In the Interest of X.R. and J.R., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0607
Filed June 24, 2026
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In the Interest of X.R. and J.R., Minor Children,
T.R., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Cheryl Traum, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Steven W. Stickle of Stickle Law Firm, P.L.C., Davenport, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her
children, X.R. and J.R., 1 contending that termination is not in their best
interests. Agreeing with the juvenile court that termination is in the
children’s best interests, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
The children were ages thirteen and eleven, respectively, at the time
of the termination hearing. They first came to the attention of the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services in February 2024. X.R., who has
hearing issues and is autistic and non-verbal, was found alone at an
intersection. The mother was reported to be using methamphetamine and to
have engaged in sexual acts in the children’s view. The department could not
initially locate the mother and the children, finding their reported home to be
abandoned. After the mother was arrested in May, the department reported
that her home contained insufficient food for the children and was infested
with insects.

After an unsuccessful placement with their older sister, the children
were placed with a suitable other in June and have since been placed in foster
care. The State also filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition in June. The
suitable other had previously raised the children’s other siblings, who are
now adults. At the time of placement both children were significantly behind
their peers developmentally. The younger child, nine years old at that time,
did not attend school. Her experiences watching her mother engage in sex

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The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He filed a notice of appeal, but
that filing was missing the father’s signature. The supreme court ordered him to file an
amended notice of appeal within seven days or his appeal would be dismissed. The father
did not file an amended notice of appeal, and the supreme court dismissed his appeal.

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acts led to the younger child searching for and viewing “numerous
pornographic material[s]” including anime and Roblox pornography on her
cellphone and iPad. Neither child received regular medical or dental care,
despite the older child’s extensive medical needs and disabilities.

The mother was also believed to struggle with substance use, and the
department provided her with recommended locations to receive substance-
use and mental-health evaluations. The department case worker testified that
she had pushed the mother to obtain a substance-use evaluation over the
course of “multiple conversations.” The mother has never complied with
department requests to engage in drug testing. Likewise, she has never
engaged in the department-requested mental-health evaluations. At the time
of the January 2025 review hearing, the mother was homeless, could not
maintain long-term employment, and had changed phone numbers multiple
times without informing the department. The mother never appeared for the
April permanency hearing despite calling the courthouse and requesting a
delay. At the August hearing, the department reported that the mother had
made no progress in any department goals at that time and consistently
missed visits with the children. She was often late or cut visits short when
she did attend. The court changed the permanency goal to termination.

The situation had not changed at the time of the termination hearing.
She still had not obtained consistent housing and had not completed
substance-use or mental-health evaluations. She was unemployed and was
not communicating with the case worker. She considers Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous sufficient alternatives to engaging in
department services. The department has offered the mother transportation
to various services to no avail. The younger child reported in a department
interview that she was “scared” at the prospect of being returned to her

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mother and scared she would be “taken” if her parents found out where she
was living. The juvenile court expressly found the mother’s testimony about
her current living and employment situation to be uncredible, noting that her
testimony “contradicts itself and the evidence presented.”

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa
Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f ), (i), (l), and 232.117 (2025). She now
appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review proceedings terminating parental rights de novo.” In re
A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). “We are not bound
by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight,
especially” when they involve witness credibility determinations. In re A.M.,
843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
We use a three-step analysis in reviewing the juvenile court’s
termination of parental rights. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). We
analyze whether (1) a statutory ground for termination has been established;
(2) termination is in the children’s best interest; and (3) any permissive
exceptions should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957
N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). A parent waives an unchallenged ground for
termination. In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 9, 2020). Likewise, once the State has proven a ground for termination
by clear and convincing evidence, the burden shifts to the parent resisting
termination to establish that one of the enumerated exceptions under
section 232.116(3) applies. In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021). But
“[e]ven after we have determined that statutory grounds for termination

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exist, we must still determine whether termination is in the children’s best
interests.” A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112 (citation omitted). In considering the
best interests of the child[ren], we are to give “primary consideration to the
child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

“[T]he child’s safety and the need for a permanent home” are the
primary elements of a best-interests analysis. In re A.M., No. 20-0480, 2020
WL 4814170, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020). A parent’s past
performance “may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent
is capable of providing.” See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012)
(citation omitted). So “[r]ather than speculate about what the future holds
for” a parent, “it is more accurate to look in the rear-view mirror and make a
decision for [the children] based on what has already happened.” In re J.H.,
952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “In determining [the
children’s] best interests, ‘we look to [the parent’s] past performance because
it may indicate the quality of care’” the parent can provide the child in the
future. Id. at 172 (citation omitted). “It is well-settled law that we cannot
deprive a [the children] of permanency after the State has proved a ground
for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child[ren].”
A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777.

The mother’s parental rights were terminated under Iowa Code
sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f ), (i), (l), and 232.117. She does not challenge
the grounds under which her parental rights were terminated and thus
concedes the unchallenged grounds have been met. See J.P., 2020
WL 110425, at *1. The mother limits her argument to the contention that

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“[t]ermination is not in the children’s best interests because the children
have a bond with the mother. In addition, the mother believes that a
guardianship would be the more appropriate permanency arrangement at this
time given the strong bond and age of the children.”

Even granting that the mother and the children have a close bond, the
existence of a bond on its own, will not override considerations of the child’s
safety, long-term growth, and physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Those other considerations are our
primary concerns in this case. The mother has not resolved substance-use
concerns, with the family having originally come to the department’s
attention due in part to reports that she was using methamphetamine. See In
re K.L., No. 17-0346, 2017 WL 2465817, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2017)
(“Methamphetamine is a scourge.”). And the mother has not shown a
commitment to maintaining a bond with the children, having failed to
consistently participate in services or visits with the children over the past
year.

Further, the children are receiving the care and support they require
in their foster home. The older child can now accomplish many tasks he
could not previously, such as recognizing letters, writing his name, and
independently eating and using the restroom. Yet despite this improvement,
he still struggles with violent outbursts and has attempted to escape foster
care. This highlights the intensive care that his development will require. The
younger child displayed many behavioral concerns while under her mother’s
care and continues to worry she will be kidnapped by her parents. The
mother has not established that she is prepared for the burden that the
children’s needs will place on her—she has not shown she can shoulder her

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own needs at this point. We agree with the juvenile court that termination is
in the children’s best interests.

We have reiterated on many occasions that a “guardianship is not a
legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472
(Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). A guardianship presents the potential for the
mother to challenge the guardianship and again throw the children’s future
into question. Lastly, the mother identifies no potential guardian, nor does
she identify any purpose for the guardianship aside from delaying
permanency. She has failed to highlight any steps she would take to resolve
the barriers to reunification or how a guardianship would further such steps.
A guardianship is not appropriate here.

We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental
rights to the children.

AFFIRMED.

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