cares for her daughter, this court is convinced that if this court
were to return [O.C.] to her mother’s care immediately, [the mother]
would merely end up in another situation where she could not care for her
daughter and that may put [O.C.] in a dangerous situation. Due to the lack
of contact with [O.C.] and the lack of engagement since [O.C.] has been
out of her care, this court does not feel that [the mother] has demonstrated
any history of stability and ability to parent [O.C.] Having a safe and stable
caregiver is in [O.C.’s] best interest.

With those findings, the court granted Shawna’s petition to establish
a guardianship under Iowa Code section 232D.204(2).1 But the court was

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The court also found that a guardianship was appropriate under Iowa Code
section 232D.204(1), which requires proof of a “de facto guardian” and “demonstrated
lack of consistent parental participation in the life of the minor by the parent.” We need
not address this ground—although it is challenged by the mother on appeal—because we
conclude that Shawna met her burden of proof under section 232D.204(2). See In re
Guardianship of J.M., No. 20-1638, 2021 WL 4304224, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2021)
(stating that the two subsections in section 232D.204 “set forth alternative methods of
proving the need for establishment of a guardianship”).
We also find that error was not preserved on the mother’s claim that the juvenile
court erred in appointing an attorney rather than a court visitor for the child. Because the
mother did not raise that issue in the guardianship proceedings, we decline to address it
on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).

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hopeful that “the reasons for the guardianship could be eliminated in a
relatively short period” by the mother “showing stability, showing an
interest in parenting [O.C.] full-time, and demonstrating consistent parental
participation.” To that end, the court ordered the parties to engage in
mediation “to establish a transition plan and visitation so that [the mother]
has a clear, articulated plan to regain custody quickly.”

The mother appeals, claiming the juvenile court’s order violates her
“constitutional rights and offends Iowa’s preference for the natural parent.”
Entwined with that claim, the mother contends the court erred in finding that
she “is unable or unwilling to exercise parental authority and a guardianship
is not in the child’s best interest.”2

II. Standard of Review

“Our standard of review of the establishment of a guardianship of a
minor is de novo.” In re Guardianship of B.B., No. 21-0992, 2022 WL
523325, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2022). “We give weight to the juvenile
court’s factual findings, but we are not bound by them.” In re Guardianship
of L.Y., 968 N.W.2d 882, 892 (Iowa 2022).

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The mother also challenges the court’s failure to grant her motion to terminate
the temporary guardianship. But any error in establishing that temporary guardianship
cannot be remedied now. See, e.g., In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1994) (finding
that any error in granting a temporary ex parte removal order in a child-in-need-of-
assistance case “cannot now be remedied. We cannot go back in time and restore custody
based on alleged errors in the initial removal order”). And because this was a proceeding
to establish a guardianship, we are not concerned with the requirements to terminate a
guardianship—which the mother asserts she met. Cf. Iowa Code § 232D.503(3) (setting
out the requirements to “terminate a guardianship established pursuant to section
232D.204”).

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III. Analysis

At the outset, the mother asserts that she “has a fundamental liberty
interest in the child’s care, custody, and control” and that it “should be
presumed that she will act in the best interest of her child.” See id. at 896
(discussing “the well-established parental preference in guardianship
cases”). The juvenile court recognized this parental preference but found it
was rebutted by the evidence Shawna offered to prove that a guardianship
should be established under Iowa Code section 232D.204(2). We agree. See
In re E.B., No. 23-0486, 2023 WL 6620521, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2023) (“The presumption is rebutted if the parent is not suitable and the
child’s best interests requires that the child remain in a non-parent’s care.”).

Section 232D.204(2) allows the juvenile court to appoint a guardian
for a minor child without parental consent
if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence all of the following:

a. No parent having legal custody of the minor is willing or able to
exercise the power the court will grant to the guardian if the court appoints
a guardian.

b. Appointment of a guardian for the minor is in the best interest
of the minor.

In challenging this ground, the mother focuses on her grandmother’s
testimony, arguing that Lorrie “had not been in a situation where she knew
the mother intimately since [Lorrie] was a temporary foster placement years
ago when [the] mother was still a teenager.” The record shows otherwise.

Lorrie testified that she had a close relationship with the mother and
talked to her “pretty much every day” on the phone. Their conversations
while the mother was pregnant led Lorrie to believe that the mother—who
was twenty-one years old—was not mature enough to raise the baby. The

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mother was living with O.C.’s father in Illinois from August 2023 until New
Year’s Eve in December of that year, when she learned that her mother was
in a fatal car accident. The mother returned to Iowa, moving in with Shawna
and her father. While in Iowa, the mother met her boyfriend through
Facebook. After dating him for about two months, the mother moved into
his house. Lorrie visited the house before O.C. was born and said it “was not
good.” The mother acknowledged the house “was a mess” but testified that
she cleaned it after O.C. was born. She also acknowledged that the house had
been broken into and that there was a mouse problem, although she said both
issues had been remedied.

Shawna testified the mother fought with her boyfriend “all the time.”
The mother’s Facebook messages to Shawna support that testimony. About
a week after O.C. was born, the mother sent Shawna a message complaining
about her boyfriend yelling at her and saying she couldn’t “handle this
anymore.” In other messages, the mother worried that her boyfriend was
using her for the money that she was earning at a new job. The mother agreed
that her relationship with her boyfriend was “up and down.” The mother’s
employment status was also fuzzy, with the mother testifying that she had
been employed at a nursing home for two months. But in a financial affidavit
the mother completed during that time, the mother did not mention the
nursing home job and said that she was instead working at a convenience
store. At the hearing, the mother testified that she was fired from the store
after working there for two weeks. While the mother occasionally offered to
help Shawna financially with O.C., she also asked Shawna for money and
food.

Against this somewhat chaotic backdrop, the mother’s visits with O.C.
were sporadic. Shawna testified that although the mother occasionally asked

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to visit O.C., she would often fail to show up. Shawna estimated the mother
saw O.C. twice in August, once in September for about twenty minutes, and
once in October. See In re Guardianship of L.W., No. 23-1725, 2024 WL
3688590, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2024) (expressing concern about the
mother’s “inability to successfully assume the parental role for as short a
period as one-hour visitations” with the child). While the mother alleged
that Shawna refused to let her see O.C., the messages between them do not
support that allegation. The only times that Shawna said no were when she
was sick or had other appointments. The record supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the mother “took a vacation from her parenting
responsibilities,” preferring to leave O.C.’s daily care to Shawna. See E.B.,
2023 WL 6620521, at *7 (noting the parental preference for custody is “lost
when a parent takes ʻan extended holiday from the responsibilities of
parenthood’” (citation omitted)). We agree with the court that Shawna
proved by clear and convincing evidence the mother was not willing or able
to fulfill the role of parent and guardian to O.C. See Iowa Code
§ 232D.204(2)(a).

We also agree that appointing Shawna as O.C.’s guardian is in the
child’s best interest. See id. § 232D.204(2)(b). The mother’s living situation,
relationship, and finances are unstable. On top of those concerns, O.C.
seemed to be an afterthought for the mother, who only asked to visit with her
when she was “bored” or had nothing else going on. We do not doubt the
mother’s love for O.C. But as our supreme court has said in the child welfare
context, “Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Parenting
cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible,
and reliable.” In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990).

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For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order appointing
Shawna as O.C.’s guardian under Iowa Code section 232D.204(2).

AFFIRMED.

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