In re A.F., A.F. and A.F., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0538
Filed June 10, 2026
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In the Interest of A.F., A.F. and A.F., Minor Children,
M.C., Mother,
Appellant,
Z.F., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County,
The Honorable Linnea M.N. Nicol, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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Kristin R. Schiller Herman, Calmar, attorney for appellant mother.

Trevor J. Hurd of Elwood O’Donohoe Braun & White LLP,
West Union, attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Kimberly Lange, Waterloo, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.

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AHLERS, Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the parents of
three children born in 2017, 2018, and 2020 due to the parents’ unchecked
use of illegal substances. Both parents appeal.

Our review is de novo, pursuant to which we give weight to the juvenile
court’s fact findings, especially as to witness credibility, but we are not bound
by them. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Our review follows a
three-step process of determining (1) whether a statutory ground for
termination has been established; (2) whether termination is in the children’s
best interests; and (3) whether a permissive exception should be applied to
forgo termination. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en
banc). After we address any challenges to the three-step process, we then
address any additional claims raised by a parent. Id. Here, both parents
challenge all three steps and contend that a guardianship should be
established in lieu of terminating their respective rights. The mother also
contends she should be given additional time to work toward reunification.

I. Statutory Grounds

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(f ) and (l) (2025) and the father’s rights under
section 232.116(e), (f ), and (l). Because termination was ordered on more
than one ground for each parent, we may affirm based on any ground
supported by the record. Id. We elect to focus on paragraph (f ) for both
parents. As to each parent, section 232.116(1)(f ) permits termination upon
clear and convincing proof that (1) the children are four years of age or older;
(2) the children have been adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA);
(3) the children have been removed from the custody of the parent for at least
twelve of the last eighteen months; and (4) the children cannot be returned

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to the parent’s custody at the present time. Each parent only challenges the
sufficiency of the proof of the fourth element.

As to the mother’s challenge, we agree with the juvenile court that the
children could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the
termination trial. The mother has struggled with methamphetamine use for
years, which has led to multiple CINA cases and removal of the children over
the past five years. Despite the focus of services designed to help with such
use, the mother has not stopped her methamphetamine use. Over the
seventeen-month period between the children’s most recent removal and the
termination trial, the mother failed to appear without good cause for most of
the drug tests she was directed to attend, which suggests continued use. See
In re R.A., No. 21-0746, 2021 WL 4891011, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 20, 2021) (collecting cases noting missed tests are presumed positive for
illegal substances). On the few occasions when she did test for the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services, the tests were frequently
positive for methamphetamine. As recently as two months before the
termination trial, the mother admitted methamphetamine use to her
probation officer, and she did not test after that admission.

Because of her unchecked methamphetamine use, the mother never
progressed beyond supervised visits. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2024) (“[The parent] never progressed beyond fully-supervised
visits, which also prevented an immediate return of custody.”), overruled on
other grounds by L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 534. As the children could not be returned
safely to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination trial, we affirm
the juvenile court’s finding of statutory grounds for termination of her rights
under section 232.116(1)(f ).

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As to the father’s challenge, we find the father has waived it. His
petition on appeal does not argue that the children could be returned to his
custody. Instead, he argues why the mother could regain custody of the
children. But, even if we accepted his arguments regarding the mother’s
circumstances—which for the reasons just stated, we do not—they do not
help the father, as the issue in the father’s appeal is whether the children
could be returned to his custody, not the mother’s. See In re C.T.,
No. 18-2199, 2019 WL 1055897, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019)
(collecting cases rejecting challenges to termination of one parent’s rights
based on the claim the child could or should be returned to the other parent);
In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (holding one parent
cannot assert factual or legal positions pertaining to the other parent, as the
court makes a separate adjudication as to each parent). So, the father waived
his challenge. Even if he hadn’t, he was incarcerated at the time of the
termination trial and facing an unknown period of future incarceration. The
children could not be returned to his custody as a result, so the juvenile court
correctly found a ground for terminating his rights under
section 232.116(1)(f ).

II. Best Interests

As for their next challenges, the mother and father focus on the
evidence of their bonds with the children to argue that termination is not in
the children’s best interests. Such bonds are a relevant consideration in
assessing the best-interest step of the three-step review process. L.A., 20
N.W.3d at 535. After noting strong bonds between the children and the
parents, the juvenile court made these findings about the children’s best
interests:
The best interests of the children in interest would be served by
terminating the parental rights of [their parents] so that they can be

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adopted. The children’s safety can best be insured by termination of
parental rights and adoption. The prior child in need of assistance cases
and successful reunification show that both [parents] can achieve and
maintain sobriety, but that sobriety is short in duration and not long
enough to last throughout the childhood of these children.

The best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth for the children is with [the current foster parents]. The placement
with [the current foster parents] provided the children with the stability
necessary for them to know who they are and participate successfully
academically in school and feel safe from foster care drift. These children
suffered in family foster care. They were separated from each other in
prior CINA cases and had foster parents who restricted their ability to be
the individual girls that they are.

These children need to know where they are going to live and who
will fill the role of everyday parents. The children need to stay together as
a sibling group, and the best opportunity to do that and to maintain the
stability they have had is to terminate the parental rights of their parents.

Following our de novo review, we agree with these findings and conclusions
of the juvenile court. In doing so, we recognize that the record is undisputed
that there is a strong bond between the parents and the children, so there will
undoubtedly be emotional trauma to the children by terminating their
parents’ rights. But when that trauma is compared to the trauma the children
would suffer from the continued instability, uncertainty, lack of safety, and
stress that comes with methamphetamine-addicted parents if the parents’
rights were not terminated, we conclude that terminating the parents’ rights
is in the children’s best interests.

III. Permissive Exception

Iowa Code section 232.116(3) provides several exceptions that, if
applicable, would permit the juvenile court to deny termination of the
parents’ rights. The exceptions are permissive, not mandatory, and the

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burden is on the parent challenging termination to prove applicability of an
exception. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018).

Here, both parents rely on the exception set forth in
section 232.116(3)(c), which permits the court to deny termination if
“[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be
detrimental to the child[ren] at the time due to the closeness of the parent-
child relationship[s].” The parents again focus on their bonds with the
children to argue this exception applies. But, for the same reasons we found
those bonds did not undermine the conclusion that termination of parental
rights is in the children’s best interests, we also find they do not warrant
application of this exception. The children are thriving in their current
placement with their current foster parents, and the foster parents intend to
adopt the children. That home is the only stable home the children have
known for the past five years. While some trauma to the children will almost
inevitably come with a termination of their parents’ rights, we do not find
clear and convincing evidence that terminating either parent’s rights will be
detrimental to the children in the long run. So, each parent has failed to meet
the parent’s burden to prove applicability of section 232.116(3)(c), and we
affirm on this issue.

IV. Guardianship

Both parents rely on Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(d)(2) to argue that
a guardianship should have been established with the current foster parents
as guardians instead of terminating their parental rights. Their argument
fails for multiple reasons. First, the guardianship option favored by the
parents is a permanency option in the underlying CINA proceedings. See
Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(d)(2). But to establish guardianships in lieu of
termination following a termination trial, both the termination-of-parental-

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rights and CINA subchapters of Iowa Code chapter 232 require a finding that
termination of parental rights is not warranted. See id. § 232.117(5)
(permitting entry of a permanency order under section 232.104 only if “the
court does not order the termination of parental rights”); see also id.
§ 232.104(4) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that termination of
parental rights is not in the children’s best interests before permitting entry
of a permanency order under section 232.104(2)(d), which would include
establishment of a guardianship under section 232.104(2)(d)(2)). For the
reasons stated, we have already found that termination of parental rights is
warranted and in the children’s best interests, so the statutory requirements
that permit establishment of a guardianship in lieu of termination have not
been met.

Second, the parents failed to identify an appropriate person willing to
serve as the children’s guardian. Due to the uncertainty surrounding a
guardianship, the current foster parents are not willing to serve under a
guardianship. The juvenile court made these findings on this issue:
[The current foster parents], the placement for these children, are
not willing to continue to have the children in their care under a
guardianship. If the Court granted the parents’ request for guardianship,
that would place the girls in jeopardy of being separated again and in foster
care drift. The Court will not put these children in jeopardy. The
children’s current placement is stable. The children’s current placement
is a place where the children have been integrated into the family home.

We agree with this assessment to conclude that this is another reason why
guardianship in lieu of termination is not the proper path.

Finally, “guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to
termination.” In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021) (citation
omitted). These children are nine, seven, and six years old. They have lived

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in chaos for much of the past five years due to the actions of their parents.
We decline to subject them to the risk of future uncertainty for what remains
of their childhood by placing them under a guardianship rather than
terminating their parents’ rights and freeing them for adoption.

V. Additional Time

The mother asks for additional time to work toward reunification.
This is a permissible option under the statute if termination is denied. See
Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a permanency order
under section 232.104 if it decides not to terminate rights); see also id.
§ 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving a parent an
additional six months to work toward reunification). But to exercise this
option, the court must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions,
or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the
determination that the need for removal of the child[ren] from the
child[ren]’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month
period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b).

On this issue, we again quote the juvenile court: “The court finds that
the parents have not made substantial progress toward[] reunification, and
that it is not likely that given an additional six months the children could be
reunified with either parent. The mother’s request for a six[-]month
extension of permanency is denied.” Following our de novo review, we agree
with this finding and conclusion made by the juvenile court. Accordingly, we
also reject the mother’s request for additional time.

VI. Conclusion

Having rejected all challenges made, we affirm on both appeals.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

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